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MEMORANDUM
TO:

MEMBERS, SENATE ENERGY & PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMITTEE

FROM:

COMMITTEE STAFF

SUBJECT:

DECEMBER 2, 1991,

INTERIM HEARING ON:

CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: THEIR
SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS & ECONOMIC COSTS
This hearing will focus on federal and state government
efforts to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants located in
California, as well as efforts to curb pollution from such plants,
and to ensure that the costs of maintaining such plants are
reasonable.
With regard to the San Onofre operating plant, the hearing
will focus on efforts to identify and mitigate marine pollution
caused by the plant. Testimony will also be received concerning a
Public Utilities Commission staff proposal to close Unit 1 of the
plant based on the staff's view that Unit 1 is no longer
cost-effective to operate.
With regard to the Diablo Canyon operating plant, the
hearing will focus on the safety of the plant, the activities of
the plant's Independent Safety Committee, and will explore in
particular a controversy involving the seismic safety of the
plant. Testimony will also be received concerning the
reasonableness of the "performance-based" rates that consumers pay
to purchase power generated by the plant.
The hearing will conclude with a discussion
of the safety and costs associated with decommissioning the
Humboldt Bay and Rancho Seco nuclear power plants.
This background memorandum begins with a draft agenda for
the hearing and then follows with a summary of major issues.
Newspaper clippings which deal with nuclear power plant issues are
attached to the memorandum.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ISSUES

REGULATORY ROLES
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)--SAFETY
The NRC, which licenses the operation of nuclear power
plants, possesses exclusive authority over radiological safety at
nuclear powerplants. The NRC periodically assesses each nuclear
plant on its performance in meeting NRC requirements. The NRC's
periodic report is called the Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance (SALP) and includes items such as plant operations,
radiological controls, maintenance, surveillance, emergency
preparedness and security. The NRC is responsible for requiring
safe operations at each nuclear plant and for enforcing compliance
with all applicable NRC safety requirements.
CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION CCEC)--ENERGY FACILITY SITING
The President's National Energy Strategy, which is
currently under consideration by the Congress, includes proposals
to reform and streamline the NRC licensing process for new nuclear
power plants. Nuclear power proponents hope that these reforms
may help to restore public confidence in the nuclear power option,
and lead to the siting of new nuclear power plants.
In California, the CEC is responsible for siting large
thermal power plants, including nuclear thermal power plants.
Under the Public Resources Code, the CEC may not approve the
siting of any new nuclear power plants until the Commission makes
certain findings concerning the federal government's ability to
dispose of high-level nuclear waste.
In 1983, the u.s. Supreme Court upheld California's law,
finding that in view of the state's "economic" purpose behind
enactment of this law, it was.not preempted by congressional and
NRC regulation of the field of nuclear "safety."
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION (PUC)--RATE REGULATION
The PUC is responsible for approving investor-owned
utility requests to charge ratepayers for the cost of constructing
and operating energy facilities, including nuclear power plants.
The PUC also authorizes utilities to charge ratepayers for the
cost of decommissioning nuclear power plants once they are shut
down. The discussion below sets forth PUC rate issues involving
the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon nuclear power plants.
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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

SONGS UNIT 1: OLD AGE AND HIGH COSTS
The San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant, referred to as the
SONGS plant, is owned by Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
and San Diego Gas and Electric Company (SDG&E), consists of three
units (1,2 and 3), and is located in Southern California off
Interstate 5 a few miles south of San Clemente, within the Marine
Corps base at Camp Pendleton. SONGS Unit 1 is the third oldest
operating nuclear reactor in the United States. To date, the NRC
has required SCE/SDG&E to make $360 million in safety improvements
to this SONGS unit.
The nation's oldest operating commercial nuclear power
plant, the Yankee Rowe facility in Massachusetts, was recently
shut down after the NRC stated that it had reduced confidence in
the plant's safety. NRC is reportedly concerned that the reactor
pressure vessel may be so brittle from age that during an accident
it would crack and release radiation. This type of concern has
become increasingly common among the nation's aging reactors. The
Yankee Rowe decision has been viewed by nuclear industry watchers
as a possible clue as to what might be in store for other aging
nuclear power plants, such as the San Onofre Unit 1, that will
soon be up for NRC renewal.
The SONGS Unit 1 reactor began operating in 1968, and
its first decade was characterized by relatively high capacity
factors--which means it operated regularly and reliably. Since
1980, however, SONGS Unit 1 has been costly to operate and its
availability has been relatively low. During this period, the
plant has had a number of serious problems which required
significant repairs and long outages. Some observers are
concerned that SONGS 1 is heading into a new cycle of expensive
repairs and poor capacity.
SCE, which is the lead operator of the plant, has
requested PUC authorization to make capital expenditures exceeding
$125 million for SONGS 1 to comply with NRC safety requirements
and to help extend the life of the plant. In response to this
request, the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA), which is
the consumer protection arm of the PUC, maintains that the capital
additions proposed by SCE will ultimately increase rates by over
$150 million and are not cost-effective. ORA's conclusion is
based in part on its view that SCE has overestimated the future
operating capacity of SONGS 1. While the PUC does not have the
direct authority to shut down SONGS 1, it could effectively do so
by denying SCE rate recovery as recommended by the ORA.
ORA has also recommended that in the event the PUC rejects
ORA's cost-effectiveness argument, then SCE should be placed at
higher risk for future poor performance through the use of a
"performance based" ratemaking system such as the one the PUC
adopted for the Diablo Canyon plant (discussed below). The
DRA maintains that performance based ratemaking will give SCE an
incentive to operate SONGS 1 as efficiently as possible, and will
place SCE at risk should its optimistic performance forecasts for
the plant not come to pass.
-2-

MITIGATING MARINE RESOURCES POLLUTION--ADEQUACY OF ENFORCEMENT
SONGS Units 2 and 3 are regulated under a California
Coastal commission (CCC) permit that was issued in 1974. As a
permit condition, SCE agreed to fund a Marine Review Committee
(MRC) to study marine environmental impacts.
In 1989, the MRC released its 15-year, $46 million study
ordered by the CCC. The MRC study found that the SONGS nuclear
facility kills large numbers of marine organisms in its intake
cooling system, and then discharges turbid water into the ocean
which kills kelp. Specifically, the report concluded that the
facility sucks up and kills 21-57 tons of fish and 4 billion eggs
and larva each year. The facility also discharges debris which
blocks natural light to the ocean floor by as much as 16%, and
this discharge has led to the depletion of 60%, or about 200
acres, of the area's kelp beds.
To "offset" this marine pollution, CCC staff with SCE's
concurrence proposed the construction of a 300-acre artificial
kelp reef, and the restoration of 150 acres of wetlands along the
Southern California coast, along with an upgrade in the SONGS fish
protection system. It has been estimated that these conditions
would cost SCE an estimated $30-$40 million.
In July of 1991, the CCC approved the staff's plan. In
doing so the Commission rejected arguments that the plan would not
prevent the SONGS facility from continuing the ongoing destruction
of fish and kelp. The CCC rejected the option of retrofitting the
SONGS plant cooling system by adding cooling towers, which use
less sea water. The CCC expressed concern that this mitigation
option could cost over $1 billion.
In addition to CCC jurisdiction over the plant, the San
Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board (SDRWQCB) also has
jurisdiction. SONGS ocean discharges are regulated under National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits issued by
the SDRWQCB pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act.
Even though the MRC report was issued in 1989, and
provided information regarding SCE compliance with NPDES
requirements, the SDRWQCB repeatedly delayed reviewing this issue
in order to await the CCC's decision on mitigation conditions.
A SDRWQCB hearing was finally held on October 31, 1991, to
consider whether SCE had violated its SONGS NPDES permits and to
determine if a cease and desist order or some other remedy should
be issued by the Board. The Board has yet to take final action.
Litigation on this isue is pending in federal court.
The suit, filed by Earth Island Institute, charges that SCE is
violating NPDES permit requirements, and demands that SCE either
fix the plant's cooling system to avoid marine pollution, or shut
the SONGS plant down.
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DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION SETTLEMENT DECISION
The Diablo Canyon plant, owned by the Pacific Gas and
Electric Company (PG&E), is located on the California coast in San
Luis Obispo County, approximately halfway between San Francisco
and Los Angeles. The plant consists of two nuclear reactor units,
each capable of producing over 1,000 megawatts (MW) of
electricity.
As noted above, the PUC is responsible for approving
utility requests to charge ratepayers for the cost of constructing
energy facilities. When completed, the combined costs of building
both Diablo Canyon units was over $5 billion, and PG&E applied to
the PUC to recover these costs from ratepayers.
The PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA), and the
former Attorney General (AG), opposed PG&E's request arguing that
billions of dollars in unreasonable costs should be disallowed.
To resolve the dispute, ORA and the AG entered into a settlement
agreement with PG&E which was approved by the PUC. The settlement
provides that ratepayers pay only for power produced by Diablo
Canyon--this is referred to as "performance based" pricing. All
costs of the operation of Diablo Canyon are paid by PG&E. Thus,
the operating risks of the plant are shifted from ratepayers to
the utility and its shareholders.
However, the consumer group Toward Utility Rate
Normalization (TURN) points out that as a result of the
settlement agreement, PG&E's customers pay a higher price for
electricity generated from the nuclear plant than from the
utility's other generating sources. Electric power from Diablo
Canyon costs approximately 9.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, twice as
much as power from PG&E's fossil fuel plants and more than 10
times as much as power from the company's hydroelectric plants.
The ORA and the AG estimated that the revenue to be
received by PG&E from the settlement over the term of the
agreement would be equivalent to a $2 billion rate base
disallowance, based on their assumption that over its full life
Diablo Canyon would operate at a 58% capacity factor. To date,
PG&E has operated the plant at a much higher capacity factor. It
has been estimated that for each percentage point above the
predicted 58% lifetime capacity that PG&E is ultimately capable of
operating Diablo Canyon, ratepayers will pay an additional $100
million more than the total amount estimated by ORA and the AG.
Opponents of the settlement, such as TURN, argued that
pr1c1ng based on performance would give PG&E an incentive to
maximize energy production and profits, which could threaten plant
safety. And they now point out that Unit 1 of the Diablo Plant
had the highest capacity factor (88%) for a nuclear power plant in
its first year of operation, and that Unit 2 set a temporary world
record for continuous generation when it completed over 480 days
of operation without a pause. As a result of this exceptional,
high capacity of operation at Diablo Canyon, PG&E has seen a
substantial increase in revenues and profits in recent years.
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TURN has expressed concern that the settlement agreement
protected PG&E's downside risk should the plant perform poorly by
assuring the company that it will at a minimum receive revenues
based on a 36% capacity factor. In contrast, there was no upside
benefit sharing, as in some other PUC rate decisions, which would
allow ratepayers to share the benefits in the event of
extraordinary capacity operations over the life of the plant.
The PUC did, however, recognize the safety implications of
performance based pricing. Consequently, the settlement agreement
established an Independent Safety Committee to review PG&E's
adherence to safety standards at the Diablo Canyon plant. This
issue is discussed further below.
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY--SEISMIC SAFETY OF THE PLANT
The United States Geological Survey (U.S.G.S.) is part of
the United States Department of the Interior, and contains federal
government experts on geologic issues, including seismic safety
experts. As part of NRC's 1984 approval of the Diablo canyon
operating license, NRC required PG&E to undertake a Long Term
Seismic Program (LTSP) to provide a comprehensive study of
earthquake hazards faced by the Diablo Canyon plant, and to
reevaluate the seismic design of the plant. The NRC asked the
U.S.G.S., as well as other geologic experts, to review PG&E's
LTSP.
Earlier this year, U.S.G.S. submitted its report to the
NRC entitled "Review of Geological and Geophysical Interpretations
contained in PG&E's Final Report of the Diablo Canyon Long Term
Seismic Program for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant." The U.S.G.S.
report focused on earthquake faults near Diablo Canyon, including
the offshore Hosgri fault which lies within 3 miles of the plant
and has been estimated to have an expected maximum earthquake
magnitude of 7.2 on the Richter Scale. By way of contrast, the
october 17, 1989, earthquake that occurred in the Bay Area near
the San Andreas fault was reported to be approximately 7.0 on the
Richter Scale.
In its LTSP, PG&E concluded that the seismic design and
existing seismic safety margins at the Diablo Canyon plant were
sufficient to withstand the safety risks associated with a maximum
earthquake on the Hosgri fault. In its 1991 report, U.S.G.S.
disagreed with PG&E's interpretation of the Hosgri fault as a
strike-slip fault with little or no vertical component of slip.
U.S.G.S. concluded that the Hosgri fault contained significant
vertical slip. The significance of this disagreement is that the
U.S.G.S. characterization of the Hosgri fault results in greater
ground motion at the plant during an earthquake than estimated by
PG&E, which in turn creates a greater seismic risk to the Diablo
Canyon plant.
Some groups, such as the San Luis Obispo Mothers for
Peace, have expressed a concern that the U.S.G.S. report suggests
that a major earthquake on the Hosgri fault could cause shaking
more severe than the Diablo Plant is designed to withstand.
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The U.S.G.S. report has been added as a supplement to a
1991 NRC Site Evaluation Report (SER) on the plant. Following
review of the U.S.G.S. and other expert seismic reports, the NRC
recently agreed with PG&E that the extra safety factors built into
the plant's design gives it the strength to resist ground motion
that might be caused by a Hosgri fault earthquake. Some groups
have argued that the NRC finding is inconsistent with the U.S.G.S.
report, and that a further, independent investigation of the
matter should be conducted by the U.S.G.S.
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE (DCISC)
Under the settlement of the Diablo Canyon rate case, an
Independent Safety Committee was established to monitor safety at
the plant. The Governor, the Attorney General and the Chairman of
the CEC were each to make on appointment from a list of nominees
prepared by the PUC, PG&E and the Dean of Engineering at U.C.
Berkeley.
According to the PUC decision approving the settlement
agreement, the DCISC is intended to provide an "additional
assurance of safety" at Diablo Canyon. It supplements, not
supplants, the direct authority of the NRC to maintain safety at
the facility. Under the PUC decision, it is to be a focal point
for the public and state government on safety issues, as well as a
credible source of "independent" information about the plant.
The DCISC is directed to review Diablo Canyon operations
for the purpose of assessing the safety of operations and
suggesting recommendations for safe operation. The DCISC is given
access to operating reports as well as NRC public reports and
evaluations of the plant, and any other reports pertinent to
safety that are produced in the course of plant operations. The
DCISC is required to prepare an annual report and recommendations,
which is first submitted to PG&E for comment, and later submitted
to the Governor, the Attorney General, and the PUC and CEC.
Controversy has surrounded the start-up of the DCISC.
The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and others have complained
that there was unreasonable delay in establishing the committee,
that the DCISC has refused to locate an office in San Luis Obispo
which could facilitate participation by those living near the
plant, that public access to safety-related documents has not been
adequate, and that there has been inadequate DCISC attention to
significant safety issues associated with seismic risks and
emergency response.
There has also been controversy surrounding the appointees
to the DCISC. After two members were appointed by the Governor
and the CEC, former Attorney General Van de Kamp declined to name
a third member to the DCISC based on his view that none of the
nominees would bring balance and diversity to the committee.
Van de Kamp maintained that all of the nominees were too closely
aligned with the nuclear power industry and their appointment
would not add credibility to the work of the committee. Following
his election as Attorney General, Dan Lungren filled the empty
slot on the DCISC with one of the listed nominees.
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On June 6, 1991, the DCISC issued it first interim report
on the safety of the Diablo Plant. In addition to the safety
report, the DCISC established an 800 number to receive public
comments and inquiries, and outlined its future activities
including the examination of the relationship of the Hosgri fault
to the safety of the spent fuel pool located at the plant, and
review of emergency drills at the plant.

DECOMMISSIONED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
HUMBOLDT BAY
The Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power Plant is owned by PG&E and
located about 4 miles from the City of Eureka in northern
Californa, and stands a few hundred yards from Humboldt Bay.
The nuclear facility at the Humboldt plant was shut down in 1976
for refueling and never reopened due to serious concerns about the
seismic safety of the plant, changes in NRC safety regulations,
and the economic costs of retrofitting the plant to resolve these
concerns. PG&E requested, and the PUC approved, a plan to pay for
the decommissioning of the plant.
The NRC is responsible for ensuring that nuclear plants
are decommissioned safely. With NRC's approval, PG&E has
implemente~ what is referred to as a "SAFSTOR" procedure as part
of its decommissioning of the Humboldt Bay plant. This process
places the facility in a condition of safe storage for
approximately 30 years followed by dismantling. The spent nuclear
fuel is to remain in the facility's spent fuel storage pool until
a federal repository is available to receive commercial fuel.
Residents living around the plant have expressed concerns about
seismic and other risks leading to radioactive leakage from the
storage pools.
RANCHO SECO
The Ranco Seco Nuclear Power Plant, owned by the
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), lies on the
outskirts of Sacramento. Following a troublesome history of poor
performance and high costs, the citizens of the utility district
voted to shut the plant down.
SMUD is now in the process of closing the plant down in a
series of steps. The utility plans to participate in a federal
demonstration project to dispose of its fuel in specialized casks
which will eventually facilitate transfer of the fuel to a federal
repository. Similar to the Humboldt Bay plant, SMUD intends to
put Ranco Seco into a SAFSTOR system which is estimated to cost
$281 million, followed by site restoration costing up to $47
million.

*

*
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
Seotember 19, 1991

State May Push
I Edison to Close,
\
San Onofre Plant
rrnm

AUOC/Uit'ti

Prt•u

The ::;an Onofre nuclear oowcr
plant that has been runnm~~: ior 24
·ears on a temporarv fcderai It·
rense soon w11i get tt:' full operat:ng hcen"e. b!J.l ;tate regulators
.llread:v a~mkmg n m1ght be
ume to shuttt down.
The plant off Interstate :'i near
Camp Pendleton ts the nauon·s
'· hird -oldest operaung nuclear
power factllty. It's the last one sull
runnmg on a temporary or "provl<tonal operaung hcense:· whtch
first was tssued 1:1 1967 for 18
months.
For vears. the LT.S. :-luclear Re2•Jiatory Commtsston wnhheld a
·ruU-term operaung license" whtle
;t requtred $360-mtlllon worth of
;afety tmprovements at the reac•or. whtch cost $89 mtlhon to butld.
:'.tore safet v modtficauons are
~eeded. but ·the NRC dectded thts
•ummer 1t wtlltssue the full license
bv the end of thts month. satd
c·eorge Kalman. the agency's prOJect manager for San Onofre.
But Califorma·s Public l'lihty
Commtsston w111 open hearmgs
next month on whether It ts worth
chargmg consumers S125 million
for the tmpronments the :-;'RC
wants.
The commtsslon doesn't have
direct authonty to force Southern
Califomta Edison to JUnk the reactor. but It could do so by denymg
the rate mcrease.
If the rate mcrease were re)t!cted. Southern Cahforma Edison
would run the. reactor unul at least
late 1993. when tt would need
refueling. uuhty company spokesman Steve Hansen satd Monday.
'-' · "To be honest. we don't know
" what we would do after that,"
~ Hansen Slld.

....

I

sa-

The Sacramento Bee Final • Monday. September 16. 1991

STATE NEWS

License for aging reactor

But after 24 years of debate, state to weigh closure ,
BY Lee Siegel
-\.ssociated Press

LOS ANGELES - The San Onofre
L'mt l reactor produced electnciry
tnder a temporary license ior 24
·,·ears while its safety was debated.
';ow. federal officials will finally IS·
,ue a full license for the agmg nude·
,r oower plant -just as state regula·
·1rs cons1der shuttmg It down.
'~\'the end of thiS month. the LS.
.udear Re~latorv Comm1sston w1ll
rant ~t ·ru!Herm operatmg hcense ·
•lr the nauon·s thtrd-oldest operaung
~uciear plant. sa1d NRC project man:l!.er <...ieorge Kalman.
fhe reactor on San Diego County s
·:oast 1s the last in the United States
~ttll runmng on a temporary or "pro'.1Sional operating license." first is~ued m 1967 for 18 months.
"We know it sounds sillv. · :"lRC
,pokesman Greg Cook ;a1d. "It
,ounds stuptd that we haven't
.. hang;ed this provisional license
<.>ars ago. It would be even more stu•td to 1ust let tt stav that wav. ·
I ntt I 's long run on a temporarv li··n~e "ret1ects the NRC's wtilingness
' ,ulow reactors wtth dubious saiery
•.Tords to conunue operation ... sa1d
\t\'ld Trickett of Public Citizen Criti·
• ..ll :-.tass Energy Project. a Washing· on ann-nuclear group.
Cook disagreed. saying 'there
1asn t been anv difference at all in
the way the phint was regulated because 11 had a proVJsionalliceme. . ..
It was an administrative matter. We
believe the facilitv is safe."
'lext month. California's _Jublic
L't1lity Commtssion will open hear•ngs on whether 1t makes economic
.:;ense to spend millions to keep the
Jja'tng reactor runnmg or whether n
,hould be shut down. said Roben Kinoslan. a PUC policy specialist.
.-\ decision is expected next spring
•>n the reactor. owned by Southern
C.::Jifomia Edison Co. ana San Diego
Gas & Electric.
Edison wants approval to charge
ratepayers $125 million for further
safety improvements required by
federal officials. It has already spent
:5360 million upgrading the nuclear
:.Jiant. which cost $89 million to build.

,...:,

A&stv:iaMd Press

The ~a.n Onofr_e Unit 1 nuclear plant near San Diego, viewed from
the aar tn July, ts soon to finally 99t a full licence after 24 years. But
the state Public Utility Commission may decide to shut it down•
Nuclear power foes argue that
Unit I is unsare. produces power at
•>nly 51 percent of its caoac1ty and
:hould be shut down so funds can be
·...tsed to obtain electncny through
conservauon or other sources. "It's
like a car w11h too manv m1les. It's
dangerous. It's inefficient." said Karl
Ory. executtve director of Campaign
Califomta.
Harold Rav. Edison·s senior vice
president-nuclear. said Unit I is safe
to run at least until 2007 and is
cheaper than other power sources.
The reactor started up in mid-1967
and began commercial power production Jan. I. 1968. It produces 390
megawatts. about one-third as much
as each of the newer. $4.5 billion
Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactors next door.
During the 1970s. federal regula·
tors were swamped issuing construction permits and operating licenses
for other reactors. Convening San
Onofre Unit I to a full license was a
low priority. Cook said.
In 1978. the NRC began a system·
atic study of the safety of the nation's
II oldest reactors. including Unit l's
ability to wtthstand earthquakes and
fires. The fhree Mile Island reactor

?

acc1dent in 1979 prompted more
safetv reVJews.
Th.e NRC reqUired scores of safety
modificattons. frequently keeping
L'nit I off line. The most important
tmprovemems· were completed in
1984. But Edison engaged in what
the NRC called ~unacceptable de·
lays" on other safety upgrades.
prompting the agency to set dead·
lines in a 1990 order.
·
For years. the NRC continued to
withhold Unit l's full license while
safety improvements remained un·
finished. But the NRC staff and an
advisorv committee ruled this summer that the reactor can nm safely
even before they're completed.
~They simply rewrote the. rule
book." said Jim Jacobson. director
for San Diego Alliance for Survival.
an anti-nuclear group.
~rn some respects the anti-nuclear
e.uys are correct." Kalman aid. But
Edison is under orders to make safe·
ty modifications, so withholaing a
full license no longer makes any dif·
ference. he said.
Ray said that Edison plans to per·
fonn the work when Unit 1 is shut
down for refueling, probably in 1993.

,.

Due Up for ·License R~n¢w~I:
The Future of Nuclear Power
b,..';t S'-<f l
By
S

Tlw: New York

WASHINGTON, June 20 -~~:;:;;;;;;;s'7is;-;;the time to phase out plants
the end of the month, the Nuclear that do not measure up to safety reRegulatory Commission may issue a quirements enacted after they were
rule defining the future of the nation's built.
nuclear power plants by setting the
The 110 reactors now in operation
safety standards they must meet to ex- generate about 20 percent of the natend their lives.
tion's electricity, and in nine states proOver the next 25 years, more than vide more than one-third of the elechalf the nuclear plants in the United tricity used. From the years 2000 to
States will tum 40, and their operating 2016, the licenses of 66 reactors will exlicenses wiU expire as they do. With no pire.
reactors on order and only two under
Some industry executives see applyconstruction, the nuclear industry's ing for renewal as a rehearsal for
hope for survival probably rests on trying to license new plants. The U.S.
continued operation of existing plants. Council for Energy Awareness, the in·
The law under which those plants are dustry's public relations arm, has relicensed allows extensions, but does not leased polls that it says show that most
specify for how long. Now the regulaContinued on Page AB, Column l
tory commission is debating what
standards to set for allowing 20-year
renewals.
Two Safety Issues Joined
There are two separate safety issues.
~uclecjr
First, are the plants as safe now as
when they were new, or has age made
them more dangerous? Second, should
plants applying for renewal have to
meet tougher requirements that went
into effect for later plants?
Opponents of the nuclear power in·
dustry say the expiration of the h·
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Up for License Renewal:

the Future of
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: Contrnued From Page AI
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Ame,;cans think nuclear power will become an important energy source, and
that inost do not object to the construction of a reactor near them any more
than .they do to tht> construcuon of any
indU$tnal plant.
Still Losing Ground?
But a New York Times/CBS News
opinibn survey conducted this month
suggests that the industry is still losing
grou~d. Asked if they would approve or
disapprove of building more nuclear
power plants to generate electricity, 41
percent of the respondents said they
would approve. That is down from the
46 ~rcent who said they would approve in a poll in April 1979, the month
a1ter.the accident at the Three Mile Island •nuclear plant in Pennsylvania.
And ~ is significantly lower than the 69
percent in July 1977 who said they
woul<i approve.
The latest nattonwide telephone poll,
whtcl'l was conducted among 1,424
adul•s from June 3-6, qid not ask therespondents' opimon on extending the

An industry

days old, then ipso facto, they're unsafe
the next day," he said in an interview.
He generally agreed with the industry's stance that the current licensing
procedures assure safety now and,
with some enhanced maintenance, will
conttnue to do so.
"A lot of It is how well you do maintenance," said Mr. Carr. who said he
owns a '63 Buick, a '73 Mercedes and
an '82 Plymouth, "all in excellent running condition."
How many old plants will actually
apply for license extensions is uncertam. Mr. Carr esttmated that 70 percent would, with utilities deciding not to
bother with plants that are small, need
extensive repairs or have management
problems and, therefore, seem vulnerable to being shut by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The original idea of a 40-year license
apparently had little to do with technical issues. Instead, the industry mamtains that in the earlv davs of nuclear
power, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's predecessor, settled on 40 years.
because that was the time span commonly used by utilities for depreciating
plants for accounting purposes. But
cntics say that once uttlities knew they
had a 40-year license, many designed
the plants to last that long.

I

waits to hear
what it must do
to prolong its life.

A Function of Aging?
And the critics question whether
some plants, particularly older ones.
even meet the safety requtrements
they were supposed to meet initially.
They argue that older plants have not
had to moderm:r.e over the years to
meet the same standards as newer
lives of existing plants. The survey had ones because they were not expected to
a margm of sampling error of plus or operate for a long ume.
mmus three percentage points.
For that reason. satd Robert C. PoiTh~ ullliues say they believe that op- lard, a safety engmeer with the Umon
pos1tton to renewals w11l be dulled by of Concerned Sctenusts. if the owners
netghbors' famtliarity with the plants. of Yankee Rowe were to build a dupliThe idea of permitting a 40-year-old cate of thetr plant next door to the
plant to run until it is 60 may raise eye- original, It would not meet current
brows at first, the utilities acknowl- safety specifications and would not be
edge. But, they argue, age 1s not a fac- allowed to open.
tor if components are carefully in- And if the destgn does not meet curspected, mamtained and replaced rent standards, he asked, why should it
when necessary.
be allowed to operate for another 20
Andrew C. Kadak, president of Yan- years? "There ts no legal or ethical
kee Atomtc Electric Company, which basts for saying that people who hve
runs ·the oldest nuclear plant in the around old plants deserve less proteccountry at Rowe, Mass.. was one of uon than those who live around new
those•argumg for extending the lives of plants," he said in an interview.
In addition. hts orgam:r.ation has told
nuclear plants. Electromc technology
has advanced substantially since his the comm1sston. the regulators have I
plant began commercial operatton in found several instances of destgn flaws ;
1961, but so much has been replaced or m older plants that mean they do not 1
added smce then. he said, that "it's not have as many mdependent backup sys- 1
the same plant."
terns as had been assumed.
\
Leaning Toward Extensions
For example. two ptptng systems at !
the Vermont Yankee plant were 1
The Nuclear Regulatory Commts- thought to be completely separate, thus ·
sion is leanmg toward allowmg license backmg each other up, and were found
extenstons. Kenneth Carr, whose five- to have a common pan mstead. Thus,
year term as chairman expires June the systems at the vernon. Vt, plant
30, said that adopting a rule on exten- owned by a consorttum of New Engstons was the most Important thing he land utilities werE> subject to simulcould accomphsh. next to keepmg the taneous failure.
Pl~.nts ru~nmg safely.
.
. , Safety equtpmrnt mstalled in Unit 1
There s notht,ng that says tf they re 1at Nine Mile Pomt c'tght miles north- 1
safe when they re 39 years and 364 east of oswego. · · ·, was designed to

I
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withstand a normal operating tef\perature of 150 degrees, but the acl!Jll
normal operating temperature has
been 20 to 30 degrees higher.
The Union of Concerned Scientists I
also says the commtsston has acknowl- :
edged that it had difficulty determining i
whtch regulations apply to which i
plants, ~~d which plants fail to comply. 1
In addttton.. the group says, utilities J
have somettmes misrepresented what
equtpment has been installed or what
tmprovements have been made.
Also at issue in extending the licenses is how long some pans will surVIVe. Cables deteriorate with age but 1
are generally not inspected closely. A 1
large ptpe ruptured at Unit 2 at the Vir- !
ginut Power Company's Surry plant in
1986, killing four workers, after years
of eros ton had gone unnoticed.
At Vermont Yankee and other plants. I
years of neutron bombardment has in-1
creased the brittleness of the reactori
vessel, the great steel pot that holds the
core, for which there is no backup. At·
many plants, that component is diffi-'

I

cult to inspect, and replacement mav
not be feasible.
·
or the 126 plants put into commercial
operation thus far, 16 have given up far :
short of thetr 40th birthdays. Indian
Point's Unit 1 in Buchanan, N.Y., tor
example, was closed by Consolidated
Edison in 1974, after 12 years, because
Federal regulators added a requirement for an emergency core cooling
system, and the utility decided it was
impractical to add one.
Dresden 1, in Morris, Ill., closed in
1978 after 19 years because it was
highly contaminated with radioactivity. Seco, near Sacramento, calif., was
closed in 1979 after 13 years by a erendum of the municipal utility d rict
that owned it, because mism
gement had made the plant ex ns1ve
and unreliable.
Yank~ Rowe. however, ha operated rehably. The industry has lected
that plant and another, Mon
lo
owned by Northern States Power Corporation in the Minnesota city of the
same name, as the two plants that will
apply first for the license extensions.

,·.
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ASHINGTON- The owner
of the nation's longest-operaung nuclear power plant announced TuesdaY that the reactor
1s bemg shut down aiter the staff oi
the Nuclear Regulatcry Commlsston expressed concern about the
safety of the steel pressure vessel
surroundmg ItS core.
The staff's findmgs on the Yankee Rowe facilitY were to have
been presented at a meetmg of the
NRC here today, along wtth a
recommendation that the reactor
be ordered to suspend operations.
But only hours after bemg m ·
formed of the report. Yankee
Atom1c Electnc Co. sa1d that tt was
voluntarily shutting down the
plant m western Massachusetts.
In operauon for nearlv 31 years.
Yankee Rowe ts less than mne
years from tne exptrauon of tt~
operatmg hcense. ~tany had expected that the plant would be the
itrst of the nauon·s early nuclear
plants to seek a formal extenswn of
tts operating hfeume.
Quesuons about the plant's safety have been funously debated for
months. Criucs mamtam that the
years of exposure to mtense neutron rad1at1on have made the reactor vessel brittle and suscepuble to
fractunng under certam c1rcum ·
stances. posstbly releasmg seethmg radtallon or even leadmg to a
meltdown of the core.
NRC Chatrman Ivan Sehn hatlea
Yankee Atomtc·~ dectston to shut
uown voluntanl\. saymg that tnc
companv had "acted verv responstbly :· Offictais satd that the reactor wtll remam out of serv1cc
pendmg additwnal techmcal studtes and wtll not restart wnhout the
commiSSIOn·s approval.
ast July, m the face of cnucs·
efforts to force a shutdown of
the plant. the NRC staff mststea
that the reactor could contmue to
operate safely until its next scheduled refuehng next Apnl. The
commiSSIOn reJeCted a pellllon for
an 1mmed1ate shutdown.
But m Its new report to membero
oi the four- man comm1sston. staff
experts satd that new analyses had
"substanuallv reduced the staffs
confidence" tn 1ts earher. more
conservauve calculations about the
condmon of the reactor vessel. As a
result. the commiSSion "recom ·
mended that the Yankee Rowe
nuclear power stauon be shut
uown unttl the NRC IS sat1sf1ed
that tne
. pressure vessel ha!'
aaeouate margms agamst fa1lurc
aurmg operauon.

W
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Nation's Oldest A-Plant
Shut Down Over Safety
• Radiation: Federal regulators express concern over
the strength of the reactor"s steel pressure vessel.
Robert Pollard. a one-t:me NRC
safety engmeer who has become a
sharp cr1t1c of the nuclear mdustrv
With the Umon of Concerned Set-enlists. hailed the new staff recom.
mendation as a vmdication of the
posttion taken by critics. "It is a
dramatic reversal resulting from
usmg a much more reahsllc com.
puter model. .. he satd.
With ItS record as one of the
country s most successful nuclear
generaung stations. Yankee Rowe
and the Monticello nuclear reactor
m Minnesota had been used bv the
Department of Energy as ·pilot
cases m addressmg the problems of
extending the lives of older nuclear
plants.
Unt1l attention was focused on
the potential brttlleness of the
reactor vessel. Yankee Atomtc had
planned to submit this Y¥r a
formal application to extend the
plant's operatmg license for 20
vears after exp1rauon of its ongmal
40- year hcense m the year 2000.
The problem of assessm~ the
condition of the Yankee Row<'
reactor vessel has been extraordlnartly difficult because fabr1cauon
techmques used at the ume 1t wa!'
created made tt impossible to take
samples to mspect for m1croscop1c
cracks.
Experts have been forced. therefore. to reach decisions based on
computer models.
The vessel. which is 33 feet tall.
9 feet m diameter and 8 mche~
thick. is filled with water and
encloses the reactor core. whtch
generates steam to drive electrical
turbmes.
The prtmary concern has been
that the vessel could crack 1f
emergency coohng water were m)ected durmg an accident. dramaucally changmg its temperature.
That possibly could release radloacuve steam. but company officials
have always mamtatned that the
contamment building would pre·
vent it from reaching the atmosphere or endangering the restdcnts
of the commumtv of Rowe. several
milesaway.
·
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Edison Fined for Safety Mistakes at San Onofre
By AMY WALLACE
TIMES STAff WIIT!I

SAN DIEGO-The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Comnu111on hu proposed that Southem Cahforrua Ed·
1.10n Co. pay a 1160.000 ctvtl pen&Jty for two aeparate malluncuonam
the standby safety ayatema of the
San Onofre nuclear power generat1JI8 aaUon jult south of San
Clemente. Edison official.l reported

Friday.
Neither malfunction posed a
hazard to plant workers or the
public. according to DaVid M. BJ.r.
ron. an Edison spokesman. 3ut
Barron said the utility considers
the mJ.Salignments to be "senou.s"
problems.
"'!.Je don't 111tend to c::.ntest the
ncuce of V101auon or th<! proposed
iir.e." Barron wd. aadU:~ t.i"lat
corrective measures. mcludmg
changes in plant procedures to
J:reclude recurrence. are m pl.lCI!.
An NRC ~Utement rete.J.Sed .r'riuay credite<l the uwity With ilnmed.late ::.nd long-term correcuon.s
J.na proused Ita "setf-cnucal" J.nd
"aggremve" responae.
Stili. the agency charged the
utility mort than the ba.se penalty
cf S50.000 per infraction "because
of the durauon of the V1otauona.''
The h.rat occurred Aug. ZT. IWO.
when a water dram valve on a
steam supply p1pe to a standby
feedwater pump on Urut 2 wu :
Inadvertently left closed because of ;
an opent1J18 error. The valve remained cloeed unUI OcL 21. when 1
the problem wu dilcovered.
The eec:ond ViolatiOn occurred 1

Sept. 24. 1990. when an automatic
va.lve tn one of the two. redundant
reactor emernncy cootin( systems

at Unit 3 wu inadvertently ltti.'
open for 95 hours-over 12 em·
ployee shift changes.
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monitoring vowed at SONGS

By Dan Trotta
·StatTWriter
SAN' ONOFRE - Southern California Edison Co. officials Wednesday pledged "renewed vigor" in
monitoring recently downgraded
plant operations at the San Onofre
i'l'uclear Gt!nerann.g Station.
In a management meeting with
representatives of the U.S. i'l'uclear
Regulatory Commission. Edison
officials said the company has
already implemented changes in
response to the penbrmance report

releasea last week.
Eight :-l'RC officials. 12 Edison
officials and several observers
filled a conference room at the
nuclear power plant north of
Oceanstde to review major points
in the SALP report.
The :-l'RC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
<SAl.P), a reguiar review scheduled
every l2 to 18 months. cited ~insuf
ficient attention to detail" during
the pertod from October 1988
through January 1990 in plant operations at the nuclear facility.

Stu Richards. chief of the NRC"s
reactOr projects branch. mentioned
a number of incidents that resulted
in the lower rating for plant operations.
In one case. plant operators
'inappropriately" allowed the Unit
2 reactor to run at full power tor 24
hours while completing an overdue
surveillance test. the report said. · •
The NRC blamed the mJ.Sta.ke on
a misinterpretation of a letter it
had sent on the sub]ect. Edison

• SO~JGS
)loFrom Page 6·1

should have applied for permission
to keep operating, according to
company spokesman David Barron.
On another occasion. San Onofre
operators failed to reduce Unit 2
reactor power by the required 30
percent within an hour after a
"control element assembly"
slipped into the reactor core.
Richards also menuoned confusion at t:nit 2 when an equipment
operator accidentally drained 700
gallons of water from the pool surrounding the reactor core. As a
result. sensors indicated that the
core protection calculators were
inoperable. which led operators to
believe Unit 2 was in critical condition.
Addressing the cited weaknesses in plant operations. Station lfan..
ager Gt!ne Moigan said. '"nlere are
multiple examples of events where
we have demonstrated a renewed
vigor in that area··
The :-l'RC downgraded San
Onofre's plant operations from Category l. or ··supenor performance.··
to Cate!Jory 2. which is considered
··good pen·ormance" or "a level of
pen·ormance above that needed to
meet regulatory requirements.''
The :-l'RC also granted higher
marks 10 three other areas. praising Edison for improvements over
the 16-month period.

» See SONGS. Page B·7

In the areas of engmeeringttech·
nical support and safety assessment/quality vertfication. San
Onofre jumped from Category 3. or
'"not sutncient." to Category 2.
Tbe nuclear generating station
also
advanced
in
maintenance/surveillance. from
Category 2 to Category 1. over the
previous SALP period.
Thd plant. located on leased
land along the beach at Camp
Pendleton. now rates "supenor'' or
"good" in a.ll areas. according to
the NRC.
"Overall. your performance has
been very, very good.'' Bobby
Faulkenberry, the NRC's deputy
regional admlnistrator. told Edison
officials at Wednesday's meeting.
"But don't become complacent.
There are still some areas for
improvement."
After the meeting, Richards told
the Blade-Citizen that plant operations. which were graded down.
carried no more weight that the
other six areas that were evaluated.

Because there is no overall rating under SALP. however. Richards
declined to say whether the plant is
safer now than it was during the
prevtous SALP penod.
"That's a difficult question:· he
said. "I would say that all nuclear
plants in the country are safe. I
would say that the performance
here has improved over the previous SALP period...

•
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!:NRC lowers
San Onofre's
overall rating
By Stacy Finz

Staff Writer

8 Court orders NRC to rwqui,. frWrt.

ing tor n-pCant wane.,.. Page A-3.
SAN ONOFRE - The U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Several concerns. particularly
has downgraded its performance in plant operauons and mainteraung of the San Onofre Nuclear nance. were Identified by NRC
Generating Station from ··superior" staff member:s 1n their repoa:t.
to ''good."
The NRC evaluators satd the
Although the three-reactor San Onofre facility, located on
nuclear power plant b.as main- leased land on tb.e northwestern
tained an overall satisfactory rat- edge of Camp Pendleton. failed to
ing, the NRC evaluators lowered set some alarms properiJ and that
the plant's performance assess- tbere was a need tbr additional
ment because of concems over attention to detail dllriq the perSONGS'.t operations and mainte- formance of routine actiViti&
nance.
They also round the plant failed
The NRC assessment covered to correct some pnmau.t problems,
the period Oct. 1. 1988. through Jan. including insutftcieat train:iDI thllt
31. 1990. The federal agency, wbic:h led to a December 1989 fire. The
monitors and licenses all nuclear Dee. 1 blaze in a storage building
power plants 1n the United States. for radioactive wastes o~urred
issued its findings April 11. It con- while workers were perlormiq
ducts such revtews every 14 to 18 maintenance on a valve system
months.
used for proceui.ae eooliq p.aea
NRC officials have a.tked to for Unita2 and 3.
meet at San Onofre with plant offi'lbe NRC evaluators fOUD.d t1u1t
cials on April ~ to discuss the ftndings.
,. See SaD ODab, PqaA.~l

.

• San Onofre
the nre was partly attributable to
"insufflcient trailliq for the control of combustible eases."
'lbe inspectors alto fouad that
plant workers committed several
errors during routine operations
because of "in.sutlleient attention
to detail" and "Weamesaes in training."
Tbe evaluators citecllDiltakes by

nuclear rnctor operators at Unit 2
last year when warzli.nlllgbts indicated a reactor m.a.l.funet:ion but the
operators. relying on a separate
pup. kept the ractor on line. 'lbe

'

.

NRC wants SONGS oft!cia1s to use a where we had c:onceru.
third. backup syaem to preveat sim.
According to David Barron. a
ilar contusion in the tbture.
spokesman for the Southem CallNRC inspectors also noted fol'llia Ed.iaoa Co.. wb.ic:h operates
another 1988 incident in wb.ich an the plant, thent bar been a dwlle
equipment operator's use of the in procedures to prevent otber ftres
wroq valve at the same unit result- trom happeinl
ed in the inadvertent draining of
Barroa said st.epa lw:l also beeD
700 gallons from the Unit 2 reeetor taken to preveDi anodler incident
cooling .system..
similar to the one that occurred
An NRC spokesman said the wben the reactor wamina li&bts
ftnci.i.Dis were not cauae for alarm. lll&lf\metioned.
.. Any time you look a& a facility ·
Althoucb tbe miDI of the ovvtbi.s size. there are bouad to be all operation of the plant dropped
areu that need impn'ri~" said from "superior performaace" to
Phil Johnson. the NRC's chief of "1ood." the facillty'a status
reactor projeds for. San. Oaofre and improved ill tbree other cateaories.
a similar plant iD Washington. illdudillcsatetrandJUmlillaDce..
"There waa nothi.n& that wu UDall*'"
"Bu:icallJ we· re ill pnaU:J good
isfactory. We just pointed ou& area sbape." Barron aaid.

•
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!·Faulty devices
threaten safety
at San Onofre
By Bob McPhail
Staff Writer
SA:--i ONOFRE -Two reactors
at the San Onofre :Suclear Generatmg Statton contam equipment suspected of malfuncuons that could
compromise the plant's safetY system.
Forty-six devtces used to measure water pressure. water t1ow and
water levels in reactor C'nits 2 and
3 are among thousands that are the
subJect of a nattonwtde alert. The
wammg was Issued March 9 by the

C'.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. the federal agency that monitors and licenses all C' .S. nuclear
such reactors.
"We continue to receive reports
of these things fJiling because of oil
leaking," said Frank Ingram. a
spokesman at NRC headquarters m
Bethesda. }ld. He said the first such
reports came from the operators of
the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant
in New London. Conn.
Northeast t:tilities. which oper~

See SONGS. Page A-ll

SONGS

uudcar plant. SIH~aklnl:( on t'HtHh
"Th•~y itfe Vt'l\ lllljll>rl.tlll 111
lion o( iiiiiiiiYIIIIIy, lnltl lhc lllatlc lllllllillll'lll~ \ ilrltllb 111-111~. ll.tl'l ""
l'tlltcn on Fnclay th;at a lnlllsnuller Silld. "So fill', we hill'c·u·l liou111l 1111}
failure t:oultl cause a rcal'lo1r IH si~nilica11l pruhkm:. ·
,..From Page A-t
The Nil!· has unh·rt·tl ultltltn
t·untinuc ope aalin.: IIIH.Icr t'IITIIIII
ales lhe Millstone nudear plant, devices measure pressure. then sl;wccs dunng wh11'11 11 :.honltl UfWI'iltiiiJ.: lllldt:ill' p11Wl'l' plitllb lu
The transmitters. known as d1f
rcrcntial prc:.surc transmlllers. m·e
manufat:lurctl hy lloscmuunl Ana·
lyhcals Inc. ol' Mannea1mlis. t.tinn.
A company spokesman s11id the

first I"CJlllrlcd prnhlems with the lrunsmll an elcclrical signal to aulomalically shut tlown
devices hetwccn Man·h and Octo- 11lanl inslrumcntotion panels.
"Thuse 111slrunwnb st·nsc· o·nnth
Ingram suid the NIIC Issued the
her 1987. aecorcltng lo NllC documents ohtaincd hy the Uhulc-Cilizcn.
The N IW's hullclin to nuclear
)llant operators saul the CtjUipmenl
failures Wt~rc eau~etl hy hil leaks
lrumtlclcdlve scab

Q

As uf

M111Th

U, the NIIC hullclin

slated, the manufadurcr ul' the
pruhlem tlevicus hud reported !H
cunl'trmcd failures 111 the ettlllp

~

mcnt, hut NllC stalf members lntlicalcd the actual number could he
much highur.

alc11 het·ausc :mdt lransmillcrs arc
used in sy:.tcms deSI!;IIcll Ill
autmnutieally shut down nudcar
rcodor:. 111 the event ul' a malfunl'
tiun.
"The failure of u lrilllSIIIICicr
nmld, untlt'r wurst t'ill>C t·muhllnns,
rt!:.llll 111 tlegnulatlllll ur l'atlure nl' a
l•lanl sult!ly syl>lcm,'' lw :.au I
Ingram refused to sJlec·ulat~ on
the worst thin~ thai cuultl huppen
lilumld those u~ctl 111 nudeor reac·
tur liafcly :;ystcms go awry
An officiul at the San Onufre
ont~ll

i•lenlify any oltltn•c· tl1ll•·n·nt

"""c

1111111111 lnlliSilllllcr~ u~ctl 111 lht•tt
planll>, revieW all ('I ant n·cn1 d~ 1111

llt~:.ellllllllll ll'illl:.llllllt·r pel lor
111111!> lhill !>l~lliol iiiiiOIIIilflt· ~hill
tluwn," the olf11 1<cl :.altl ·11 the lllilllt'e, tlcv"f"l' itlld IIIIJ•It·llll'lll
lrallslllltler:. clnn·t work. 1111'~' "t·nhann~tl !>111'\'t·IILuwc pi 111-:1 au"·
woultln'l St'IISt: u prohlt!lll awl. they lnlllllllllur the lran~mtllo-r~. olnlllthdwck llliiiiUfill'llll'lllf.! lot 111111tlll't.,
woultlnot :.t..:nal ,, :.hultlown ..
l>avltl llanon, a ~pokesman for lo CIISUrc llw tlt!VII'I~!> llllhl' illl' 111>1
Southern l'ahl'orlll<l 1-:oh,un t'u. hunlle!! anti Jll'-llfy n111l 111111'11 plitlll
whlt'h opt' I 11lc:. ll11· th.-.·•· n·;u·tur op.~r;cliun whak lh•· :.11,111'1'1 ''·""'
fac·1llly al San llnulrc. Sitltl pl.1111 nllllt·r:. rt'lllillll ''' tb•·

llflit'\als there hr:.l learncclul lll·11h
The Nltl' stall 1:. "''1"'~'"'1-: lhal
lcms with the Host·llltllllll tratblnil
h~r:. ahoul il yean ilguuntl have hct!ll ull nf the l>kp:. lllilllll.tlt·tl 111 th•·
closely wateh1ng thetr pel lur- l111lld111 he t'lllll('lclt:tl w11h111 1211
tlay:.
llliii\Cc.

~
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Water Panel Muddies San Onofre Waters
• Regulation: Ending its delays on a hearing about nuclear power
plant pollution. the agency takes a bold step toward confusion.
By AMY WALLACE
Tlllt£5 STAff IIIRIT£1

More than 18 months ago. the Reg~onal
Water Quality Control Board announced
that 1t would hold a heanng to deode
whether to ISSue a ceue-and-demt order
to the San Onofre nuclear power plant.
The plant. wd a board memorandum
wntten .n February. 1990. !JUiht have
VIOlated Ill federal pollUtant dilc:harge
perm1t as many as 20 times. To help the
board dec~de what to do about it. mterel\ed
parties were asked to subnut written
tesumony before an Apnl. 1990. heanng.
But the hearmg never happened. Saymg
1t could not act until the state Coastal
ComftUSSIOn completed its a.aeument of

84

the power plant. the board postponed its
hearmg from April to August. Then. the
board postpOned it apm-indefinitely.
So on Monday. when the board voted
unammously to finally hold a public ·hear·
ing on Oct. 31 to deode whether the power
plant has Vlolated its perm1t. some people
were less than tmpressed.
For one thing, 1nstead of a formal
ceue-and-desiat order heanng on specific
Vlolauons. the board opted for a less cntical
fontm-what Arthur L. Coe. the board's
execuuve director. called a "potenua.l enforcement acuon heanng" that would giVe
the board a chance to "we1gh the eVldence
whether to constder a ceue-and-dl!lllt
0~~-

•

If you find that confuatng. you aren t
alone. After the board voted. even some

board members seemed unsure about whit
they had done.
"ll'a a heanng for renewal of their
penml." board cha~rman Charles Badger
said. sumnung up-.ncorrectly-the public
meeting that will take place this Hallow-: •
·r
een.
•
Officials at Southern California Edison.
the plant'a operator. sa1d they weren't
surprised by the scheduled heanng. Having long nwntained that the plant does not
Yio!ate ill federal penmt. Edison ill ready to
malte that case in October. according to
spokesman Steve Hansen.
Envtronmentalists. meanwhile. who
have long fought to mtntm!Ze the power
plant'a effect on the ocean. lamented that
the retPonai board. which has direct jurisdic:Uon over federal penmt violations. has
taken thia long to act.
Almolt two years ago. a 15-year. 146million study ordered by the Coastal Com·
P I - - POLLUTION, 84

•
•
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m1151on found that the nuclear
plant 1s breakmg federal law by
killing off tons of fish and kelp each
year.
Released m September. 1989. the
study found that the plant had
caused a 60%. or 20-acre. reduction m the area covered by the San
Onofre kelp bed. The study also
slid the plant's cooling system
sucks up and kills 21 to 57 tons of
filh yearly, then discharges the
debns-filled water tnto the ocean.
reducmg natural light on the ocean
floor by as much as 16%.
Since that study wu made pubhe. people like enVlronmentallawver R1chard (Corky l Wharton
have been trymg to get the reg~on
al·lioard to do something. In De·
cember. 1989. Wharton. a professor
at the Umvemty of San Diego
School of Law. dispatched two of
his students to address the reg~onal

board.

T

he students potnted out that
the plant's federal permit specIfies that water diSCharged into the
ocean "shall be essenually free of
... substances that s1gmficantly
decreue the natural light" underwater. Further. the permit requires
the discharge system to be de·
signed to "mamwn the indigenous
marine life and a healthy and
diverse manne communtty." Edi·
son officials deny v1olaung thetr
permit.
The students asked the reg~onal
board to revoke the nuclear plant's
permit until Edison reduces the
amount of sea water sucked mto
and spewed out of the plant by
cooling towers. Instead. the board
sa1d. it w11l wa1t for the Coastal
CommiSSion to act
But the Coastal CommiSSIOn.
while concedmg that the cooling

J)

towers are the only way to fully
protect the ocean. decided aptnat
them.
In a mitigation plan approved
last month. the commillion decided
that the towers were too expensive
(their pnce tag is aatd to approach
S2 billion l and that they might
cause environmental damage to
the surrounding land.
Instead. the commilalOn called
for Edilon to malte up for the
continwnr damale by tmprovmg
ill fish pro«ectioD and warnmg
systema. building a 300-acre arufi.
ctal kelp reef and reetonng a
150-acre c:outal wetland some·
where in Southern Califorma.
Now the repx1Al and state water·boarda are the en'lironmentalIS&s' last hope short of a lawawl.
Wharton IIICL
If the regiOnal board refules to

act agiUIIt the plant. opponents

can appea.t to the state Water
Resources Control Baird.
"Nobody eJie t. pmr to stop
(the plant'• envtronmellta.l Impact!
from happeninl ax:e,t the Water
Quality Control Board." he said.
"The regional and the state boards
are the last adminiltratin apndes
we can go to. 'lbat.'a it. If they don't
do il. it doeln't get done."
But Wharton admlnrledgea be·
ing baffled by the way the board
characteriZed the public heanng ;r
scheduled Monday.
~
"A ceue-and·delilt hearinl is
what they set for April, 1990.
Eveeybody hal a.lreM1 lubmitted
wntten teaumony on this. .. he said.
"For them to uy now that they're
going to have anaf.ber hearinl to
decide whether to take any action. . . . Well. look at what
they've done in the put-just
d.ragglng their feet aad dragging
their feel."
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San Onofre Mitigation
Plan Wins Approval
• Energy: Environmentalists criticize Coastal
Commission's failure to order a full halt to the nuclear
plant's destruction of fish and kelp.
By AMY WALLACE
!1\1(\ ,f,\fF w•IIF.

HUNTINGTON BEACH-ACter
17 years of debate over the environmental impact of the San Ono·
rre Nuclear Generaung Stauon. the
Califorma Coastal Comm1ss1on
adopted a plan Tuesday that com·
miSSioners acknowledged Will mtt·
igate. but not prevent. the plant's
ongomg destrucuon of tons of fish
and kelp.
Workmg With data from a 15·
year. $46-mlllion study dmgned to
look at the long-term Impact of the
plant. the commiSSion voted 7 to 2
to requ1re the plant's operator.
Southern Californta Edison. to •m·
prove the plant's fish protecuon
systems. budd a 300-acre aruficial
reef nearby and restore a 150-acre
coastal wetland somewhere m
Southern Callfornta.
"What we have crafted here IS
as specific and detailed an approach as we have ever recom·
mended." Peter M. Douglas. the
comm1ss1on's execuuve director.
sa1d. "We do believe 1t is going to
lead to a restOred. functtonmg
wetland and that remediation w111
occur."
Edison officials. who held a news
conference lut week to vo1ce the1r

support for the plan. were delight·
ed by the vote.
"This 1s a ~ood result for the
people of Calilorn1a." sa1d Michael
Hertel. Edison's manager of environmental affairs. who esumated
that the plan w•ll cost Edison S30
m11lion to 1mplement. "We are
pleased. We're on the track now of
domg somethmg positive aboUt the
problem-producuve work. not
JUSt wnting checks (to payl for
research."
But environmental advocateft.
several of whom had addressed the
comm1ss1on dunng five hours of
testimony Tuesday. were VlSibly
disappomted. Instead of endmg debate about the nuclear plant's role.
they predicted. the commtSSton·s
vote Will spark controversy.
"It's essenually buymg another
lawsuit, this one agamstthe Coast·
al CommiSSion:· sa1d Steve Cran·
dall. a lawyer represenung the
Earth Island Institute. which filed
suit last November against Edison
because of its alleged v1olauons of
federal pollutant-discharge permtts at San Onofre.)ust soul.h of the
Orange County line.
Crandall descnbed the plan approved Tuesday as "guesstng.
maybes and what·lfs." saytng the
P I - ... Nt1CLEAR. AlS

·. COIIIJiliiiiOft wu uams unproven
.~ to ftx "terrible" degradaUon.
. Rtmmon C. Fay, one of l.hree
~on the coiiUIUIIion'a Marine Review Committee, which
conducted the 15-year study,•
qreec1. c:alllnl the Coula1 Com- •
. million'S VOle l fall\lre.
·.
"The eVldence wu there. They
ducked the tssue and went to the
coameuc solution of weUandl.
wlrich are papuiar." said Fay, who
represented env;ronmental intereau on l.he panel. The eommis·
sion'a plan. he sud. will mean "the
resident fishes can look forward to
beiq sucked In and killed. What's
the ba.lanc:e? I fall to understaDd
it."
The two commiuioners who
voted apinst the plan seemed
c:onc:emecl about the unproven nature of the mtttpuon measures.
One sugestld adding penalties 1f
the measures do not work.
Releued In September. 1989. thf.
Clllllllllit.tee's study found that the
nuClear plant had caused a 601ll. or
D-acre. reducUon in the area
cofered by the San Onofre kelp
bed. The study said the plant's
cooling system sucks up and lulls
21 to 57 tons of fiah and 4 billion
egp and larvae yevty, then dil·
charges the debris-filled water mto
the oc:e1n. reducilll natural lilht
on the ocean floor by q much u
161(,.
Fay and Crandall were among
many who advocaled reuofiWng
l.he nuclear plant's exJIUftl c:ootinl
apparatua with cooling towers.
. wlrich uae lea sea water.
Bul on Tuesday, a c:ommilliP,n
staff scienlilt teat.ifted that tlie
towers themletves had negative
side effects-&meml them. a IUb·
· SWltial "salt fallout" when milt.
from the toWel'l deposi&a Alt. on
the Sllft'CIUilClln land. u well u the
aeat.hetiCai1Y unpleuant addition
of 300-foot. conc:ret.e cones on the

·r.
·f'

c:aaat.line.
Commlllioner David Malcolm.
who voted for the plan. said t.baL
· the Sl·bllllon to 12-billion cost of
the propoled cooling towers would
· hurt Edison's c:uat.Omen mare ~
the utility itself.
"1 feel that. the gun Ia nol beinl
(pointed) at Edison. the bad guy,
but at me. the ratepayer. the lood
guy." he sud. "The 1lll tb1n1 I I
need to do Ia have my uUllty bill I
doubled because we've built ugly I
c:oolinltoWerl. • • • To me. they're
out of the question."

I
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.Edison Reveals: Its Plans
to Compensaiefor Fish.tni
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• Environment: Reef, wetland restorations to make up
for marine life losses at San Onofre nudear power plant.
- ~--llid. 'l'be-pial-then

By JOHN PENNER·

diacbarpt debrts·ftlled·water into
tA oeeao. bJoci:iDI aaunt liSht to
HUN1'INGTON
BEACH- • t.he oceaD ftocr act depieCing 60%
of
the area'a kelp 1M!*. the report
Sout.hem Ca1iforma Ed:ilon eDCU·
Slid.
tives Friday outllned plana to ·implement a senes of state recamTo otfaet thole problem&. Edison.
melldationl to mit.ipte t.he killiDI
in coapera&iOD wttb IWe and fedof tons of fish and kelp at the f11111's
eral environmental agencies.
SID Onofre nuclear power plant.
would reatare 150 ICftS of 'degradDllrml a news conference held ed wet1aDd between·Pdnt Conception and Blja C&lifornia.
at an Edilon power plant in HuntiJIIt.on Beach. t.he company exec:u •
The firm il COftlid:erinl five sues
tiVfl sud they are preplnDI to
for rest.oraUoa. incJudiD( 17 acres
build a 8-acre arutlcia.l kelp reef.
of parc:bed. fOI'IMI' wetland It owns
restore 150 acres in wetJands aJq
nat to its Huntilll'tOD ae.cb plant.
the So\Mem Califomia cout and
Melone s8:L The ot.her favored
upcrade SID Onofre's fiSh protecsites are San Dlfl\lllO Laaoon m
tion system. among other meaDel Mar. t.heTQuanaRiver Estuary
sures.
•
in Imperial Belch. Ballona Creek
Wetlanda in Manna del Rey and
ThOM! steps are the chief proposthe Lol Cemtos Wetlands in Seal
all made by the state Coutal
Beach. he lllld.
Commismn st.alf after ana!)'ZIDI a
15· ye&l'study completed in 1989 OD
If the comJIUISIOn approves the
the nuclear planCa en't'ironml!nw
recommended rmt.iptiOD plan. the
efft!eu. That repon concludes that
wet.laDd rat.ent.iDa will pt under
the dlmqell amouut to a Violauan
'ft1 ~..MelanMiid.of feQenl law. a ciw'p i:dilan
'nllelftia....a.lld baYe one year to
dilpUteL
eftlulle polllllual sites. for the
N~ the utility ~>.xecu·
offlhore artifidal reef. which entives Slid they will not chtller~~t
ables kelp to pow retldlly. After
the recommended measures. which
tbat. it would build a small. demon·
t.he Coutal Conurusllon wtll constration reef. which would be monsider nnpo~~ng at a pubUc 1earing
itored for three years. The full.
Tuelday at Huntm~t.on Beach City
300-acre reef would be blli.l1 Within
Hall. Mtelinl the reqUirements
siX years. Melone Aid.
WIMd caat EdiaOD S30 million to
Edison would aLso talte stepS to
140 million. estmtated Fn.nlt Mel·
improve the San Onofre system of
one. Edilon's semor engmeer in
separatiftl filb from aea water. By
environmenw affairs.
installing high-intensity lamps
The nuclear facility's cooling
Within t.he 1111tem. the firm may be
system suc1ts up and kills 21 to 57
able to divert more fiSh back into
tons of fish each year. the enVU"'O''·
the ocean. Melone said.
menta! report complied by three

.·.
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Court to Let
State R.ule on
San Onofre
• Environment While
allowing a lawsuit against
the nuclear power plant
to continue. a federal
judge will wait for
Coastal Commi.ssion and
water board to resolve
damar done by facility.

Cout.

U.S. Oi.stnctJudge RUdi Brewster demed the San Franc:isco.
bued Earth llland lnaUtute's
motlon for a pretlminarJ lnjunc:Uon IPIJIIl the nuc.lar JlOWW

Rolemad·bued Southern CaJi.

Plant. which II operated by the
Rosemad-bued Soutbem ~
fornia Edllon Co.
The iDjunc:Uon IOUfbt to force
Edllon to enact a Umetable for
eftttinr the enVIronmental dam·
age that is purportedly caU8ed by
the plant's coolinriJitelft.
However. Brewster a1.ao handed Edilon a setback by denyiniJ
the uUlity's mouon to staJJ proceedinp 1n the enVironmental
BJ'Oup'l laWIUit lplnll Ediaon
over the plallt's operauon.
BreWSter's actions keep the
laWIIIIt alive, but shift the burden
to the state Couta.l ConmriiieiOn
and the Rqiona! Water Quality
ConUOJ Board to act fila. ill
tlndinr waya to offset San Onofre's c1a1r1qe.
"He wanted to hold the apnctes' fee\ to the fire." Steve
Crandall. the attorney foe: Earth
Island. saul after a brief ·court

Tbe iDjlmc:Uon IOUibt to fon:e
Edllan to eRIC\ a t.lmetable for

heannr on the cue m m mantbl

By RAY TESSI.fR.
TIWU STAfF WIIT£1

A federal JUdge m San

Oieso

said Monday t.hat It is up to state
apnc:~es to dec:Jde how to atop the
San Onofre nuclear power plain
from lti11inl fish and kelp off the

COIIL

U.S. Oi.stnct Judge Rudi Brew.
ster derued the San Franciscobued Earth Island lnaUtute's

IDCldOn for a prelilmnar)' tnJunc.
l.laD apma the nuclear JIO'II"!T
plant. wtueh is operated by the

ronua Edilon eo.

endiDr

the envuonmemaJ. damap that II purportedly CIU8ed by
the plant's coolinr l}'ltelll.
However. Bre'Witel' aJio handeel Ed.llon a setback by denymr
the UU.Uty's mouon to stall proceedinp 1n the en\'1roft1Denta.l
SI'QUP'I laWIUit apsna Edison
onr the plant's operatiOn.
Brtwater's acuona keep the
laWIIIIt alive. but sluft the burden
to tbe state Couta.l Comzrrt;mOn
llld the Rerumal Water Quality
Comroi Board to act fila. ill
ftndllll ways to offllt San 0110fre't claiDip.
•He wanted to hold the apn.
del' feel to the fire." Steve
CrarldaU. the attol'lle)' foe: Earth
1IJ&Dd. said after a brief ·court
hW'iftl.
The JUdge scheduled a status
hW'iftl on the cue m m: mantbl
llld the matter could 10 to U1a.l
earty nen year uniesl the atate
resotves the ISSUe. Crmdallllld.
AlUiouP Eartb Island didn't
WiD 1D IIIJWlCUOD. "We're IIJ'IU •
fled the judge didn't staY the
ca." like Edison wanted. be aid.
"He wu allowmiJ the cue to 10

forwud."

DaYid LUDdln. an auomey for
EdiDI. said the judge qreed
WltJI the UU.Uty'a contention that

stile &pnc~es are resp•wNe for
nmewm, the plaDt'l opel"'UUm.

"He thought it wu reaanable

to let the state agenoes proceed."

LUildin sa1d. "These arenc1es

.
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-·-~Sild Monday t.hat It IS up to state
agenoes to deade how to atop the
San Onofre nuclear power plant
from 1tiJ.1in1 fish and kelp oft the

.

-~-----

................ .

heann,.

The JUdge scheduled a atatus

and the matter could 1J0 to U1a.l
early next year unless the state
re101ves the ISSUe. Crand&Jlllid.
Althourh Earth Island didn't
Win au Jll,JUilCLIOn. "we're IIJ'IU·
fled the JUdge didn't stay the
cue" like Edi.ton wanted. be said.
"He WU allOW1niJ the cue to 10
forward."
DaV1d Lundin. an attorney for
EdJ.son. said the judp qreed
with the UUiity'a contention that
state apnc:iea are responllbl~t for
revimnr the plant's operaUaD.
"He l..hourht it wu raallble
to let the state
proceed."
Lundin sa1d. "Then apnc1e1
have been revieW'inl·tbe situa·
Uon tor 15 yean and are about
reacty to make fmal conc:JuaiODI."
The ume 1t hu ta1ren to atop
the c:tamare prompted Earth 11land and other plaintiffs to file
suit 1ut November, c:laiminr the
nuclear power plaDt il Violatinl
federai law by ki1lJnl toni of ftsbooo"
andkelp.
r
The acuon wu tiled a year
after a 15-year. S48-milllon
Coutal CoiDIIUIIiOD-IpOIIIOI'ed
report conctuded the P1aDt suc:ta
up and k11ll 21 to 57 toni o1 fish
annually and bad c:a...t a 200·
acre reduction in the kelp bed.

.•

·r

SAN ONOFRE
\. ,......... - frta 81

~aucralic lethargy" in pur~Y flilin.IJ to act on the report's fihdinp.

In a statement Monday, the
plamuffs apin mamtained that the
plallt's cU.scharp of heated ocean
water-reportedly 2 miWon pi·
Ions per minute to cool the plant's
three reacton-hu c:au.l "wide·
spread damqe to the ocean ecology'' near the plant.
Despite the study on marine loss.

••

"foot-drlamr

~ NlpODii·

ble for manne protectiaa have not
acted." the statement canunuec:L
Edison. which patd for the
Couta.l Commilllan'a repan. baa
held there il no ecoJop:a1 diluter
and that litipUan 11 uanec:esary
because state qendes wW act on a
pial! to of.fJet the problem later this
year.

arenas

Envtronmenta.liltl are 11181'1

that it hu taken 10 loq to
remedy the problem. IDd the suit
accusee government QeDCies of
Pl.._- SAN ONOI'R& 83
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Edison Sued Over Harm to Fish Near San Onofre
By ALAN ABRAHAMSON
TIMES STAFF WRITER

SAN DIEGO-Charging that the San
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Is
violating federal Jaw by killing tons of
fish and kelp, an. envl~nmental group
Wed suit Thursday against Southern California Edison Co. demanding a stop to the
killing.
The suit was filed about a year after a
15-year, $46-mllllon study found that the
nuclear plant south of San Clemente Is,
Indeed, killing tons of fish and kelp. But
since then, neither Edison nor state regulatory agencies have taken action on the
findings, according to the suit, filed by
Earth Island Institute Inc., a San Francisco-based environmental group.
The suit, filed In federal court In San
Diego, demands that Edison either fix the

plant's cooling system, which the study sull But he said the utility lsln compliance
with all federal environmental laws.
said is responsible for most of tbe.flsh and
"The marine life offshore Is thriving,
kelp kills, or shut the plant down.
The study was Issued by a panel created despite some limited effects from operation
in 197-t by. the Coastal Commission liS a of the plant, as one would expect," Barron
condition of Its granting Edison a consaid.
strucUon permit to expand from one reacThe San Onofre plant Is located along
tor to three.
the Pacific Ocean a few miles south of San
The suit illso says Edlsoh . should be Clemente, within the Marine Corps' base at
ordered to establish . a11' envlrohtnental ... _Camp Pendleton.
trust fund and restore fish and kelp levels.
Rosemead-based Edison operates three
It also asks for unspecified monetary
nuclear-powered units at the plant. The
damages.
first opened In 1968; the second and third
"It's pie-In-the-sky until we \tin, which
opened In 1984.
we Intend to do," said one of Earth Island's
According to the suit, fish are
San Diego lawyers, Charles S. Crandall.
killed when massive amounts of water are
"But we want the plant to comply and to
taken Into the plant to cool the reactors.
make restoration for the damage It has
Kelp. a<;cording to the suit, dies from
done-and lt has done damage, clearly."
particles that come back out with the
Ah Edison spokesman, David Barron,
water and either land on the fronds or
block sunlight.
said the utility's lawyers had not seen the
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The Shame of Serious Understaffmg
Bureaucratic bottleneck developing over troubling report about San Onofre
It has been more than a year since a
:;tudy concluded that the San Onofre
Nuclear Generating Station is breaking federal law by killing tons of kelp
and fish every year. This was no
ordinary report. Funded by Southern
California Edison, the research was a
15-year, $46-million review of the
power plant's impact on the offshore
environment.
Ordered by the California Coastal
Commission. the review determined
that the plant has reduced the San
Onofre kelp bed by 200 acres. or 60%.
San Onofre's cooling system sucks up
and kills 21 to 57 tons of fish a year.
dischargmg the debris into the ocean
and reducing the natural light levels
on the ocean floor by as much as 16%.
This is perhaps not an ecological
disaster of the highest order. but
certainly a matter for the commission's attention. And yet a year has
gone by without a commission hearing on the report.
As a result of those delays, the

Water Quality Control Board-the
other agency empowered to force
Edison to make changes-has postponed its hearings on the matter
three times. This despite an environmental lawyer's requests to revoke
the plant's permit until Edison remedies the two reported violations.
The cause of all this delay is the
now familiar commission staff shortr
age. Staff scientists there simpl)l
don't have the time to review a study
that the agency ordered 15 years ago.
That state of affairs is, of course.
traceable to Deukmejian Administration budget cuts. Staff at the commission has been reduced from 172 when
Gov. Deukmejian took over to 110
today. An advisory panel on cost
control round last year that the
agency's budget had been reduced. in
real terms. by 56% since 1977.
The November ballot is full of
potential new protections for the
environment. Forests, crops, the
ozone layer, bays and estuaries would

receive more help. Yet only the oilspill-prevention provisions of Proposition 128 would add staff to the badly
strapped commission, and those funds
would pay for its new responsibilities.
(The Legislature has enacted a similar new program).
It's futile to scold Deukmejian again
for his attitude toward the environment (except to remind him of the
need to sign the bill that would
provide the commission with new
enforcement powers over those who
damage the coastline.) The commission. which will ask for :rT new
staffers and a budget increase of $3.1
million for fiscal 1991-92, must place
its hope in the next governor. Both
candidates have shown concern for
the coast's future.
While the electorate considers how
far it wants to extend environmental
safeguards. the state ought to fmd a
way to help an existing watchdogthe Coastal Commission-do the job
we established it to do.
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Report Detailing
San Onofre Plant
Failings Sits Idle
By AMY WAl.Ut.CE
TIMES STAFF WRITER

One year after a 15-year. $46-million study found that
the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station is breaking
federal law by killing off tons of fish and kelp, state
regulatory agencies have taken no action on the findings.
and envtronmentalists-including one of the study's three
authors-are crying foul.
"Somewhere along the line. justice is being delayed,"
said Rimmon C. Fay, a biologist who represented environmentalists' interests on the three-member Marine Review
Committee, which released its 'study a year ago this week.
"The present composition of the Coastal Commission is not
one of great dedication toward the environmenL.The (state
Regional Water Quality Control Board) bas an 01Jtstanding
record of neglect of enforcement of regulation. So nothing
is being done."
Richard (Corky) WhartOn. an environmental lawyer
who unsuccessfully challenged the nuclear plant's license a
decade ago, agreed.
"It's _been one year and they have done absolutely
nothing but set the hearings back again and again," said
Wharton, now a professor at San Diego School of Law.
"Nobody questions (that the study is) the most definiuve
report of its kind ever done. But there it is, and there tt
sits."
The study. which was ordered by the California Coastal
Commission. found that the nuclear plant had caused a
60%. or 200-acre. reduction in the area covered by the San
Onofre kelp bed. It found that the plant's cooling system

Pl....... NUCLEAR. B4

'7) \., '\-<t d

completely financed by Edison,
for the board, adding that the
board's tentative January hearing
· . ·~tWtotlnt~nded to provide an IndeIs designed to follow the Coastal
pendent 'ctentlllc review of the
~plant's Impact by appointing one
Commission's December meeting.
Continued from Bl
"That's a ways away. Hetw~en
bloloJist for each special Interest,
sucks up and kills 21 to 57 tons of
now and then, who knows what
EdiSd'JI, the environmentalists and
·nsh yearly, then discharges the
the CoiStal Commission.
will happen? f wouldn't bet against
debris-filled water Into the ocean,
It being postponed again."
llansch said the commlsston Is
reducing natural light levels on the
Edison spokesmen called the
due to lake up the study when It
ocean floor by as much as 16%.
postponement "reasonable,'' but
meets In San Diego In December.
These "substantial" adverse efrejected their critics' content ion
But that has led to the third
feels-while "not large-scale ecothat the company has exerted its
postponement of a Water Quality
logical disasters"- violate the
Influence to extend the delay~.
Control Board hearing on the
plant's federal pollutant-discharge
"I don't think this could hf' laid
study: although the board Is not
permit, the study found. It recomat our doorstep," said Michaelllcrrequired to by law,ll has decided to
mended several ways to prevent or
tel, Edison's manager or environ~
wall for the Coastal Commission to
mitigate the damage. from upgradmental JfL;llrs. "ll took Wayl and
evaluate the study.
Ing the plant's cooling system to
his colleagues 13 or 14 years to
"Our
feeling
was
the
Coastal
building an artlrtcial reef.
come up with the report. and it's
Commission Initialed the study and, obviously going to take the Coastal
To· date, the plant's opetator,
completed the study and they
Southern Callrornla Edison, has not
Commission some lime to decide
should take a position on It," said
altered Its operations, Edison orrtwhat should be done. To take a
John V. Foley, a board memher _
clals confirmed. And spokesmen
and the general manager of the I he
for the two stale agencies that
Moulton Niguel Water Dislrlct,
have the authority to force Edison
which serves southern Orange
to take action on the study's recCounty. "Th~ real question Is dm~s
ommendations acknowledge that
the study really, truly document
lh~y _have been slow to evaluate
any violations. I don't think we
thorn, repeatedly postponing hearwant to do their work first. And we
Ings Jn order \o focus on other
don't have a reason to believe
pressing Issues. But they say nveranything yet."
work -not oversight-Is to l>lame
for the delay.
hat that has meant, howev"The truth of the matter Is we
Is that every lime the
er,
hav~n·t had starr to do It-we
Coastal Commission postpones ac-.
should have a team of 10 scientists
lion, so does the water board. Last
looklr1g at this and we don't. We
l>ecemher, two of Wharton's law
didn't have anybody working on It
students asked the board to revoke
for a while." said Susan M. Hausch,
, he plant's permit until Edison
manager of the energy and ocean
remedies the two reported permit
resources unit of the Coastal Comviolations. The board delayed takmission. "The commls5lon Is defiIng action until April, then delayed
nitely not dragging their feet. It's
It until August. and now.has said it
the staff- we h:wen'l taken It to
will wait until sometime In Januthem. We couldn't."
ary.
The Coastal Commission r.realed
the Marine Review Committee in
"ll's kind of a joh; wc·ve hati so
I 97 ~ a~ a condition of ils granting
many tentative dates schedule-d
Edison a construrtion permit to
and they've all been postponed,"
expand from one reactor to three.' said Bruce Posthumus, a senior
The committee's study, which was
water resource control engineer
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little bit of extra time on It to make
sure they do the right thing Is not
only the prerogative but the duly
of the commission."
In the meantime, envlronmentallsts say, the San Onorre kelp bed
will pay the price.
"As long as that plant operates In
Its present mode, on a CUil)UlaUve
basis things are going to grow
worse," said Fay, who believes
that even the final report to which
he signed his name underestimates
the extent of the damage. In order
to get construction permits in 1974.
Fay said, Edison "said, In erfect,
you provide us the evidence that
something is wrong, we will do
something about it.' But nothing
has happened. Nothing. Not even
token action. Ills frustrating."
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' Diablo Canyon

l Safe for Quake,
NRC

Decides,·-~, ..

By Cha.rl8• htlt

,

F Chronic£• Sct.IUie Writer

-

The Diablo Canyon nuelear
power plant can withstand a major earthquake on a fault discovered well after it was designed,
the Nuclear Regulatory Comm.ission ruled yesterday In Washington, apparently ending yean of
legal wrangling for Pacific Gas
and Electric Co.
In announcing its decision that
the plant "has an adequate margin
of safety," NRC offtcen praised
the reviews of seismic hazards conducted by the utility and independent contractors. The prime threat
is the Hosgrl Fault on the bottom
of the Pacific Ocean three miles
west of the plant, which is near
San Luis Obispo.
The NRC said the geological
and seismological studies "are the
most extensive, thorough and complete ever conducted for a nuclear
facility in the country and have
advanced the state of knowledge
in these disciplines significantly."
Federal regulators Issued
building permits for the power
plant's twin l,lOO.megawatt Westinghouse reactors in 1968 and
1970, when geologists said the
nearest major faults were at least
20 miles away. In 1971, U.S. Geological Survey sclentilts dJseovered
the Hosgri just offshore.
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That finding forced PG&E to
review its design and upgrade the
plant and led to demands by opponents that the plant be shut down
because of seismic danger.
After yesterday's ruling, PG&E
geosciences director Lloyd Cluff
said "We're very pleased with this
con~lusion, because of course it
confirms our own conclusions."
The ruling requires PG&E to
submit further calculations to
back up its stand, but Cluff said
this will be ho problem for the
plant's engineers.
JJetailed calculations show that
PG&E may have underestimated
slightly the amount of.shaking at
some frequencies from a magni·
tude 7.5 earthquake on the Hosgri
Fault, the NRC decision said. Air
suming the next set of calculations
contain no surprises, it agreed
with PG&E arguments that the extra safety factor built into the
plant's design gives it the strength
to resist such vibrations.
Opposition to the plant has
come largely from Mothers for
Peace, a San Lula Obispo organiza.
·t1on. No one I.DIWered its telephcae yesterday for comment.

Post-qual5e
rumblings
at N-plant·
Safety debate rages
over Diablo Canyon
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October's lorna Prieta earthquake leveled buildings and bridges
in the San Francisco Bay area and
brought the World Series to a temporary holt.
Now, six months later, its scientific aftershocks have reached 230
miles south of San Francisco and
arc thn·atcnlng Pnci(ic Gas & Electric Co.'s niablo Canyon nuclear
pow!'r plant on the coast near San
l.uio,; ( lhispn.

0

N

U.S. (;eolo~ical Survey seismologists reviewing a PG&E study or the
plant's seismic surroundings are
warning that on earthquake similar
to the Lorna Prieta could occur on
the sea-floor llosgri fault near Diablo Canyon - and that such an
earthquake could cause shaking
111ore severe than the plant is designed to withstand.
In nwelings that begin this
month, l'~i& E's geologists will try
to rl'futc that contention. U they fail,
the utility may lace the expensive
prospt>c\ of installin~ even more
~ei~mic bracing than tt has already
Seo

Diablo,
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Diablo
Continued from Page A1

had to build into its $5.8 billion
plant.
The debate over the Hosgri fault
began long before the quake. and it
may not be resolved for another
year or more. But USGS geologist
Robert D. Brown said that data
gathered in the Loma Prieta earthquake gave the -agency a "Jiving example• of the hazardous geology it
already was saying might be present at Diablo Canyon.
"I don't know of another example
that fits what we were suggesting
about Diablo Canyon as well as the
Lorna Prieta does. • Brown said.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered PG&E to study the
faults around Diablo Canyon as a
condition of the plant's license. By
1985, when the study began, the
utility had spent 16 years and $5.8
billion building the plant - far
more than the seven years and $340
million it had estimated the job
would take when it began work in
1966.
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April 30, when ground motion will.
be the subject.
But a compromise seems unlike~ ly. While Brown and other review' ers say the Lorna Prieta earthquake
has strengthened their belief that
the Hos · ma be a thrust or
oblique Fault. tluff said PG&E's
most recent field research near the
Diablo Canyon plant has left him
even more convinced that the Hos. purely .....
.............-'"""t'.
t.-...... J;..
gn. IS
"We've got all the evidence:
Cuff said. •If someone says they
still don't want to believe us, that's
their problem.•
Cuff bases his conclusion largely
on studies of the onshore San Simeon fault about 40 mlles north of
Diablo Canyon. That fault. he says,
is unmistakably a strike-slip fault.
But while Cuff contends the San
Simeon fault is simply an extension
of the Hosgri fault - •tt is the same
fault,• he said - Brown says the
evidence on that point •is not wholly convincing.•
ln any event. Brown also argues
that similar research on the San An·
dreas fault shows that it is mainly
strike-slip to the north and south of
Lorna Prieta. but at the October

.
I

The biggest part of the overrun withstand an earthquake of 7.2
was attributable to bradng the plant ·magnitude on the Hosgri fault. asto withstand a 7.2 magnitude earth- suming the fault is a strike-slip rathquake on the Hosgri. which wasn't er than thrust or oblique. If the
discovered until after construction NRC. which has the final say-so,
rules that the Hosgri is more likely
began.
At. issue now is a seemingly ele- a thrust or oblique fault. does that
mentary question: Exactly what mean the plant is underdesigned?
type of fault is the Hosgri? Although
PG&E's chief geologist, Uoyd
the question is basic. it is almost Cuff, said there was "hardlY. a stg·
impossible to answer for certain be- nificant difference• in the reSulting
cause the fault lies under water, and ground motion whether the fault is
therein lies the main source of dis- deemed thrust rather than strikeagreement.
slip. Robert Rothman, an NRC seisPG&E favors a theory that says mologist. said the estimated ground
the Hosgri is a simple strike-slip motion probably would jncreas~fby
fault. in which two blocks of the 10 percent. an amount that may or
earth's crust slowly grind past each may not tum out to be significant.
other. Brown and others believe it is
But Ken Campbell, a former
more likely to be a thnlst fault. in USGS earthquake engineer who alwhich one block slides up and over so has been revi ·
the Diablo
the other. or eise a combination of Canyon work for ~C, estimatthrust and strike-slip that is called ed the increase in ground motion at
an oblique fault.
47 percent.
How the question is answered is
"'That's significant, no question
important because earthquakes on
thnlst and oblique faults nre gener- about it.• Campbell said.
ally - although not universally Differences among the scientists
believed to cause more ground mo- are supposed to be hashed out at
tion than earthquakes· of similar meetings the week of April 16,
magnitude on strike-slip faults.
when the nature of the Hosgri fault
Diablo Canyon is designed to will be discussed, and the week of

earthquake's epicenter, the faulting
proved to be oblique.
Even before the Loma Prieta
earthquake, the USGS reviewers
had used data from seismic tests at
the Diablo Canyon site to theorize
that the Hosgri fault had two parts
- a nearly vertical fault that
reaches up to the sea. floor and a
buried thnlst fault that begins more
than half a mile below.
It wasn't until they examined data
from the October earthquake,
Brown said, that the USGS geologists learned that the San Andreas
fault at Loma Prieta was configured
exactly the same way.
"What we had suggested in some
of our review comments prior to
Lorna Prieta was an earthquake and
fauh.geometry (on the Hosgri] that
turned out to be identical to what
we had at Loma Prieta,• he said.
""The two are kind of mirror images."
The outeome of the debate over
the Hosgri fault is likely to depend
on the NRC, which will have to
reach a decision after getting reports from PG&E. the outside reviewers and its own staff. It also
will be aole to draw upon the rec·

ommendations of its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a
panel of experts on nuclear power
safety.
Ro~ the NRC seismologist.
predicted that the most PG&E
would have to do is to .reinforce
some of the plant's equipment.
something that probably could be
done during a normal refueling
shutdown. A permanent shutdown
of the plant is highly unlikely, he
said.
However, the debate over the
Hosgri fault is provoking .calls for a
shutdown from groups opposed -to
the plant. which was dogged by~
tests throughout construction.
· Rochelle Becker of the San Luis
Obispo opposition group Mothers
for Peace said the data gattaegd
already were enough to create "rea·
sonable doubt" that the plant is
safe.
And Audrie Krause, executive IIi·
rector of the San Francisco consumer group Toward UtDity Rate NDr·
malization, said that if the plala'a
safety was in question, "'it shouldbe
shut down and the ratepayfn
should not be forced to pay for fle
power it produces. •

---
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Diablo CanyOn Plaltt
Breaks World ·RecOrd..
Nuclear reactor runs 481 days without pause
~·?l·'lt

SF

By Dtu1UJ Perlllu.ua

Chroak,. ~ 64llor

•

The Diablo Canyon nuclear erating about 1,100 megaWatts ~
power plant'• aeeond nuclear llllit or more than a miWon tuowaua-:
set ~world reco1d. for eondnuou. of elec:tr1dty.
.· ,... ..._. · :•
eledridty generation by a UC)ltPlannrn1 for the plant began tn·
wa&er reactor when it eompleUcl 1988, bat Pae utlllty.al~JqL~
481 days of operaUon without a · dJately ···encountered· ·:protest$
pauae yesterday, Padflc Gu and apmst n~ear power'·QCI law~
Electric Co. President George A. satts aimed at preventing eoF
Maneada announced yesterday.
atructton. Discovery oflbe Hoagrt'
The reactor began operating earthquake fault three .miles off
more than five yean ago, and dur- the eoast forced the utWty to redeing its most recent record-break· algn the reactors in 1978. Follow•
ing run. tt generated 12.5 bUlton tug the reactor accident at the
kilowatt-hours of electricity Three Mlle Island nuclear plant
enough energy to meet the needs three years later, Diablo Canyon
of a city twice the size of San Fran· engineers were forced to strength·
cisco for a year and a hall, Manea· en the reactors even more.
t1s said.
Bulldlng the first unit bad beThe un.tt Is scheduled to shut gun lD 1988. and af~C,.20
down briefly wtthtn two weeki to )'81.1'1 of conii'OVeny
c~
tate on a fresh load of nuclear Uon delayatt ltal'ted·ojentlon iQ
fuel. but the electrle power tt pro- May 1885. CoDatruc:UoJt!lt .Untt.2
duced during this period of opera· began lD 1970, and it ltlrted Pl"'>
tton was the equivalent of nearly dac:tng electl1c1ty in ~ 1988.
20 milllon barrels of oil burned in a
Lut weet. atter·a detailed in·
fossil fuel power plant, Maneadl apeetion by federal eniineen. the
calculated.
.' ~ Nuclear Regulatory. CAmmtaton,
"The record symbolizes our - which oversees ail the ·..nation's
commitment to safety. attention to atomic power plants. announced tt
detail and excellence in opera- bad given Diablo Canyon's over-all
tlon," be said lD a stater.1e.:1L Both operations h16lo uaarka for efflclenreactors nat only save petroleum, cy, safety, radiation ...~ntro}s,
Maneatls said, but they also oper· maintenance, emergegcy preate without emitting the poilut- paredzie...and. aecurtty.
•.
ants spewed by oU· or coal-bu.rntna
Until yesterday's record, tiie
plants.
Untt 1 reactor at Three Mile Island
The $5.5 bllllon nuclear plant tn Pennsylvania -held the-record ot
houses two reactor units, each gen· _ 480 daya of continuous operation.
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set~ record, shut· down by.Jeak
lly Richard Jackbwa~ .L.j · <1 J
level for Jenks of radioactive water.
wo~;~~'t shui·:_d·~~-\~~~x (tJ-

Diablo

Assistant News Editor
ARROYO GR.¢\NDE- Unit 2 at
the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
Plant was shut down ~or refueling
Monday a week before It was scheduled to and three days _after settmg a
world record for ..conunuous operation.
The shutdown came three weeks
after small leaks were detected in
the reactor coolant system, according to plant spokesman Brad
Thomas.
The leaks, combined with .other
small problems, led plant operators
to start the scheduled refueling
early, Thomas said.
At the time of the shutdown, the
leaks were measured at .7 gallons a
minute, below the 1.0 federal action

L:J.SL rrionth, the Jenks exceeded 1.0,
plant) until it was time·for rcfuelir
causing a brief "unusual· event" to
because they wouldn't: want to lo
be declared at the plant.
money," Becker said;;~.
. The leaks_ n~ver created a danger
said sh~ vJ~·t··~omfoned ·
for the pu~llc nor pla~u_ ~mEY~ye~s, .. a television repon .this. week tl
Th.~mas smd.
.
.
~'
quoted a Diablp .official as sayi
The wa~er that 1s. gom,g ~n tJ:e
the plant is designed
leak
floor goes mto a dram .. It s bke m
..
. ··: • · ·. ··, : . ·
your sink," he said. Plants routinely
I can '1 tell )'ou · 1£ .tt ','s fl7
have to deal with small Teaks, he
dangerous or not. ~utI do~ t ~h·
added.
they' woul~. shut· 1t. down if 1~ v.
The plant's record run of 484
dangerous, she wd ... -.~~:--:
days beats the record of 480 set • Diablo officials have insisted
earlier this year by Unit 1 at the only by strictly following sa:
Three Mile Island nuclear power rules will the-i>lant·Operate at
plant in Pennsylvania.
·
m~efficient.,
Unit 2 was last off line during its
'\,,
·
1990 refueling. Because the current . - - - - - - . . . . ;_ _ __
shutdown was so close to the scheduled Sept. 9 refueling, plant operators have decided to start the refueling early, Thomas said.
The early start-up of the refueling
process could increase he length of
the outage by a few days, Thomas
said.
.
: ~: :.. . · ~ -~~;~. ·
- Mothers for-Peace spoi<Cswoman..,Rochelle Becker said the early shutdown fueled some of the group's
most persistent fears.
"All along we have said they

She
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PG&E
Jumps 89%
In 9':12~!;r

I

Ry Jeff Pellim~
Chronat'lf!. • tUJWrltrr' •

At i§. ~nual meeting yes· '
terday, PaciHc Gas and Electrir
t:o. demonstrated just how lu·
erative its much-maligned Dia·
blo Canvon nuclear plant can
be. The company reported an 89
percent leap in quarterly earn·
ings, thanks largely to Diablo.
Profit rose to $244.4 million 153¢
per sharel from $136.7 million 1~1
m the year-earlier quarter, whtle
sales rose to $2.1 billion from $1.9 •
billion.
"The major reason for this lm·
provement is the increase in revenues produced by Diablo Canyon,"
Chairman and chief executive Rich·
ard t:larke told 1.500 shareholders
at the Masonic Auditorium in San
Francisco.
The Diablo Canyon plant ran
into a series of major cost overruns
and ultimately set the utility back
S5.5 billion - as compared with the
$500 million it was supposed to cost
originally. PG&E wanted its custom·
ers to bear the brunt of the cost. but
the California Public Utility Com·
See Page C4. Col. 4
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PG&E
From

Pa~te

C1

mission balked at this.
The settlement reached last
year wtth the commission rewards
PG&E for operating the plant "at
sustained higb levels of performance" - and safely, as Clarke
pointed out yesterday.
For the first quarter. at least.
the company did just tbat. One of
tbe plant's two reactors operated at
98 percent of capacity while the oth·
er was at 93 percent. The industry
average for nuclear reactors is just
70 percent.
Diablo Canyon's revenue for
the three months totaled $359 mil·
lion. compared with just $181 mil·
lion a year earlier. Last year. the
gross from Diablo was "insufficient
to cover normal operating expenses. and thus had a depressing effect
on earnings," Clarke observed.
Clarke cautioned, however.
that the first-quarter performance
can't be sustained indefinitely.
Whenever one of the nuclear reactor units is shut off for refuelingthey go throu~h this procedure every 18 months - the company's
earnings are bound to suffer.
Clarke noted Utat one of the
units will he down for refuelin~ in

Thursday, April 20, 1989

the fourth quarter this year. "This
means our fourth-quarter earnings
are expectC'd to he lower than the
first-quartPr earmnl!s I reported today.··
Contir.umg to operate the plant
at high eW~iency is "fundamental"
to the company's success, Clarke
said. The facility accounts for 27
percent of the utility's assets.
Diablo Canyon offers a chance
for si~nificc;nt earnings ~rowth until 1994. beeause of price escalators
built into the agreement, Clarke
said. After that, the price PG&E re·
leives for Diablo power will reach a
plateau.

ficiary will he PG&E Entf'rpnses. an
unregulated ~uhsidiarv that thP
rompanv erE'ated. In thl' meantirr.P.
the c·ompany w11l trv to t·ilrn the fu:l
13 percE'nt authonzcd rE'turn on its
gas and E'lectric husmess.
Clarke's strategic plan didn't sit
well with all the shareholders at
yesterday's meeting.
Instead of all thE' rapital spend·
ing, the company "hould first restore the dividend that it cut last
year. one shareholder said. In th£'
first quarter of this year. it paid out
35¢ per share. as compared with 48~
in the first quarter of last year.

"Starting In the mid-19905. our
objective is to have investments in
unre~ulated business ventures that
will provid·:- a new source of earnings to sust.un growth." he said.

Clarke said that the dividend
would be restored only when "our
earnings stream is sufficient to sustain an increase." But he didn't 1)(.
fer a time frame. which angered
some shareholders at the meeting.

During the next five years. the
company p~ans to plow $2.2 billion
into unregtlated business ventures
in oil and g<;s, power-plant construction and real €'State. The chief bene-

"The performance of this company has stunk. · sa1d sharehold<'r
Nick Rossi. a Boon\'ille residt>nt.
"Management needs a swtft kick in
the butt.·

•
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. ployees who were allO~;tb:ettter.a
"vital" area allowing another..worker
inside without proper aut119riz8tion.
Security continues to be aproblem
The third incident occurted when a
at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power security guard was riot fulli searched
plant, according to a Nuclear Regula· upon .re-entering a high·seClJrity area,
tory Commission letter announcing he sa1ei. · .
.. .• , .. >. Thomas• said the violation.~-- were
three nevi alleged violations of federal
reported by PG&E. Government in·
rules at the plant.
Overall, plant security "appears spectors .found the problems when
adequate," an NRC inspection con- going :OYe~ , logs ..~ept by.:. Diablo
·· ·
.
•· · ...-.,.~- · ·
cluded. But there are areas Pacific workers
. Gas and Electric Co. needs to work
"Aity ~olation is bad.". Tho~ ~aid.
on, a commission regional offi.cal said.
"We're working hard to make ~ertain
In a June 25 letter, NRC radiation these don'l occur again. It's really a
safety and safeguards official Ross A. problem of educating everybody". on
Scarano complained about "the rela- the staff about proper procedures. ... • ··
tive ease" in which unauthorized
AIIother NRC regional' 9fficial, senr-·
people got into high-security areas, ior physical security, specialist Doug.
and said PG&E has not fixed similar Schuster, called the problems .."an
problems identified more than a year administrative goo~ more or less.".,-.
But Scarano's letter. took PG&E CO
ago.
· · ,.:_
But a plant spokesman described task because the violations' come .on .
the problems as ~echnical, mostly the heels of a more serious Level m
involving plant workers allowing oth· notice of ·. ~olation involving li securi·
er PG&E employees or contractors ty problems cited in Aprlll990.
·
into vital areas without making sure
"Thest: ... violations are of concern
they have proper authori7.ation.
because ·they demonstrate that in
Still, spokesman Brad Thomas ac- spite of your efforts to reduce the
knowledged that PG&E takes . the occurrence of these types of events,
problem seriously and will continue your corrective actions· have been
working on it. ,
less than fully effective," Scarano
· · •·"- ··' ·
The three alleged violations were wrote. •· · ' ,,:..
classified as Level IV on a scale of
"Specifically, the relative ·ease in
five, with Level I being most serious. which unauthorized individuals have
Level IV violations generally do not repeatedly · gained vital-area access
involve fines, although the NRC will continues to demonstrate the possibilwait for a response from PG&E ity of a more serious compromise,"
before deciding whether a fine is the letter continued.
The NRC decided not to fine the
warranted.
Federal nuclear officials also men- utility for the Level m violation in
tioned two other problems not consid- 1990 because of a promise to set up a
ered serious enough to warrant "comprehensive program" .to keep
citations. Neither of these problems the problems from happening again..
was described in detail because they
The 1990 violations involved allowinvolve security. A more.,. detailed ing unauthorized people into vital
inspection report describing them areas, failing to keep complete logs on
was not made public.
who entered vital areas and failing to
PG&E's Thomas said two of the protect. information on. the plant's
incidents stemmed from plant em- security program.
By Jan Greene
Telegram-Tribune

-.
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]itRC Proposes Fine
·q~er Diablo Canyon
. .
•

~ ..h ,

·~

. ·.1rhe Nuclear Regulatory ComliiiWon staff Is proposing a fine of
tsODlO against Pacific Gas and Electrj~ Co. for alleged violations of
· NRC requirements involving a safety system at the Diablo Canyon pu·
clear-power plant.
The plant bas been cited for
violations three times before, a NRC
spokesman said.

.........

- · "PG&E accepts complete responsibility for the violations and
wtU pay the fines," said James Sbif.
Cer._senior vice president of nuclear
~er generation. "We have taken
. ex-.nsive corrective action to adflress the deficiencies."
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Diablo warned on workers' excessive
o· vert I me
checked before the reactor Is starlet·-- · · - - - -- ·.

By David Eddy
~;~1
Telegram-Tn'bune \d'~ ',{
up. so any
mistakes
made by fatigue(
workers
can
be corrected.
.
The excessive overtime problem
At le~t ~8 mamtenance workers was deemed a Level 4 violation on a
~erfo~g 'kef safety-related func- scale. of 1 to 5, with Level 1 being thll>re- - tions at the Diablo Canron nuclear worst, said Marvin Mendonca, NRC
power pl~t were w~rking far too section chief.
much overtime, according ~ a .recent
Level 4 violations are fairly comNucl~ Regulatory CoDlD1lSSlon in· mon, he said, noting that in a recent
spection.
.
The workers were performing elec· year there were 23 Level 4 violations
trical and mechanical maintenance on at the plant
the Unit 1 reactor during its current
There Is no penalty associated with
refueling. said Ken Johnston, a
the violation, said Mendonca, atresident NRC Inspector at the planl
though PG&E is requJred to respond
Though inspectors cited Pacific Gas with a list of corrective adions.
and Electric Co. for a violatlon of the
technical specifications of the plant's
PG&~ om~ did not know that an
license, no serious ~ resulted, workers ex~ overtime had to be
.. ·r-'J'"•·-;-·~· 1 ., ti r approved,saidTbomas,andlschanghe S31'd
or: ~";~: :·~ .t
;-l lng its poUcles. From now on, an
'1t didn't lead to- pJJyilcal. ~ overtime wort must be approved by
!ems," said Johnston. "JJ It bad, Uley the plant manager. In the~ only
I

t

•

~

~

• ''·.

:!ly~ve ~--~~m/r~ C}!~~~

d to be
Inspectors rouD~ ~~!oCt."''/ Ins~e-~to~s ~ere irritated by
6 and Nov. 3, at leaSt .1~ people had . · PG&E s initial response to the prob- '
worked more than 72 hoUl'llln a single · lem, said Johnston.
respond because the daily time
week, according ~ a ~tly 1.re"Although the Inspectors' llndings records of 1,000 workers bad to be
leased NRC report .
~.
were brought to the attention of plant
According to the report jlrepared managem~nt on ~ct. 27, Individuals In
by Johnston and his colleague, Paul the electrical mam~c:e shop exNarbut, workers must have authoriza- ceeded the 72-hour mamnum as late
tion from the plant manager to work as Nov. 3, 1989," accorditg to the
more than 72 hours in a week. report
M.anag~ment ~d no knowledge of the
In addition, after noti.Mng plant
excesstve overtime.
management, the inspectOrs• report
PG&E spokesman Brad Thomas on the routine inspection was delayed
said many of the refueling procedures because they had to wait more than
aN! long and complicated, and compathree weeks for the workers' time
ny officials wanted to keep the cards.
workers on the jobs until they were
"Tbey were not very repsonsive to
c'lmpleted.
our concerns," said Johnston. "We
He emphasized that an the work were frustrated"
dnne during the refueling is doubleThomas said that it took so long to

•

1

:'1

reviewed. In addition, aU those workers who were found to have worbd

~cessive overtiiiie ·had ~belnt;:'
viewed.
1 ·:.·

~·~~ ~.:·:.
::-·.-.

·'/\.'.·
·~.
.. . . .,. .·~t

~~Z.~: .

San Luis Obispo County (Calif.) Telegram-Tribune/ Thursday April 6!

~~).,1;.:..
'
:;;'~.
'.;·By Teresa Ma rian.1 Brown

~

~~· :t:~~~f'~

.·NR,C criticizes Diablo engine!at~
.

"'t :Teleil:IJD·TriliLJ.De

.

~Fri~~; Canyon engineers are
~doingi1Dcomplete or inadequate
· · ort.:J:harge.s a new federal report. ·
e 'report,· released this week by
~~Uie'.Nuclear Regulatory Commis·
~p;'cltei~.Pacific Gas &·Electric.
· · :lor 14 possible violations.:..- •
., Four of the citations could end up
•. u~;Level· m violations and 10 have
.ralleady been judged Level IV viola"'.'Uou~'''·-;

.

~~ 'd '....-~.. ~.
~ .Ill •··•
"f ..

..

; ··~. Unde; NRC rules, a Level I viola·
:. tion is the most serious, and a Level
· V violation the least serious.
-~ PG&E spokesman Ron Rutkowski
~Aid the utility is taking the NRC's
~-:report·: seriously. "We're going to
.. promptly and aggressively take the
~··appropriate corrective actions," he
The NRC is now studying the four
-~u yet LJ.Dclassified Diablo violations
. to•see.;if they warrant a Level m
; 'status.~
~!! Diablo Canyon has received only
~:two Level ID violations in its histo~.ry · said NRC spokesman Greg
~: ~k.· The first was in 1984, when
~ ::· PG&E was given a $50,000 fine for
~:"inadvertently" having an emer·
t: · gency reactor core cooling system
t· out of service when it should have
been working, Cook said. The reac·
tor was not running at the time.
.... Tbe second came in 1986, when
PG&E was ordered to pay a $50,000
fiDe for having one of two safety
~· valve systems out of service without
~ realizing it, Cook said. Level m
~: violations can bring fines from the
~ NRC; less-serious Level IV and V
l~ violations have no fines attache~.
~ · Having only two Level III vtola·
tion.s "is a very good history," Cook
:wd. "That's pretty good for violations in terms of this (western)
' region.".
~ PG&E was assigned five Level IV
violations when a small amount of
= radioactive gas leaked from a reac·
~ tor core into the containment build·
~ ing' ar.d · then into the atmosphere
&during refueling April10, 1987.
f ~ PG&E did not violate any rule.s
r wbicb would warrant a more sert·
! ous. violation because the NRC ~d
~ not at that time developed rules 111
the safety procedur~s wbich led to
r the incident. Cook sa1d.
;¢

tt.
~

f.

t

.

.

i , Tbe latest

violations were issued
{after five NRC inspectors and sev·
: eral independent contrac~ors spent
~more than a month at Dtablo Can·
. on- from Jan. 23 through Feb. 28.
' ~-During that month, the team fo! cused on Diablo's safety system
. review and surveillance p_ro~r~ms.
:What they saw "raised stgnthcant
!· uestions " according to the report.
8 "Plant 'staff does not fullr under·
;~nd the plant design basts ·:· the
~commLJ.Dication) between engmeer·
i~g- and plant (staff) is weak ... (and) engineering_ work
has been incomplete or tnade·
quate," the report said.
.
"Engineering needs to . be •.m·
proved. The quality of engm.~er~g
work needs to be improve~. sal~
Paul Narbut, the NRC:s seruo~. re~l·
dent inspector at Dtablo. Tb1s
demonstrates some issues we've
been discussing with the plant staff
for years ... it shouldn't be news to
PG&E."
Most serious of the four. unsettled
violations is a problem w1th opera·
tion of the plant's oce.an water
cooling system, Narbut satd.
PG&E's engineers told plant man·
agement in a letter in -1983 to rLJ.D
the system with three pumps, or
add a second heat exchanger when
only two of the pumps were rLJ.D·
ning. That direction was apparently
never followed.
The incident illustrates weak com·
munication between PG~.'~ nucle·
ar design engineering divtston.. located in San Francisco, and Dtablo
managers and engineers, Narbut
said. "We've been saying this for a
while. and now we've brought home
the point," he said.
.
Bryant Giffin. fonnerly .a des~g~
engineer in the San Franctsco divt·
s1on and now assistant plant manag·
er at Diablo. a2reed that the letter

.

··ilo.f':~~·

incident shows poor communicatioD.i ~
Communication between San Frap-0_·'
cisco design engineers and· pla~t. ·engineers needs to improve, he saliL
"We're trying," Griffin said. "We ·
recognize that bad been and sWill _
a problem. We're trying to improve :
communication within our own or·
ganization and the guys in' San
Francisco are trying to do the same
thing ... I think it has improved." ...
The letter. about the cooling syatem heat exchangers should have
been followed up on, Griffin said.i-0
PG&E now uses a more formal
notification system for such· eng!·
neering directions, be said. San
Francisco design engineen now .follow up on what was done at Diablo · ·
with their design-change directions, .:
be said.
· · · ' ~-e-;,
Griffin stressed Diablo officiala ·
are taking to heart all of the violations listed in the NRC report. ,. • ;.:"We want to do well," be· said.
"When you. read the names of the
No. 1 plants ln the United~States,
and you see your dame there, you .·
have pride. That's ~ben we ~ant_to
be" he said.
.
..
PG&E has its own inspection pr. ··
gram to find the kinds of violations ·.
listed in the NRC report. The NRC ·_ ·
praised PG&E for starting that pr.
gram. but said it needed to :.!Je
improved.
·· ·
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Diablo's safety violations liste~r.>·
Among violations of safety stan·
dards for which Diablo Canyon bas
been cited, or that tbe Nuclear
Regulatory Commission is consider·
ing: .
Under cons'deration:
A citation for a
•
. 1
. .
1
fa11ure _to Incorporate
1_91l eng 1neenno
catculahon from PG&E eng.neers ~nto plant
operahon procedures. The calculation called
tor a second ocean water coolant heat
trcllanger to be put Into service whenever
one of tllree ocean water cooling system
pumps is out of service.
• Under consideration: a citation for the
way PG&E handled the installation of a
replacement pump at Unit 2 during a main·
tenance shutdown. The new pump was heav·
1er and required new earthQuake standard
calculat1ons. However, the calculations were
not officially completed until a month after
Unit 1 was restarted, according to the NRC
report
• unoer consideration: citing PG&E tor
tne way it handled tilt installation ot a piece
lor a pumo in the auxiliary salt water
cooling system. The NRC report says PG&E
•nstalled il without re·selting a breaker
switch that would have told O!)!rators if it
wasn·t working properly, according to the
report.
• Under consideration: a citation for not
hav1ng enough diesel fuel on hand at tile
Plant. NRC regulations require nuclear pow·
er plants to have at least seven days· worth
ot chuel futi ~tored to run plant touipment
'" an emergency. The NRC calculated that

~veral

w~:~

.

PG&E is short
hours•
• Level IV violation: for deClaring a Unlt.2 •·
ventilahon system o!)!rational even tiiOuOII- ....
portion was not completed and was schtd·. -~
uled to be completed later, and !"• prow .;:
paperwork on the change had. ,not -~~en ..
completed.
;·~a.~;~-.... ·~ ·
• Level IV violation: for installing 1 Unit 2 '
pipe support clo~r than reguletionsellowtd.\ :.
Level IV violation· for not havin" tour ;
•
.
. · .
."
· ·
PIPt bolls 1ft a Unit 2 coohng watt~ line !IO.~!
enough.
· .:to.:·.:·.::~
• Level IV violation: to' rtplacing Urtb"
quake support bolts on two dampers In a
Unit 2 ventilation system without written
work instructions or procetdures. ;:.. ·. ~- ·'~
• Level IV violation: tor not inspecting
nine welds inside a ventilation pipe before'
the pipe was welded shut from the outside
and the ventilation system was. declared
operable.
·
.., ;
• Level IV violation: tor running a power
supply cord for temporary construction
projects next to a power cord that Is part 4f
tne Unit 1 control room preuurlzatlon ·sys: ·.
tem - without a written safety evaluation · ·
considering any electrical interference tt1t - •
conwuction cord could cause.
;. ._ -:Vc::• Level IV violation: for not filcin; a Unit 2. • ~
anchor bolt that didn't meet standards, aod ."· ·
tor not fixing loose. miuing and unpropeny, .
operating parts when a pump was replaced~;~ ..
•Level IV violation: for allowing a worker,:,.·.
to change a cooling system pump washJf'~ ...
without filing the right paperwork. ,.,.. -~ ~,,.. ~
-Term MarianiBrowr-•

..
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Diablo Canyon reactor
repaired, back on line
Safety valve leak
caused ~eeklong
Unit 2 shutdown

(·ontinuous service for nearly four
months before the weeklong out·
agP. will be ~adually brought up to
full power. said Ron IWtkowskf.' a
!<pokesman for Pacific Gas and
EIN'tric Co., which operates the
nuclear power plant.

"We11 be conducting tests all the
SAN LUIS OBISPO - Work· wa\' until full power is achi£'\•ed,
er.:; at the Diablo Can~·on nuclear prt~bably wmetime Monday." Rutpower plant mtarted the Unit 2
reactor Saturday. a week after a
small leak in a safety valve prompt·
ed its shutdown. utilit!· officials
said.
The unit. which had b("(·n in

kowski said. "You don't just flip a
switch to turn it on again."
,

l't ilit~· officials shut down the ·:
unit April 8 to n>place a pressurizer ·
!'o&fety valve that had begun leaking
several weeks before. 1be valve is
desitmed to open if pressure in the
n>act.or coolinR system exceeds accepted lt>vels.
"We monitored the leak for liE'\'·
(·ral WE't'ks before deciding to shut
1 down the unit," Rutkowski said.
"The !'.E'E'P81ZC was well below Nu·
ciPar I-\ejZUlatory Commission stan·
dard;; - about one-fiftieth of
what's allowed - but we felt that
because it wasn't getting any better,
we F.hould shut. down the reactor
and n>place the valve."
DurinR the week that Unit 2 was J
out of commission. Unit 1 operated
at full capacity and continued to do ;
so Saturday. Rutkowski said. The
unit ·s shutdown had no affect on
plant or public safety.

l
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Repair of Leaky Pipe \
·Forces Shutdown
:of Diablo Reactor
.

?-;?,.. '69

:sr. . Assnrral~d

Pffu

~tPsan Luis Obispo
The Unit 2 reactor at the Diablo
Canyon nuclear power plant was
:shut down early yesterday for re·pair of a leaky pipe in the seawater
-<·ooling system, a utility spokesman
.·said.
The plant's other reactor. Unit
1. was operating at full power.
The leak occurred in a heat exchancer in a "non-nuclear" poruon
· of the s\·stem. said Clvde Walthall.
_l;pokcsman for Pacific-Gas and Elec:tne.
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H.epa1rs are expected to take
1'' o or three days.

The reactor was running at 50
:percent power for rout me cleamng
. of the seawater cooling system
when the leak was disco\·ered. Wal·
thall said. The repairs will prevent
:;altwatcr from leakinJZ into part of
) 1h<' cooling system where it does not
belong, he said.
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Diablo Reactor
Remains Shut Down
For Repair of Pipe

,_,,-n
-4MIIOf'fGf~d

Prral'

san Luis Obispo ~J-.
The Unit 2 reactor at the Diablo
( ·anyon nuclear power plant remained shut d~wn yesterday while
workers repa1rt>d a leaky pipe in th£>
ot(•an water tooling sy~tem. a utili',. spokesman said.

The leak. disco\'ered Sunda\
m the unit's "non-nudear" po·r.
tton of the ~,·stem and po!>cd no
<lancer of rad1at1on relca!>c. said
l'l~·dc Walthall. spoke!>tnan for Patlfit Gas and Electric Co.
wa!>

The t;nit 1 reactor contmued to
operate at 100 percent capacity, h(·
~aid.
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Report underlines
danger of Diablo
'

I

I·

";.

A recent report on a mishap at Diablo CanyOn
·:;
nuclear power plant in Aprill987 doesn't sound like the
same incident that was reported to the TelegramTribune at the time.
The current report by the McClatchy News Service
was based on information from Jesse Crews. a senior
reactor engineer for the Nuclear Regulatory
,..:,
Commiwlion who led an investigation of the incident.
-,. Crews said the the NRC did an intense investigation
of the- incident because it had catastrophic potent1a1.
H things had been only sligbUy different, the NRC "
official said, the result could have been a core
t
meltdown such as happened at Three Mile IslaDd.
The McClatchy News Service report said it was
"the most serious mishap" at the plant since it was
turned on. "Water began to boil in one of Diablo's twin
reactors at a time when most of its safety systems and its operators - we!\! dangerously relaxed."
That is a bit different than the information we were
given by a Pacific Gas and Electric Co. spokesman at
the Ume - although many of the details were the same.
The story at that point was that 30 gallons of·
radioactive water had leaked and traces of
...
radioactivity were released into the atmosphere.
The spokesman said in Apri11987 the incident was
''minor" and didn't endanger the public safety or
workers at the plant.
The Telegram-Tribune story went on to explain
many of the details as recounted in the current
McClatchy account.
The main difference is that the potential for a core
meltdown or other serious results was not made clear ·
right after the incident occurred.
The incident was serious enough that the NRC
issued bulletins to all the utilities in the country asking
them to take steps to prevent the Diablo type of event
and how to cope with it if it -occurs.
We have pointed out over and over again that
Diablo by its very nature as a nuclear power plant has
a potential for disaster that cannot be overemphasized.
This recent report bears that out and it should
place an even greater burden on PG&E to tell it like it
as whenever an emergency occurs at the plant.
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Nuclear plant panel
needs a jump start
The idea of creating a ~tatewide advisory safety
committee to oversea all nuclear power plants in tbe state is a
good one.
Sen. Herschel Rosenthal. D-Los Angeles, has proposed a
bill <SB2541) that would establish a six-member cammittee to
review the safety, public health and environmental conditions
of the nuclear plants in tbe state.
Rosenthal said he introduced his bill because, in his
opinion, tbe Diablo Canyon nuclear safety committee,
negotiated as part of a Pacific Gas and Electric Co. rate
settlement in 1988, has been a failure.
So far only two members oftbe three-member panel have
been appointed and tbe committee has not held any meetings
yet One of tbe two is a UCLA professor, tbe other is an
executive of a power company in North carolina. Attorney
General John Van de Kamp, who was to pick the third
member, rejected all nine nominees.
Rosenthal's bill provides lor an advisory committee
composed of a representive of the nuclear power industcy, a
public health expert, an environmentalist, an emergency
response expert, a nuclear safety engineer and a member of
the public.
It makes sense to us that establishing a broad-based
advisory panel by state law is a much better way to oversee
the nuclear industry than negotiating a committee out of a ·
rate agreement
Rosenthal's bill, in our view, would lessen tbe chance that
industry-oriented people would be the "watchdogs" over
nuclear power.

-"
.

- ,......,...---· ---- --

Bill seeks panel
for nuclear safety
·.

By Jan Greene
Telegram-Tribune
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The Diablo Canvon nuclear safetv
committee is a •'failure." according
a state senator who has introduced
legislation to create a statewide
r.uclear safety paneL
The Diablo Canvon committee was
created in Deceniber 1988 but onlv
two of its three members have been
appointed because of a dispute among
state officials.

to

The panel has never met. although
there are plans for a meeting in April
in San Luis Obispo.
Sen. Herschel Rosenthal, D-Los
Angeles, complained that the committee should have been available last
October to review any effects of the
Lorna Prieta earthquake on Diablo
Canyon.
"My bill would fix. the Diablo
Canyon problem and at the same time
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Please see Nuclear, Back Page
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Nuclear-------Continued from A·l
e:rtend independent oversight to all of
the state's nuclear power plants."
Rosenthal said in a written statement.
Rosenthal is chairman of the state
Senate Energy and Public Utilities
Committee, which oversees nuclear
power plants.
Rochelle Becker, a spokeswoman
for Mothers for Peace, long a critic of
Diablo, said the fact that Rosenthal
offered this proposal should not keep
the Diablo committee from moving
forward.

"This isn't a replacement'' for the
Diablo Canyon and San Onofre,
Diablo safety committee, she said. in near San Diego, are the only plants
part because it would take at least a currently operating. Rancho Seco, in
year for the bill to get through the- Sacramento, and Humboldt Bay, in
Eureka are closed.
Legislature.
However, Becker said Rosenthal's
Committee members would include
new panel could replace a poorly an expert from the nuclear power
functioning Diablo committee "some- industry, a public health expert, an
environmentalist. an emergency retime way down the road."
Under the Rosenthal bill <SB 2541>, sponse expert, a nuclear safety engia six-member advisory committee neer and a member of the public.
would review the safety, public: health
The Dlablo Canyon independent
and environmental conditions of the safety committee was created in a
four nuclear power plants in Califor- 1988 rate settlement agreement negotiated by Pacific Gas and Electric Co.,
nia.

the state Public Utilities Commission. Obispo area. according to committee
and state Attorney General John Van member \Vllliam Kastenberg, a UCLA
deKamp.
engineering professor. The other
Van de Kamp, one of three parties member is Warren H. Owen. an
to choose a member for the panel, in e:tecutive \\ith Duke Power Co. in
December 1989 rejected all nine North Carolina.
nominees, saying they were all too
Becker said her group wants input
industry-oriented.
on how the committee sets up its
The PUC has refused to compile a meetings and procedures to be sure
new list. so the issue remains at a they are public. But letters to both
standstill
men garnered only a simple response
In the meantime, the two members that they are planning a first meeting
already appointed constitute a quo- in April and the public will have an
nun and .are planning an April opponunity to speak then, Becker
~eeting somewhere in the San Luis
said.

. ., ·'~....__-..,...,-,·-··...----~ .....~··

Under the Rosenthal bill,
a six~member advisory
committee would review
the safety, public health
and environmental
conditions of the state's
nuclear power plants.

Sina'l crowd praises,
deplores Diablo safety
1 o- I 1- Cf I

(Continued from page 1)
self-described "mother for power,"
thanked the committee for meeting
in San Luis Obispo because it gives
residentS "the opponunity to give
input to you" and "hear information
from PG&E about what's occurring
at the plant."
Ilona Ing, a San Luis Obispo
Realtor. posed some issues for committee members to think about. noting that none of the members attended the meeting of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safety in San
Luis Obispo last month.
lng said she was surprised to fmd
that the ACRS had hired a seismologist from the East Coast who is not
familiar with West Coast seismicity
and who also did not attend the
ACRS meeting.
Cal Poly professor Richard
Kransdorf addressed the committee
at length, saying there is a need for
the committee to have a local office.
He said safety committee members not attending ARCS meetings
indicates the comminee is "going
through a lot of motions."
Kransdorf said he reviewed the
county's emergency safety plan in
the Diablo Canyon repository at Cal
Poly and wondered if any committee
members had examined it.
He said while some pans of the
five-volume plan had been updated
to 1990 and 1991, one had not been
updated since 1987, another not
since 1982, and the portion for Cal
Poly was only a rough draft from
1982.
"Some were not there at all," he
said. noting that the Cal Poly sheltering analysis simply said "to be
filled in by contractor."
He said the plan contained some
general information about sheltering
in the event of a release of radioactive mazerial, little information on
what to do in an eanhquake, and
"absolutely nothing" in the event of
both at the same time.
"1 believe it's criminal people
have no idea in this county where
they might go in the event of a
nuclear release if they cannot evacuw.c." Kransdorf said.
He also said there was no information on what kind of protection

t=eTF

would be afforded by various types
of shelters.
·
Kransdorf also criticized advance
warning and practices for
emergency drills at Diablo Ca_ny~.
"I'd like to urge that someume tt
would be nice to do an unannounced
drill at night in bad weather and see
what. kind of results you have."
Kransdorf said.
.
He offered to look into the issues
he bad raised if the committee so .
desired.
·an
Kransdorf said the lack of public ! ,
J;lecuic
a
fV\T
panicipation at the meeting ·ThursiUla'l"
... . . ....• ·.'-D4;. . r-·
4
day tnight be a "reflection of happiall t h e . . .
ness or simply the relaxation of peopublic commeDi" ..
tt
ple or they view the committee as
But Motiun
~~'lfe le8d
increasingly irrelevant."
g opp(ment of. tile Diabro'Canyo1
Committee Chairman Warren
~UC;Iear Power Plant;: \Jas ·been boy.
.....;,a. mecung.
·
Owen said a committee member and
i~coumg
b'ecauie the .CQll!JDi~
its legal counsel bad planned to at'..
they believe"lhc committel
tend the ACRS meeting in Wash~ useless and have: petitioned for i
tb be disbanded.
ington. but when it was postponed
and moved to San Luis Obispo they
• Citizens for ~·Energy,,
were unable to be here.
nut!ear. group, did bl.ve a rep
emauve present. but she did not
But he said a consultant did anend
any safety issues.
and briefed the committee on the
meeting Thursday.
Chris Pillsbury· Qf Los Osos.
{Continued on page 6)
"In all fairness. we try to be responsive to things that come before
the committee," said mpnber WUlaim Kastenberg, notillc thai no
members were here when the chair-·· .
man of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission visited Diablo Canyon
because "be doesn't tell us when
be's coming here."
He pointed out that the committee
only learned of the ACRS meeting
from Kransdorf.
"I'm not the person that should be
telling you... Kransdorf said. urging
the commiuec to set up a communication process with other advisory
and regulatory bodies.
The commiuee's legal counsel
Robert Wellington said the county's
emergency p~ ~~·t within .the
committee's jurisdiction and advised
Kransdorf to comact the State Advisory Committee on Emergency
Planning.
"I'm sorry that anyone feels
we're not taking our responsibility
seriously," Owen said. ..4s Roben
(Wellington) pointed out.. some
(issues) are in our purview and some
are noL
·
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Nuclear safety panel
on Diablo Canyon
has yet to meet once
By Russel CJemings
\fc:Clatc:by News Service

fRESNO - When the epic electricity rate case for the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant was senled
in 1988. part of the agreement called
for creating an independent commit·
tee on safety to start keeping an eye
on the plant in January 1989.
Today. more than a year after that
deadline. the committee has yet to
hold its first meetmg - or even set a
finn date for a first meeung. Its rwo
members have never met each other.
And its $500.000 budget for 1989 will
never be spent.
Blame the delay in part on the
time-consuming process of screenmg
potential committee members. said
Pete Arth. a staff anomev for the
state Public Utilities Commission
who has been doubling. as the committee's lawyer until the comminee
can get itself organized enough to
hire its own Iawver.
·The process took some time."
Arth said. "There was a nominating
process that required looking at a
fairly large pool of potential candidates and making sure they had sufficient expertise."
.---Blame it in part as well on a longstanding dispute over the makeup of
_ the committee. which originally was
supposed to have three members.
The dispute ended in December with
Attorney General John Van de Kamp
refusing to appoint a member on
·grounds that the entire list of pros·
peers was aligned too closely with the
, nuclear power industry.
· 1 he two members - William E.
i(Utenberg, an engineering profes·
sor at the Universitv of California,
f:.os Angeles. and Warren Owen. ex«;.~tive vice president of Duke Power
Co.. a utility based in Charlone. N.C.
- were appointed by Gov. Deukmeji·
~..and the chairtnan of the California
Energy Commission.
The 1988 settlement lets the Pacif·
tf Gas & Electric Co .. which operates
lfte plant. I'KO\Ier more of its S5.8 bil·
~ in construction costs if it runs Di·
ablo Canyon more efficiently than
~1~'£~plant.

-~to make sure PG&E doesn't cut
tomers. the safety committee was
created. Its primarv job is to make an
repo~ on . the safety of the

annual

that they had decided to carry on despite not having a third member.
Kastenberg said their present plans
were to have their first meeting
sometime in May at San Luis Obispo.
not far from the plant on the Pacific
coast.
.•
~The work is there. and we'll tack· •
le it." Kastenberg said. "We'll have a i
meeting. and he and 1 will have to
discuss in public how we will operate."
Arth said the committee would
have access to the entire plant and to
all of the documents relating to it, in·
eluding those that are not nonnally
made public. such as reports by the
industry's secretive safety panel. the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
The list of prospective committee
members was drawn up by the chair·
man of the PUC. the chainnan of the
engineering department at the Uni·
versity of California, Berkeley. and
PG&E. •

•.· ...

_,

..,,
I

•

Rochelle Becker. a member of the
Mothers for Peace group. which took
a leading role in the decadelong opposition to Diablo Canyon's con·
struction and licensing. said the
screening process gave PG&E virtual
veto power over the candidates.
All of the candidates•. Becker said,
"have been involved in the nuclear
industry. Most of them bave been in·
volved in EPRI, the Electric: Power
Research Institute. which is an advocate of nuclear power."
In defense. PG&E spokesman
Brad Thomas said the utility simply
played by the nates.
"'ur view is that this is what everybody agreed to. • Thomas said.
"We've done what we said we would
do."
Because the committee did noth·
ing in 1989, it spent none of its
$500,000 budget. so that money which wu supposed to come from
PG&E's customers - will not be
charged to them. Arth said.
As for this year and the future.
Kastenberg said then! would be no
shortaee of things to spend money
on. especially because the committee
Is supposed to operate independent·
ly.
•we'll use a lot of consultants,
there will be some travel. we'U have
some staff members and we've been
advised that we should also hire
.. -- --~··-~ ....-.i.
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Panel is part of Diablo ~on rate-setting deal

Van de Kamp rejects
rate panel nominees
At-

for the committee. whose three

torney General John Van de
~p declined Friday to appomt anyone to the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Com-

members are to be appointed by
the governor, tbe attorney general and tbe c::bainnan of the
California EDergy Commission.

SACRAMENTO (AP) -

mittee.
He said the seven nem.i.oees
from wbich he was to choose

were too aligned to the nuclear
power industry and none would
bring diversity or indepentient
views to the committee.
Tbe committee was part of
an agreement approved by the
Public Utilities Commission
that called for rates for electricity from Diablo canyon to be
based on bow well the $5.5 billion plant perfonns over its expected 30-year life. Rates were
increased 5 percent last Janu-

ary.
Pacific Gas&: Electric, wbic:b

owns tbe nuclear power pJaat
near San Luis Obispo. is paying

Nine men with backgrounds
in nuclear power were nominat·
ed for the committee last Julv
by the rresideDt of the PUC,
president of~ aDd tbe dean
of engineeriDg at University of
California, Berkeley.
Gov. George Deukmejian appointed William Kasteoberg of
t.be UCLA School of' Engineering. EDergy CommissiOn Chairman Charles lmbrecht named
Warren Owen. executive vice
president of Duke Power Co. of
North Carolina.
Van de Kamp said the industry views of the seven are already represented on the committee by the other two nomi-

the

nees.

CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL:

We're here today because a number of serious

controversies have arisen regarding California's nuclear plants.

For example,

proposals have been suggested to shut down the San Onofre facility in Southern
California due to environmental and cost problems.
There is also a continuing debate over whether the Diablo Canyon Plant in San Luis
Obispo County will be able to withstand a major earthquake.

And I have been concerned

that the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee may not be doing an adequate job.
Questions have also been raised about the costs and safety of shutting down and
removing high-level nuclear waste from the Rancho Seco Plant near sacramento, and the
Humboldt Bay Plant near Eureka.

We will explore all of these issues today.

But there is also a broader question before this committee.

Recently, Governor

Wilson released his "Energy Plan" for California which sets forth a bold strategy to
meet California's future electricity needs through energy conservation and renewable
energy generation facilities.

Bill proposals consistent with the Governor's plans are

pending in the Legislature.
Neither the Governor's energy strategy nor the legislative proposals envision
nuclear power playing a significant role in California's energy future.

This leads me

to the general question of whether this state should step back and reassess its
position on the use of

n~clear

power, particularly in view of safety, environmental,

and ratepayer considerations.
So in essence, this hearing is about the future of nuclear power in California.
Will we be seeing proposals for new plants?
on line?

How long will we keep aging nuclear plants

And what are we doing to decommission shut-down nuclear plants?

I am pleased to say that we have with us today distinguished panelists to discuss
these matters.
Let me conclude my remarks with the ground rules for the hearing.
witnesses to please refrain from reading your written testimony.
will be put into the record.

I'm asking all

Your written material

Instead, please take 10 to 15 minutes, or less, to

highlight the major points you would like to make.
Questions from the members may follow each presentation.

In a few cases, where I

have had numerous questions, some of you have been given advanced copies of the
questions.

So please be prepared to respond.

At the end of the hearing, we will have an open-microphone session to take brief
comments from persons whose views were not represented by the witnesses.
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Those wishing

to speak at the open-mike session should give their name to the committee sergeant.
Now Senator Russell, Senator Hart, any comments pertaining to

this?

What I suggest is that each panel come forward and sit in the front row seats, and
then we'll take one witness at a time at the table.
Let's start with John B. Martin, Regional Administrator of the
Regulatory Commission.

u.s.

Nuclear

Welcome, and thank you for attending.

MR. JOHN B. MARTIN:

Is the microphone on?

Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senatore.

I'm pleased to be here this morning.

I am going to take you up on your invitation and refrain from reading this statement.
It will be provided for the record.
What I would like to do would be to briefly summarize our responsibilities and,
from our perspective, the status of the four nuclear power facilities in California.
I'll start by just a very brief summary of what we do.
Commission has basically three functions.

The Nuclear Regulatory

One is to promulgate regulations

implementing the Atomic Energy Act; secondly, is to license nuclear power plants as
well as a host of other types of facilities involving radioactive materials for medical
use and research and universities and whatever.

And then, lastly, we spend a valuable

portion of our time doing inspections of the different facilities, and that's primarily
the function of my office.

I'm located in Walnut Creek, and we have roughly 100 people

in the office of which roughly 65 or so are devoted full time to the inspection of
nuclear power plants, as well as our 42 other staff that includes work in Washington
and the regions.
The regulation development and licensing was handled by our headquarters staff
based in Washington, so I won't spend a lot of time on that.

As I said, the inspection

program enforcement activities are handled in our office.
We basically have two categories of inspectors.
least two full-time resident inspectors.

Some have more.

have four people there, full-time residents.
frequently at night.

Each nuclear power plant has at
San Onofre, for example, we

They do inspections on a regular basis,

There are quite a bit of unannounced back-shift coverage.

It's

the function of the resident inspectors to have their finger on the pulse of what's
going on, to understand the people, how they interact, and have a good sense of the
chain of events as they're unfolding from day to day.

About half of the inspections or

so are provided by our regional-based inspectors who are primarily specialists in such
things as radiation detection and various engineering disciplines.

And they travel

through the plants, typically, for a week at a time, eo that over a period of time they
have a broader perspective of several different plants.
As I say, we devote, on the average of six staff years per year on inspection
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activities of each nuclear power plant.
depending on the activities at the plant.

Some give a little more, some a little less,
But it averages out roughly six,

six-and-a-half staffers per plant.
Let me summarize briefly our view of the performance at the nuclear power plants in
California.

As you may know, each year or so, a period of 18 months, we do an

evaluation, a summary evaluation, of how we think the plants are performing in several
different areas of operation -- engineering, quality assurance, radiologic detection,
maintenance, and a few other topics.

And we summarize in a numerical fashion how we

think the plants are doing.
San Onofre is a three-unit station with -- Unit 1 is an older plant that's been in
operation since 1967, and Units 2 and 3 are a more recent vintage, in the early '80s.
And our summary for these plants is that their performance has been generally good to
excellent during the last four or five years.

We've had a couple of enforcement issues

over the last couple of years, one involving engineering deficiencies -- that was in
1988 -- and another in 1991 involving failure to maintain safety compliance completely
in accordance with the technical specifications.

But in general, our conclusion is

they are an above average performer and generally satisfactory.
Diablo Canyon is a two-unit station that started operation in the early '80s, and
our evaluation of them is that they've been on a continually improving trend since
start-up.

And our overall evaluation is very good to superior.

It's, as I say,

generally an improving performer.
As you may know, there has been a sizable issue involving seismic safety at Diablo.
In fact, part of the additional licensing was the requirement that they do a seismic
re-review to take into account any new geological information and new technology that
may have developed during the first two years of plant operation.

That review was

recently completed; we've completed our review and heard all the different views on it
and considered the plant design is entirely satisfactory for the seismic conditions
that exist there.

Diablo Canyon, that's had a •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Can we hear from Senator Russell.

SENATOR NEWTON R. RUSSELL:

As I recall, Diablo Canyon initially was designed and

then re-designed when we found some additional seismic concerns that deal with those
issues; is that correct?
MR. MARTIN:

Yes, that happened a couple of times.

As I understand it, again, the

plant was originally done, construction, permanent in the early '70's sometime.

And

the plant was well under construction when this new fault was called the Hosgri Fault.
And I can't speak real authoritatively about that.
sizable perturbation in the design.

But as I understand it, that was a

It was a location in which the fault hadn't been
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anticipated, and the plant was re-designed to meet the new requirements and
substantially upgraded.

And so that's correct.

There was a substantial re-design of

the plant during the late '70s.
Then, as you may recall, right in about 1981 or so, there were some additional
design problems found which, just the quality of the design and engineering work,
wasn't specifically seismic related -- and that happened at about the time I got up
there -- and required a couple of years to go back and redo and reverify and check the
design.

Diablo Canyon is one of those plants that we know probably most about, not

only the seismic design, but the whole plant design of any plant in the country.
you're right.

But

It's had a considerable amount of checking and double-checking and

independent verification.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

In your study, the review has shown what regulations of the

seismic •••
MR. MARTIN:

Concludes that the design of the plant, as it stands today, is

entirely satisfactory for the seismic conditions at the plant as they are known today.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. MARTIN:

That's true of San Onofre also?

Yes.

Turning to Rancho seco -- of course, this was shut down due to a

voter referendum -- and in the last couple of years the fuel was removed, and we worked
quite closely with SMUD over the last couple of years to work through the
decommissioning plans on a step-by-step basis and have gradually worked towards their
submitting decommissioning plans, which I suspect they will do sometime this summer.
And we're prepared to act expeditiously on it.

In the meantime, the fuel has been all

consolidated and has been stored, and sizable portions of the plant have been cleaned
up.

As far as we're concerned, things have been proceeding satisfactorily towards

decommissioning.
Humboldt Bay is the last plant I'll mention.
near Eureka.

This is a very small plant located

In 1976, we required that the plant be upgraded to meet more modern

seismic standards.

PG&E decided at the time that after some studies that they just

didn't want to spend the money to do that.

It was just too much trouble for the

seismic risk, so they elected to shut it down and decommission it.

And Humboldt, like

Rancho, has had the fuel unloaded in the spent-fuel pool and is stored.

And as soon as

a federally funded site or a storage facility is available, it's my understanding to
ship the fuel off and complete dismantling of the plant.
And that concludes my remarks, a very brief summary of our written testimony.

And

I'll be happy to answer any questions that •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
questions.

You're aware that we provided you in advance with a number of

I'd like to just go through them--
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MR. MARTIN:

Sure.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

-- one at a time.

What is the NRC's position on the use by state regulatory agencies of
performance-based ratemaking where utilities are paid on the basis of the amount of
power generated?
MR. MARTINt

Well, I think we're somewhat defensive about it.

We've proceeded

rather cautiously in this area because, depending on the details of these schemes, they
could be good or they could be awful.

And I think the ones I'm familiar with here in

California are not of great concern.

What we're particularly concerned are incentive

plans that would provide an incentive for utilities that, if you keep running the plant
when you really ought to shut it down to do maintenance or some other kind of
corrective actions.

And in particular, we've had concerns about incentives that have

very sharp thresholds.

You know, a utility would have a very large incentive to keep

operating until next Friday, as opposed to this Thursday, when it's time to fix a
valve, or sharp thresholds or doing evaluations over very short periods of time where
there's large incentives to keep running a plant as opposed to shut it down for
maintenance.

We have not seen that yet, but the commission has taken a fairly strong

position, and we're going to be looking for this sort of thing and communicate to the
public service commissions our feeling.

And we've really got to be careful with these

things so that the utilities maintain the incentives to operate these plants
responsibly.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Senator Russell.

You've got a point.

Doesn't the performance-based rate making

incentive concept fall in that same category?

I mean if you're paying for producing

power, they do not pay when you don't, then the incentive is to run the power plant.
And depending upon the economic conditions of the utility and the person in charge,
they pose a risk.

When you talk about dollars and cents, the bottom line to

stockholders is that they pose a risk to the public if there's danger when they
operate.
MR. MARTIN:

Well, I think that's true and that's what we're concerned about.

And

if the incentives are particularly over the longer term, I think it's of less concern
than if it is over the shorter term, where

you know, it's not unusual for a power

plant to develop a deteriorating condition in the valve or something to where it would
be wise to shut down and fix the valve.

Well, if you have incentives to run over

periods of years or months, that doesn't really affect that decision much.

But if you

have one that, for example, there's a sharp penalty if you run less than nine months,
and your valve is leaking at eight months in 28 days, you have an emotional commitment
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to keep operating when you really shouldn't.

Those are the kinds of things we're

worried about.
But as I said, we haven't seen that anywhere out here, but I think we've taken a
position on this kind of a preventive measure to kind of remind people to be mindful of
it.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

What's the NRC's position on the creation of Independent

Safety Committees for nuclear plants?

And what contacts have you had with the Diablo

Canyon Independent Safety Committee?
MR. MARTIN:

As far as I know, we don't have any position expressly articulated on

Independent Safety Committees.

I think, as far as we're concerned that, again the

situation is in the details if it's a committee that seeks to provide direction to the
utility and conflicting signals would, what we consider, not provide for safety, I
think that would be a problem.

So far, the Independent Safety Committee at Diablo does

not appear to be set up that way.

We have not -- I personally have not had an

interaction with an independent committee which operates independently, as far as I can
tell.

I've read the first report or two, and it did seem like the kinds of issues they

were raising were very similar to the kinds of things we've been concerned about.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. MARTIN:

Are they employees or outside citizens?

No, this is an outside citizen's group.

scheme that perhaps PG&E could explain better than I.
UCLA.

It's a very complicated

But it involves faculty from

Well, there's a fairly complicated scheme of nominating the slate of candidates,

and then the appointments are made, I believe -- I'm not sure exactly, but I believe
the appointments are finally made by the Chairman of the PUC, Attorney General, and the
Energy Commission.

so there's a nomination process of the slate of candidates by a

variety of commissions, and I think either the company gets to nominate some and then
the final selection is made by the chairman of the California Energy Commission, the
chairman of •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you.

What is the NRC's policy concerning plant license renewals?

In other words, will

aging plants, such as San Onofre, have to meet tougher safety requirements than those
applied to newer plants?
MR. MARTIN:

Well, let me answer it this way.

have to meet are reviewed on a continuous basis.

The requirements that the plants
When the older plants, like San

Onofre, didn't want it, for example, when we conclude that it gets out of date, as we
did in the late '70's, we concluded that it was not up to snuff on seismic
requirements; and the plant was ordered to upgrade to meet current seismic criteria,
which they did during the early part of the '80's.
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That's not on a continuous basis.

So when the license expires, there should not be a big backlog of unresolved safety
issues.

Those are handled on a daily basis, weekly basis, so that at the time license

renewal comes the issues ought to be pretty well restricted to age-related degradation.
There isn't any sharp difference between a plant that's 40-years-old and one that's
40-years-and-6-months.

And so the scheme that we've adopted for license renewal is to

have the utility submit at least five years ahead of time, if they elect to renew their
license, an evaluation of the plant and any age-related susceptibilities, just because
of time, that need to be evaluated.

Those issues will be reviewed by the staff and

litigated in a public hearing, if agreed to and if it's desired, and that is the
approach.
renewal.

But we do not foresee saving up a whole bunch of items until the license
Both should be dealt with.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Has your agency reduced the number of on-site inspections at

the nuclear plants in California as a result of budgetary problems?
MR. MARTIN:
have to say yes.
done

Well, my budget is a little bit less than it was years ago, so I'll
I've got like 100 people where I used to have at least 110.

we do some fewer inspections.

So we've

On the other hand, during the 1980s, there was

an awful lot of activity in the western plants.

And there were several upgrade

programs underway so that -- although at some point you realize, we do fewer
inspections than we used to.

The activity level is way down.

there's any appreciable difference in the amount of coverage.

So I would not see that
The Diablo Canyon, for

example, there was, at one time we had four resident inspectors that we had two plants
in a start-up program.

And they subsequently are going through the start-up phases and

settled down to steady operations.

But I haven't had to reduce because of any budget

concerns.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Finally, you've already said that -- I guess it's fair to say

that the NRC has rejected or given little weight to the report provided by the

u.s.

Geological Survey concerning Diablo Canyon's seismic risks associated with the Hosgri
Fault.
MR. MARTIN:

I would disagree with that, Mr. Chairman.

detail the Geologic Survey Report.
to the overall review.

The NRC considered in great

As a matter of fact, it's included as an appendix

I think a better characterization would be that the report was

considered and reviewed in detail and discussed.

There remains, as I understand it,

and I'm just parroting what I've been told-- I'm not an expert in this --that there's
a difference of opinion on what kind of slip motion may occur along the fault line.
And there was, after all the reviews were done, we concluded that the NRC's view and
our consultant's view were also supportable positions; so we just agreed to disagree.
But, the overall result of this, in terms of what does it mean, is the plant
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design.

It's my understanding that there's an intellectual discussion over the site of

the Hosgri fault, but I believe that everybody agrees that the ground motion and the
requirements that the plant would have to withstand would not be much different at all
within the envelope.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

We'll have an opportunity to hear from the

u.s.

Geological

Survey soon.
Well, thank you very much.
MR. MARTIN:

I appreciate your --

Certainly.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

input today.

Next with us is William Chamberlain, General Counsel for the California Energy
Commission.

Welcome.

MR. WILLIAM CHAMBERLAIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

William Chamberlain appearing for the Energy Commission.

Seated next to me is Mr.

Daniel Nix of the Energy Commission who co-chairs the Western Interstate Energy Board
Committee on high-level waste. He's here to answer any questions you might have of the
federal program for disposing of spent fuel from nuclear reactors.
Based on the requests in your invitation, I'm going to try to do two things, three
things, this morning:

First of all, summarize the Energy Commission's responsibilities

with respect to nuclear power plants; second, I'll discuss our view concerning the
likelihood of new nuclear power plants being sited in California; and finally, I'll
address the commission's role in the operation of the plants.
Addressing first our responsibilities, which is siting nuclear power plants, we
have no jurisdiction over any existing nuclear power plants that you're looking into in
particular today.

They were all specifically exempted from our licensing authority and

from the '76 nuclear laws.
we did evaluate the possibility of alternatives to the Rancho Seco nuclear plant
and found that SMUD had that under consideration.
be able to purchase alternative energy from others.

And we found that SMUD would like to
But we have no regular role in

inspecting or monitoring any of the existing Diablo or San Onofre units.
Turning to our assessment of the likelihood of new nuclear power plants in
California, we concluded the probability of that event is very low for a number of
reasons.

First of all, we feel that utility officials have indicated no interest in

continuing with nuclear power development.

They're citing the high cost of

construction, long regulatory and construction lead times, and public opposition to
nuclear power.

And they're not alone in this attitude.

No new nuclear power plants

have been ordered in the United States since 1978.
Second, I think there are -- this attitude is also driven by the fact that there
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are many sources of electricity today that compete with nuclear power, including
demand-side management, co-generation, repowering of existing utility gas-fired
boilers, and alternative resources, such as wind, geothermal, and solar-based
technologies.

In addition, natural gas prices are very low today.

One of the many

benefits of nuclear power is replacing fuel, oil, or natural gas, burned by other
utilities.

And our recently completed gas price forecast suggests that these prices

will remain attractive at least through the 1990's.

So that made highly capital

intensive nuclear power plants seem economically unattractive.
The third and fourth reason for our view that new plants are unlikely has to do
with earthquake safety and scarcity of water for cooling.

Almost all of our

experience, including what Senator Russell indicated just a few moments ago, with
nuclear power plants, have been marred by unexpected problems that have come up with
respect to earthquake faults which were undiscovered when the plant began.

Because of

our generally unstable geology, the construction costs are higher here than they would
be in other parts of the country.

And the likelihood of geologic surprises is

increased.
Additionally, because the nuclear units convert heat to electricity less
efficiently than other kinds of power plants, they require more water for cooling.

And

I'll give you the last six year's drought that dramatizes the need to rely on sources
of generation that require less water consumption.
A further hurdle for any new nuclear power plant proposed, at least by an
investor-owned utility in this state, is the Public Utilities Commission's current
regulatory procedures for resource acquisition.
they want to build and go out and build it today.

Utilities don't simply decide what
They have to first identify what

they believe is the best economically attractive resource.

And then they have to allow

other parties to bid in order to allow competition to benefit ratepayers.

This

procedure would make a utility commitment to the nuclear power plants today difficult,
if not impossible.
plants.

In our analysis of future need we did not identify nuclear power

And even if one was identified, it would have to be open to competition from

other parties to have the opportunity to offer to provide that power.
Finally, as you're probably •••
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Are you saying then that

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

I think they would try to propose the cheapest possible plant

?

that they could, and it would have to be -- it would have to turn out to be less
expensive than all the alternatives.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

I'll ask another question.

If you talk about alternative energy

and natural gas projects, those fuels are fossil fuel.
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And there is some concern about

heating up the atmosphere, the greenhouse effect, and so on.

And it's my understanding

that the hydro and solar and so forth were more valuable but are less than 5 percent of
our power.
true?

So as we grow, we're looking at more fossil fuel generated power; is that

And if that is true, how do we deal with the greenhouse effect?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

I think the greenhouse effect is one of the issues that the

nuclear industry hopes will provide incentives for nuclear plants in the future.

We

will right now, at this stage, could establish a goal, for example, to lower greenhouse
emissions.

We could buy a great deal more emission reduction per dollar in efficiency

improvement and possibly in future renewables.

Or this could turn out to be wrong if

the cost of nuclear power plants comes down substantially.
costs are high.

But current construction

I just don't think you're going to be competitive with efficiency

improvements and renewables.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

You indicated that renewable& were limited, and I think certainly

in today•s technology that's true.

But aren't there some problems in their

development?
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:
very, very low.

In addition to the natural gas power plants, emissions today are

For example, earlier emissions of 80 parts per billion are down to

less than 5 parts billion today.

And we believe there's even a possibility that those

emissions could be reduced further with new technology.

So I don't -- and when you

look at the electricity growth which is very small compared to the past, you can
increase generation efficiency to meet needs.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
Number 1.

My understanding is that you have reviewed the San Onofre Unit

Is it under Energy Commission jurisdiction?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

No, Mr. Chairman.

I believe that when they were rebuilding the

plant in some way to add 50 megawatt capacity we looked at it.
I think the final point that I would like to make relates to our experience in
successfully defending California's nuclear laws from pre-emption challenges.
California citizens are obviously concerned with the safety of nuclear power plants,
and that gives rise to your legitimate concerns with these issues.

But the United

States Supreme Court has now clearly indicated that actions of the states that are
specifially designed to regulate radiation hazards are pre-empted.

By contrast, the

the court has unanimously upheld California's regulations that were based on legitimate
economic questions relating to the wisdom and cost-effectiveness of using this
technology as compared with other alternatives.

The state can also legally regulate

environmental concerns that relate to radiation hazards, such as biological effects.
So we would therefore recommend that any action the committee of the legislature
might consider in the future with respect to the existing nuclear power plants focus on
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two areas:

the environmental impacts that are not associated with radiation hazards,

and the economics of continued investment in these facilities, given possible nuclear
safety requirements by the NRC.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

I'd like to welcome Senator Boatwright to the hearing.

That's the end of our •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much for your testimony.

we move to the next

one now.

Mr. Edward O'Neill, Assistant General counsel with the PUC.
MR. EDWARD O'NEILL:

Thank you.

Welcome.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senators, Assemblymen.

My name is Ed O'Neill.

I'm the Assistant General Counsel with the California Public

Utilities Commission.

And this morning, I was planning on just going briefly over the

role of the commission as it relates to nuclear power plants.

We have other people who

will be here later in this hearing to discuss the issues concerning the San Onofre Unit
1 Plant, the Diablo Canyon Plant, and the Humboldt, and all sorts of general items this
morning and answer any questions you may have relating to those general issues.
Very briefly, the regulation of nuclear power is divided.
federal government and the state.

It's divided between the

It's divided here in California between the Public

Utilities Commission and the Energy Commission.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission exercises authority and its exclusive authority
over the nuclear safety and the technical aspects of nuclear power development as it
relates to nuclear safety.

So they have jurisdiction over radiation hazards and

handling of nuclear waste, the technical design issues concerning the plants, the
Quality Assurance Program, and things of that sort.

But that does leave a significant

amount of authority for the state to exercise over nuclear power.
The Atomic Energy Act does not pre-empt traditional state authority over production
and distribution of electricity.

Those functions that have been traditionally

exercised by states -- and they continue to be functions that can be exercised by
states -- are being exercised by the State of California and other states.

In the

State of California, the authority that we have is divided into, as I said, between the
Public Utilities Commission and the Energy Commission.
The Public Utilities Commission generally exercises what we consider economic
authority, but it isn't solely or strictly economic authority, and I'll explain that
briefly in a moment.

Our primary function is a rate-making body.

We have to decide

jurisdiction over the rates that the utilities charge and over the rates that cover the
costs associated with nuclear power plant construction, operation, and maintenance.

We

are responsible for setting methods for the recovery of the costs associated with
nuclear power, and those rate-making methods have a significant impact on the way the
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utilities respond to events, the decisions they make, and consequently on certain
resources and the ratepayers.
We also have authority to set aside funds for decommissioning nuclear power plants.
That is an important activity that we are engaged in on a periodic basis.

We take a

look at the amount of money that is going to be set aside for future decommissioning.
We have responsibility for establishing some means to assure that those funds are
available when they are needed to decommission plants in the future, and we also try to
make sure that the funds are collected in such a way that ratepayers who benefit from
the power produced from the nuclear power plant also pay the costs associated with the
decommissioning of that plant.

so we try to match the cost of the facility, both the

construction and operation, maintenance, and future decommissioning costs with those
ratepayers who are receiving benefits.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Question.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Senator Russell.

The amount of money that's allocated for the future

decommissioning, is that paid on a monthly table by all the ratepayers; and is that a
small increment of their rate?
MR. O'NEILL:

It's a small increment of the rate that's currently charged to

ratepayers, and we can get into this a little more detailed when we talk about Humboldt
in particular.

But in general, the Public Utilities Commission holds a hearing •••

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. O'NEILL:

You don't have to •••

Okay.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

But basically it's recovered through your utility bills.

How is that then sequestered?

By the utility or by the CPUC or

what?
MR. O'NEILL:

We require that it be set aside in a separate fund, a separate

department account.

Some states allow •••

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Yes, okay.

We require them to set it aside so that there is a higher degree of

assurance that that money will be there.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

And the interest on that money then is factored into the total

ultimate cost?
MR. O'NEILL:

It is.

decommissioning costs.

Third, I mentioned our role of setting rates and recovering
Third, we share authority with the Energy Commission over

resource planning decisions.
The Energy Commission has the responsibility for adopting an energy plan for the
state.

The PUC basically implements that plan.

It's a somewhat complicated procedure,

but we do so by reviewing the particular utility resource plans as they come up for
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review.

And there may be some changes between the time the Energy Commission adopts a

p1an and the utility seeks PUC review and approval.

And that may result in a

difference between the plan approved by the PUC and the one approved by the Energy
Commission.

But basically the Energy Commission approves an energy plan; the PUC

reviews the implementation of that plan by reviewing the utility resource plan.
The other important element of resource planning that we're engaged in is the
function of our continuing oversight of the utility operation.

We review the

reasonable utility resource procurement decisions on a regular ongoing basis, and that
has applied to nuclear plants.

If a particular plant becomes too expensive to operate

-- for example, the Public Utilities Commission defines certain utility costs
associated with that plant; for example, continued operation of a plant to be improved
that can result in the utility deciding to use a particular plant less often or use
it

in a different way or shut it down altogether.

And that hasn't happened yet but

that's an important ongoing responsibility that we have over utility resource planning.
Fourth, we also have some jurisdiction, although it's limited, in the area of
siting.

The Energy Commission has primary responsibility for siting, and they would

have the responsibility for issuing a certificate for the construction of any new
nuclear plant if an application was filed.
The PUC does have responsibility in that area, though.
plan for a nuclear power plant from a financial standpoint.
the cost of the plant.

We would review a proposed
We would take a look at

We'd also take a look at questions concerning service

reliability and things of that nature.
Finally, both the PUC and the Energy Commission have some indirect authority over a
number of different aspects of nuclear plant development and operation that have
economic impact.

And this is an area of jurisdiction that is not real clearly defined,

but it is a result of the
case in 1983.

u.s.

Supreme Court decision in the PG&E vs. Energy Commission

Now that case did hold, as we stated, that the state is not barred from

the regulation of the economic aspects of nuclear power development.

As a result,

there can be many different aspects of the nuclear power plant operation that have
economic effects that we, at least in theory, have some jurisdiction over.
If, for example, we continued operations of a nuclear power plant and created such
financial risks that a utility's bond rating was affected, the Public Utilities
Commission may have authority to require some changes in the way that plant is
operated.
plant down.

We may have authority in such circumstances to require a utility to shut the
I say "may have" because that's an area where the legal support is not

directly on point and there is some dicta in the PG&E case which suggests that we may
not have that authority.

I think the better argument is that, as long as we have
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authority over the economic aspect of nuclear power development, we would have
authority to issue an order like that.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

That's generally my overview of our authority.

Let me ask you a question.

How closely is the PUC

coordinating your rate making decisions with the NRC?

For example, have there been any

discussions with the NRC concerning the safety implications of your decisions?
MR. O'NEILL:

I believe they're having some informal discussions, and at one point

I believe we received a letter from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission commenting on at
least one of our decisions which established a performance-based pricing mechanism.
I'm not sure exactly which one it was.

Since that letter was sent, though, the NRC did

institute a general review of performance-based rate making decisions.

And we've

reviewed the NRC's ruling, and notice, and I believe there's a report produced as a
result of that.

And I think our program in California meets the NRC's standards.

I

don't think there's a problem there.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much, Mr. O'Neill.

Senator Hart.
SENATOR GARY HART:

Mr. O'Neill, could I ask you to comment just a little bit more

on the decommissioning work that the PUC's involved in?
decommissioning of the toxic dump sites?

Did it involve my district's

I'm just trying to understand a little bit

better how the decommissioning works in terms of the resources that will be available
and whether we have adequate resources to dispose of the waste.

I don't know what's

taking place in other states, but there seems to be adequate resources to work through
the decommissioning process.

Do you make modifications based upon new information that

might give you additional resources?

MR. O'NEILL:

We can cover Humboldt Bay specifically a little bit later, but I have

to give you a general answer.

We do take a look at the amount of money that is going

to be required to decommission a plant, typically in an adversarial proceeding where
interested parties can present different points of view; different experts can give
their own estimates.
Once that's done, funds can be set aside so that, over the years, through
continuing utility contributions, the estimated amount needed for decommissioning will
be available.

Now there's a big debate ongoing about the cost of decommissioning large

nuclear power plants.

In order to account for that cost with certainty, the PUC has

generally approved decommissioning funds that have a large contingency factor
contingency factor up to about 50 percent.
SENATOR HART:

MR. O'NEILL:
SENATOR HART:

a

Now there is a

Fifty percent of what?
Fifty percent of the estimated cost.
What are the estimated costs of, let's say, Diablo Canyon or San
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Onofre or Humboldt.
MR. O'NEILL:
me, right now.

Can you give us some idea of what we're talking about?

We have the Humboldt figures.

I don't have the figures right with

I can provide them for you later, during the Humboldt panel, later this

afternoon, if you'd like.
Excuse me, Senator.

But assuming that we estimated the cost of decommissioning a

plant is a billion dollars.

The PUC would set aside that billion, plus a contingency

amount to account for a possible higher cost.

We would set aside $1.5 billion under

that hypothetical.
The other thing that we do to protect ourselves is to provide for reconsideration.
If it looks like the amount of money set aside is well under what current estimates
are, we will reopen our proceeding and redetermine the amounts from the ratepayers so
that accrual will be suficient.
the mechanism is in place.

I don't believe we've had the need to do that yet, but

So we can judge that at any time.

The most difficult case is the case where you have a plant that prematurely
retired.

The Humboldt Bay Plant is an example.

In that case, you may have set an

adequate amount of money aside on a yearly basis, and you may have estimated the future
decommissioning amount after it.

But if the plant's prematurely retired, you may not

have collected nearly the amount of funds necessary to decommission it.
SENATOR HART:
MR. O'NEILL:

What do ratepayers pay?
In that case, it's sort of interesting.

collecting the profits.

The big problem isn't

The big problem is one that we consider a shareholder equity.

You may have no alternatives but to bill future ratepayers certain costs to cover the
cost of decommissioning Humboldt, and that's just filed on the basis of the fact, not
that they're getting power from Humboldt anymore, but on the basis of the fact that
they're getting utility service in general and all of its resources.

But there may be

some dispute in equity in charging ratepayers that are not receiving power from
Humboldt, the costs of decommissioning the plant.
There is not a high rate power plant because you have a large body of ratepayers
now, and you'll have a large body of ratepayers in the future.

But you can come up

with higher incremental costs of decommissioning the facility if your estimate is off
by a bit, or if the plant's decommissioned early as in the retirement in Humboldt.
SENATOR HART:

Will you give me some idea as to what the -- what are the

decommissioning costs involved of saving -- you used the figure of a billion dollars.
It seems like a generous amount of money.
MR. O'NEILL:

How is that billion dollars spent?

Well, I'm a lawyer and not a nuclear engineer.

We can get you that

information later.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay, our next witness is David Freeman, General Manager of
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the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District, SMUD.
Welcome, Mr. Freeman.

You bring a unique energy background to this hearing with

your federal experience in Washington, D.C., your TVA work, and of course, more
recently, you came over to a utility that voluntarily shut down its nuclear plant.

So,

this morning, I hope you can help us with the big picture, sharing your view of the
role of nuclear power in our energy strategy, telling us what life is like with SMUD
after nuclear power.
MR. S. DAVID FREEMAN:

Well, thank you Mr. Chairman.

Let me begin by expressing my appreciation of this committee.

I have not lived in

California long enough to be accused of being a provincial or a chamber-of-commerce
type.

But I must say, that having lived in all parts of the country, this state led by

this committee and the counterparts in the Assembly are leading the nation in
developing an energy policy for this nation.

And I'm very proud to be here and be a

very solid part of what is being done to kind of rationalize the conflict between our
environmental concerns and our need to keep the lights on.
process is something that has to be continually evolving.

And the rationalization
we learn more about the

environmental problems and learn which sources of energy really are the chief leader
and which are too expensive to use.
I have good news to report.

The dark cloud that was hanging over SMUD in terms of

nuclear decommissioning costs, and the health and safety problems associated with
closing down Rancho Seco have been largely lifted.

And I think due to the excellent

cooperation and oversight that we've received from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
this is made to be a sort of a man-bites-dog-type story, not the utility's perspective
of being prey to the regulatory agency.

But I think the NRC is doing an excellent job

of keeping our feet to the fire, so to speak, if you'll pardon the expression, and as
well as working with us in a practical way to reduce the staff at Rancho Seco, as we're
no longer an operating plant.
We have moved the fuel rods, stored in tanks, but we have a definite plan for
removing that fuel from out of the liquid into dry, transportable casks which will put
us in position by 1998 of having the fuel there.

And if the federal government, in all

its glory, can get its act together •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. FREEMAN:
in case it happens.

Good luck.
Well, don't count on it, sir, but you're right.

We'll be ready

In any event, with the fuel being in its safest possible posture

in a dry cask, which can either stay there at the site indefinitely, or be transported,
if they ever find a place which several states agreed upon and the federal government
agrees upon, it doesn't seem like it will happen any time soon.
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As far as the reactor and the other pieces of equipment out there, we're putting
them in what we call "SAFESTOR"; in other words, cleaning them up and kind of leaving
them where they are.

Now we were one of these awful utilities that the gentlemen from

the PUC certainly identified, in that by a vote of the people in Sacramento County, we
did prematurely shut the reactor down in '89.

The operating license was for 2008.

We

had been collecting money regularly in the decommisioning fund, and we have about $100
million.

And it is, Senator Russell, put in a trust fund that we can't get our hands

on -- and that's pursuant to rules of the NRC.

so, we had $100 million collected, but

that is not what's needed to decommission the plant.
about a prematurely shut-down nuclear plant?

And the issue was, what do you do

And we worked that out with the NRC, and

they are permitting us to continue to collect the money until the year 2008 because the
safest thing to do with a reactor is to leave it alone.
It would be unbelievably stupid to go out there and expose workers to tearing that
reactor vessel apart and kicking it to Shangri-La because there is no place that's
available to put it so it's not hurting anyone.

It is, in fact, cooling off so that

the plan that we have is to leave the reactor right where it is until 2008.

In the

meantime, we will continue collecting the money in our rates to accumulate the amount
of money we need.

And we have detailed list of distribution of costs to be brought in

to the prudency review of Batelle and their European company that's had some experience
over there.

And we have a specific estimate of $284 million dollars which we estimate

to be the cost of ultimately doing everything that needs to be done.

There is a

contingency factor included in that.
That money will be collected, but I don't think anyone today can tell you for sure
what we're going to learn between now and 2008 about what to do with a nuclear power
plant whose useful life is over.

There's a lot to learn, and quite frankly on-site

storage of that reactor, just leaving it right there, it looks like a very attractive
option rather than spending hundreds of millions of dollars tearing something apart
that's inherently radioactive and putting it and burying it in a shallow grave
somewhere.

We have a decommissioning report from the NRC which contemplates that we

will tear it apart in 2008, and ship it to wherever waste disposal site may be licensed
and approved by then.
But there is the alternative option that the best thing to do with the reactor in
2008 is let it sit there for a while longer because it's certainly not endangering
anyone where it sits.
speak to this.

And there's a moral issue here, and the Chairman asked me to

There's a moral issue of whether it isn't more responsible to leave the

nuclear waste as sort of a sore thumb there, where you can stare at it and see it, and
have two or three people out there carting it, so to speak, rather than just spending
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huge sums of money tearing it apart, putting it on trucks, and burying it somewhere and
then forgetting about it for a hundred years.
That's a very, very difficult question to answer, and at this point I would like to
say, Mr. Chairman, I applaud your suggestion that this state review its nuclear policy.
We are, I think, at the end of a first nuclear era, and we haven't yet begun the second
nuclear era.

We're sort of in-between of having perhaps gone too far, too quickly in

scaling up the size of the reactors based on submarine technology and not putting
enough effort into the research and development of inherently safer reactors.

And it

would be wise, I think, for the state to re-think it's nuclear policy, not that any
nuclear reactors are going to be built in the '90's; but we know the lead times to
these measures, and we're all very much aware of the global warming problem and we
ought to consider every option.

And I personally have a lot of faith in renewables,

but I would think that it would be unwise to just dismiss nuclear power indefinitely.
It is just an option and therefore I think that it would be wise to reconsider the
state policy, including how you go about handling the nuclear waste, which frightened
the federal government.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR HART:

Senator Hart?

Well, Mr. Chairman, let me be sure I understand this, as it relates

to Rancho Seco.
You're saying that the plant is not doing anything as it relates to removing
materials until the year 2008.

And then, after 2008, it seems from your remark that

your recommendation would be they put out a state hearing.

And if there was a

Shangri-La to take them to, then that would be the safest and the most cost-effective
thing to do.

Is that an accurate interpretation of your testimony?

MR. FREEMAN:

Not, let me, if I could say it in my words.

doing nothing out there.

First of all, we're not

We're cleaning up and laying up and putting it in a SAFESTOR

condition with the facilities that are there and putting the fuel into the dry casks so
we can make that facility just as safe as it possibly can be.

Our plan is -- we are

raising the money to be in position to actually tear the reactor apart and strip it
down to the bone in terms of getting ready to prove that it cna stay there or move
someplace.
I'm simply raising for this commission, Mr. Chairman, actually to raise policy
questions so that the possibility that between now and 2008 we will have a deeper
appreciation of the costs and the options.

And I would just not completely overlook

the possiblity that on-site storage, may, perhaps, be the safest and the most
cost-effective way of dealing with it.

I don't advocate that.

Our decommissioning

plan before the NRC contemplates that we're going to tear apart and take it down to
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move it.

I don't -- and I think that's a prudent thing to do.

money to be able to do it.

We need to raise the

We need to be in a position to do that, but I just gently

suggest that when we're 10 or 15 years older, perhaps wiser about these things, with
the hope of finding an answer to moving all those nuclear wastes all over the country
to bury it somewhere, that we may come to the conclusion that leaving the reactor at
the site, guarding it, would be the wisest thing to do.
Alvin Weinberg, one of the foremost nuclear scientists, once said that "Eternal
vigilance is the price of nuclear power."

And I personally believe that it's more

responsible to have something above ground where you can visibly see it, so future
generations can't forget about it, than these storage outlets -- that's just my
personal opinion.

Our corporate policy is to follow along and raise the money, and

we're going to do that.
SENATOR HART:

And the money that you will be raising, did you say it's $281

million?
MR. FREEMAN:

Yes, sir.

SENATOR HART:

And I don't know if you could comment on my question to Mr. O'Neill,

as to, for those of us that really aren't that familiar with nuclear technology or the
decommissioning process -- why does it cost $281 million to take something apart and
take it somewhere?
MR. FREEMAN:

It's a very good question.

First of all, the productivity of workers working with highly radioactive material
is understandably very low.

You just, you can't work very fast if you've got to have

all sorts of protective clothing and gear so that you're dealing with highly
radioactive components.

And it just takes a lot of person-hours to tear it apart, to

take all the pieces, and then you ship it.

Say ship it down to Needles, and then you

have to pay for that transportation and you have to pay them a certain fee for handling
it for you, and it all adds up.

But the $281 million also includes our program for

putting the fuel into dry casks and for the maintenance of this SAFESTOR between now
and 2008 so that when you break it down into component expenses, we still have 175
people out at Rancho Seco, although it's a far cry from a couple of thousand when it
was operating.

And it just adds up.

we have done this calculation very carefully, but I personally think that we'll
learn a lot.
sum of money.

And the number could easily be high rather than low.

It's an enormous

I'm hopeful that SMUD will be able to use that money to pay off some of

it's debt and not have to waste it dealing with waste.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR HART:

Senator Russell.

Do you think that's the realistic possibility that you might be able
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to undertake such a scenario that you were putting forward, one possibility.
MR. FREEMAN:
SENATOR HART:
MR. FREEMAN:

Yes, sir.
You could save a lot of money.
Yes, sir.

ratepayers of Sacramento.

The money's in the bank, and it will be there for the
And if it doesn't need to be spent, it can be used to pay

off debt or reduce rates or whatnot.

I think it's prudent that we raise the money.

Let me say this, Mr. Chairman, I don't rule out the possibility that a new,
inherently safer, nuclear reactor may be built at the Rancho Seco site in 20 or 30
years from now.

I'm not wise enough to say that that's impossible.

If that were done,

then the reactor would just be sitting in the site where you have people there anyhow,
and it would be very cost-effective to just leave it there for another 20 or 30 years.

SENATOR HART:

Mr. Chairman, finally, I just wondered if the committee would be

interested in getting one of these various commissions that we have in the State of
California to share with the Senate information on the decommissioning

costs and how

this $281 million -- how it breaks down -- or what the decommissioning costs are for
the other larger facilities, such as San Onofre.
MR. FREEMAN:

We have a detailed estimate that I believe a witness will make

available to you this afternoon, and I'll be glad to to provide it.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:
amount of money.

Thank you very much..

Senator Russell has a question.

Yes, the San Onofre was providing power generation for a certain

If that's taken out, so that loss has to be replaced by some other

source, will that replacement come from PG&E?
MR. FREEMAN:

Yes, sir.

We had contracts with Southern California Edison and PG&E

to replace the Rancho Seco power and •••
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. FREEMAN:

We •••

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. FREEMAN:

And what is the cost to the ratepayers?

Of that shut-down and transfer?

Well, we're purchasing electricity from PG&E and Southern California

Edison at roughly the same costs that operating Rancho Seco incurred, recognizing that
Rancho Seco operated at about a 50 percent load factor over its age.

Now obviously, if

the nuclear plant was operating at an 80 percent load factor, then it would be higher
cost and higher than 50.

But we negotiated fair contracts.

We think the price of

natural gas has been good to us and has gone down rather than up.
I looked at the projections at the time, before I was there when they decided, the
people decided to shut down Rancho Seco.

And the projections of natural gas prices

were 20 percent higher than what they are today.
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So we are not being punished,

economically, by having shut down the Rancho Seco plant.

And we are in the process of

requiring co-generation power plants, one wind plant which is from a facility in the
northwest of here, in the very late stages of consideration this month and is a
complete replacement for Rancho Seco.
again, with our own power resources.

So, by the year 2000, we'll be independent,
But it will be primarily our energy efficiency

program which is a 700-megawatt program, the co-generation plants, wind plants, the
hydro that we already own, and some geothermal.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

But those replacements will be costs that would not have had to

have been expended had the Rancho Seco plant continued.

So there is a cost to the

ratepayers that would not have been there; is that correct?
MR. FREEMAN:

Well, the cost of Rancho Seco, at the time it was shut down, on an

operating basis, are pretty well in line with what we're going to be able to bring in
to new power resources because a nuclear plant operating only half the time isn't a
very cost-effective unit.

Now, I'm not commenting on the other nuclear units in the

state, which apparently operate much better.

But, looking at -- I've only been there a

year-and-a-half -- I wasn't there when the decision was made.

But based on the

projections of what was considered would happen if Rancho Seco stayed or was shut down,
what's happening is not costing the ratepayers money now.

I'd be answering the

question differently if we never built Rancho Seco, in the first place.

All right.

That's a different question.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

But maybe this is hindsight and maybe you can't answer it, but we

would always hope that a facility that's working 50 percent, if it were to continue,
would be improved so it would operate more effectively and efficiently.

Was there any

chance of that?
MR. FREEMAN:

Yes, sir.

it go for another year.

I think the people of Sacramento County voted once to let

Hundreds of millions of dollars were invested.

operate a whole lot better.

It didn't

I don't want to, you know, look backwards and

second-guess, but my experience with nuclear power is such, that if you don't put the
money into the maintenance every year and you let it go for a number of years, which
may have happened here, it's almost too late.

This is one of the earlier nuclear

plants that was built before Three-Mile Island.
had to be done.

There was a lot of retro-fitting that

And, frankly, I think the answer is that it's continued operation

really didn't appear to be economic because the vote in sacramento that denounces that
plant was not a vote against nuclear power.

It was a lack of competence in the ability

of this particular utility to operate this particular nuclear plant in a cost-effective
manner.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much, Mr. Freeman.
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We've now had the general overview and I've been a little bit lax in terms of the
total time.

I'm going to hold everybody to ten minutes.

The next panel will be the discussing the San onofre Nuclear Power Plant.

The

first one will be Richard Rosenblum, Manager of Nuclear Regulatory Affairs for Southern
Cal Edison.
Let's begin with testimony from Southern Cal Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric
Company.

Mr. Robert Lacy will come up to the table, will be near the front so that you

can come next.

And this is concerning San Onofre.

I'd appreciate the utility witnesses including in your testimony your views
concerning two major issues:

efforts to mitigate the marine pollution that we've heard

about and the cost-effectiveness of SONGS Unit 1.
MR. RICHARD ROSENBLUM:
Dick Rosenblum.

Okay, ten minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators, Assemblymen.

My name's

As stated, I'm the Manager of Nuclear Regulatory Affairs for Southern

California Edison.

As you may know, Southern California Edison is the operating

partner for the three units at San Onofre and owns 80 percent of san Onofre Unit 1, the
remainder being owned by San Diego Gas and Electric; and about 75 percent of San Onofre
Units 2 and 3, 20 percent of those units are owned by San Diego; and the remaining 5
percent is owned by the Cities of Anaheim and Riverside.

san Onofre is located on the

Pacific Coast, about halfway between Los Angeles and san Diego on the Marine Corps Base
at Camp Pendleton.
In preparing for this meeting and sitting in the back, I noticed there are some
briefing materials already handed out with the agenda.

And in listening to what others

have said, I'll try to keep my remarks very brief.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

Thank you.

To some extent, I may repeat information already stated merely for

consistency and continuity.
With that brief introduction, let me re-acquaint you with the three units at San
Onofre quickly.
400 megawatts.

Unit 1, as stated, started operation in 1968, has a capacity of about
During its first 12 years of operation, San Onofre Unit 1 operated on

average at about 73 percent of its capacity.
In the early 1980s, following the accident at Three-Mile Island, a period of
back-fits, retrofits at the unit, started, which has been going on now for about a
decade that has required extended outages and has reduced the lifetime capacity factor
at San Onofre to about 51 percent.

We've obtained a full-term operating license for

San Onofre just recently from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

And, in the next

refueling, we'll be completing this decade-long period of modifications and following
that would expect the unit to return to the performance that •••
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Senator Russell?

Just to clarify what you said, the 51 percent, is that what

you've cut over the lifetime,- longevity of the plant, by 51 percent or is the
power-generating capacity 51 percent during this period?
MR. ROSENBLUM:

We've reduced its lifetime capacity factor, in other words, the

average amount of energy it's produced over that presently almost 20-year period to
about 51 percent of what it theoretically could have done if we'd run it at 100 percent
the whole time.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

Starting back in '60 •••
Starting in 1968.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

So it's been shut down, basically then, for some time, which

will -- which has reduced that quotient.

Now, you said it was operating at 73 percent,

but now because of the retrofit that has been reduced to 51 percent?
MR. ROSENBLUM:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

That's correct.
And then when you finish all these retrofits, then you'll start a

new phase and maybe it will go up to 73 or 80 percent again?
MR. ROSENBLUM:
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:
for a few minutes.

We would expect it to return to about 70 percent again.
Thank you.
With that brief review of SONGS 1, let me talk about SONGS 2 and 3
SONGS 2 and 3 came on-line in the early 1980s following the

accident at Three-Mile Island and, as a result, have not had long shut-downs or
back-fits.

Most of that work was done during the initial construction.

The units have

operated lifetime capacity factor of about 69 percent to date, and we consider that to
be roughly typical of what we would expect in the future for this site as a whole.
Since they first became operational, the three units at San Onofre have produced
about 160 billion kilowatt hours of electricity, which to give you a feeling for what
that means, it's roughly equivalent to the electricity we would obtain from about 260
million barrels of oil.

During that period, we've eliminated approximately 62 million

tons of air pollutants that would otherwise have been generated from fossil fuels such
as natural gas.

Those include NOx, SOx -- which are the precursors to smog -- and

carbon dioxide, which is thought to be a significant contributor to the Greenhouse
effect.
In recent times, 1990 is the most recent year for which we have complete year
statistics, the three units at San Onofre produced about 15 percent of the total
electricity on our system.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

We had a site •••

Senator Russell?

Yes, sir.
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SENATOR RUSSELL:

That billion kilowatts that you referred to, do you have any

figures that, if that had been produced by a typical fossil fuel plant, with all the
retrofits required during that period of time, would the cost per kilowatt be less with
a fossil fuel, or less with the nuclear power, or do you know?
MR. ROSENBLUM:

I really couldn't say.

The cost of energy has been so volatile

during that period that it would be very difficult for me to predict what the result
would have been otherwise.
As I was saying, in 1990, our latest complete year, the aite operated at an average
of 74 percent capacity for all three units and ranked fourth in the nation for nuclear
plants on total energy generated.

We expect 1991 to have performance that's very

similar to 1990, based on what we know today.
I was going to speak briefly about plant safety.
already said a good bit.

Mr. Martin from the NRC has

I won't repeat any of the information he provided.

I will

point out that we don't look to the NRC as our primary source of oversight or safety at
San Onofre.

We have our own oversight organizations staffed by 140 professional

nuclear personnel.

They spend 100 percent of their time reviewing our activities.

They range in qualifications from people who perform non-destructive examination,
x-rays of pipes and that sort of thing, to a group of Ph.O.s that oversee the operation
of the plant and the engineering decisions we make.
With that brief overview, let me speak, Mr. Chairman, about the environmental
matters you questioned.
As you know, we recently completed
Review Study of San Onofre operation.

I should say recently completed was a Marine
It took about 14 years to do that study at a

cost of in the high $40 million, about $48 million dollars.

And the result of that

survey, that study, was that San Onofre was not creating the ecological desert that
some had feared in the Pacific Ocean prior to the initial operation.
identify localized impacts to the ocean.

The study did

And although Edison doesn't agree with the

results of the study completely, we have nevertheless agreed to a mitigation program to
compensate for any effects.

We think this is very important because obviously almost

any endeavor by man results in some impact to the environment.

And where that impact

cannot be feasibly or cost-effectively avoided, it ought to be mitigated to the extent
possible.
So we've agreed to this program.

The mitigation program is between the Coastal

Commission, the Chairman of the MRC, and ourselves.

We all agree that this will avoid

the impact -- it will mitigate the impact, I should say -- of the operation of the
unit.
There are three pieces to the mitigation program.
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Very quickly, it consists of:

Restoration of 150 acres of wetlands in the vicinity of San Onofre. This not only has
an impact on the environment but obviously great aesthetic impact since it sharply
improves them; the establishment of 300 acres of artificial kelp to avoid any damage we
may be causing to the kelp; and some improvements in our plant's fish protection system
to minimize the number of fish that may be entrained in our cooling water system.
In addition, although not finalized yet, the Coastal Commission is looking at the
possibility of a marine fish hatchery.

That study also raised some questions about our

compliance with our cooling water permit.

The San Diego Regional Water Quality Control

Board has just finished extensive hearings on the matter.

We believe that we are in

compliance with our permit, and a conclusion by the Water Quality Board is expected
early next year.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

What's the problem?
That we are having a more than localized effect on the marine

environment which would not be allowed by our permit and that, as I believe stated
earlier, we are reducing the light level reaching the bottom of the ocean.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

How wide an area is your operation affecting?
I'm sorry, Senator.

I don't know the exact extent of what's

considered localized under the regulations.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

We'll hear a little bit more about the particular problem from

the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board a little bit later.
MR. ROSENBLUM:

Okay.

Just one more minute and I'll try to be done if I'm okay on

time?
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

Cost effectiveness of SONGS Unit 1.

Yes, Unit 1, of course, is the oldest unit at San Onofre and is

presently in its 11th fuel cycle.
In a CPUC filing recently, we requested permission to invest $125 million to
complete the safety-upgrade program I discussed previously.

Hearings in the matter

were heard in the Biennial Resource Plan update phase of a CPUC hearing recently.

The

Division of Ratepayer Advocates who will speak after me disagreed with Edison's finding
that investment of that money and continued operation was cost-effective.
We believe that continued operation is cost-effective.

And, in fact, in that

hearing, and to determine the cost-effectiveness, we performed 32 evaluations of
possible futures for San Onofre involving different capacity factors, different gas
prices, different values for environmental pollution credits, and other values.
Twenty-seven of those studies showed that san Onofre was cost-effective with a
ratepayer benefit as high as $600 million dollars.

In other words, the ratepayer would

get $600 million more benefit from running San Onofre than not running it.
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Five showed

that San Onofre might possibly not be cost-effective in the future.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:
have to invest.

What factors did you take into account ••.•
Gas costs and the capacity factor of the unit, how much capital we

That's correct.

We also ran six studies using the CPUC's preferred

and primary cost-effectiveness tool.

All six of those showed that San Onofre was

cost-effective.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

So you're telling me that PUC says that you're okay?

MR. ROSENBLUM:

we have filed that information.

No.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

Fine.

Thank you very much.

The PUC itself hasn't concluded it.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
Assemblyman Harvey.

Okay.

As I said earlier, the DRA from the PUC disagrees with the •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

Oh, I see.

Those are our studies.

Thank you very much.

I'd like to welcome to the committee

Thank you for coming.

ASSEMBLYMAN TRICE HARVEY:
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

(Inaudible)

It's all right.

It's all right.

Senator Russell.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

If the decision, whoever commits to it, in terms of

cost-effectiveness and so forth and so on, the result would be you have to shut that
plant down?
MR. ROSENBLUM:

That would be one possible result, certainly.

The outcome of the

hearings aren't at all clear and what the possible treatments for San Onofre aren't
clear.

We could continue to run it in the rate base; we could run it under some form

of incentive-base rate-making; or conceivably we might shut it down.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

What's your opinion of the incentive base rates?
Well, of course •.•
You're heard the concerns, the views, described by •••
Of Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin.
Yes, I think those are valid concerns.

It can provide wrong

incentives to a utility; and it might not, depending upon how it's structured.

It's

really very difficult to answer that question in the abstract.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

But if the plant is taken off-line, what effect would that have

on SMUD customers buying power from the Edison Company?
ROSENBLUM:
treatment.

I'm sorry, Senator.

I don't know what the effect would be in our rate

I believe that's a contract.

I don't know how it's -- it's -- the price is

fixed.
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SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

If that were taken off-line?
It is our view that taking San Onofre off the line would result in

a loss to the ratepayers, yes, in 27 out of 32 of the possible features.
SENATOR ROSENTHAL:

Yes.

Assemblyman Mountjoy?

ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD MOUNTJOY:

We just heard a minute ago about the fact that

Rancho Seco is shut down, they now buy power from Southern Cal.

If San Onofre is shut

down, what happens to that power that we're now selling to Rancho Seco customers of
SMUD?

It would seem to me like you'd be very foolish to go into a contract where you

don't have some kind of escalator.

Your costs are going to go up.

Obviously, the

costs then to SMUD would be going up also.
MR. ROSENBLUM:

Again, I don't really know what that contract's terms are, so it's

difficult for me to answer.

At least in the near term, we have sufficient capacity on

our system to replace San Onofre were it shut down.

I believe when San Diego

testifies, you'll see that that's a very different situation for them.
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

You have enough capacity to continue your operation and that

is in continuing, even selling to the other customer that you have out there?
MR. ROSENBLUM:

I believe that's •••

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
MR. ROSENBLUM:

I assume you're selling •••

In the short term.

Somewhere down the line, that would reverse;

and, of course, we'd need new capacity.

For San Diego, I believe the picture is very

different and they need the capacity right now.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

We'll next hear from Robert G. Lacy,

Manager of Nuclear for San Diego Gas and Electric Company.

Welcome.

MR. ROBERT G. LACY: Good Morning, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. LACY:

Ten minutes, sir.

And Senators, Assemblymen.

My name is Robert Lacy.

I'm the Manager of

the Nuclear Department for San Diego Gas & Electric.
In the interest of time, I'm not going to talk about the Marine Review Committee
and the offshore environment.

Mr. Rosenblum has already done that eloquently.

I would

like to talk, though, about our role at San Onofre, since we don't operate the
facility.

But in view of the fact that we are a 20 percent owner, and coincidentally

we get 20 percent of our customers' energy from that facility, we've got a very deep
and continuing interest in its safe and reliable operation.

And, with that in mind, we

monitor and work with Edison in a number of areas that I'd like to talk about very
briefly.

And then I'd like to get into the issue of safety and the cost-effectiveness

of San Onofre Unit 1.
We do have an on-site engineer who monitors the day-to-day performance of the
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facility and reports to our senior management on close to a real-time basis, what is
going on at the facility.

He has a nuclear background.

He understands the plant

probably as well as the Edison people who are out there.
In the estimating and budgeting area, we also have a full-time cost engineer and
full-time accountants and auditors who monitor and work with Edison in preparing
budgets, estimates, and tracking costs at san Onofre.
In the licensing area, we have a full-time licensing engineer who works with his
counterparts at Edison.

And on occasion, either I or my senior management will attend

meetings with the NRC on issues that are of particular importance to san Diego Gas &
Electric.
Overseeing in these areas, the entire operation of the facility is a business
endeavor, is the Board of Review which consists of members from our senior managements,
both Edison and San Diego; and in the case of Units 2 and 3, the two cities of Anaheim
and Riverside.

They monitor and approve things like budgets, overhaul schedules, fuel

plans, and so on, everything except for matters related specifically to safety -- and
I'd like to get into that right now.
We do take a very proactive role with Edison in matters related to safety and
participate on bodies at two separate levels that are specifically charged with
reviewing what goes on at the facility as it relates to safety impacts and the
potential for perhaps reduced safety in the future.
The first is the On-Site Safety Review Committees.
and one for Units 2 and 3.

There are two:

one for Unit l

And their role is to ensure that the plant complies with

all of the safety procedures that are either mandated by management or by the NRC.

The

other level, this is a senior level, are the Nuclear Control Boards, who are made up of
senior technical managers from the owners; that is, in the case of Unit l, Edison and
San Diego -- and in the case of Units 2 and 3, Edison, San Diego, and the two cities.
In addition, the Nuclear Control Boards can, and as a matter of fact right now,
they do have an outside consultant who participates with us in overseeing the plant
from a safety perspective.

That consultant happens to be an ex-manager of the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission.
In many respects, the nuclear control boards are analogous to PG&E's Independent
Safety Committee.

They oversee what's going on from a safety perspective.

But there's

one very important difference between these boards and the PG&E committee; and that is,
that these boards have the authority and in fact have dictated changes in the plant,
either operating procedures or physical changes in order to ensure a continued safe
operation of the facility.

so there is that one very important difference.

There's another point I should make in this context, and that is, that the nuclear
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control boards are not, have not, been mandated by the NRC.

These boards were created

by the owners, although I understand that the NRC looks very favorably on them and

their work.
Let me now talk about the cost-effectiveness of Unit 1.
~inting

And I want to start by

out that the conclusions that were reached by San Diego as compared to Edison

are somewhat different.

And when one looks at the difference between our two

utilities, I think that's pretty understandable.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. LACY:

Conclusions as to what?

The cost-effectiveness and under what conditions the unit remains to be

cost-effective, and I'll describe that in just a minute.
We participated with Edison in the studies that led to certain assumptions that
were made with regard to predicting the future for San Onofre Unit 1.

Those

assumptions related to capacity factor, capital requirements, operating and maintenance
costs, and so on.

Those are unique to the unit.

those assumptions would stand.

And regardless of who the owner is,

Then we coupled those assumptions with those that are

unique to San Diego Gas and Electric, and those would relate to such things as the need
for capacity.

And as Mr. Rosenblum has pointed out, our needs are more immediate than

theirs, as well as internal financial constraints and capacity options and
opportunities and so on.
The result is that we have demonstrated in the PUC proceeding we think very
strongly that the unit remains cost-effective for the customers of San Diego Gas and
Electric.

And in doing that, we did sensitivity studies at varied, as Edison did,

things like capacity factor and in gas prices and so on and demonstrated even more
strongly, and under some of these varying assumptions, the unit remains
cost-effectiveness.
In fact, Senator, you talked about 51 percent capacity factor a few minutes ago
when Mr. Rosenblum was testifying.

we even took the capacity factor of Unit 1 down to

44 percent, and it is still cost-effective for our customers.

So we feel very strongly

in this regard that the unit should remain in service, that hopefully the BRPU
proceeding will reach that conclusion sometime early next year.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Question.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. LACY:

Senator Russell.

Yes, sir.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

If the decision were to be that it's not cost-effective, you've

got to take that plant off-line, where would you make up that 20 percent loss?
MR. LACY:

Well, here's an important difference between ourselves and Edison.

We'd

have to make up that loss immediately where Edison would have a few years to come up
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with an alternative capacity.

I'm not in the resource planning area.

My judgment

right now would be we'd have to go outside and buy capacity someplace in the near term
to make up for that loss.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

You have been, I understand, short on capacity and have been sort

of scrambling for and reaching out to other plants and other states; is that correct?
MR. LACY:

That's correct, sir.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

And for now, I presume that you have met your needs.

would then exacerbate that possibility, that requirement.

So this

Do other plants around have

enough capacity that you could make up that loss immediately?
MR. LACY:

Well, our strategy in the near term -- absent shutdown of Unit 1 --

we're still trying to buy capacity off-system.

I would assume, even though again, I'm

not a resource planner, that we could probably make up the additional capacity that we
would be required to make up, if the unit is shut down, through off-system purchases.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

From the -- what was it?

Arizona Nuclear -- Palo Verde -- is

that what it's called?

•

MR. LACY:
there.

Well, no.

There's no power available

It would be from probably coal resources in Arizona and New Mexico.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. LACY:
MR. LACY:

Which are under the gun now for environmental degradation.

Environmental perspective, yes.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. LACY:

Which are under the gun now, I understand.

I'm sorry, sir.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

Would that be a long-term contract?

I couldn't answer that question, sir.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. LACY:

Committee.

Thank you very much.

Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

We'll next hear from Dr. Fay, Member of the Marine Review

And there's a replacement for Dr. Murdoch who I understand is ill.

DR. RIMMON FAY:
Murdoch.

Palo Verde is fully subscribed.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I think Dr. Ambrose is here for Or.

He'll give you the background of the MRC studies, and then I'll fill in

for •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. FAY:

Pardon?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. FAY:

Between us?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. FAY:

You have ten minutes between you.

Okay.

Ten minutes between you.
Oh.
Ten minutes between you.

Take it away, Rich.
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You have five minutes each.

DR. RICH AMBROSE:

Good morning.

My name is Rich Ambrose.

I'm a marine biologist

at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and the Technical Coordinator for the
Marine Review Committee.

And Dr. Murdoch would have liked to have been here today but

he's sick, and so he asked me to give his testimony in his place.
Between 1976 and 1989, the MRC carried out a study of the effects of the cooling
system of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, or SONGS, on the the marine
environment.
~wer

The study broke new ground, first, in being wholly independent of the

company, and second, in using a powerful statistical design that can distinguish

the effects of the power plant •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. AMBROSE:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. AMBROSE:

Are you going to give us the gist -in five minutes, or are you going to read your statement?

I'll give you the gist.

The second reason it broke new ground was using this powerful statistical design
that can determine the effects separate from the natural variation in the environment.
The power plant affects the marine organisms in two ways.

First, it takes in an

enormous amount of ocean water to cool the reactor, an equivalent amount to one square
mile by 14 feet deep every day.

Second, it moves turbid water -- that's water with a

lot of particles -- from near the shore and from close to the ocean floor, offshore, up
near the surface, and about 60 percent of the time over the kelp bed.
So the two major corresponding effects on the marine biota are as follows -- can I
get slides, or should I just do •••
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Yes.

Just for my own information, the Marine Review Committee, who

appoints them; is that an established public group or is it self-anointed or what?
DR. AMBROSE:

It was a condition of the permit that the Coastal Commission gave to

Southern California Edison for the construction of SONGS.

There are three members.

Dr. Fay, who's a member -- a representative -- of the environmentalists; Dr. Vira
McCalis, who is a representative of Southern California Edison; and Dr. Murdoch, who's
appointed by the Coastal Commission.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

And who appoints those other two?

They were interveners who are coordinated by Friends of the Earth who

appointed Dr. Fay, and Southern California Edison appoints their own •••
SENATOR RUSSELL:

So the coastal Commission appointed one; the Friends of the Earth

appointed one; and -DR. AMBROSE:

And Edison.
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SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

So the idea is a balanced •••

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

Edison appointed one?
Well balanced, yes.

Right.

(Laughter)

So the two major effects of those physical changes to the environment are, first,
the intakes kill 4 to 5 billion fish eggs and larvae every year.

Now although fish

populations can compensate, to some extent, for these losses, most likely that results
in a decline in adult fish stocks.

The main effects fall on a few species of fish that

are concentrated near shore, and the MRC calculated that the standing stock of these
species is reduced by 1 to 10 percent in Southern California Bight -- that's an area
from Point Conception to Northern Baja California -- and this is an amount equivalent
to about 600 tons of fish.
Now these are not large percentage losses, and they occur mainly in non-sport and
non-commercial species.

But they occur on top of losses imposed by other human

activities, and they probably appear ultimately as reductions in the sport and
commercial species that feed on these affected groups.
The second major effect is that the changes in the physical environment cause
roughly a 50 percent reduction in the area of kelp near the power plant, an average
reduction in the abundance of about 70 percent of fish that occur in the kelp bed, and
of about 45 percent in 9 species of invertebrates in the kelp bed.

These effects are

substantial because kelp beds are ecologically important and biologically diverse
habitats in the ocean and are quite sparse in the San Onofre area.
The MRC concluded that these effects do not constitute an ecological disaster, but
they are substantial adverse effects and require corrective or compensatory action.
And along those lines, the MRC first considered massive changes to the power plant,
namely, the addition of cooling towers and altering the discharge systems, that could
prevent most of these effects.

The majority of the committee concluded, however, that

the cost would be disproportionate to the benefits and there would be additional
significant environmental effects.
So instead, the MRC unanimously recommended a set of options from which the
commission was invited to select its final list of conditions.

And these options

included changes to the operation of the plant and various possible mitigation
techniques.
The MRC worked with the commission staff in exploring these options and decided
that changes to the plant would reduce its efficiency and would transfer a portion of
the environmental effects to other power plants.

Thus the mitigation package finally

imposed on Edison by the commission centered on a replacement kelp bed and restoration
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of a coastal wetland, as you've already heard, and that this package is entirely
consistent with the MRC's recommendations.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

How do you replace kelp?

By constructing an artificial reef and making sure that kelp grows on

that reef.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

In the same general area?

In the same general area but outside of the effect of the plume of

the power plant so that you don't have ongoing •••
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

How far away?

I don't know exactly, but the kelp bed extends a little bit over a

kilometer from the discharge of the power plant and we detected effects that far.

So

it has to be at least a kilometer away.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. AMBROSE:

Would you wind up, please.

Yes, sir.

Two points -- the Marine Review Committee has submitted

testimony to the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board on hearings on SONGS'
NPDES permits.
being met:

The majority testimony is that two standards in the permit are not

First, the plant reduces the light reaching the ocean floor in the kelp

bed; and the second one is the plant causes a degradation of the biota by reducing the
abundances of kelp and other organisms in the kelp bed.

And the board is presently

weighing this and other testimony.
And then finaly, you asked Dr. Murdoch to comment on the broader implications for
regulation, and he has two conclusions -- three conclusions -- sorry.
He's concluded that the current regulation on the SONGS' NPDES permit is inadequate
for three reasons:

First, the present standards are ineffective.

Edison's required by

its NPDES permit to carry out environmental studies to determine whether or not the
effects of SONGS on the marine environment violate regulatory standards.

But the

mandated studies do not have the power to detect any but the most disastrous of
effects.
itself.

Second, self-assessment does not work.

As is standard, Edison investigates

The company or its consultants carry out the studies required by the permit.

The company analyzes and interprets the results.
techniques for finding effects.

These analyses do not apply adequate

And then finally, the Regioanl water Quality Control

Board has too small a scientific staff to investigate properly the issues raised by
this inadequate process.
In Dr. Murdoch's view, the regulatory activities carried out for SONGS' NPDES
permit have been almost entirely a waste of the millions of dollars that have been
spent.

The situation could be improved by carefully rewriting the regulatory standards

and requiring third-party monitoring by a wholly independent body reporting directly to
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the regulatory agency.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Senator Russell.

Help me to understand.

You've got a power plant on the coast,

and it's discharging water, which is creating some problems that you're saying.

And

how far --you call that a "plume", do you?
DR. AMBROSE:

Right, from the discharge.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

And the plume affects the adjacent water?

Right.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

And how big is the plume, and how big is the area that is

affected with the temperature change?
DR. AMBROSE:

Most of the effect is not from the temperature.

that the plume picks up and distributes in the area around.

It's from particles

The temperature changes

less than 4 degrees farenheit within a thousand feet of the discharge.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

What are the particles?

Where do they come from?

They come from -- they're natural particles that are in the water.

They're usually either inshore or close to the bottom.

What the plume does, what the

discharge does, it picks up these particles and moves them up closer to the surface and
over the kelp bed.

And when they're moved in that location, they reduce the light that

reaches the bottom of the ocean floor so that kelp can't grow as well.

It doesn't

survive as well.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

And that area that these particles cover is how big?

I don't know exactly, but on the order of a few kilometers, a mile or

two.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

And that creates in that area an environmental degradation of the

organisms that are living in the kelp bed.

And compared to -- that's a part compared

to the whole; it doesn't seem very significant that the plume that would be a couple of
kilometers across and maybe a couple of kilometers out would make that big a deal.
DR. AMBROSE:

And it's true that that effect is localized.

And one of the reasons

we believe it's important and it should be mitigated is because kelp is a very
important -- kelp beds are a very important community, and they're relatively scarce in
that area.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

Yes.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

Were they there before the plant was built?
They were scarce?

That's right.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

And they're still scarce?
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DR. AMBROSE:

Right.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

So what's the problem?

But there are fewer of them, so the ones that are there are

Lmportant.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:
from the intake.

So what was there, there is less of?

Right.

But also the other major effect is not from the discharge but

The power plant takes in a lot of fish larvae and eggs and kills

them, and some of those fish would have grown up; some of those larvae and eggs would
have grown up to be adult fish.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

If there is an environmental disruption of a certain area, isn't

is a natural process that, in this case, the fish, go somewhere else?
DR. AMBROSE:

The way the life cycle of fish, marine fish, those larvae and eggs,

are floating over many, many miles in the ocean; and so that effect actually is spread
over a very, very large area.

And we estimated the effect over the Southern California

Bight, which is from Point Conception to Baja California.

It's virtually all of

Southern California.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. AMBROSE:

The sucking of the eggs?

Because the larvae are spread over such a large area.

Even though

they're killed locally in San Onofre, the effects are spread over a large area.
SENATOR HART:

Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR HART:

Yes, Gary.

Dr. Ambrose

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR HART:

Thank you.

Senator Hart.

-- I missed the point that you were making about Dr. Murdoch's

conclusions, and you mentioned a waste of dollars.
lot.

Now this was a study that cost a

This was a $40 or $50 million study?
DR. AMBROSE:

Excuse me.

The waste that he was talking about was not the Marine

Review Committee's study but •••
SENATOR HART:
DR. AMBROSE:

Which cost how much?
Forty-eight million is the number that we've been told.

I think it's

about that right.
It has to do with the monitoring that's required as part of the NPDES permit.
SENATOR HART:
DR. AMBROSE:

NPDES.

What's that?

It's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.

It's something

that the •••
SENATOR HART:
DR. AMBROSE:

The Regional water Board?
Yes, that's right.

The Regional Water Board has to give a permit to
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the power plant to discharge their water.

And as a condition of that permit, they

require Edison to conduct their own studies.

So these are separate studies from what

the Marine Review Committee did to see whether -- but with a parallel purpose, to see
whether the power plant is having an effect on the environment or violating a permit.
SENATOR HART:

Having spent $40 or $50 million on a major study to make these

determinations, these conclusions that you've just shared with us, we have another
study -OR. AMBROSE:
SENATOR HART:
OR. AMBROSE:
SENATOR HART:
DR. AMBROSE:
SENATOR HART:

Right.
that's going to be •••
Has been going on.
That has been going on that's dealing with some of the same issues?
Right.
Why do we need to have two studies when one study was done by

eminent biologists and cost $50 million?
DR. AMBROSE:

The monitoring for the NPDES permit, it's a standard condition for

and there are many NPDES permits for discharges along the coast.

They routinely are

required to monitor their discharge to make sure they're in compliance.
The Marine Review committee study was a special study established

j~st

by the

Coastal Commission to see whether there is an effect on the marine environment.
SENATOR HART:

Didn't the coastal Commission and the Regional Quality Board try to

get together and do one study?
OR. AMBROSE:

In fact, there was some coordination.

But for the most part, I think

the important distinction is that the Marine Review Committee study was done by the
independent body, independent from the power company; whereas the NPDES permit
monitoring is conducted by the power company.
SENATOR HART:

I see.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you.
Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN TRICE HARVEY:

Assemblyman Harvey.
Yes.

I have two questions.

would be, you've told us the bad side of it.

The first one, I guess,

Is there a good side?

increase in species due to the warmness of water and so forth?

Is there any

In '78, there was

because I was heavily involved in the proposed nuclear power plant being sited in the
town of Wasco in Kern County or whether it should be on the coast.

We went through

this debate with scientists on both sides and not taking to other area, but we had
community hearings, the civic center with scientists on both sides, one side telling us
it's based on all of their education and all the books and studies they've done on how
safe nuclear power is; and the other side, well qualified, saying how it's going to
destroy us all and we're supposed to make decisions when they're well-qualified people
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that don't agree.
At the time -- this is going back to '78 and '79, though -- it was beneficial, once
pointed out, that happened as a result of this intake and output.
LS shaking his head no.
Lmproved.

There's nothing beneficial; nothing happens; nothing's

It's strictly everything is from the bad viewpoint of this.

DR. AMBROSE:

I think I can answer that with the slides.

This slide summarizes the effects of the nuclear power plant.
the top there are substantial adverse effects.
about.

The other gentleman

And you can see at

Those are some of the ones I talked

The red arrows indicate those were all significant decreases.

On the bottom, the Marine Review Committee also studies those groups but concluded
that there were no substantial adverse effects in those groups on the bottom.
with the green arrows actually showed significant increases.
have any significant effect at all.

The ones

The other ones didn't

Also, you'll notice that there's an asterisk

against the ones with no adverse effects and we expressed reservations about those
effects.

But the majority of the committee concluded that there were significant

increases in those three groups -- such as soft bottom fish.
ASSEMBLYMAN HARVEY:

Okay.

Thank you.

So there is two sides to the stroy.

I'm

glad I asked that.
I guess the other question I had was sort of answered in that because we're here to
review the study.

And what I would hope could be done is, if you've got $50 million

spent, as Senator Hart was related to, on that amount of money and another study on top
of that, I think it comes to the decision now on what needs to be done.
that becomes political.

And I guess

I don't really think that most of us would need other studies.

And I'm sure that there's other sides of this story that may or may not be heard today,
that there's those who will try to say that there's some positive things happened.
DR. AMBROSE:

The coastal Commission will talk about what action they took.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. RIMMON c. FAY:
California.

Dr. Fay.
Thank you, Senator Rosenthal.

I'm Rimmon c. Fay, from Venice,

I also served for a little over six years on the California Coastal

commission, not at the time when the state commission heard this matter of San Onofre.
And then subsequent to 1980, I gained tenure on the Marine Review Committee.
The MRC came into existence because Southern California Edison said you'll not be
able to detect an effect of the nuclear power plant on the environment.
environmentalists said you're going to create a marine desert.

The

And we could not get a

regulatory agency, the Water Quality Control Board or the Department of Fish and Game,
to enter in here and lend their expertise to tell us what the effects would be.

So the

coastal Commission resolved this matter by creating a Marine Review Committee to go in,
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to study, to predict what the effects would be, and then to monitor, to see what
actually occurred in the environment.

The srength of that is that the MRC looked at a

number of different groups of organisms, looked at them in a way that they could
determine if there was a significant difference in the populations of those organisms
once the power plant went on-line versus the before period when it was in construction.
The design on that study was done with enough statistical validity to it that the
MRC could report with confidence if the 50 percent change occurred in the populations
of the organisms that we were examining.

More than that, the MRC examined the physical

and chemical effects of the operation of the power plant to explain how some of these
changes in populations occurred, and that's where this problem of turbidity arose
because San Onofre is sited in probably the worst portion of the coastline of
California to put in a nuclear power plant that entrains a square mile of water to a
depth of 14 feet per day.

That's an enormous volume of water.

That's more than ten

times the daily discharge from the City of San Diego's sewage discharge to the ocean, a
huge volume of water.

And in this operation of circulating water through the power

plant for cooling, it moves a great deal of sediment offshore where it naturally would
not occur, natural sediment.

That reduces the life to the water column, interferes

with the reproduction and recruitment of the kelp.
supports a great number of other organisms.

The kelp is a keystone species that

It's a whole community by itself.

The

kelp doesn't reproduce, and the organisms dependent upon the kelp bed can't live there
any longer, and the organisms that are entrained in the flow are killed as they go to
the power plant.

And I've given you a summary of some of these losses in the handout

that I've delivered to the committee.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. FAY:

Mr. Chairman.

The MRC did not set out to maximize the estimates of the losses.

It set

out with a statistical design to make sure that the losses measured were statistically
valid, good evidence.

In every group of organisms that we examined, there were changes

in the population structure.

Water quality law says, if there's a change in the

balance of indigenous populations of organisms, you've got a violation of water quality
ordinance.
We know that every group of organisms we examine change in population structure.
We know that there were significant changes by more than 50 percent in the groups of
other organisms caused by the operation of the power plant.

That is the hardest

environmental evidence that's ever been created by any environmental group to study a
problem of this nature anywhere in the world, and it's good you
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Senator Russell.

Is your testimony reflective of the majority of your group?
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DR. FAY:

The committee unanimously stated in its findings that there was

substantial damage being done to the environment as a result of the operation of the
SONGS Units 1, 2, and 3; unanimous conclusion.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. FAY:

They support what you've just said?

We differ, and I differ with the present Coastal Commission and I've

differed with my colleagues on the MRC.
The mitigation law has its first priority, the prevention of damage to our natural
resources.

That's what the Coastal Act is about; that's what the Clean Water Act is

about; that's what every bit of environmental legislation that deal with the coastline
has been about.

You protect our natural resources.

We have given conclusive evidence that SONGS is substantially adversely impacting
those resources.

The protection the Marine Review Committee agreed upon unanimously to

an extent of 90 percent of the prevention of the damage could be implemented with the
retrofitting of cooling towers to SONGS Units 2 and 3.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

I thought this gentleman before you said that some of the

recommendations they realized were not cost-effective, and so they reduced those to
what he said.
DR. FAY:

It sounds like you're saying something different.
I'm representing the public, sir.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. FAY:

We all represent the public.

I mean that's a given.

I'm representing the public, I hope, on behalf of our marine resources.

And I'm speaking for the applicability of the relative law that says we'll protect,
maintain, enhance, and restore our coastal resources.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. FAY:

At what cost?

Yes, sir.

Are you concerned with that?

I use the same sources of information that Southern California

Edison uses for the cost of installing and operating cooling towers, same exact •••
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, apparently, your committee came up with some different

conclusions or different solutions than what you're saying.

What I hear you saying is

some sort of a massive change whereas that's not what I heard from the first witness.
DR. FAY:

Substantial -- that's the key word, substantial change.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. FAY:

Well, planting kelp beds, you know, that's a change.

Those are not the same kelp beds that were lost as our operation, as a

result of the operation of the power plant.
compensatory mitigation.

They're different kelp beds.

It is

It is not a preventative mitigation, nor is it restoration in

kind -- well, resources that are lost as a result of the operation of the power plant.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

It sounds like what you're saying is that you want to have things

the way they were before the plant was built.
DR. FAY:

That's what the law calls for.
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SENATOR RUSSELL:

And I just say, as a previous witness said, any time you put

anything into the environment, it's going to make some changes that we can mitigate, we
can modify, but we can't go back to what it was before.

And it seems to me that we

have to keep in mind the incremental costs of what you're trying to do and a bit of a
mitigation cost.
Let me ask another question.
started when?
DR. FAY:

When was it appointed?
It began in 1975.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. FAY:

And the plant was built in '68, operating '68?

I'm talking about when the first plant was built.

1968.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. FAY:

In 1975.

Units 2 and 3 became operational in 1984, '85.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. FAY:

Your commission, your Marine Review Committee,

so that pre-dated your commission?

Yes, sir.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

And you have been -- the commission has been -- making their

findings since 1973?
DR. FAY:

No.

They made annual reports and semiannual reports to the Coastal

Commission since 1975.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

'75?

And do you have any idea what the cost was?

$40 million cost over ten years by Edison.

We heard this

What has your committee spent in their

reviews?
DR. FAY:

Southern California Edison provided those funds.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. FAY:

Yes, sir.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. FAY:

Oh, they did?

Is that part of the $40 million?

That's where it came from.

So they did their own study, plus you did your study?

There's two independent studies in here -- let me go back to where it

was •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. FAY:

Did Edison pay for both studies?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

SENATOR RUSSELL:

Okay.

And that's the $40 million?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

DR. FAY:

The question was:

That's the $40 million?

The two studies, $40 million?

No, no, no.

Edison has an annual monitoring budget in excess of a

million dollars for studies -- they're monitoring studies that are required by their
NPDES permit.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

I think I understand where you're coming from.
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Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
Okay.

Senator Hart.

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

In your studies, are you just, did you just study the area;

and is your -- you were talking about the depletion of certain species of fish.

Is

that only in that two-kilometer-wide plume?
DR. FAY:

No, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
DR. FAY:

Or is it the entire coast in that area?

It depends on the particular effect that you're talking about and •••

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
DR. FAY:

Is that what •••

The loss of species.

And it depends on the particular study.

If you use radioactivity and

enrichment of heavy metals, presumably from the power plant, discharge from the power
p1ant, you can see an enrichment radioactivity and heavy metals 12 kilometers up and
down the coastline from the site of the plant.

If you're looking at the populations of

organisms •••
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
we?

We're just talking water-in, water-out at that point, aren't

Suction water-in discharge?
DR. FAY:

Well, it appeared that there was an effect on the biology of the sand

crabs, plus or minus six kilometers up and down the coast from the power plant.

So it

depends again on the particular variable that you're looking at and the particular
organisms.
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

Okay.

But in the entire coast, there's a problem because of

the taking of the -- if you talk about -- I notice middle fish, and I guess you're
talking middle fish, would be like barracuda or some species of that type.

But those

are depleted basically because of loss of bait, but that's overfishing by commercial.
And there's been a study done on that.

So unless your study included other causes of

depletion of middle fish, the bottom fish are doing very well there because it's one of
the best places to fish, bottom fish.

And so it's kind of confusing to me if it's

disturbing the bottom so much, why are the bottom fish doing very well?
DR. FAY:

I disagreed with the conclusion on the bottom fish.

There was never any

evidence that where the bottom fish were impacted the discharge from the power plant
could be measured.

And so •••

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

Well, I didn't do the study.

f1ash on a screen said bottom fish were doing better.

The study that I saw that you
But I know from fishing the

area •••
DR. FAY:

I understand.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

There's not agreement on the committee about everything.
Well, it's his committee, right?
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

He's a member.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

Oh, I see.

so you're in a minority opinion that there, that

the bottom fish aren't -- well, I agree with the committee because I fish there, and it
does very well, so (laughter) •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN HARVEY:

Yes.

Assemblyman Harvey.
One question.

the nuclear power plant safety.

I think we're back sort of where I was on

I guess you can get well-qualified people on both

sides of this issue, and Mr. Fay doesn't agree with some of his colleagues, and he has
a right.

But then again, when I was asking about isn't there a good side of some fish?

Mr. Fay's shaking his head no, and he's showing me yes.

So I understand they don't

agree, and I can appreciate that.
There's an old adage, I said, in doing these studies that statistics don't lie but
statisticians do.
understand that.

You can kind of get where you want to go with your job, and I
I've been guilty myself.

But the question is throwing me.

I hear

twice you have said in response to Senator Newt Russell's question about you need to
put in those cooling towers.
Now you disagreed then because the gentleman just said, when I asked the question,
it's not the temperature; it's the turbidity and coming up above levels it's doing
this.

It's really not the temperature.

And I was taught way back that the temperature

helps some species, but you don't agree with that at all.

You want to spend all this

money for cooling towers when somebody says that's not going to help a thing, but
you're willing to spend all that for cooling towers because you don't agree with them,
right?
DR. FAY:

I quoted you Dr. Ambrose's text.

the MRC final report.
Ambrose said:

He created the words that said this in

He was our technical advisor on this particular point.

And Dr.

"Ninety percent of the damage caused by the operation of Units 2 and 3

can be prevented by the retrofitting of cooling towers to SONGS Units 2 and 3."
More importantly, and I hope we can get NRC to comment on this, NRC has recently
examined extending the life of these generating stations to 40 to 50 years.

Absent the

abatement of this pollution problem, we're going to be looking at those annual losses
with chronic impacts introduced to them for 40 to 50 years for the operation of SONGS
Units 2 and 3.

To me, that's criminal and certainly justifies retrofitting with

cooling towers.
ASSEMBLYMAN HARVEY:

The last point, Mr. Chairman, if I might, and I'm still not

clear, and maybe it will be later, that if you're going to put in cooling towers, you
still, as Mr. Mountjoy's referring, you've got the same amount of product coming in,
the same amount going out; you just cool it some.
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As far as turbidity, I'm not sure of

all that.

But maybe it'll come clear to me before this is all over.

DR. AMBROSE:

Could I clarify?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Gentlemen, we have to conclude this portion.

I'd like to ask Dr. Ambrose, was that your statement?

Did he

quote that correctly?
DR. AMBROSE:

That's correct.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

But I also understood you to say that because of the costs of

doing those kinds of things, it was not cost-effective, and so you recommended other
things; is that correct?
DR. AMBROSE:

costs and also the fact that cooling towers have other environmental

effects •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

Thank you very much.

We'll next hear from Susan Hansch, Manager of Energy and Ocean Resources Division
of the California Coastal Commission.

And maybe you can explain the problem we've just

heard about.
MS. SUSAN HANSCH:

I'll do my best.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. HANSCH:

Thank you.

Good morning, Senators.

My name is Susan Hansch.

And on my left, is

Chris Perry who is the deputy manager of our unit and also the project manager at San
Onofre; and she'll be here if there's questions I need help with.
What I'd like to do this morning is highlight two major sections of two major
issues.

One is to discuss the mitigation package the Coastal Commission approved and

also highlight for you what we feel that we learned from the Marine Review Committee
studies and how it applies to power plants along the coast, how you might want to
consider it in looking at other power plants.
The original SONGS permit condition and the Coastal commission's practices prefer
prevention over mitigation.

This was an important premise the commission used when

choosing between the range of prevention and mitigation options recommended by the MRC
to address the marine resource impacts.
After a complete analysis of the MRC's work, the coastal Commission chose a package
of mitigation that with, essentially all mitigation, very little changes to the plant.
And we have looked at the cooling towers because we believe that they could, as was
mentioned earlier, eliminate the impacts, most of the marine resource impacts, because
essentially you don't have a large intake of water into the plant and you don't have a
large discharge into the ocean.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. HANSCH:

You essentially eliminate that whole section.

would that reduce the operating capacity of the plant?

It can, especially when you're doing a retrofit.
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If you design

cooling towers into a plant initially, it's a lot different.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. HANSCH:

So, would that reduce the efficiency of the plant?

It could, yes.

And Edison said that they believed in this case it

would.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. HANSCH:

Thank you.

If you design a plant initially with cooling towers, that's much

different than doing a retrofit.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

Assemblyman Mountjoy.
If you cool with the saltwater, if that's what you're going

to do, what's the environmental impact of that saltwater when it sprays into the
atmosphere?

You know, here at Rancho Seco, it's clean water.

water; they have their own lake, and that's what cooled it.
about pumping sea water into the towers.
MS. HANSCH:

It's just regular lake
But here you're talking

There's going to be some corrosion.

That was one of the issues that was looked at, and one of the

environmental impacts was a possible, of saltwater fog, increase in fogging.
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

We're talking about all the plant life now on the beach, all

over the, all the stuff that's playing along that freeway now being sprayed with salt.
You know, we're going to cause another --we're going to cause a worse impact for those
of us that live on the land.
MS. HANSCH:

The commission did not recommend that there be the cooling towers.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
MS. HANSCH:

No.

Oh, that was not a recommendation of •••

The MRC laid it out as one of the options.

The Coastal

Commission staff evaluated it and recommended to the commission that cooling towers not
be required for the different environmental impacts, including the fact that
retrofitting the plant could make the need to increase power production at other
coastal power plants, moving air pollution problems to other plants and also increasing
the input of water from the ocean from other power plants and increasing fishery
impacts of those locations, and, because the cooling towers were very expensive.
I would like to say right now, though, in looking at a new power plant that was not
a retrofit, the Coastal Commission's staff would recommend looking thoroughly at the
option of cooling towers to eliminate marine resource impacts.

That's different than

in a retrofit.
The Marine Review committee looked at a broad array of mitigation measures,
including the changes of the cooling system, moving the diffusers, construction of the
cooling towers, as well as all sorts of compensation techniques.
whole debate about the cooling towers.
that cooling towers not be implemented.

And you've heard the

The staff recommended to the Coastal Commission
We did recommend that there be a kelp bed of
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300 acre, artificial kelp bed.

That was approved by the commission on July 16.

We

a1so recommended that there be changes and mitigation measures for 150-acre restoration
of wetlands some place in Southern California.

We're working closely with Edison now

and a panel of scientists to determine which wetlands should be mitigated and restored.
Aund in that whole process, we developed fairly strong performance standards to make
sure that the wetlands are actually mitigated and meet scientific standards.

And if

they are not, Edison is required to remediate until the mitigation project is
successful.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
this plan?

Question.

Are there some wetlands that have been impacted by

Is that •••

MS. HANSCH:

No, there were no wetlands impacted by this plant.

figure out how to help compensate for the loss of fisheries.

The idea was to

And since wetlands have

value for fisheries as breeding areas, and also overall, they're a very impacted
coastal resource.

It was a way to provide mitigation.

The kelp bed mitigation in this proposal will be direct mitigation for the impact
to the kelp bed.

And the wetlands is designed to provide fishery enhancement for the

fish loss through the entrainment and impingement in the plant.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. HANSCH:

I thought wetlands dealt with birds.

Well, wetlands have a whole range of values, including bird values.

There are two other aspects that Edison is being required to do, and that is, to
install and measure the effectiveness of behavioral barrier devices which are designed
to either prevent fish from entering the intakes or to attract fish into the
fish-return system.
The second is the Coastal Commission directed the staff to look into a possibility
for a marine fish hatchery program.

We're working with a group of scientists now to

determine, and with the Department of Fish and Game, to determine if we should require
Edison to fund a fish hatchery program.

we expect to go back to our commission

sometime in early '92 with that information.
The knowledge that the Coastal Commission gained from the exhaustive Marine Review
study provides really important knowledge that can be applied to other coastal power
plants, and it covers several major points, the first being that the MRC scientists
developed new and more accurate environmental assessment techniques.

Usually, it's

very hard to separate the changes in the ocean that are natural from impacts caused by
something like a power plant.

The techniques of the scientist design could prove that

statistically.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Another question.

Since the MRC didn't start up till 1975 and

since the first plant opened in '68 and was started earlier, how do they go back and

-45-

compare what it was before and what's happening now?
MS. HANSCH:

The whole MRC study was really designed to look at the impacts of

Units 2 and 3, the later two stages, not the first stage.
the impacts that had occurred with one.

And they did look at some of

But Units 1 and 2 and 3 are really quite

different, as far as their intake system and discharge system; so they're not directly
comparable.
The MRC data, we believe, will provide important design information for future
power plants, that is, how to figure out how to do the diffuser system so there'll be
less impacts, where to locate discharge systems.

And one of the things that was found

by the MRC is that the impact that everyone thought would be caused by heat wasn't as
significant as the impact that's actually caused by the increased turbidity.

So that

changes a lot for future design when you're looking at any kind of coastal power plant,
not necessarily just the nuclear power plant.

As Dr. Ambrose suggested, the MRC had

recommended the State Water Resources Control Board re-evaluate some of their standards
based on this data.
One of the most important things, I think, that came out of the whole study was
that independent third-party monitoring is preferable to self-monitoring.

It became

very clear through this study that this evidence showed that there was an impact, and
that impact would never have been found through Southern California Edison's
self-monitoring program.
sort of information.

Part of that is because it is not designed to get the same

And it always helps to have independent scien·tists and academics

working through the problems and questions.

We feel that there's a real need to

consider revising many of the ongoing regulatory monitoring programs.
And in conclusion, we believe that the knowledge gained from the MRC studies will
allow more informed decision-making processes for the coastal Commission and other
agencies.

The MRC studies clearly showed that coastal power plants have significant

impacts on marine resources, especially coastal fish populations.

And one of the

things I'd like the senators to consider is this is just one of many power plants along
the coast.

All of the coastal power plants have intake systems which entrain and

impinge fish; and cumulatively, that is a significant effect on fishery resources along
the coast.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Assemblyman Mountjoy.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

Does that include the oil-fired plants, the beach plant, the

Huntington Beach Plant?
MS. HANSCH:

Yes.

Most of them do have cooling systems.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

So no matter what the plan is, whether it's nuclear, whether

it's oil-fired, it has an impact?
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MS. HANSCHa
~wer

Right, as far as impacts on fish entrainment and impingement. This

plant actually has some very sophisticated fish return system that returns larger

fish back to the ocean.

Most of the old power plants do not have such.

This power

plant, though, does take in a larger amount of water -ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
MS. HANSCH:

San Onofre.

-- than any of the other -- yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
MS. HANSCH:

Than many of the other power plants.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

One question, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:
does make sense.

San Onofre.

Senator Russell.

You know, you talk about an independent group or study, and that

But it kind of, kind of seems similar to trying to have an outside

organization do reapportionment and get an even balance.

I mean, you know, we can be

as scrupulous as possible, but the Republican philosophy and the Democrat philosophy
would still come through in some way or other, perhaps; or at least we would fear that.
How can that be prevented?

You've got this gentleman here who's a scientist who

probably has wonderful credentials.
equally fine credentials.

He's disagreeing with other scientists who have

You have the concerned scientists over here.

another mother for science or something over there.

You have

And how do you, how do you know

that -- we always thought that science was science; two and two is four and you don't
argue with it.

But apparently, these things can be massaged one way or the other,

depending upon your philosophical viewpoint.
MS. HANSCH:

Have you struggled with that?

Yes, we have struggled with that and since the very beginning in 1974

when the commission had to look at giving this permit to Southern California Edison.
There were people on both sides.

The environmentalists said there would be an

ecological desert, and Edison's scientists said that there would be no impact.
there's this huge range.

And so

So the commission tried to set up this three-person committee

that would take those varied opinions and hash out and argue and work out those
differences throughout the process.

It's a very difficult, cumbersome process.

they did that; the Marine Review Committee did that.

And you're right.

But

There are

differences of opinion, but all three of them signed the final report and did come up
with solid recommendations.

There are variations in their opinions.

And I don't

think, Senator, there is any perfect way to do it.
I do believe that the process did work and came up with something that the
regulatory bodies could use and make some significant changes and some important
decisions.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

I understand.

-47-

MS. HANSCH:

But there's no simple way.

I wish that --well, at least we haven't

found any.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Former Attorney General van de Kamp didn't even appoint somebody

to the MRC; is that right?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Oh, Safety Committee.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

That was different.

Oh, sorry about that.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
Okay.

That was the Safety Committee.

Thank you very much.

We'll next hear from Arthur Coe, the Executive Officer of San Diego Regional

Water Quality Control Board.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. ARTHUR L. COE:
My name is Art Coe.

We provided you in advance some questions.
Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Senators.

I'm the Executive Officer of the Water Quality control Board of

the San Diego region.
I've handed out to your staff my prepared testimony which I was planning to briefly
summarize and then answer the questions.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. COE:

If that would be appropriate.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. COE:

In ten minutes.

Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. COE:

Thank you.

Thank you.

Less than ten minutes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
been handed out.

As I pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the prepared testimony has

And I'm going to focus my summary on the issue, the MRC report, and

the actions that the Regional Board is taking in response to it.
I will point out in the information that I had prepared beforehand, there is
presented some details on two other NPDES permit violation issues that involved Unit 1.
And if anyone has any questions, I don't if I can answer them as they come up.
With regard to the report of the Marine Review Committee, the Regional Board
received that report in August of 1989.

Sometime prior to that, we had a meeting with

staff of the Coastal Commission to discuss the general findings of the report and also
discuss coordination between the two agencies in dealing with the findings of the
report.
At that time, at the staff level, it was determined it would be desirable for the
Coastal Commission to act first on the report of the Marine Review Committee.
was basically for four reasons.
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And this

First of all, this was a request of the Coastal Commission and the chairman of the
MRC, as we understand it.

Secondly, the Marine Review Committee was commissioned by

the Coastal Commission, and we thought it was most appropriate that that commission
hear and decide on the disposition of the report before another state agency began
dealing with it.

Thirdly, the issues that were anticipated to come up at the coastal

Commission hearings would provide information that would be of use to the Regional
Board in their deliberations.

And finally, there was the question of what disposition

the Coastal Commission would make of the MRC report that would have some bearing on
what the Regional Board, what action the Regional Board would take.
would they accept the
additional work?

report~

As an example,

would they reject the report; would they ask for

So for those reasons, at least at the staff level very early on, it

was decided that the Coastal Commission should go first.
In December of 1989, we brought this, after the final report was out from the
Marine Review Committee, we brought the matter to the Regional Board as an information
item.

This was partly in response to a request from the Surf Riders, two environmental

groups -- Friends of the Earth, I believe, and the Surf Riders Association.
At the December 1989 Regional Board meeting, the board heard a fair amount of
information about the content of the Marine Review Committee report.

And following

that discussion, the Regional Board made the decision that they would hold a hearing to
consider enforcement action based on the findings of the Marine Review Committee.

The

Regional Board at that time also concurred with the staff recommendations that the
Coastal Commission should act first, and then the Regional Board would begin their
process.
The Coastal Commission held their hearing and reached their decision in July of
1991.

In August of 1991 at the regular Regional Board meeting for that month, the

Regional Board set their hearing date on the matter for October 31.
Regional Board had their hearing.

On October 31, the

We listened to some seven hours of testimony.

The

record was held open until November 15 for submission of additional written testimony.
The October 31 hearing was to receive testimony only.
decision on that date.

The board did not make a

The Regional Board staff is now reviewing the testimony that

was submitted, and we will come back to the Regional Board at their December 9 meeting
and suggest some dates for the board to meet and make a decision on the testimony that
was received during the hearing process.

It appears that we're looking at sometime in

January of 1992, right after the first of the year, before we'd be able to get through
the material that was received during the hearing and bring it back to the board.
With regard to the questions that you had posed, the first one dealing with why the
Regional Board has taken so long after the release of the MRC report to deal with the
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compliance issue, it's simply --we had determined that the Coastal commission should
go first.
The second question deals with the requirements of the NPDES permit for the San
Onofre discharge.

And the question was:

Can the Regional Board use the Coastal

commission offset conditions to comply with the Clean water Act, NPDES requirements?
And by offset conditions, I'm assuming that you were referring to the mitigation
programs that were agreed to or mandated by the Coastal commission.
far as the Regional Board is concerned, is not directly.

And the answer, as

If the Regional Board

determines that the NPDES permit has been violated by the San Onofre facility, the
board can consider the mitigation programs that have been agreed to in their
deliberations on what remedies they would seek for the violations.

The board also

could find that the permits were violated but that the impacts were not particularly
great and that Edison, should they decide to do so, could request state modifications
to the NPDES permit for those conditions that were in violation.

If Edison were to

approach the State Water Resources Control Board for an exception to the state's ocean
plan, the mitigation program that has been agreed to could be used as partial grounds
for requesting an exception to the state's ocean plan.
The third question that he posed to me was dealt with the Regional Board requiring
independent monitoring as opposed to Southern California Edison monitoring to ensure
compliance with NPDES requirements.

We have discussed that issue with our legal

counsel; we discussed it sometime ago.

And the answer was maybe, but it's not clear.

This •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Let me break in.

What you'e saying then is that you said let

the Coastal Commission go first, and then we'll comment on it.
been the other way around.

Maybe it should have

Maybe you should have commented, and then the Coastal

commission would try to deal with your concerns, because if you can't offset with the
way they have suggested, what happens?
MR. COE:

The remedies that the Regional Board -- if the Regional Board determines

that the NPDES permit has been violated, the NPDES permit conditions have been
violated, the remedies available to the Regional Board would include assessing
penalties to Edison for the past violations.

That would include establishing a time

schedule for bringing the discharge into compliance.
alternatives.

Those are actually the two basic

The Regional Board, as far as we can tell, does not have the authority

to require Edison to install cooling towers; they do not have the authority to require
Edison to shut the plant down.

so I don't know -- I can't conceive of a scenario where

the mitigation measures would be, in effect, wiped off the books.

Obviously, if they

want the cooling towers -- I'm not sure if the mitigation measures would be appropriate

-so-

but the Regional Board can require that.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Question.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. COE:

Who monitors then the NPDES compliance?

Do you?

The Regional Board monitors compliance.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. COE:

Yes, Senator Russell.

That's you guys?

Yes.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

And if the commission says they approve of these offsets and your

experts say, well, even with the offsets, it doesn't meet the NPDES requirements, then
you would be authorized to levy some fines but not much else.
MR. COE:

Or the board could also require them to bring the discharge into

compliance with the NPDES permit conditions, which could require them to take some kind
of structural measures or some of kind of, make some kind of operational changes in the
dLscharge of the plant.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

And if they didn't do anything or didn't do it the right way,

let's say, you would have authority to take them, what, into court and to fine them
or ...

MR. COE:

If the board issued an order requiring compliance and the order was not

complied with, the board's recourse is to go to the Attorney General and request that a
legal action be filed.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. COE:

I see.

Thank you.

I'm not sure if I finished answering about the monitor.

finish the monitoring.

I guess I did

I don't know if there's any questions on it or not.

The answer

is maybe, and that is, the issue of discharge or monitoring versus third-party
monitoring was raised in the Regional Board's hearing.

That will be something that

will be considered as a part of the board's decision-making process.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
situation.

Thank you very much.

That places the plant in a no-win

There isn't anything that you can do to satisfy your requirement by

anything that the Coastal Commission has suggested as mitigating?
MR. COE:

Well, as I pointed out, they can request, first of all, an exception to

the state's ocean plan.

And the mitigation measures would be a factor in determining

if that request would be granted.

If they get the exception of the state's ocean plan,

they can then come back to the Regional Board and request that those permit conditions
that they were in violation with be modified.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. COE:

I see.

so there is an avenue for them to --

Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

-- come back?
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MR. COE:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

Next witness is Charles Crandall, an attorney with Milberg, Weiss, Bershad,
representing the Earth Island Institute.

Welcome to Sacramento.

I hope you enjoyed

your honeymoon.
MR. CHARLES

s. CRANDALL:

I did, although I got sick on it, Mr. Chairman, so most

of it was spent flat on my back; but I had a relatively good time.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

But as they say, the honeymoon is now over, right?

We

appreciate receiving testimony on the Earth Island Institute lawsuit which is filed
against Southern California Edison.

And in particular, I'd like to hear your views on

whether the Coastal commission and the Regional Water Board are adequately enforcing
the law.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

May I ask, so I can understand the direction you're coming from,

I never heard of the Earth Island Institute.

What is it?

Is it like Earth First or

the Sierra Club for islands or what?
MR. CRANDALL:

I would like to analogize it more closely to the Sierra Club than

Earth First, if I could.
Friends of the Earth.

It is an environmental group that had its origins with the

One of the founders was Mr. David Brower, and it is involved in

various environmental endeavors.

One of the most notable involves the tuna fishing and

the dolphin problem on the international level where they've been quite successful.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. CRANDALL:

The island part is what?

Earth Island Institute?

That earth is a biosphere basically and

that we have to •••
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. CRANDALL:

Island in the universe; is that what •••

Exactly.

Right.

My name, Mr. Chairman, is Steve Crandall.

environmental lawyer with Milbert, Weiss in San Diego.

I'm an

I was with the Department of

Justice for ten years in environmental enforcement, and I teach the subject and have
for the past six years at the University of San Diego School of Law.
I would prefer to approach this in the limited time, not by going through the
litigation that is ongoing in San Diego.

That essentially is litigation that was

designed to make up for the fact that the water board had not filed an action within
the timeframe required by law, which is 60 days, far from two years that it has taken
the water board to get around to holding its hearing.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. CRANDALL:

Are you suing the Water Board?

We are not suing the Water Board.

Edison only.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Not the Water Board district?
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We are suing Southern California

MR. CRANDALL:
Water Board.

No, we didn't think it would be productive, frankly, to sue the

We view them largely as an ally.

They have technical expertise.

They

are terribly understaffed and underfunded, I believe, and their enforcement activities
really are in serious arrears; and we view ourselves as supplementing their authority.
so we didn't think it would be productive to sue them.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. CRANDALL:

Your lawsuit relates to the water discharge?

Yes.

It relates to exactly what's been going before today, that is,

the turbidity problem, and the SONGS Units 2 and 3.

I would just point out a couple of

things from the litigation.
First, as I think this committee is seeing, you can't understand the issue, let
alone come to a decision in a ten-minute time frame or one-day hearing or indeed, as
the water board held on Halloween a one-day public hearing, just can't do it.
In the litigation that's been pending, for example, I took the depositions of two
of the so-called experts for Edison.

That lasted three days.

Russell commented, an incredibly complex issue.
the litigation will resolve once and for all.

It is, as Senator

But there is an answer that we believe
And our pitch to the Water Board was,

listen, don't bother yourself with the cease and desist order at this late date.
Intervene in the lawsuit, which is before a federal judge, and we'll address the issue
of should there be cooling towers?
says?

Are cooling towers, in fact, so expensive as Edison

And things of that nature.

But here is what I would just leave this committee with briefly.

What we have

uncovered in litigation, it is really one point, and it echoes what Ms. Hansch said
about independent monitoring.

And I know, Senator Russell, you had some concerns about

it, which is, is self-monitoring the way to go, or do we need to get the regulated
industry out of the business of looking at itself?

And my answer is, we must get the

regulated industry, in this case, southern California Edison, out of the business.

And

I have two, what I think are, irrefutable reasons why.
First, back when Unit 1 was in operation and Units 2 and 3 were just in the process
of being planned, the Water Board went to Southern California Edison.
you have a turbidity problem at Unit 1.
you build Units 2 and 3.
of intensive tests.

It said, look,

We want you to stop it and correct it before

What did Edison do?

They went out, they conducted a series

They came to the conclusion that, gee whiz, there's really not too

much we can do about this turbidity problem, short of serious design changes.
they do?

They didn't tell the Water Board for four years.

What did

They sat on this

information until the concrete was laid for Units 2 and 3, and the machinery was
already going forward so that it would be extremely costly to make any kind of design
change.

That's point one.
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SENATOR RUSSELL:

Did they make any changes in the outflow compared to the Unit 1

which you said wasn't a problem?
MR. CRANDALL:

They didn't make --well, that's a difficult question.

Originally,

the diffuser system for Units 2 and 3 was designed differently to accommodate a
temperature problem that was feared.

In other words, the out-take, the outfall system

is different, but not as a result of the problem I just discussed.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. CRANDALL:

No.

But is the turbidity in 2 and 3 different than in 1?
And Edison knew that when they built Unit 1, Units 2 and 3, and

they designed it essentially the same way.

The intake system is identical, and the

problem is that the intake system takes all this turbidity, which is near the shore,
and shoots it in a plume out over the kelp bed.
trust by Edison.

They knew that information.

And so my point 1 is, a breach of
They withheld it for four years until it

was too late for the Water Board to take any action.
Point 2, and this has been made by Dr. Murdoch through the testimony here and I
want to emphasize it.

You mentioned, Senator Russell, isn't there a waste of money

because you have this $45 million study by the MRC that had three representatives on
it, on the one hand, and then you had this additional study that was going on that was
being funded by Edison for its Water Board and why don't they get together.
here, here.

I say

That's precisely what should have happened, but who should have brought

that to the Water Board's attention?

Southern California Edison.

The same scientists

that were doing, that were participating in the MRC study, Dr. Byron McCalis and his
staff, were the same people that were participating in these yearly reports to the
Water Board.
Listen to what happened.

The MRC was concluding we have turbidity problem.

going to affect the kelp bed; these are substantial impacts over here.

It's

And over here,

and in its yearly reports to the Water Board, Edison was saying no problem; there's no
problem.

The kelp is very healthy, just totally sticking its head in the sand, as to

the results that were in the possession of its own scientists over here in the MRC.
that good faith?

Is that the type of behavior that this committee or the Water Board

wants to see on behalf of a regulated industry?
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. CRANDALL:

Is

What are you suing for?

We are suing for both.

No way.
Money or for some kind of action?

There are two types of essential remedies.

One would be the ultimate remedy, would be, in fact, a change of the cooling system to
retrofit cooling towers which is a possibility.

I think it's going to be a tough job

to show because of the cost-benefit analysis that you mentioned before, but that's
something we think is desired.

Another thing is penalties because each and every day

that that plant is violating its light requirements, it is subject to a $25,000-per-day
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penalty.

And that doesn't go to me; it doesn't go to the group.

Treasury of the United States Government.

It goes to the

But we think it is a penalty that the

message has to be sent to industry that you can't take lightly these requirements and
then expect to get away with it 15 or 20 years down the road when you bring your
accountants in and say, gee whiz, it would cost a billion dollars to retrofit our
plant.

We can't do that.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

We don't think that's fair.

My concern, and certainly, anybody's entitled to bring any

lawsuit of anything, is that we have a body, the coastal Commission.

We have this

local water board, Regional Water Board, and we have this commission that we heard from
all looking at this, and now a federal judge who is going to make a decision, either
for you or against you or somewhere in between, which basically throws all that out.
MR. CRANDALL:

But Senator Russell, that's because the agencies didn't act in a

timely manner as required by federal law.

That's the nuts and bolts of it.

-- we put them on notice back in August of 1989.

They had

You have this report that unanimously

concluded, unanimously, with an Edison representative, the plant was violating federal
law.

We said to the Water Board do something.

years; do something.

Don't hold hearings; don't wait two

And they still have yet to do it.

And at this time, right as I'm

sitting here, they haven't made a decision yet.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Assemblyman •••

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:

I'm curious about your source of funding.

Is it strictly

private, or is it government funding of any kind?
MR. CRANDALL:

I'm sorry.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
MR. CRANDALL:

The organization comes from non-profit contributions, I believe.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
MR. CRANDALL:

Okay.

Thank you very much.

Thank you very much.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. CRANDALL:

There's no government type •••

No, not to my knowledge.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. CRANDALL:

Strictly non-profit kind?

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY:
MR. CRANDALL:

Your funding for your organization.

When was the lawsuit filed?

It was filed in November of 1990.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

Division of Ratepayer, Robert Kinosian.

I think Edward

O'Neill is going to introduce you.
MR. O'NEILL:

I will.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Yes.

This is the Division of Ratepayer Advocates of the PUC.
There are actually two different questions that you may address
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concerning San Onofre Unit 1 issue.

Some may relate to the recommendation of the

Division of Ratepayer Advocates that was filed in written testimony this September
concerning the cost-effectiveness of continued operation of San Onofre Unit 1.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Right.

And Mr. Kinosian is here today to discuss that recommendation.

He is

the engineer with the ORA responsible for performing that analysis and preparing most
of that testimony.
The other area that you may have questions, it concerns the role of the commission
itself.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I'd like to just deal with the ORA.

MR. O'NEILL:

That's fine.

Okay.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Well, then let me, in the interest of time --

He gave it to the PUC.

-- turn it over to Mr. Kinosian.

MR. ROBERT KINOSIAN:

Thank you.

I guess it's still morning, maybe afternoon.

Good afternoon, Chairman, senators.
We'll start off with SONGS 1 is over 20-years-old.

It's one of the oldest

operating nuclear plants.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. KINOSIAN:

Okay.

We've heard that.

Tell us •••

Well, our commission required that a cost-effectiveness

analysis of SONGS 1 be done because of the high costs of some modifications which are
required to be done on the facility.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. KINOSIAN:

As you've heard •••

Can you pull the mike up a little closer so we can get •••

As you've heard, Edison and San Diego both asserted that they

believe the continued operation of SONGS 1 is cost-effective.

This might be correct,

if you assume that SONGS 1 in the future will operate very reliably, that natural gas
prices will increase significantly, and that the cost of operating SONGS 1 will
decrease considerably as they have done.

However, those assumptions are not

reasonable, given the historic experiences with SONGS 1.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Now they said that out of 32, 27 different configurations said

that it would be cost-effective to make these changes, and five or something else.
You've studied those 32, have you?
MR. KINOSIAN:

Yes, we have.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. KINOSIAN:

And in all of those •••

Do you disagree with them?

Yes, we do.

In all of those scenarios, they used very optimistic

assumptions regarding both the operation and the costs of SONGS 1.

For example, the

lowest capacity factor, which is the measure of reliability of the unit, the lowest one
they used in those 32 analyses was 60 percent.
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As Edison itself had mentioned, the

historic lifetime average for SONGS 1 has been only 50 percent.

They also used in

those 32 analyses assumptions of 70 and 80 percent.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, that 51 percent is based upon the retrofit time that was

calculated into the running of the full plant.

Once it starts up after being

retrofitted, that will no longer be 51 percent.
MR. KINOSIAN:

The 51 percent wasn't just due to retrofits.

For example, in the

1ast five years, the plant has been shut down more than 50 percent of the time to
repair broken equipment, not for retrofits required by the NRC.
matter of retrofits.

So it's not simply a

The plant is aging, parts are wearing out and breaking, and there

needs to be maintenance done on them.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

But also SDG&E testified that they're 20 percent.

And they

evaluated it, and they said it would be cost-effective, I believe.
MR. KINOSIAN:
~t

Yes.

In fact, they had an analysis that assumed, that showed, that

was cost-effective even at a capacity factor of only 44 percent.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. KINOSIAN:

Right.

However, in that analysis, they used a natural gas price forecast

that assumed natural gas prices doubling by next year.

So on the one hand, they were

assuming that the costs of any alternatives to replace San onofre would be very, very
expensive, in concluding that SONGS 1 would be cost-effective to continue operating.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

So you get your experts and we'll get our experts, and we'll

f~ght.

MR. KINOSIAN:

Well, we believe that we've made a very strong showing in the

proceeding at the PUC that SONGS 1 is clearly not cost-effective.

In addition, the

utilities simply ignored a number of factors regarding the cost-effectiveness of SONGS
1 in the analysis they presented.

They failed to consider the fact that shutting down SONGS 1 would, for example,
reduce their insurance costs; and fees are considerable.

We estimated that those two

things alone would result in $50 million savings to the ratepayers from shutting down
SONGS 1.
They also ignored the environmental detriments of operating SONGS 1, as you have
heard their environmental impacts on the marine life that they did not consider in any
way

~n

their analyses.

the facility.

They did not consider environmental impacts from radiation from

However, they did include the value of reducing air emissions from other

resources that might replace SONGS 1.

In fact, the single largest benefit they found

in their analysis to operating SONGS 1 was the value of reducing air pollution from
other resources.

And as you may be aware, Edison has strongly asserted that the values

the PUC uses for air emissions are too high and overstate the benefits to ratepayers
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from reducing air emissions.

Yet, those exact same air emission values are the sole

reason Edison found continuing operation of SONGS 1 to be cost-effective.
DRA

believes that using reasonable assumptions and accounting for all the factors

which apply to SONGS 1 clearly shows that it is not cost-effective to continue
operation -- in ORA's opinion, yes.

But I would add, that as I said, if you ignored

the air emission values, Edison and San Diego both would concur that continuing
operation was not cost-effective.
Now if the PUC rejects ORA's recommendation and approves the continued operation of
SONGS 1, we have recommended that a performance-based pricing mechanism be put in place
for the utilities to recover their costs of operating SONGS 1.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

On that point, if you disagree with the conclusions that they

have made, I presume that you have some private reasons for that as to what they did
wrong.

Aren't you then, if that same group are going to be based upon

performance-based rate making, aren't you putting them in a position where the bottom
line is going to dictate and therefore somebody might choose to operate a plant that's
not completely safe simply because of the dollars and cents involved?
You know, it sounds good to say make it, do it this way.
opt for safety first.

But, you know, I'd rather

And everybody's concerned about nuclear power plants and the

safety and so forth, and you get a utility with a CEO that's maybe under the gun.
returns aren't all that great.

The pressure to operate that plant longer, we've heard,

I think, is just not appropriate.
MR. O'NEILL:

The

How do you respond to that?

Senator, could I respond just for a moment, because the commission

itself has considered the general question that you asked in the context of the
adoption of a performance-based rate making method for recovery of costs for the Diablo
canyon Nuclear Power Plant.

And although there are differences, and they're fairly

significant between Diablo and a small plant like San Onofre 1, that Bob can discuss in
a moment.
I think it's important to look at the question in the broader context.

The

commission did find, in reviewing the Diablo canyon settlement, that with an economic
incentive tied to the plant performance on a regular, continuing basis, like the
performance-based pricing system that opted for Diablo, the utility will actually have
a greater incentive to operate the plants safely over the longrun.
reason should be fairly apparent.

And I think the

As long as there aren't sudden thresholds which

affect financial performance in a dramatic way, a performance-based pricing incentive
can give the utilities increased incentive to monitor the plant carefully and maintain
it well.

If the plant is shut down for some reason because of a safety problem, it's

going to cost the company an awful lot of money.
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That's a much better incentive than

under traditional rate making where the utility's income is not affected by shutdowns
of that type.
But the other thing that's really critical is that the plant can be shut down
simply because of the appearance that things are not being managed well or operated
well.

The NRC could issue an order requiring PG&E or southern California Edison or any

other utility operating a nuclear plant to shut the plant down or to extend an outage
in order to assure itself that a problem will be taken care of.

Even if there was no

problem at all at the plant, the plant can be shut down under those conditions.

So

with the performance-based pricing incentive in place, there's a real incentive for the
utilities not only to operate and maintain the plants safely, but to make very, very
sure that they're going above and beyond the requirements of the NRC to make sure they
can demonstrate that it's being operated safely.

So I think there really is a very

strong long-term incentive on the part of the utilities under these performance-based
pricing mechanisms to maintain a very close watch over the operation of the plants.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. KINOSIAN:

But it does concern me.

Well, if I might follow up on what Ed just said, I would agree that

their performance-based pricing provides a long-term incentive to operate the plant as
reliably and safely as possible to avoid any long shutdown periods.

However, the

performance-based pricing system, we're recommending for San Onofre also does not
produce any significant short-term concern over a short-term need to, say, increase
your quarterly profits or your annual profits because we're recommending that the
prices for SONGS 1 be based on Edison's forecast of what it will cost, which is
relatively low.

So the price that will be paid for any increased generation is

relatively low, and there's very little profit for them to make from increasing the
generation.

In addition, the plant is only one-seventh the size of Diablo Canyon, so

there's not a significant impact on their bottom line from relatively small changes in
its operation.

There's not that large amount of money involved.

Finally, unlike with Diablo Canyon, for San Onofre there is already an existing
rate making mechanism in place.

And since this is a plant that's been in operation for

a number of years, the existing rate-making system provides for bonuses or penalties
for the utility if the plant operates outside of a certain band of reliability for a
period of two years.

So we're replacing -- and that's the exact sort of system which

you've heard concerns about from the NRC where they have short-term deadlines they need
to meet.
We're recommending that that system with a two-year deadline be replaced by a
system which simply has the long-term incentive over the life of the unit to operate as
reliably as possible.

So we think our proposal is actually, if anything, going to
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improve the situation, which is why we have not in our proposal recommended that a
safety committee be formed for San Onofre due to the adoption of performance-based
pricing.
MR. O'NEILL:

There's one thing I should add.

The commission is considering this

recommendation in the context of its biennial resource plan update proceeding, and a
decision should be issued early next year.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

And the final witness for this morning

session, Karl Ory, Chief Administrative Officer of Campaign California.

Mr. Ory,

welcome.
It's my understanding that Campaign California has had a long-standing concern
about the cost-effectiveness of San Onofre Unit 1.

The document you provided indicate

you believe there are less expensive ways of providing power to ratepayers.

Can you

briefly elaborate on these issues?
MR. KARL ORY:

Certainly.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ORY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators.

You're another environmental group?

First of all, I'm the Executive Director of Campaign California.

one of the state's largest environmental-consumer organizations.
Assemblyman Tom Hayden.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. ORY:

We're

We're chaired by

We led the campaigns to pass Proposition 65 •••

You don't need to say any more.

And Prop. 99, the Tobacco Tax Initiative.

We also led two initiative

campaigns here in Sacramento to close the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant.
The DRA report documents a record of omission and concealment by Southern
California Edison.

And it's filing for authorization to pass further costs to SONGS 1

to ratepayers, include examples of inflated capacity performance, reliability, and
numerous underestimatations of cost, including the cost of capital additions, of line
losses, of environmental impact on marine life, of insurance, of decommissioning, and
they overestimated the cost of replacement power.
Southern California Edison is cited by DRA for flawed and incomplete information.
As an example, Southern California Edison, for comparison, uses a group of seven
similar nuclear plants but omit five other plants of similar design that had poor
performance. Campaign California applauds the DRA recommendation now under
consideration by the PUC that SONGS 1 be designated a deferrable resource and its
capacity be put out to bid.
Let the free market determine the need for SONGS 1.
organization TURN joins us in this position.
with too many miles.

The state's leading ratepayer

Simply put, SONGS 1 is like an old car

It's dangerous; it's inefficient; it operates to avoid

embarrassment to the nuclear industry.

Nuclear plants are not exempt from the laws of
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nature.
You stated earlier that you're aware of its age, 24 years of age.
it is the single most significant fact about San Onofre Unit Number 1.

But I think that
As nuclear

plants age, they require increasingly larger expenditures from maintenance to repairs
and produce ever less power.

One national study showed that for the period between

1981 and '85, repair cost at older plants, those built in the '60s, were twice that in
newer plants.
An early DOE report projected this trend, suggesting that after 15 years, capacity
of older plants would decline by 2 percent every year.

SONGS 1 has proven this rule.

Reliable in its first decade, its averaged only 27 percent capacity from 1980 to '87.
In '88, it rose to 36 percent.

In '89, it fell to 31 percent.

Yet Southern California

Edison projects a capacity factor of 60 to 80 percent.
In future years, in order to justify continued operation of this plant, let's look
at those five other plants that have similar design.
the best of those other five, is 59.9 percent.

The highest lifetime capacity,

To continue to operate at all,

expensive repairs and improvements will continue to be needed.

Southern California

Edison budgets for some long-delayed safety improvements triggered by the Three-Mile
Island accident but leaves little contingency for other likely costs.
study of cost found SONGS 1 to be the costliest in the nation.

A 1988 national

It measured net capital

additions from '82 to '86 ranked by cost per kilowatt.
While Southern California Edison would like to think they've got everything fixed,
they in fact face probable, large unbudgeted expenditures.

Southern California

Edison's rosey forecast would be destroyed if SONG 1's troubled steam generator needed
to be replaced, estimated by Southern California Edison at $200 million, yet all other
three-loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactor plants have replaced their steam
generators.

The optimists at Southern California Edison also project that NRC will

lighten up on requirements as the plant ages because modifications will not be
cost-effective.
safety.

We agree that it appears at times that the NRC will place cost above

But not even the NRC will as a matter of policy allow a plant to operate less

safely because of age.

Southern California Edison's assumption that cost of capital

additions would decrease is false.
Factors outside of the control of SONGS 1's managers may force unbudgeted expenses
onto the plant, a problem that any of the other 12 similiarly designed plants may
trigger improvements at all the plants.
could increase costs.

The current Earth Island Institute lawsuit

Seismic activity and continued research could lead to yet

further earthquake safety requirements.

Finally, SONGS 1 is simply not needed.

A 1987 study showed that even without nuclear power, the nation has a 28 percent
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electrical generating power in '86, the year of the study, 28 percent surplus
electrical generating power.

In the western half of the United States, the surplus

without nuclear was 40 percent.

And certainly, this has been proven here in Sacramento

with the closure of Rancho Seco.

Even the perceived environmental benefit proves to be

just so much smoke.
First of all, SONGS 1 reduces the need for fossil fuel only to the extent that it
operates.

And for the last decade, it's only worked about a third of the time.

Is

there anyone here that believes that SONGS 1 is a reliable source of energy to the next
century?
Second, any air benefit is offset by the damage to the marine environment.
Significant marine environmental benefit will result when SONGS 1 is closed.
Third, continued operation increases the large amount of on-site stored nuclear
waste.
And finally, continued operation exposes the nation's largest urban area needlessly
to the inherent safety risks of nuclear power.
SONGS 1 should be considered a deferrable resource.

The ORA report notes that

SONGS 1 has not met any of the requirements for designation of a resource as
non-deferrable.
If the PUC arbitrarily designates SONGS 1 as non-deferrable, it will shield it from
competition from other energy resources.

This lost opportunity could cost ratepayers

hundreds of millions of dollars.
If the PUC ignores its own policies, legislation should be adopted defining what
resources can be shielded and requiring a competitive market.
Russell wasn't here to hear me agree with him in his position.

I'm sorry.

Senator

I think that the option

of performance-based rate-making, while preferrable to the existing situation, is
ill-suited to an aging troubled plant that needs no disincentives for safety.

We

instead would like SONGS 1 to face a free market and see what other options are out
there of other energy-producing sources.

And as we found here in Sacramento with

Rancho Seco, there is no limit to the number of ingenious and environmentally sound
ways of replacing the power lost by such a troubled plant.
Finally, I'm reminded of a fight that Campaign California joined in the late '70s
to stop San Diego Gas and Electric's involvement with the Sun Desert Nuclear Plant.
were told then of rosy economic projections and endless need.

We

However, two years

later, a San Diego Gas and Electric executive described their denied plans as one of
the best things that ever happened to them.
Utilities can't make tough decisions.

They're on a nuclear powered treadmill.

treadmill is driven by the guarantee of rate returns and a lack of competition.
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The

It's

time to put on the breaks.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

We will adjourn this committee until 2 o'clock.

We'll come back this afternoon and

complete the testimony.

--- BREAK ---

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

The hour of 2:00 having arrived, let me, in order to expedite

the afternoon session of the hearing, for those of you who have received questions in
advance, please try to respond to them as part of your direct testimony.

For those

questions that remain unanswered, please respond in writing to the committee by
December the 16th.
Okay.

That's two weeks from now.

We'll begin now with PG&E.

Mr. Womack, Lawrence Womack, Manager of Nuclear

Operations Support, Pacific Gas & Electric Company.
MR. LAWRENCE F. WOMACK:
here.

Good afternoon, Chairman Rosenthal.

My name is Larry Womack.

Gas & Electric.

I'm pleased to be

I'm currently manager of steam generation with Pacific

For most of the last 14 years, I was involved with the PG&E nuclear

program, most recently from 1989 until November 1 of this year as Manager of Nuclear
Operations Support in our Nuclear Power Generation Business Unit in San Francisco.
I'm pleased to be here this afternoon, and I plan to report to the committee on the
operation's safety and ratepayer costs of Diablo Canyon.

And please bear with me.

I,

you know, I was better prepared to read a statement, but I'll work on the eye contact
here.
First, as a bit of background, Diablo Canyon has two 1,100 megawatt electric
Westinghouse pressurized water reactors.
1985 respectively.
operation.

They went into initial service in 1984 and

And currently, each unit has completed four 18-month cycles of

so we're along on the major curve.

We've still not subject to the initial

start-up problems that we experienced years ago.
First, I'd like to talk about operations and safety.

But first to emphasize PG&E's

commitment to operation of Diablo at the highest levels of safety, reliability, and
performance -- these were paramount in our nuclear organization.

They are also

important to PG&E's ratepayers as the plant is operated efficiently and effectively.
It provides the best return to them.
Diablo is a vital, strategic resource in PG&E's energy plan for the next ten years
and beyond.

In 1990, for example, Diablo accounted for 18 percent of PG&E's generation

to its customers.

Diablo also is helping PG&E in implementing its strategic initiative
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to improve the environment of the Central and Northern areas of California.
Diablo is principally operated as a base-load facility.

It's maintained

meticulously and routinely upgraded, its systems and componentry, such that we minimize
the possibility of equipment failing as a result of age or obsolescence.

As a result

of this, Diablo does operate or has operated for long, continuous periods between
refueling outages.

This is a general indicator used in the nuclear industry to signify

a positive or a high level of performance, that being the operation in absence of
unplanned outages or forced shutdowns.

As a result of this effort, the lifetime

capacity factor for both Diablo Canyon units is 76 percent.

This is well into the

upper area of performance of the industry on the whole.
As Mr. Martin from the NRC discussed this morning, we have two resident inspectors
full time at Diablo, a regional staff in Walnut Creek that also oversees the operation
of the plant and literally dozens of inspections that are performed on an annual basis
by both our resident and non-resident staffs, including personnel from Washington,
D.c., to oversee the operation of Diablo.

And at approximately 18-month intervals, the

NRC performs what is called an overall systematic assessment of licensee performance,
or SALP.
In the NRC's most recent SALP report on Diablo for the period of January 1990
through June 1991, Diablo received what we consider one of our best SALP reports or
evaluations compiling our performance through that period in the eyes of the NRC with
receipt of top marks or ones in four of the seven SALP categories and twos in the
remaining three categories.

The SALP score, as a point of information, it's scored on

a scale of one to three with one being a really superior operation, as Mr. Martin had
discussed this morning; where two is good or, you know, better-than-average
performance; three, acceptable performance.
Probably the most important information contained in the SALP report was, and I'd
like to quote it from the NRC -- this in regards to Diablo's performance -- and that
is, I quote:

"It was very good, in some cases superior, and clearly directed toward

safe facility operation."

We have put a tremendous effort in over the years to improve

upon our performance, learn from our experience, and deliver higher levels of safety
and plant reliability.

We've also found that meticulous attention to good maintenance

can produce many benefits, multiple benefits, in the way of safety availability and the
like.
I'd like to talk a little bit about our refueling process and to say that there are
literally thousands of maintenance and plant refurbishment tasks, which must be
completed during a refueling outage.

These tasks require considerable planning such

that they can be executed efficiently and safely when it comes time to shut the plant
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down and refuel.
To this end, we have applied what we consider some innovative management techniques
and established what we call high-impact teams of both management and union personnel
to work closely together for as long as a year before the refueling outage takes place
to practice and plan their activities such that when it does come time for them to
perform, they can perform as a cohesive team directed really by their own actions and
requiring minimal management because of the level of their rehearsal.
When we did this, or took this approach, two major improvements occurred.

First,

the training and practice that these teams had gone through made the performance of
their task very efficient.

And as a result, the unit was able to be returned to

service at an earlier date or at earlier dates than had been previously experienced.
In other words, we were able to shorten the overall duration of our refueling outage.
The second and most significant here is again the efficiency and planning that went
into the reduction in task time also resulted in a reduction in the amount of radiation
exposure to our plant workers, and these are not insignificant numbers.

And I'd like

to give you a couple of numbers in that manner.
In 1988, which was a year that we performed two refueling outages, one each on Unit
1 and 2, we have reached an exposure of 430 man rem per unit.
radiation.

A rem is a measure of

In 1991, a similar year, in that we had two refueling outages, we averaged

only 270 man rem per unit.

This was a reduction of 37 percent.

Both -- this is both

an improvement in overall plant safety and an attention to worker safety in the power
plant to minimize overall exposure to our working population.
PG&E has also made many capital improvements at its own initiative in order to
enhance the safety and reliability of Diablo Canyon.

I'd like to discuss a few of

those very quickly here.
The first is the installation or the procurement and installation of a sixth
emergency diesel generator to be installed and on-line in 1993.

The purpose of this

$40 million investment is to improve the safety of the plant to give us better

assurance that emergency backup power will be available to safety systems in the plant
if we were to have a loss of off-site power.

We have also upgraded two major systems within the plant.

As examples, the first

being our plant process computer, which monitors the operation of either unit.

There's

one for each unit continuously and helps to alert operators of any change, again, a
multi-million-dollar investment we elected to make.
We've also installed a new digital feedwater control system for the sole purpose of
trying to minimize the number of transients that the old system had put plant
components and equipment through, and in many cases, in the past resulted in unplanned
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reactor shutdowns.
PG&E also continues to maintain a $90 million spare-parts inventory to ensure that
we both have the right part when needed and to ensure that we can properly maintain
plant equipment in as safe as possible condition.
In the area of seismic safety, the NRC's staff in June 1991 submitted their safety
evaluation report on PG&E's long-term seismic program for Diablo Canyon.

Based on its

review and the review of its consultants, and I'd like to refer to the extensive list
of consultants here, the University of Southern California, the United States
Geological Survey, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sania National Laboratory,
the University of Nevada, Reno, and Rice University.

With all this input, the NRC

staff concluded that Diablo Canyon's seismic design margins are sufficient to assure
the health and safety of the public.
The NRC also concluded that PG&E's six-year evaluation of the seismic margins at
the plant have been carried out in a competent and professional manner and really
represented the most extensive, thorough, complete study ever commissioned of its type
for a nuclear facility in this country.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

Let me ask a question.

Sir.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

As part of your emergency preparedness, can you tell us what

you had to do or what you did or what you didn't do during the earthquake in 1989?
MR. WOMACK:

You're referring to the Lorna Prieta quake?

First off, as maybe a bit

of background there, the Lorna Prieta quake epicenter is something on the order of 150
to 160 miles from Diablo.

As a result, the ground motion or the accelerations

experienced at Diablo were very small, very smal: indeed.

In fact, they were so small

that it was not felt by any of the personnel at the plant site.

Only our sophisticated

detection system, which is capable of measuring response down in the thousandth of a
"g" range responded to it.
Aside from that, once the event was reported to the plant, and I believe I was the
first one to report it, I experienced it very well in my 14th floor office in San
Francisco.

That was to initiate a response to that with our established emergency

operating procedure for an earthquake or a seismic event.

That resulted in extensive

walk-downs and evaluation of Unit 2 which was in operation and not affected at that
time and also a review of Unit l's status at the time it was in its third refueling
outage.
I'll continue here.
More recently in October of this year, the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards, or ACRS, which is an advisory body to the NRC independent of the staff,
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NRC chairman Ivan Sellen and endorsed the conclusions of the NRC Safety

~rote

Evaluation Report.

The ACRS noted that the geological and seismilogical

characteristics of the area that are significant to the seismic safety of the plant
~ere

not at issue amongst the large number of consultants and experts that were

associated both with the staff, the licensee, and the ACRS.

The NRC and the ACRS, then

concluded that this represented satisfaction of PG&E's license commitment, license
requirement to perform this study for Diablo, and the NRC has concluded its review of
the matter.
I'd also like to discuss operational safety matters, and in particular, note that
the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee has concluded in its two annual reports
that the plant is being operated safely.

The Safety Committee was created as part of

the Diablo Canyon rate case settlement for the purpose of reviewing the impact of
performance-based rate making on the safety of plant operations.

As I'm sure you're

also aware, the committee acts in an advisory capacity and exercises no authority over
the day-to-day operation at Diablo.
The Safety Committee has been in operation since early 1990, the three members
sitting on the committee possessing the technical knowledge of the operation of the
plant.

Their review has been thorough, fair, reasonable.

In each case where the

committee has taken or made a recommendation, we have carefully reviewed that and taken
action on each recommendation.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

One question.

Do the workers in the plant know how to contact

the Independent Safety Committee?
MR. WOMACK:

Yes.

The Independent Safety Committee, again, associated with its

independence, does publish in the local media a method of access to that.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

There's nothing posted in the plant so that anybody can call?

No, not directly.

we rely on the local media.

However, PG&E has long

had what we refer to as the quality hotline which is a system whereby plant employees,
workers can anonymously make their concerns heard.

This has been in place for

something in the neighborhood of eight to ten years and have been very effective
through the redesign, refurbishment, and operation of the facility.

I might also point

out that the two resident inspectors at Diablo are available to take that input, if
there would be any concern as to the operation of the plant.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

Yes.

Would you begin to conclude.
I'm about at my last-- I'd like to discuss the implementation

of the Diablo rate-making settlement.
And again, as you're aware, the rate-making scheme was approved by the CPUC for
Diablo and is unique in the utility industry.
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The settlement agreement was approved in

December of '88.

Under the agreement, the plan is not included in our rate base.

Instead, we tie our revenues to plant operation.
comes in.

Simply if the plant operates, revenue

If the plant does not operate, no revenue comes in.

All operating and maintenance costs, including all capital costs associated with
the facility, are paid out of these revenues.

The shareholders, not the rate payers,

share the risks and rewards of operation.
This agreement we strongly believe gives PG&E a real incentive to run Diablo at the
highest level of safety and reliability for the entire 28-year term of the agreement,
not just these first three years that we've been in so far.
I'd like to make one quote here, if I can, and enter it into the record, Mr.
Chairman, that the NRC made in recent discussions regarding this type of rate making,
and that is, I quote:

"The settlement provides a number of incentives to PG&E to

improve the reliability and safety of plant operations.

PG&E assumes risks associated

with equipment failures, prolonged outages, and new regulatory requirements for the
entire 28-year period of the settlement.

This program provides PG&E with an economic

incentive to ensure that plant operations -- excuse me -- that the plant operates well
over many years.

The Diablo canyon settlement does not rely on short-term performance

measurements with sharp thresholds and does not use SALP scores, features that the NRC
has identified may adversely affect the public health and safety."
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Let me ask one final question.

It's been suggested, and there

was some reference to it earlier today, that the cost of a kilowatt hour is higher than
any other form of energy.
MR. WOMACK:
system.
engineer.

I might rephrase any other form of energy available in the PG&E

That is unfortunately only partially correct, and I'm, by no means -- I'm an
I'm not familiar with, as well, with our rate structure.

But I do know that

the range of costs in the system is quite wide, ranging from our hydro generation,
where the fuel cost is effectively zero -CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

Hydro.

-- up to the higher end, QF power sources, which are in excess of the

kilowatt hour cost at Diablo. Exactly, you know, how much is above us and how much
below, I really can't answer.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

We can provide that information but

One of the things that we've heard over the years is how much

cheaper nuclear power is than other sources of power.

And when we held a hearing

sometime ago about various kinds of energy, we found out, for example, that solar was
no good because that was 8 cents; that's high.
or 10 cents for nuclear power at Diablo.
MR. WOMACK:

Now I'm informed we may be spending 9.5

Can you comment on that.

Well, I guess again •••

-68-

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

If you're not prepared to, I'd like to have an answer to the

question.
MR. WOMACK:

Yeah, I guess my best answer, and again, I'm not an expert in that

area, but one certainly has to account for the fact that, when it was predicted that
solar could be delivered at 8 cents a kilowatt hour, it was many years ago.
been advances there as there have been in other energy sources.

There have

But my own comment

would be that Diablo's costs today are well in line with what would be the avoided
~wer

costs or the costs of securing new generation within the PG&E system.

So again,

recognizing that we are growing and that our old resources have to be retired.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

What I'd like to hear at some point is the question of costs,

and you mentioned some of the other forms.
cogeneration as compared to nuclear.

I'd like to know what you paid for

I'm informed that cogeneration is cheaper, and so

I • d like to •••
MR. WOMACK:

Again, it depends on a number of complicated factors, and I think it's

best for us to respond in writing to the committee with the full range rather than me
stumble over myself here this afternoon.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
o~rations

Because in past hearings, we've heard from cogeneration

about what they're getting paid, and it's not 10 cents a kilowatt hour.

Anyway •••
MR. WOMACK:

Understood, Senator.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

Thank you.

Thank you very much.

I guess I do want to make one conclusionary statement, and that is,

that PG&E is taking, continues to take aggresive steps, to maintain a high level of
performance, both in safety and reliability at Diablo.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

We don't need to hear it again.

Okay.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

Already said that.
Thank you very much.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

Now we'll hear from the PUC.

Edward O'Neill, I guess,

is going to introduce Bruce DeBerry.
MR. O'NEILL:

Let me just take a minute to introduce both Bruce DeBerry and Anne

Mester.
In order to be fully responsive to the committee, I wanted to bring people here
today who could respond to hopefully all of your questions on all aspects concerning
the Diablo Canyon settlement.
Bruce is currently an assistant director on the commission's transportation
division, but he had previously served the commission in the capacity as the project
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manager on the ORA's Diablo Canyon rate case team.

Bruce and I spent quite a few years

working on that case and shared responsibility for developing the case that led to the
Diablo Canyon settlement.
Anne Mester is an attorney with the commission, and she is responsible for, among
many other things, oveseeing our involvement, limited as it may be, with the Diablo
Canyon Safety Committee.

So first, I thought Bruce would explain briefly some of the

provisions in the settlement and then Anne would discuss the Safety committee.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. BRUCE DeBERRY:

In five minutes.
Okay.

Chairman Rosenthal, as you know, the agreement was

signed in June of 1988 and later approved by the commission in December of 1988.

The

agreement was reached after assessment of the highly complex dispute and technical
issues that existed in that case.

DRA believed that this agreement shifted the risks

of operation and the risks of the costs and capital additions, and it also provided a
potentially large cost disallowance which was in the best interest of ratepayers.
Under the agreement, as you know, PG&E owns and operates the plant and is only paid for
any energy which is delivered from the plant to ratepayers.
The agreement in summary covers 27 years of operation and includes the prices to be
paid for energy in the future and a mechanism to calculate the prices under a formula
which begins in 1994.

It also includes an incentive to incur its operation when the

power is most needed in peak periods of the summer.

It includes also a cap on cost

recovery if the plant is ever abandoned and, as you know, also creates a safety
committee.
record.

A summary of the elements in the settlement have been provided for the

And if you would like to address any of those, why, I can do that.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
Okay.

That's fine.

we have it for the record.

Now let's hear about the Safety Committee.

MS. ANNE MESTER:

Good afternoon.

we also have provided for you a statement of the

basic provisions of the settlement agreement which do apply to the Safety Committee.
And what I'd like to do today is just briefly go over the mechanics of the commission's
limited involvement with the committee.

I'd like to stress that the committee was

intentionally created to be an independent safety committee.

It functions -- it is

intended that it function wholly independently from either PG&E or the PUC; and as a
result, the PUC's involvement is fairly minimal at this point.
approve the settlement which created the committee.

Of course, the PUC did

The settlement contains, as was

referred to briefly, earlier today, a rather elaborate scheme of nominations and
appointments mechanism.
nominators.

The president of the commission serves as one of the

The nominator -- there are three nominators -- they serve as a committee

and nominate, as it turns out every year, three names to either reappoint or to replace
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a particular appointment on the committee.

The committee member's terms are three

years; they're staggered; and so we have this system whereby it recurs every year.
The PUC as a body does not participate in this nomination process.

This is

strictly the role of the president of the commission, although the president must
consult with the PUC as a whole before the nominations are actually relayed to the
appointing powers.
The PUC also sets fees for the members of the committee, and these fees come out of
the committee's annual budget.

The fees are based on commensurate fees which PG&E pays

to like individuals which it hires.

And another thing we've looked at there has been

the fee schedule for trustees of the nuclear decommissioning trust, which is another
entity the PUC created a while ago.
The settlement agreement gives the PUC the authority to audit the books, accounts,
and records of the committee.

And such auditing is to be done with an eye to

reasonableness of expenses and conflicts of interest which may occur therein.

The

staff of the commission is going to undertake with some involvement from PG&E because
that's also the way the settlement agreement provides for it, its first audit of
committee expenses in the first quarter of next year.
The last role the PUC has is in reviewing the committee's annual reports.

And to

date, even though two annual reports have been adopted by the committee, the PUC has
only seen one of them because there is an intermediate step before an annual report is
transmitted to what turns out to be actually for reviewing agencies, the PUC being one.
The annual reports are also given to the Energy Commission for review, the Attorney
General, and the Governor's Office, any one of which entities may decide based on
recommendations in the report to approach the NRC to request an institution of a
proceeding to cause PG&E to adopt one or more of the Safety Committee's
recommendations.

At this point, that has not occurred.

I'm happy to answer further questions.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I just have one question.

Does the commission have the

authority to revisit the decision if it determines, for example, during audits that the
rate-making provisions were not reasonable to the rate base, or the Independent Safety
Committee was seriously flawed?
MR. O'NEILL:

Well, the commission does retain continuing jurisdiction over PG&E

and every other utility that it regulates.

It has the legal authority to reopen the

proceeding and to modify its decision approving the settlement.
are a number of reasons why that's a very unlikely circumstance.

However, I think there
First, I think it

would have a very, very chilling effect on any future settlements in important, complex
cases.

This settlement was entered into with the understanding that it was a long-term
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agreement and that the actual plant may perform much different than anybody forecast.
As a result, if the PUC were to re-open the proceeding because of three years of
high-plant performance, I think it would have a very adverse effect on any future
settlements that involve similar types of long-term estimates.
Secondly, the settlement is really in its infancy.

It's a long-term settlement.

The plant has operated well for several years, and I think that's good for PG&E.

It's

certainly in the interest of the ratepayers and citizens of California from a safety
standpoint, the safest nuclear plant is one that operates at a pretty high level.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

What if the PUC decided the energy was costing too much?

Well, it has the legal authority to re-open the settlement.

But it

would have a very difficult time setting a rate for Diablo Canyon, given the fact that
there is no complete evidentiary record concerning the reasonableness of the costs
incurred there.

There is no record that they could rely upon.

We prepared hundreds of

thousands of pages of testimony in supporting exhibits which were filed with the
commission but hearings were never held.
taken years to conclude.

Had they been held, I imagine they would have

We may still be, have been involved in that process today.

But there are practical problems doing that.
The other thing, though, is that re-opening the settlement at this point may have
the effect of achieving the worst possible outcome for ratepayers.

PG&E would have

received the benefit of high-plant performance in the early years and avoided the risk
of potentially much lower plant performance in the later years of the plant.

So by

re-opening the settlement, the commission might ironically achieve exactly the opposite
result that it was seeking to achieve.

So I think there a number of reasons why that

would not be a good idea, although it's clear that the commission does have the legal
authority to re-open the proceeding and revise that decision, should it choose to do
so.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

We will now hear from Robert Wellington who's the legal counsel for the Diablo
Canyon Independent Safety Committee.
Welcome to the committee.
MR. ROBERT R. WELLINGTON:
Wellington.

Good afternoon, Senator.

As noted, my name is Robert

I'm the Attorney for the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee, and

we're pleased to be here this afternoon.

Thanks for your invitiation.

My nine-year-old son told me yesterday that my prepared remarks take 14 minutes and
40 seconds to read, so we'll save all that time and we'll just submit them for the
record.
I've also provided to you, and I'd rather go through that, the comments talk about
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the formation of the committee and the history and the background.

And since this is

the first time we've appeared before you, we had submitted that material.

I've provided you with

noted the appointment of the three members and have attached
an attachment of documents of exhibits.

Also, we've

As you can see, the background resumes of the

Independent Safety Committee members as appointed.

B is a list of documents pursuant

to the settlement agreement that are provided to the committee.
Your letter, a recent letter, asked for a brief summary on the activities of the
committee, and I'll just touch on a couple of those.

In particular, if you'd look over

at Exhibit C of the packet of documents, at Exhibit c, D, E, and F, I've provided you
with a notice of meetings; and then on the second page, the agendas from each of the
meetings of the Safety Committee.
Obispo on May 22, 1990.

The first meeting, as noted, was held in San Luis

As has been indicated, the settlement agreement was entered

into in the summer of '88 and was then approved by the PUC in late 1988.

But it wasn't

until a year later that Professor William Kastenberg at UCLA was first appointed by the
Governor, and then a second member was appointed which allowed them to hold that first
meeting.
As you can see from that agenda, which is attached at Exhibit c, the sessions were
set up, the committee is held in this format, as followed:

The committee has held

full-day meetings in three sessions -- the first session, usually a morning session,
devoted to a business and organizational matters; a second afternoon session devoted to
fact-finding and presentations; and in connection with that, then an evening session or
a third session devoted primarily to public comments and communications.
In the list of the questions you provided, that was provided to me this morning,
one of the questions was having to do with the open-meeting laws.

As noted there in

Exhibit C, we've adopted Policy Number Four, Rules and Procedures for the Conduct of
Meetings.

And that provides that meetings will be noticed and will be open in public

pursuant to applicable law.

And then I provided -- with regard to the next four

exhibits, you might -- could I have a copy for Senator Russell as well.

Thank you.

The next four exhibits, three exhibits, D, E, and F, again, are the subsequent
agenda meeting notices noting the subsequent meetings all held in San Luis Obispo
County.

All three of the meetings were held in San Luis Obispo itself and one south,

about 15 miles, in Arroyo Grande.

As you can see, in addition to the committee's

meetings itself and the technical presentations, the fact finding that the committee
has conducted by review of these exhibits, you see outage management, training
programs, fuel-handling operations, fitness for duty, and other reports and technical
fact-finding matters that the committee has asked PG&E to make presentations on.
I might note for the record that in the first four meetings of the committee, over
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16 hours have been devoted to fact-finding sessions that have been open to the public,
available for people to listen, the people in the affected community to hear what's
going on, and also to express their concerns in the local community.
A review of these exhibits would also show the number of consultants.

This

question was relevant to the consultants retained by the committee during the terms of
its operations.

It has, in addition to the technical presentations, the consultants

shown on the exhibits, a geotechnical engineer has been retained to advise the
committee on seismic matters.
it in more detail.

One of your questions relates to that, and we'll address

That consultant is going to address the committee on that matter,

following the conclusion of the USGS report, and the NRC report is now reviewing all
those materials and report to the Independent Safety committee at its meeting, next
meeting, in February, in San Luis Obispo.
other consultants have included a board-certified psychiatrist to review fitness
for duty and Employee Assistance Programs, a metallurgical engineer, who gave a report
who was also going to be giving a report at the February meeting, a professor of
radiology who spoke about the low-level radiation program at the most recent meeting in
October of the committee, and a consultant who is advised on probablistic risk
assessment, and a report was concluded at the last meeting on that matter.

I've

also •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WELLINGTON:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WELLINGTON:

Question.
How often does the committee meet?

In 18 months -- as I said, the first meeting was in May of 1990.

The committee has met four times.

It looks like it's going to meet an average about

every, its average about every four months, three times a year.

I finally then report

to you the charge of the committee to prepare a report and note the first interim
report that cover the first six months of 1990, and a copy of that has been filed with
you.
The first annual report of the Safety Committee was adopted at its October meeting,
and that's some 200 pages in length.

That's been provided to PG&E for their response.

And upon our receipt of that response in mid-December, that will be filed pursuant to
the settlement agreement with the Governor, Attorney General, and the Chairman of the
Energy Commission will also file a copy of that with your committee.
I've got other questions that you've provided to me.

But if you-- and I can

address those or •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WELLINGTON:

You can address them-- I'd just like to ask one.

Sure.
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Have you made an unannounced visit to the plant, as a

committee?
MR. WELLINGTON:

The settlement agreement does not provide for unannounced visits.

rn fact, the terms of the settlement agreement by which the committee is organized
provides that the committee shall take, have at least one annual site visit plus what
other site visits it wishes, and it will make arrangements with PG&E for those, and
that all the, each site visit must comply with all applicable federal laws,
regulations, and NRC policies relative to who may go in.
~tself,

So the settlement agreement

by its own terms, does not allow for unannounced visits.

Anything else?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WELLINGTON:

I think that's it.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WELLINGTON:

Thank you.

You know -- I'm sorry.

Could I add one other thing?

It's not in

my prepared remarks, but it ties off on what Anne Mester just said a minute ago and
~t's

in the exhibits.

And I'll just mention it because it might be of interest to you.

Anne Mester, the attorney from the PUC, mentioned the limited oversight that the
PUC has of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee.

But there has been a recent

review where the PUC did take a specific look at what the committee was doing.
~t

And if

hasn't been brought to your attention, I'd like to bring it to your attention.

At

Exhibit o, you'll see there's a petition that was filed back in the spring by the
Mothers for Peace in connection with the committee; and that petition was filed with
the PUC relating to the settlement agreement and specifically the Independent Safety
Committee.
At Exhibit P then, you'll see a brief, a short, it's a 14-page response.
deals -- this was filed by the committee, on behalf of the committee.
all of the issues that had been raised relative to that.

And this

It deals with

And then at Exhibit Q,

there's an opinion of the administrative law judge from the PUC and then also approved
by the PUC itself dealing with those petitions; and I thought it might be of interest
toy~.

Thanks very much.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you.

our next participant will be Dr. Robert Brown,

u.s.

Geological Survey, the

u.s.

Department of the Interior.
DR. ROBERT D. BROWN:
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. BROWN:

Chairman Rosenthal.
Welcome.

Senator Russell.

I should begin, I think, by noting that the
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u.s.

Geological Survey's report on Diablo Canyon is available to the public as Appendix c in
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. BROWN:

Were you here this morning?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

Because NRC testified this morning and agreed to

Okay.

I hope you'd comment about that.

disagree with USGS.
DR. BROWN:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. BROWN:

All right.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. BROWN:

Would you pull your mike a little bit closer.

All right.

Fine.

A point of clarification is that our report to the

USGS examined the geological, geophysical, and seismilogical issues related to Diablo
Canyon and the long-term seismic program that PG&E conducted.

It did not examine such

other topics as soil structure interaction, the engineering performance, of the
building or the structures at the plant or their components.
Initially, USGS considered, was to have considered the ground motion conditions at
Diablo Canyon.

And one of our geophysicists, Ken Campbell, was assigned to that task.

Ken left the USGS about three-quarters the way through the process, the review process.
And he continued to consult on ground motion for the NRC but as a private individual
rather than a USGS employee.

And for that reason, there was no ground motion -- there

were no ground motion issues considered specifically in our report.
The discussion of the scope of our review relates to a number of questions that
were asked, and these concerned things like whether the USGS has expressed an opinion
on whether the plant will survive a major earthquake, whether we will be involved in
further review of PG&E's evaluations for NRC.

A number of these issues are engineering

matters, and they require a rather sophisticated structural engineering judgment.

We

did not provide that for •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

You'll have an opportunity in the next two weeks, I hope, to

provide us with that information?
DR. BROWN:

Yes, I can provide that in written form, if you wish.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. BROWN:

Thank you.

But essentially, that's the reason why some of these things were not

done.
We have, in fact, a long-standing interagency agreement with NRC to advise them on
earth science issues and research related to reactor siting.

And from 1985 until the

completion of the review process in September of this year, I was the senior USGS
geologist involved in that process.

A landmark in that process was the PG&E final
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report which was issued in July of 1988.

And chapters 2 and 3 of that report, which

dealt with the geology, seismology, and tectonics, and the capability of the fault for
generating large earthquakes raised a number of questions.

Those questions were

formally addressed to PG&E by NRC, and there were a series of reports then issued over
the next 18-month period approximately.

And all of that material, the final report,

plus those supplemental reports, is the documentation that PG&E offered.

That material

formed the basis of our review plus access to other published and unpublished data that
we have and also our own investigations that have been completed or in progress.
As our report to the NRC noted, we were able to confirm many of the conclusions
from the long-term seismic program, PG&E's investigation.

But we also questioned

several conclusions, and the most significant of these, the ones that received the most
notice, were those relating to the Hosgri Fault.

And there's several issues involved

there, and I'll try to summarize those rather quickly.
PG&E's interpretation of the Hosgri is a vertically, essentially, a vertical fault,
extending down to 12 kilometers' depth, and characterized by horizontal motion of the
blocks on either side.
strike-slip fault.

So it's essentially, in geologist jargon, a right-lateral,

It's very similar to most of the earthquakes that occur on the San

Andreas Fault.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. BROWN:

I beg your pardon?

SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. BROWN:

Is that in the ocean?
The fault, yes, the fault is in the ocean.

In the ocean.

It's three miles -- it's about 2.8 miles offshore from Diablo Canyon.

The USGS interpretation of the fault geometry and the nature of slip is somewhat
different.

We agree that it probably is vertical down to depths of about two miles,

but we think that it flattens to depths of 50 to 70 degrees toward the northeast at
depths between three miles and eight miles deep.
We agree with PG&E that the maximum magnitude earthquake on the fault is a 7.2.
also differ in the sense of slip.

We

As I mentioned, the PG&E intepretation is

strike-slip horizontal motion on the fault.

The USGS interpretation is that it's

likely to have a combination of vertical- and horizontal-slip, an oblique-slip fault,
very similar to the Lorna Prieta Earthquake of 1989.

And in fact, one of the

significant things about Lorna Prieta is that it demonstrated the possibility of large,
oblique-slip earthquakes in California.
possibility before Lorna Prieta.

We had been arguing that this was a

It was a nice demonstration to have come along.

These differences become important chiefly in estimating ground motion.

And the

critical thing, from the standpoint of ground-motion estimates, is really not how far
the plant is from the earthquake of the surface of the earth but its relationship to
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the fault zone at depth.

And as I think I mentioned before, the energetic part of the

fault zone is down at three or four miles to something like eight miles deep.
The USGS interpretation would incline the fault zone toward the plant.

And in

fact, at most of the depths that we're talking about, the very lower part of the fault
zone would be beneath the Diablo Canyon facility.

So -- and then the other point is

that in general, coming out of the ground motion estimates for Diablo Canyon, it
appears that the oblique-slip or reverse-slip faults consistently have higher ground
motion for the same magnitude earthquake than do strike-slip faults.

so both the

geometry of the fault and the oblique-slip orientation contributes somewhat to
increased levels of ground motion.

And, of course, if ground motion levels become too

high, they exceed the design parameters for the plant and can lead to failure and loss
of function.
There's a problem, however, with estimating maximum ground motion levels.
fact, there are a number of problems associated with that issue.
three of these.

And, in

I might just mention

One is, that in order to estimate the slip on the Hosgri Fault, it's

necessary to import slip observations on the San Simeon Fault 36 miles to the north.
Another one is a vertical component of slip on the Hosgri Fault is clearly there.

But

its magnitude is certainly unknown, and it's likely to remain so without offshore
drilling to provide reliable age control.
And finally, and perhaps more importantly, even if all these other questions were
resolved, our ability to estimate ground motions for ?-magnitude and greater
earthquakes within three miles of the source is limited because the database for that
estimation is nearly devoid of that kind of earthquake.

I think about the only one we

have right now is the Corralitos station on, that was within the distance of the Lema
Prieta Earthquake.
These kinds of gaps in our knowledge make the assessment of the earthquake hazard
uncertain, and we can overcome some of that with, by the use of probablistic methods.
But these -- and these allow us to make decisions, but they're really no substitute for
hard data.

There are, I think, five important conclusions or lessons that we might

draw from the Diablo Canyon experience.
The first, which is specific to Diablo Canyon, is that the problem of the Hosgri
Fault and its seismic potential is still not entirely satisfactorily resolved.

Some

more general points are, first, for critical facilities, such as dams and reactors,
geologic hazards should be fully and carefully evaluated before resources are committed
to construct and operate the facility.
Secondly, in regions as geologically complex and incompletely known as Coastal
California, exploration costs required to define earthquake hazards adequately may
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approach or exceed the constructions costs in many facilities.
unexpected events occur frequently in earthquake research.

New discoveries and

Providing for timely

reassessment of earthquake vulnerability is a critical element in long-term risk
management.
And finally, where a seismic hazard is recognized, adequately defined and
~antified,

engineering strategy can usually reduce the risk to acceptable levels.

An

engineering solution to an undefined or poorly constrained problem offers substantially
less protection.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

Any questions, Senator Russell?
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Were you involved in any surveys before the plant -- I mean was

your organization involved in any geological surveys before the plant was started or
approved?
OR. BROWN:

We were involved -- we became involved -- actually, we were involved

early on through our regular interagency agreement with NRC, and the assistant director
for engineering at that time was the main contact for that.

After the construction

permit and before licensing, the Hosgri Fault zone was discovered offshore.

And so

that's something that came up midway in the process.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. BROWN:

Was that discovered by your agency?

It was initially discovered by an oil company geologist who was looking

for oil offshore and was not called by that name.

But after that discovery, the survey

assigned part of is marine geology group to go out and further explore that fault zone
and determine whether or not it was active or inactive; and they provided much of the
data to show that it was active.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

And then based upon that, PG&E redesigned

their plant in keeping with the information that you or the oil company or whoever
else?
DR. BROWN:

I think that was the foundation for the first redesign that was

mentioned by the PG&E people.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
comment?

Okay.

And when they redesigned their plant, were you asked to

Was your agency asked to comment on the sufficiency of it as it relates to

that fault?
DR. BROWN:

Senator, that was before my relationship to this problem.

I think we

were involved in that process on pretty much a day-to-day level directly through our
contact with NRC because NRC was overseeing this process.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

So while you weren't there and cannot testify as to your personal

knowledge, would it be fair to assume that your people were involved in the analysis
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and in looking at the safety factors as it related to that?

That would be part of your

charge normally?
DR. BROWN: I think they were involved but to a less of an intensive degree in terms
of a review.

We were doing more independent evaluation of the geology around the plant

site and less of a review process than this time.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

And now your overview has been reactive, reactivated, or is it,

has it been an ongoing oversight?
DR. BROWN:

It's not an ongoing thing.

the long-term seismic program was begun.

It was reactivated in 1985 at the time that
However, we continued to have an interest on

offshore geology, and we are doing surveys of Coastal California.

And this, the Hosgri

is just part of a fault zone that extends all along the coast, and it's a major issue.

so ..•
SENATOR RUSSELL:

How did you get reactivated as it relates to Diablo Canyon?

Do

you know?
DR. BROWN:

Yes.

There was a request that went from the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission to the USGS director's office to provide review capability for the long-term
seismic program.
SENATOR RUSSELLi
DR. BROWN:

And since '85 then, it's been kind of an ongoing review process?

That's right.

There were a series of informational meetings between

NRC and PG&E beginning in 1985 when they were scoping the program and deciding what
should be included and what the content of the program should be.

And as time went on,

those meetings became an exchange of data and interpretations and a questioning sort of
thing.

And I was involved in all of those meetings from the time of the scoping study

until September of this year.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, if you can paraphrase then your bottom line.

Here are some

facts, period; or here are some facts -- you need to do something else; or you don't
need to do anything else; or what is •••
DR. BROWN:

Well, I think that NRC went further toward meeting some of these

concerns •••
SENATOR RUSSELL:
DR. BROWN:

Their reference to what?

Toward meeting some of the USGS concerns and were clear this morning,

the statement that we agreed to disagree.

And incidentally, I was a consultant to the

NRC staff.

But they did require an increase in ground

That's who I interacted with.

motion levels and an incorporation of a vertical component of motion in the analysis of
the ground motion.

And they also required a look at the range of dips on the fault

which was not as great as we would have liked to have seen.
survey interpretation.

-so-

But it overlaps with the

SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, do you think then for the citizens that live in that

general area, people of California, that proper precautions or proper analyses or
proper whatever is being done as it relates to this issue?
OR. BROWN:
have right now.

We've probably gone about as far as we can go with the data that we
But one of the points I wanted to make is that new data may confirm

that this is a perfectly safe situation and that we may even have overestimated the
hazard.

On the other hand, it may show that we haven't.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

And your agency is in the process of developing that data or

trying to develop such data?
DR. BROWN:

We're gathering data on Coastal California faults.

We're not doing it

specifically for the power plant because it's a regional problem.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

But you are looking into that.

And if anything that comes up

that reflects upon this, you would share it?
DR. BROWN:

Yes.

our data is interpreted and released.

It's made a matter of

public information.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

The final witness in this portion, Rochelle Becker, who's going to be speaking for
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and TURN.
Welcome, Ms. Becker.

I guess you were invited to testify on behalf of the Mothers

for Peace who have concerns about the safety of the plant and the Independent Safety
Committee created by the PUC.

In addition, I've been informed that the consumer group,

TURN, has concerns about the costs of Diablo Canyon energy could not attend and asked
you to represent them at this hearing.
MS. ROCHELLE BECKER:
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

That's correct.
Okay.

Since you're wearing two hats, I'd like to request that

you take no more than 15 minutes to cover both the safety and the cost issues.
MS. BECKER:

I will do my best.

First, thank you very much for inviting the Mothers for Peace to attend today.
We have been legal interveners in Diablo canyon proceedings for over 17 years and
represent a large portion of our community who supports us over that time.

We have a

slightly different view of Diablo Canyon and PG&E.
We have been participants in this hearing since 1974.

And 17 years later, we are

here again to speak about seismic issues and safety issues.
First of all, I'd like to call to the committee's attention that in the USGS review
of the long-term seismic program, the USGS spoke very clearly in statements that they
made disagreeing with PG&E and disagreeing with the long-term seismic review of the NRC
as a result-- I have to read some of this.
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I'm really sorry, but it's •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

You can read as much as you can in 15 minutes, and then I'm

going to cut you off.
MS. BECKER:

Okay.

(Laughter)

All right.

While I feel Mr. Brown is a very

capable man and led the USGS team, someone in the USGS wrote very strong language when
they came to reviewing PG&E's long-term seismic program.
To quote the last sentence in the first paragraph of the USGS review:

" ••• some

issues remain unresolved or controversial, chiefly because of the lack of definitive
evidence."

They go on to state that "Reviewers disagree with PG&E's interpretations of

the Hosgri as a substrike fault."

The words "disagree", "controversial", "unresolved",

constantly appear in their testimony.
NRC's staff's review.
many papers.

We the public read their testimony and read the

And the first sentence of the NRC's staff's review

Basically, it was that everything was all right at the plant.

way too
And

nowhere in the NRC, in the USGS, review does it say that everything is okay,
seismically okay, at Diablo Canyon.
They talk about controversy; they talk about unresolved issues.
the only ones.

And they're not

Other independent reviewers who worked on the NRC long-term seismic

review, in PG&E's long-term seismic review, talked about unresolved issues.
Dr. Ken Campbell, who worked on ground motion, used the following descriptive
words:

"biased", "unconservative", "unreliable", "inappropriate", "too subjective".

Dr. David McCollough, who was involved in the review of the offshore data before he
retired and worked for the USGS before that time, was so disturbed with the NRC's
staff's conclusions, that he's writing, formulating a letter of protest that's going to
be forwarded to the NRC.

Dr. Crouch, who was formerly with the United States

Geological Survey and a consultant to the California Public Utilities Commission,
reviewed the long-term seismic program and the NRC review of that program for the
Mothers for Peace.

He also is concerned about the bottom line, whether or not this

plant is safe.
And at the last day of this review hearing from the Atomic Committee on Reactor
Safeguards, a man named Dr. Jay Sampson showed up.
from Southern California.

He's an independent oil geologist

And he was so angry with the long-term seismic program

conclusions that he traveled to San Luis Obispo at his own expense to speak to the ACRS
about his conclusions.

I've included all of his documents in a packet that I gave to

the committee before I attended, and you also have my testimony.
But the bottom line is that NRC allowed PG&E, the applicant, with the largest
financial stake in the outcome of this program, in the seismic program, to do its own
review.
work.

They allowed PG&E to hire the consultants; they allowed PG&E to do all the
PG&E does not get paid if they have to shut this plant down to fix it; PG&E does
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not get paid for the time that it's shut down, if they have to shut it down to fix it.
we are very concerned that the Public Utilities Commission's performance-based rate
making scheme also affects whether or not the outcome of this seismic review was as
upfront and open as it could have been.

We believe that more information is needed and

that more information will be available.
One of the USGS review teams who worked under Mr. Brown stated that they felt -- he
felt -- that they were way too gentlemanly in their review of the long-term seismic
program.

And he was livid with the NRC review.

This is Dr. Steve Lewis, and I request

that the committee talk to him about the United States Geological Survey results and
the NRC review.
We feel that the only way to assure the public in San Luis Obispo that this plant
is safe is to have an independent study, a complete independent study.
had given, data to the USGS to review.

PG&E was given,

The USGS developed very little of their own

data in looking into the long-term seismic program.

The only way we're going to be

assured that it's safe is for an independent study to be made.

Every time there is an

earthquake in Northern California within the first 30 minutes, some reporter is saying,
gee, we've talked to the people at Diablo Canyon and everything is okay.
there, and these earthquakes have occurred hundreds of miles away from us.

Well, we live
We want to

make sure that this plant is okay.
The NRC is full of engineers; the NRC is full of attorneys.
seismic consultants who are experts on the California coastline.

The NRC is not full of
We need people who

are experts on the California coastline to assure the people of San Luis Obispo that
this plant is safe.
Now I'd like to speak on the Safety Committee.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. BECKER:

I'd like to ask a question.

Sure.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Senator Russell.

Has the Mothers for Peace taken any position on nuclear power in

general?
MS. BECKER:

Oh, absolutely.

We oppose nuclear power, just as much as PG&E favors

nuclear power.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. BECKER:
17 years.
jobs.

Thank you.

And nobody in the Mothers for Peace is paid and have not been paid for

We're here because we really care about our community.

We have full-time

We take time off from work to attend every one of these meetings for 17 years.

We believe the plant is unsafe.

we have brought safety concerns to the NRC, to the

PUC, to anybody who would listen to us over and over and over again.
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And I believe

even PG&E will agree that the plant is safer today because the Mothers for Peace
brought those concerns to the public.
Now the Mothers for Peace also participated in the safety hearings in the PUC rate
case.

We participated because we were concerned that the Public Utilities Commission

would adopt such a settlement agreement to pay the utility for performance.
We were disappointed when the PUC staff decided not to go forward with their
original recommendation of a $4.4 billion disallowance.

But we were devastated when

they decided to bring forward this pay-for-performance rate scheme which they
formulated behind closed doors without the participation of the public and brought to
the commission's attention two weeks before the reasonableness hearings were supposed
to begin.
Now we were never filed in this hearing because we were concerned about how much
money PG&E was going to make.

That's my other half.

we were filed in this hearing

because we were concerned about safety implications of the way this plant was rate
based.

We felt that pay-for-performance would give PG&E the incentive to not shut down

their plant when maintenance needed to be made or hurry through refueling and making
those maintenance modifications at the plant because they wanted to get back on line
and because they wanted to continue making the very high profits that they've made.
Well, every time PG&E has refueled, they have touted publicly how fast they have
done that.

They have set worldwide records at refueling at Diablo canyon.

That might

make them feel very good, but the public who lives there wants them to take their time.
They've also had problems during refueling.

They have been cited for excessive

worker overtime; they had a crane accident that caused a power outage at the plant; and
during the last refueling, they had two workers that were exposed.

Also, they had been

leaking at that plant for three weeks before they shut down for refueling and didn't
shut down until they had set this, once again, world record for continuous operation.
That does not make the people of San Luis Opispo feel safe.
Now also because the commission agreed that there might be a small safety problem
in this pay-for-performance rate scheme, they gave us this safety committee.

The

safety committee has absolutely no authority to do anything at Diablo Canyon.

We find

them to be a toothless lap dog and not a watch dog that they're supposed to be.
waited and waited and waited for this committee.

We

Now if the commission felt that there

might be safety implications of this rate scheme, why did we have to wait a
year-and-a-half for the first safety meeting?

Why did they require that any member of

the safety committee have experience, background, and knowledge of the nuclear industry
when they

have no authority to do anything?

Even the NRC doesn't require experience,

background, and knowledge in the nuclear industry.
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And they have authority over

nuclear power plants.
f~rst

public meeting.

So we waited; we waited a year-and-a-half.

And we attended that

There was a lot of the public who attended.

And we went before

the safety committee, and we asked for three things.
We asked for an office, a presence, in San Luis Obispo, a place where the community
could go to review documents, to look at correspondence, to talk to the committee about
our concerns or their staff about our concerns.

We haven't gotten that.

We asked that

they retain a seismic consultant to look into the most obvious concern at Diablo
Canyon, and that is the seismic problem at Diablo.
year, they did retain a seismic consultant.

We waited for that.

Just this

And the seismic consultant they retained

is from the East Coast, a man who does not have experience on the California coastline
geography and seismology, a man who couldn't even attend the public hearing in San Luis
Obispo to listen to the independent people who spoke to that committee.
Third, we asked for this committee -- I forgot what was third -- sorry.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. BECKER:

Okay.

About two minutes left.
We asked that -- I'm sorry.

We asked for all the

correspondence submitted to this committee to be made available to the public.
don't know what the public is asking the committee to do.
Safety Committee's hearings.

We

We no longer attend the

We have to take time out from work from our schedules to

do so, and we no longer believe the Safety Committee can provide any additional
assurance for safety.
Now we've gone to the public document room, and we have read the documents that are
there from the Safety Committee.
Cal Poly University.
evening.

The public document room is on the third floor of the

You cannot park there during the day, so you have to go in the

But what we discovered when we were reading the documents is that there

no correspondence in there.

is

We do not know what correspondence this committee has

received, nor do we know when the committee asked PG&E a question what question was
asked.

The responses to the questions are in the public document room.

responses, but we don't know if they're responsive.
follow-up that's been done.
doing.

It's not there.

You read the

We don't know if there's any

We need to know what this committee is

We are paying $500,000-plus a year over the very high profits that PG&E is

making under the settlement agreement for this safety committee.

And I don't believe

that anyone in San Luis Obispo believes that any additional assurance of safety is
provided by this committee.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. BECKER:

Excuse me?

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. BECKER:

You talk about high profits.

You talk about high profits.

Yes.

-as-

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. BECKER:

Would you explain that, what you mean by high profits.

Well, PG&E has issued statements talking about their record profits

since Diablo Canyon went on-line.
necessarily the Mothers for Peace.

They're PG&E's words, the high profits.
We're not concerned about profits.

They're not

We really

aren't.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MS. BECKER:

Oh, I'm well aware of that.

It will cost us more to shut down the plant.

My other hat is TURN, but they have submitted written testimony.

And unless you

have any questions •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

No, I have no -- just a comment.

It seems to me, that if

there is a perception that there's something wrong, and there appears to be, whether
there is anything wrong or not is the question.

But the fact that there is a

perception that there's something wrong, it seems to me that somebody, PG&E perhaps,
ought to try to make some of these things a little bit easier for people to get
information about.
I don't know why, for example -- if the plant is in San Luis Obispo

I don't know

why there isn't one person in San Luis Obispo that can answer questions or provide
information.
MS. BECKER:

Senator Rosenthal, you're assuming that when we ask PG&E a question

we're going to get the complete truth, that we're going to get all of what's going on.
We get misleading statements.
to PG&E.

We have spoken to PG&E for 17 years.

They're our neighbors; they're my neighbors.

as people.

We do.

We don't not speak

It's not them versus us

It's a nuclear power plant 2.8 miles from an earthquake fault in which

there is such conflicting testimony from independent experts.
only read what we're given.

We read everything we can find.

We're not experts.

We

And the bottom line is

they really don't know if this plant's going to withstand an earthquake until it
shakes.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. BECKER:

Thank you very much.

You're welcome.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

The final •••

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, I would say that your observation has

some merit to it, but I would submit, that given the philosophical opposition that this
group has to nuclear power and the obvious distrust of anything and everything from the
Safety Committee to the Geological Survey, to certainly to PG&E, that I wonder whether
there's anything that anybody could do that would satisfy them, other than to close the
plant down.
CP~IRMAN

ROSENTHAL:

Perhaps not.

I would think that people might have, some
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people-- I'm not suggesting this particular group-- some people might have -- I would
feel better if the committee could make an unannounced visit.

I don't know of anything

other than that that would at least give me confidence that something wasn't open.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

You mean to visit the plant unannounced?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

I don't know.

People sleeping or something?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

We can't do that.

What would they expect to find?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Yes.

I don't know.

Okay.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

But, you know, in many areas where somebody is supposed to be

watching whatever goes on, whether it be a nursing home or a manufacturing plant, the
ability to make an unannounced visit by OSHA in one case or by this committee on
another case or by somebody to a nursing home, how else do you make sure that what is
going on ought to go on and hasn't been sanitized?

That little thing alone, I think,

would give me a better feeling that something was available or happening.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Well, the PG&E people are here and they're listening.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

And I'm not

to nuclear; that's something else.

I understand their position.

They're opposed

I'm just talking about --well, we'll move on; and

then the open microphone, if you'd like.
Okay.

Now we're going to take care of the Humboldt Bay and the Rancho Seco Nuclear

Power plants.
The first one is Lawrence Womack, Manager Nuclear Operations Support, Pacific Gas &
Electric Company.

And since some of it has already been touched upon •••

MR. LAWRENCE F. WOMACK:
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

I'll be as brief as possible, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Again, my name is Larry Womack.

Mr. Chairman and Senator Russell, I'm

pleased to provide a brief status on the decommissioning of PG&E's Humboldt Bay Power
Plant Unit 3.
Humboldt Bay was retired in 1983, and it's currently in what is called SAFESTOR
status which Mr. Freeman described with regard to the SMUD facility this morning
pending its decommissioning upon removal of all-spent fuel.

Under the rate making

required for decommissioning by the CPUC, PG&E has collected approximately $94 million,
and Humboldt Bay's decommissioning costs are considered fully funded at this point.
And again, this exists in a trust that PG&E cannot touch pending removal of fuel from
the plant.
In June 1987, after questions have been raised by the Redwood Alliance and others
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concerning the viability of shipping Humboldt's spent fuel off site earlier than the
then scheduled 1998 startup for the federal repository, PG&E agreed with Redwood
Alliance and governmental representatives in the area around the plant to pursue the
highest priority possible for acceptance of the spent fuel at a federal respository
once it opened.

PG&E also agreed to decommission the plant following the shipment of

the spent fuel off site to a viable repository.
Finally, PG&E agreed to re-examine the possibility of using dry-cask storage to
store the spent fuel if and when such storage option becomes available for sites such
as Humboldt.

As a result of this agreement, PG&E has reviewed the feasibility of

dry-cask storage at Humboldt.

PG&E has concluded that to date dry-cask storage at

Humboldt is not feasible from an economic, safety and regulatory standpoint.
First, from the regulatory standpoint, the current version of dry-cask storage
being used on a demonstration basis by various utilities is not necesarily of the same
design that would be used to ultimately ship the spent fuel to a repository.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Do you vitrify that?

MR. WOMACK:

I don't want to get caught up in the current designs, but it's

No.

the French that vitrify their wastes.

The various designs for the ultimate repository

could indeed vitrify, but I'm not positive there, Senator.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. WOMACK:

Thank you.

Given that uncertainty from an economic or a safety perspective, it

does not appear to make sense to move the spent fuel out of wet storage and into
dry-cask storage only to face the possible further removal of the spent fuel from a dry
cask to a transfer cask ultimately for shipping to a repository.
Secondly, from a purely economic standpoint, the existing SAFESTOR wet-storage
capacity at Humboldt is adequate to serve our needs until the federal repository is in
operation and the spent fuel can be transferred.

The wet storage is as safe as

dry-cask storage, and it does not make sense for us to employ dry-cask storage with the
movement, the possible movement, of the fuel twice, if no economic or safety reason of
a demonstrable nature is identified.

And to date, none have.

And this concludes my status report on Humbodlt Bay Unit 3.

I'd be happy to answer

any questions.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

In the press just recently, in the last

couple of days, there is the suggestion of another process of eliminating the waste,
changing its form in some way.
MR. WOMACK:

It might be referred to, what's called, I think it's called actinide

burning.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Right.
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MR. WOMACK:

And the process here would involve taking spent fuel or separating the

particularly active components, fabricating it into fuel-like assemblies or including
it in fuel for a nuclear reactor or another type of reactor working on -- well, where a
lot of neutrons would be present

and causing it to be transmuted into basically, I

guess what I'd say, benign, non-radioactive forms, or possibly even further burning
those byproducts of the fission process and obtaining usable energy from that.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
wh~le

But •••

The article went on to say that we ought to wait for a little

before we put the stuff in the ground.

MR. WOMACK:

Well, there's certainly a camp out there that would argue that the

va1ue of the spent fuel is quite high, both for the plutonium content, the remaining
uranium, and as recent information is identified, the fission products that are highly
radioactive.

So •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Okay.

Mr. Edward O'Neill, Assistant General Counsel for the PUC.

Good afternoon again, Mr. Chairman, Senator Russell.

I'd like to

introduce at this time Cherrie Conner who is an accountant with the commission's
Advisory and Compliance Division.

She is responsible for, among other things,

overseeing the utility trust funds in which funds have been set aside for future
decommissioning.

She will go through briefly the procedure that we use for doing that.

And then we also have some answers to questions that Senator Russell asked this
morning.
MS. CHERRIE CONNER:

Okay.

You have some written documentation that was

prepared •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:

Would you pull the microphone over, closer to you.

I'm sorry.

Good afternoon.

You have some written documentation that

was prepared for you that gives a brief history.

I won't go into too much detail

except to say that the utilities -- San Diego Gas & Electric, PG&E, and Edison -- both
have qualified and non-qualified nuclear decommissioning trust funds.

The qualified

fund is tax deductible, so the contributions, the utilities, don't have to pay a tax on
those contributions.

The qualified portion, they do have to pay a tax on them.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:

What's the breakdown?

Why is there a breakdown?

Because the Tax Reform Act of 1984 prepared, made, under section

468(a), said that pre-1984 service life of nuclear plants would be, could be
decommissioned and that would be non-qualified.
not be qualified for tax deduction purposes.
deductible.

In other words, those fundings would

But anything after 1984 would be

This allows the utilities to collect more money and to retain more of
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those funds.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Just a personal comment.

One of the reasons we're in the

depression we're in was as a result of the 1984 tax legislation.
MS. CONNER:

Okay.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:

Okay.

That's a personal comment.
(Chuckle)

Well, in 1987, the commission has established

decommissioning funds for, the decommissioning costs for, Diablo Canyon 1 and 2,
Humboldt Bay, San Onofre, 1, 2, and 3, and Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3.

Along with

establishing the cost, they established the annual decommissioning revenue requirements
that each of the utilities would charge their ratepayers for decommissioning of those
plants.

At that same time, they allowed the utilities to establish the trust funds

and ••• established the nuclear decommissioning trust funds, the trust agreements.

And

they limited the investments on the non-qualified portion of the funds to primarily the
same parameters that the Tax Reform Act in 1984 established for the qualified, although
they allowed them to enter into investments and high-quality corporate bonds and
equities in addition to the municipal 'bonds, U.S. Treasuries, and certificates.
Each utility has a five-member trust committee.

This committee has no more than

two utility employees on it and then three outside committee members.

The committee's

responsibilities are to select the trustee and the investment manager as well as to
establish the investment policies for the trust funds.

They also submit reports

annually and tri-annually to the commission for review of their performance of their
funds.

And that's basically the responsibility of the Commission Advisory and

Compliance division in my branch.
performance.

We review the nuclear decommissioning trust fund's

We meet with the trust committees at least once a year, if not more often

than that, and provide information to the commission on the peformance of the trust
funds.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I have a couple of questions.

What is it going to cost, the

total cost, for Humboldt?
MS. CONNER:

The total cost to decommission Humboldt.

I have that for you.

In

1991 dollars, the utility's latest estimate, the decommissioning of Humboldt, is $77.9
million.

If we decommission it into future dollars of decommissioning Humboldt in the

year 2000, I believe that •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:

Eight.

Eight, 2008, would be $265.5 million.

It's the same $79.9 million

escalated by various escalation rates for labor materials.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

How often does the utility in any of these funds, the

decommissioning funds, send money for funds?
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MS. CONNER:

It goes in monthly.

The utility is collected in their general rate,

and then they submit it to the trustees on a monthly basis for investment.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:

I see.

A trustee.

And the money is invested by a trust?

Well, it's invested by an investment manager, and the

trustee oversees the investment managers to make sure that they are investing according
to the policies of the commission's decision as well as the various individual
investment policies.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:

Thank you.

Did you want to know any information as to what the the total level of

funding is in each of the funds?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Give us a ballpark for the four plants in California, the

total.
MR. O'NEILL:

Excuse me.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

You mean the decommissioning cost estimates?

Yes.

I have those totals.

For Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, based on the

latest estimate, including a 50 percent contingency, the PUC has estimated the cost to
be

$894 million.

Now that's including the 50 percent contingency.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

For San Onofre •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

You can leave it up.

Don't worry about it.

For San Onofre Units 2 and 3, we have estimated the decommissioning

costs at $667 million.
Diablo figures.

I understand.

That's in 1990 dollars, so it's not quite comparable to the

And that also includes a contingency, a contingency of 25 percent.

The San Onofre .••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Which plants are those?

San Onofre 2 and 3.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Now how about number 1?

San Onofre 1, the estimate is $230 million in 1990 dollars with a 25

percent contingency.
MS. CONNER:

And the Palo Verde estimate is -- excuse me -- one more page.

Palo Verde estimate is $121.8 million.
MR. O'NEILL:

That's for Edison.

Edison's share.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Okay.

Now the utilities own the plants outside of California?

Yes, they have interests •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:

The

Yes.

jurisdiction-wise.

Does that money go into the same fund?
It's what the utilities are responsible for, the PUC,

so Edison's interest in Palo Verde -- I don't know exactly what the
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interest is -- but their nuclear decommissioning costs are allocated to the ratepayers
here in California.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:
MR. O'NEILL:

No, I don't.

I thought it was •••

You mean their percentage interest?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:

You don't know what that figure is?

No, we're talking about dollars approximately.

Oh, $121.8 million.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

How much?

MS. CONNER: $121.8 million is the •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. CONNER:

Estimated decommissioning costs, Edison's share.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

$121.8 million.
Okay.

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Now we'll hear from Jim Adams, Redwood Alliance.

And would

you please tell me what the Redwood Alliance is.
MR. JAMES

s. ADAMS:

Yes, I will.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the

committee, and staff.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

We will include this as part of your testimony, if you'll just

tell us briefly what it says.
MR. ADAMS:

I certainly will.

with any forestry-related issues.
Humboldt County.

First of all, despite our name, we are not involved
It's merely because we're based out of Arcata and

And when we formed our group in 1978 to work primarily on energy and

other resource issues, we chose the name Redwood Alliance.

So I'm here not to discuss

legislation related to Redwoods, et cetera.
What I would like to talk about, and I was interested in the testimony, I just
heard from Mr. Womack.

The Redwood Alliance, as he mentioned, was part of an agreement

regarding the decommissioning plan for the Humboldt plant.

And as part of the

agreement, PG&E agreed to basically to do a couple of things, to try to find, basically
get the fuel assemblies, the fuel rods, out of the plant as soon as possible when there
is a respository for them to be placed in.

And another thing was to re-evaluate the

dry-cask storage method of storing the fuel rods once those technologies have been
licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I was unaware that PG&E had in fact re-evaluated the dry-cask storage option that
Mr. Womack just said.
more of the details.

And so after this, perhaps he and I can get together and discuss
I think one of the problems is that we haven't probably been

communicating as appropriately between PG&E and ourselves because we were unaware of
that.

Perhaps that's partly our fault as well.
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The second issue I'd like to talk about is the -- we still have a concern -- well,
first of all, let me say that in general, we are pleased with PG&E's safe-storage
process, the decommissioning plan that it put together, and, of course, the decision
not to reopen the Humboldt Bay plant primarily because of the issue of seismicity.
There were some active earthquake faults that the plant had not been designed for.

And

in order to retrofit that, PG&E would have had to spend a lot of money, and we think
they made the right decision in not re-opening the facilities.

So we support that and

the process that's gone on since then.
However, we have a couple of concerns, one of which is whether or not there has
been an adequate analysis of dry-cask storage, and I will get into that with PG&E
representatives directly.

And the second one is the monitoring well situation.

And,

in fact, I believe, there's an attachment -- it's labeled Attachment C in the packet
that I gave you.

Our concern is that we would feel better if there were some

water-monitoring wells placed between the radioactive waste storage areas and the bay.
Essentially what we have here is a situation where the facility is very close to
Humboldt Bay, and the tide moves the water in and out on a regular basis.

And from our

review of the documents, there are no monitoring wells between the radioactive waste
storage areas and the bay.
We contacted the EPA on this and wrote them, corresponded with them, to try to
raise the issue.

We did not receive any results from that.

We still have a concern

that there needs to be some additional monitoring wells put in, and I have a feeling
it's one of the things that we'll try to negotiate with PG&E when we can set up some
meetings.
Another issue is the, and it has been mentioned today, and it's this whole thing
about INPO reports.

And I refer to that on page •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. ADAMS:

INPO.

What report is that?
Let me find it in the -- on page 4 of the testimony, INPO refers

to the -- actually, the name of it is laid out at the bottom of page 3 and then a
discussion on page 4.

It's called the "Institute of Nuclear Power Operations".

It's a

nuclear utility self-regulating group funded basically by ratepayers' electric bills.
And as it notes there, it conducts periodic inspections of all nuclear power plants and
assembles fairly candid reports about what is going on in these facilities.
Unfortunately, the NRC has refused to grant public access to these reports, so we
have a situation where the utility themselves have very candid reports about how the
operations are working at every nuclear power plant in the country.
reports to the NRC.

They share them with themselves.

They submit these

They share them with some of the

international nuclear agencies, but the NRC's refused to grant them to the public.
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There's been court cases on the East Coast and Washington, D.C., where an appellate
court has ruled against the NRC in a couple of cases saying there's no reason why these
reports shouldn't be released to the public, and we take that position as well.
We have written the INPO agency directly, and I believe that's one of the
attachments.

Attachment D, the very last attachment of my packet, was our response

from INPO to our, one of our Redwood Alliance organizers, Michael Welch, basically
denying us access to the reports on the basis that it would seriously impact the
detailed, and this is a quote directly, " ••• would seriously impact the detailed and
candid exchange of information that is so vital to the INPO evaluation program."
not believe this is a sufficient reason for not releasing these reports.

We do

It goes to

what you were mentioning about -- you would feel better if there was a possibility for
the Safety Committee to visit the site unannounced to just check and see how operations
are going.

We would feel much better if we could see the candid reports for the

nuclear power plants, such as San Onofre, Diablo, in particular, to know that in fact
what it is that the industry is finding itself and not be told by the NRC that we do
not have access them, and we would hope that this committee would join us in an attempt
to get those reports.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
capable of doing.
MR. ADAMS:

Question.

I'm not familiar with what NRC is capable of or not

But can it refuse a court decision?

Apparently what has happened is at the first district level, the court

has ruled in favor of the NRC, but it has been appealed.

And the appellate court has

now, from my understanding, for a third time, sent the case back to the district court,
saying it could find no reason why the NRC cannot provide these reports; and it's my
understanding that that's where it lays.

It has not gone any further, and obviously no

reports have been submitted to the groups back on the East Coast.

And as you can see,

by our denial and others, no reports have been released by the NRC at this time.
Perhaps we'd work with staff, but we would like some help essentially to try to
persuade either the California delegation or the NRC itself that this is a matter that
should be taken up and access should be provided.
in Congress.

And I do think you will see a move

Some hearings will be conducted on this next year, and we will be

participating in that.
Those are the end of the specific remarks.
of you.

You have the written testimony in front

I would like to say that I'm hoping that out of this hearing gives us renewed

impetus for negotiating and communicating better with the utility on this issue because
we all know that the decommissioning of nuclear power plants is still a fairly unknown
activity in terms of the cost.

I would just point out that it costs approximately $98

million to decommission the shipping port facility which is slightly larger than the
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Humboldt plant.

But we do not believe right now that we have an adequate handle on

what it's going to cost to decommission the large nuclear power plants, and that's why
every couple of years when they're reassessed, the price keeps going up.

So we will

continue to watch that as well.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Senator Russell.

Thank you very much.
The final one in this session, James Shetler, Deputy Area General Manager of
Nuclear, Sacramento, for SMUD.
MR. JAMES SHETLER:

Welcome.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Russell.

I do have a handout

that I will be referring to in general terms as I walk through my presentation.
My name is James Shetler.
SMUD.

I'm the Deputy Assistant General Manager, Nuclear, for

It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon to discuss the status and the closure

and decommissioning process for Rancho Seco.
I'm going to briefly expand upon Mr. Freeman's comments from this morning.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. SHETLER:

I won't do that, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. SHETLER:

You don't have to expand too greatly on the •••
Thank you.

Basically, I would like to make a few points.

Number one, in June of

'89, when the plant was shut down, we were faced with a rather new territory.

We had

not been there before -- and the NRC also had not been there before -- prematurely shut
down plants were not something that the industry had dealt with a lot at that time.

We

recognized our goal was to maintain the health and safety to the public and the
environment but at the same time trying to minimize the costs to our ratepayers.
We finally honed in on an approach that today has us in a permanently defueled
state and down to about 175 technical people at Rancho Seco.

We have submitted our

decommissioning plan to the NRC in a proposed form in June of this year after several
public hearings.

And in October of this year, our board ratified that plan.

Our

decommissioning plan also envisions a phased approach, basically, due to the reason
that there is no place to send the high-level waste and the nuclear fuel at this time.
We will be entering into a SAFESTOR period when the decommissioning plan is
approved, which is envisioned to occur starting this summer of '92.
the fuel on a wet-storage arrangement until 1998.

We will maintain

In parallel with that, we are

working on a demonstration project with the Department of Energy to look at procuring,
and designing and procuring a combined storage and shipping cask which would allow us
to place the fuel in dry storage one time; and when the Department of Energy is ready
to receive it, to then ship it directly to the Department of Energy and not have to
return to the spent-fuel pool.
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It is our anticipation that this demonstration program had authorized funding from
the federal government.
that by 1995.

It will be initiated in '93, and we'll have the results of

At that time, it would be our intent to purchase additional casks and

place all our fuel in dry storage by 1998.

At that time, we will place the plant in

what we call a hardened SAFESTOR mode, where the nuclear portion of the plant had been
secured from inadvertent intrusion.

Our intent then is to maintain the plant in that

mode until 2008, which is the end of our original operating license; and then we will
enter into a phase of decontamination for the final decontamination of the plant.
intent is to have the license terminated by 2011.

our

We've talked quite a bit about the

costs.
A couple of points I'd like to make -- one of the major costs we have to deal with
is waste disposal.

For our plan, we have assumed that the low-level waste will be

shipped to the Southwest compact side of Needles, California.

And we are looking at

the high-level waste; and the spent fuel, of course, can be received by the Department
of Energy, either at a monitored retrievable storage site by 1998 or the final
geological repository.

We're for looking at 2010.

We have talked about the dollar figures.

our estimated $281 million in 1991

dollars, estimated that about $80 million to cover the SAFESTOR period, about $20
million to deal with disposal of the fuel and the dry casks, and about $177 million to
deal with the actual decontamination of the site.
trust fund, and we are contributing to that.

Those dollars will be set aside in a

Beyond that is site restoration.

This is

not an area that the NRC regulates, but it is open to the utility to determine what
they will do with the final clean structures of the facility at the end of its life.
We did believe that the cost estimate is a major issue.

As Mr. Freeman mentioned,

we had two prudency reviews done, one by Batelle Northwest Lab, which is the NRC's
consultant for decommissioning costs, and one by a European contractor to get a
European perspective.

Both of those came back with some adjustments.

To date, as Mr. Freeman mentioned, we have $100 million approximately in our fund
that was transferred in July to an independent trustee.

We are making contributions at

the rate of about $8 million a year that will increase to $12 million a year starting
with the approval of the decommissioning plan.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

we can read many of the things you're saying.

Why don't you

sum up.
MR. SHELTER:

Just in summary then, we also went through the environmental process,

both the state and the federal process.

And we believe, that after entering a rather

uncertain environment with a premature closure, that we have identified a process where
we can meet the regulations for the environment and health and safety, and can do so at
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minimum cost to our ratepayers.
With that, I'm open to any questions, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. SHELTER:

Senator Russell.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

We will now have an open microphone.

If there is anybody here that would like to

add one or two more minutes •••
SENATOR RUSSELL:

The PG&E guy wanted to say something, and you suggested he wait

ti.ll now.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR RUSSELL:

I'd like to hear from him, if he cares to.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
prepared.

That's fine.

If you care to.

Or you can do it in writing if you're not

If you'd rather give it us in writing, that's fine.

MR. WOMACK:

Very briefly, on the subject of unannounced site visits, as I think

Mr. Martin this morning from Region 5 referred, that is a practice that the NRC
randomly employs throughout the year, both with their resident inspectors and their
non-resident inspectors.

In fact, most of the inspections that occur, as Mr. Martin

referred to this morning, these week-long inspections, those are unannounced.

Simply

an inspector shows up 8 a.m., Monday morning, and starts work for a week or two.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

But then they won't give the information to anybody who wants

to find out what they found out.
MR. WOMACK:

No, that is incorrect, Mr. Chairman.

the public record.

That information is a part of

It's communicated to the public document room and to all identified

interveners in the process.
The other information, which Mr. Adams was referring to, relates to INPO, the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.

And INPO was formed as a, we call it an

industry organization to really aid in kicking the industry in the butt, if I can use
that term, in improving its performance; and as such, he's really considered a
consultant to the industry.
So on that basis, those matters have largely remained confidential but in many
cases have been released to the NRC.

so in that circumstance, it's not the NRC's

choice to release that information to the public, as I see it anyway.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. WOMACK:

Do you have any information on these huge profits you're making?

Well, the so-called huge profits, I think, would be better put as

Diablo right now -- again, depending on whether we have a year with two refueling
outages or one refueling outage ranges between, say, 25 and below 20 percent of Diablo
-- excuse me -- of PG&E's profit -- up to just over 30 percent on an annual basis.
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So

I would not call that huge or outrageous profit.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Are you not limited by a certain percentage in statute, I

believe, as to the profit •••
MR. WOMACK:

That's really beyond •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:
yes.

This is beyond that

For the utility portion of the business that is regulated by the CPUC,

And for this year, I believe it was 12.9 percent return on our equity in the

business.

And for '92, I believe it's 12.65 percent.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

But this plant •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. WOMACK:

Diablo falls outside.

SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. WOMACK:

But Diablo is •••

Sky's the limit, or you're going to go bankrupt?

No. The sky is -- you know, you can only generate so much power.

really, the level of performance we've achieved, there is not much up side to it.

And
So

there's not much more room to increase our revenue or profit.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Is the speed with which you refuel, or have refueled, is that

speedier significantly than other nuclear power plants around the world?
MR. WOMACK:

No, it is not.

In fact, the French and the Germans and the Japanese

are routinely refueling, performing shut-down maintenance on their plant equipment in
periods as short as four weeks, 28 days, and typically in the 30- to 40-day range.
Their safety performance has been equal to or better than the performance overall in
the

u.s.
Diablo's experience in the last four outages has ranged from 56 days up to, oh, 70

to 80 days.

I forget the exact number.

So by no means is it close to being a world

record for refueling outage performance.
SENATOR RUSSELL:
MR. WOMACK:

Thank you.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Anybody in the audience would like to make a one-minute

comment?
MR. O'NEILL:

Mr. Chairman, I would like to also --

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Mr. O'Neill.

-- put the price paid for Diablo canyon power into perspective since

the number of questions have come up, and we didn't really respond to that in our
earlier remarks.
The commission's staff has monitored this.
plant and ignoring what's going on down there.

We're not just walking away from the
And I think there are a number of ways

of looking at the situation in order to understand it, exactly what is occurring and
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what's likely to occur in the future.
First, I think it's important to compare the amount of money ratepayers are paying
for the power from Diablo under the performance-based pricing scheme with what may have
been paid under normal, traditional rate making.

And without getting into a lengthy

debate about what costs were reasonable or may have been allowed by the commission, if
we just picked the $5.5 billion cost at commercial operation and used that as a figure,
just to give us a sense of perspective here, the annual revenue requirement for the
p~ant

in 1989 would have been $2.3 billion.

And that would have covered the return on

investment, depreciation, taxes, operating and maintenance expenses, administrative,
and general expenses, things of that nature.
The actual cost for power produced by Diablo Canyon in that year was $1.3 billion.
In 1991, the revenue requirement would have been $2.3 billion, just slightly over that;
and the price paid for Diablo Canyon power under the performance-based pricing scheme
will be approximately $1.6 billion by the end of the year.

That's estimated based on

the current forecast for the operation through the end of '91.
Now the price paid on a cents-per-kilowatt-hour basis compared to the cost of other
power is on the high side.
p~ant

However, it's far lower than it would have been if the

was included in the rate base.

The price currently, under this complex pricing

scheme we have, is 9.6 cents per kilowatt hour.
energy is currently about 10.4 cents.

The price PG&E pays for non-gas QF

Now the price paid for gas QFs, or cogenerators,

is substantially less, although that fluctuates wildly depending upon natural gas
prices; and gas prices are now low.

So the price per kilowatt hour is on the high side

relative to some other sources of power, but it's substantially below what it might
have been if it had been included in rate base.
One other thing that's important to keep in mind here, the actual performance of
the plant to date has been exceptionally good.

There's just no question about that.

The average lifetime capacity today is about 76 percent.

To tell you the truth, it

can't get much better than that with normal refueling outages.
Womack.

And I agree with Mr.

The upside potential from this point from PG&E's perspective is minimal.

They're doing about as well as they can possibly do, and we should give them credit for
doing that.

I think they've done a good job, and the NRC reviews indicates that.

The prices that we pay for power are likely to actually improve over time.

Even if

the plant continues operating at very high capacity factors up to 76 percent, we'll
still end up approximately where we would have been had the plant been included in rate
base.

And the reason for that is because under the settlement, after 1995, the basis

for determining the price changes, it switches from an automatic, pre-determined
escalation rate to a formula based on the consumer price index.
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And it actually will

likely produce a real decline in the price paid for Diablo canyon power.

If the

Consumer Price Index increases at 2.5 percent annually or more, the actual real price
per Diablo Canyon power will decline under this formula.
So over time, the relative difference between the price paid for Diablo canyon
power and the price paid for other sources of supply is likely to improve, not get
worse.

So I just wanted to offer those comments to try to put the price paid into

perspective.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. O'NEILL:

Thank you.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Did you want to comment?

MS. HELEN HUBBARD:

About a minute-and-a-half.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. HUBBARD:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. HUBBARD:

Take two.

Oh, thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. HUBBARD:

All right.

Identify yourself, please.

Yes, I shall.

My name is Helen Hubbard.

I am President of Citizens

for Total Energy which is a 15-year-old California-based, non-profit energy and
educational organization.
We believe that losing even one unit of California's five nuclear power reactors
would not be in the best interest of California's electric consumers.

We believe that

San Diego Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison have convincingly demonstrated
that Unit l at San Onofre can continue to operate safely, reliably, and environmentally
soundly and on a cost-effective basis.
I think I better say this right now.

I believe it's incumbent upon me to distance

myself and my organization from the public Mr. Fay says he represents.
speak for my organization or for me personally.

He does not

Environmentally speaking, there hasn't

been a single allegation raised today against San onofre or Diablo Canyon that I
haven't heard over the last 15 years, over and over, ad infinitum.
It's time to realize that nuclear power is here to stay, and no amount of
obstructionism or litigation will put it out of existence.
live with, it is impossible to live without.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. HUBBARD:

And that's what I wanted to say there.

Okay.

And there is another issue that I'd like to address, and that is, the

possible creation of an oversight committee for San Onofre.
the offing.
reliable.

As difficult as risk is to

This may or may not be in

In our view, such a commmittee does not make a power plant safer or more
What it does do is add to the cost of the operation, and these costs in the
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final analysis must be borne by the already overburdened taxpayer.

No other industry

in the United States is as overseen, tightly controlled, monitored, and regulated as
the nuclear industry.
I wonder how many of you gentlemen have been faced with the hundreds of volumes of
rules and regulations which operators of nuclear power plants must comply.

If you had

to comply with the same stringent rules and regulations, you would probably throw up
your hands in dismay and resign.
All national polls taken in the last several years have shown that a majority of
Americans, including state and national legislators, believe that nuclear energy is an
Lmportant part of this country's energy mix now and in the forseeable future.

It makes

no sense to continually badger an industry which is safely and reliably producing 21
percent of the electricity in the United States and 28 percent of electricity in
california.
To put it in the simplest terms, we believe that San Onofre Unit 1 should continue
to produce electricity; and we also believe that there is absolutely no logical reason
to create an oversight committee for these utilities.
And I thank you for your patience.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
Ms. HUBBARD:

You're welcome.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
hearing.

Thank you very much.
Anybody else?

I think, Senator Russell, this has been a good

I want to thank everyone for their participation.

I believe the committee

now has a better understanding of the way in which our utilities and regulatory
agencies are taking action to ensure the nuclear power plants are safe, clean, and
cost-effective.
SENATOR RUSSELL:

I'd also like to thank the staff for the work that they did.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Yes, staff did a fine job on this, as usual.

As a result of

this, I don't have any bills now; but it doesn't mean that I won't have one.
(Laughter)
SENATOR RUSSELL:

Uh-oh.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Oops.

Anyway, the hearing is adjourned.

---ooo---
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Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF
JOHN B. MARTIN
BEFORE THE CALIFORNIA SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
DECEMBER 2, 1991

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committe. My name is John
Martin. I am the Regional Administrator of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's Region V office, located in Walnut Creek, California. I welcome
the opportunity to summarize the responsibilities of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission relating to power reactors and to highlight, from our perspective,
the status of the four nuclear power facilities in California.
Let me begin by providing the Committee with a brief overview of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's nuclear power reactor regulatory program, with
emphasis on the inspection program. There are three principle functions that
comprise the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulatory program. They are:
promulgation of regulations, issuance of licenses, and compliance inspection
and enforcement. Regulation promulgation, and license issuance activities are
administered by the NRC offices in Rockville, Maryland, while the inspection
function in the Western United States is a primary responsibility of my
Regional office.
The NRC inspection program serves to assess the performance of commercial
utility reactor facilities by confirming that utilities are in compliance with
the provisions of their NRC issued license to operate the facility, and by
ascertaining whether other conditions exist which have safety implications
serious enough to warrant corrective action. Except for a limited number of
special inspections conducted by Headquarters-based staff, the majority of
inspections are conducted by inspectors assigned to my office.

The inspectors performing inspections at reactor facilities in the state of
California fall into 2 basic categories. First there are inspectors who work
out of our regional office in Walnut Creek, who travel to the plant sites
normally for a week at a time and then return to the office to report their
inspection findings and to prepare for their next trip. In general, these
region-based inspectors are specialists in specific technical areas such as
health physics, emergency planning, physical security, fire protection, and
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other specialty engineering disciplines. The other category of inspector is
the resident inspector. The resident inspector is assigned to work full time
at a plant site. This allows the resident inspector to become very
knowledgeable in the operation of his assigned site. It also allows our
office to have rapid knowledge of any occurrences of significance at the
facility and to quickly provide an independent assessment of an event without
reliance on the utility. Resident inspectors provide the major on-site
NRC presence for direct observation and verification of routine licensee
activities. Among other things, their work includes in-depth inspections
of control room activities; observation of maintenance and surveillance
testing carried out by the utility; periodic 11 Walkdowns 11 of systems
important to safe operation to verify the correctness of system lineups;
and frequent plant tours to generally assess radiation control,
security equipment condition, housekeeping and the like.
For the purposes of understanding NRC oversight of nuclear plants it is
important to know that the utilities are required by law to notify the NRC
within one hour of significant events. To ensure prompt notification, the NRC
maintains an operations center at our headquarters office, which is manned 24
hours a day, and has direct communications with each facility via a dedicated
telephone line. Through our emergency response organization, the NRC is
prepared to promptly respond to events, regardless of the time of day.
We devote approximately 6 man-years of effort for inspection and enforcement
activities at each operating reactor in California annually. Each inspection
results in an inspection report which documents the findings, including any
violations of requirements or recommendations for improvement. These reports
are made available to the public and are widely circulated.
Let me now turn to the four specific nuclear power plants in California and,
from our perspective, briefly highlight the status of each. At the San ~nofre
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facility operated by Southern California Edison, the NRC presently has four
full time resident inspectors assigned. The San Onofre facility consists of
three reactor units, located near San Clemente. Unit 1 is an older plant,
having comrrenced operation in 1967. Unit 1 produces about 450 MW of
electricity. Units 2 and 3 entered operation in 1982 and 1983, and each
produces about 1100 MW of electricity. The NRC's evaluation is that the San
Onofre site's safety performance has been generally good to excellent during
the past five years. Additionally, Southern California Edison has demonstrated
a number of significant initiatives that we view as strong commitments towards
safe operation of the facility. Two examples are their efforts to enhance the
engineering staff support of the site and their commitments to excellence in
the training area.
There are several major regulatory issues that have faced Southern California
Edison during the past ten years. Beginning in 1979, based on a review of the
seismic design of Unit 1, that Unit underwent significant modifications to
enhance the unit's ability to withstand a major earthquake. During the
1980's, additional upgrades were made to improve Unit 1 in the areas of fire
protection, qualification of safety equipment to function in radiation and/or
steam environments, and in response to lessons that were learned from the 1979
accident at the Three Mile Island Plant. Because Units 2 and 3 were
constructed in the early 1980's, most of the Unit 1 enhancements were already
incorporated into the original design of Units 2 and 3.
To enforce compliance with NRC regulations, the NRC has the legal authority to
assess civil penalties against utilities for significant failures in
performance, or if need be, to order the facility to shut down or otherwise
modify their operations if public safety demands. The NRC has not had reason
to order San Onofre to shut down an operating unit. As is the case with most
utilities, when a potential safety issue has clearly arisen, Southern
California Edison has been prompt to take conservative actions without
prodding from the NRC. Although the performance at San Onofre has been good
overall, we have issued two monetary civil penalties during the past four
years. In 1988, SCE was fined $150,000 for inadequate engineering work
related to the ability of Unit 1 electrical equipment to operate in a harsh
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environment. In early 1991, they were fined $150,000 for failing to maintain
two safety system components in Units 2 and 3 properly aligned, as required
by their license issued by the NRC. In both cases, Southern California Edison
took actions to prevent a recurrence of the problems.
Let me now turn the discussion to Diablo Canyon, a two unit facility with each
unit producing about 1100 MW of electricity. The performance of the Diablo
Canyon facility, during the past five to six years has been very good to
superior, with a fairly consistent improving trend. Diablo Canyon is operated
by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company and is located near San Luis Obispo.
In a manner similar to that at San Onofre, the NRC has two full time resident
inspectors at Diablo Canyon. Both units have recently experienced relatively
event free operation. Unit 2 completed a record 481 day continuous period of
operation this year prior to shutting down for a scheduled refueling outage.
Diablo Canyon has also been strong in both the training and engineering areas.
The largest issue faced by Diablo Canyon recently has been a review of the
ability of the plant to withstand a major earthquake on the Hosgri fault,
which is located about 3 miles from the plant. The review has focused
primarily on the magnitude and type of earthquake that the Hosgri fault may
generate, and whether the plant design is appropriate for the postulated
earthquake. The study of this issue was recently completed and demonstrated
the safety of the plant in this area.
As was the case with San Onofre, the NRC has had no reason to order Diablo
Canyon to shut down an operating unit. Since 1988, the NRC has fined Diablo
Canyon on two occasions. In 1989, they were fined $75,000 for several
examples of poor engineering work, which were identified by our inspectors.
In 1990, they were fined $50,000 for failure to properly maintain safety
equipment. These violations were again identified by our inspectors. In both
cases, PG&E took extensive corrective actions.
Turning to Rancho Seco, the faciltiy is a single unit site operated by the
Sacramento Municipal Utility District. Rancho Seco was designed to produce
about 900 MW of electricity, however in 1989, the plant was shut down in
response to a voter referendum. Since that time, SMUD has been working with
the NRC to move toward the ultimate decommissioning of the facility. The
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reactor fuel has been stored in a large fuel storage pool at the site since
1989, and much of the heat generated by the fuel has decayed away. This
condition has resulted in the potential for a significant safety problem
occurring at Rancho Seco being far reduced from that at an operating plant.
We currently have one resident inspector who spends one-half of his time at
the site.
The major issue facing SMUD is to formulate a site decommissioning plan, which
the NRC must approve. This work is under way with a scheduled completion date
of mid-1992.
Although Ranch Seco is no longer operating, all of the pertinent NRC rules and
regulations still apply. Since the unit was shut down in 1989, we have fined
SMUD on one occasion for failure to maintain a fully trained emergency
response organization. Here again, the utility promptly corrected the
problem. SMUD has remained committed to plant safety and adherence with our
regulations since their 1989 shutdown. We consider that their overall actions
during the past two years have been responsible and directed towards safety.
Lastly, Humboldt Bay Unit 3 is a 65 MW plant located near Eureka, and operated
by Pacific Gas and Electric. The plant started operation in 1963 and has been
shut down since 1976. The plant shut down because the Commission ordered that
seismic upgrades be made in order to continue to operate, however the company
decided to cease operation instead. The company has since elected to
decommission the facility and has an approved decommissioning plan. The
facility is presently in a SAFSTOR condition, which simply means that the
facility will be maintained in a mothballed condition until the spent fuel is
removed to a federal waste disposal site, at which time the facility is
scheduled to be dismantled. We do not have a resident inspector assigned to
Humboldt Bay, however .we do make periodic inspection visits to the site.
This completes my prepared remarks. I thank you again for the opportunity to
be here today. If you ha~e any questions, I will be pleased to answer them if
I can.
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CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
GENERAL OVERVIEW
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
December 2, 1991
A. FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER NUCLEAR ENERGY

1. Under the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. §2011, et seq.)
the federal government reserved comprehensive authority,
exercised through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
o·Ter:
a. Nuclear safety; and
b. The technical aspects of nuclear energy.
2. The Atomic Energy Act did not preempt traditional State
authority over the production and distribution of
electricity.
(See e.g. 42 u.s.c. §2018.)
a. States were permitted to exercise their traditional
authority over economic issues.
b. The exercise of the States' traditional authority
over economic issues is, however, subject to the
reservation of federal authority to regulate sales
of electric power for resale in interstate commerce.
B. CPUC AUTHORITY OVER RATEMAKING AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
The CPUC has broad authority over ratemaking and other
economic issues (see e.g. Pub. Util. Code §§ 701, 728, 729,
761 and 762) including:
1.

A~thority

to set intrastate rates for the sale of
e:ectricity which includes provision for the recovery of
costs associated with the ownership and operation of
nuclear power plants.

2. Authority to review the cost effectiveness of nuclear
plant construction and capital additions to nuclear power
plants.
3. Authority to establish the method to be used by utilities
to recover the cost of constructing, operating, and
maintaining nuclear power plants.
4. Authority to establish a method for the collection of
funds necessary to decommission nuclear plants at the end
of their useful lives.
5. Comprehensive authority to determine what costs
associated with nuclear power plant construction,

·.
operation and ownership should be paid by uti:ity
ratepayers, and what costs should be absorbed by utility
shareholders.
a. Authority to review the reasonablenss or "'prudence"
of the costs incurred by utilities in cor.structing
nuclear plants and in modifying nuclear ~lant
facilities, systems and components;
b. Authority to review the reasonableness O:!:" "prudence"
of utility expenditures for operating, maintenance,
general and administrative costs associa~ad with
nuclear plants; and
c. Authority to review the reasonableness of utility
procurement decisions and practices in ot~aining the
electricity to meet customer demands.
d. Both the CEC and CPUC have authority over utility
resource planning issues.
C.

CEC AUTHORITY OVER SITING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
1.

&~y

utility seeking to build an electric power generating
plant in California, including a nuclear plan~, is
required to obtain a certificate authorizing such
construction from the CEC.

2. In addition, before any such certificate can te issued
for a nuclear plant, the CEC must find that t~ere exists
a demonstrated technology and means approved ty the NRC
for the permanent disposal of high-level nucla~r waste.
3. Currently there is a moratorium on the siting cf any new
nuclear plants in California because, at prese~t, there
is no permanent means or site for the permaner.~ disposal
of high-level nuclear waste.

COMMENTS OF ROBERT KINOSIAN
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
DIVISION OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES
REGARDING THE SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR FACILITY
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
December 2, 1991

PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION:

DISALLOW ADDITIONAL COSTS

The need for over $100 million of modifications prcmpted the CPUC
review of the cost-effectiveness of SONGS 1.
Due to the high costs of nuclear fuel, operations and
maintenance, the ongoing need for repairs and modificat~ons, and poor
performance, it is not cost-effective to continue operating SONGS 1.
The losses are expected to be between $250 and $700 million.
In its analysis of cost effectiveness, DRA allocated marine
damage and mitigation costs to SONGS 1 based on the Coas~al
Commission's study, while SCE ignored these impacts.
On the other hand, SCE did include the benefit of =educed air
emissions in its analysis.
In fact, the main reason SCE found SONGS 1
to be cost-effective was the high value of reducing air pollution.
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL:

PERFORMANCE-BASED PRICING

If the CPUC authorizes continued operation of SONGS 1, ORA has
proposed that SCE's cost recovery be based on SCE's forecasted costs
and the actual performance of SONGS 1, i.e., performance-based
pricing. This means that SCE shareholders, and not the =atepayers,
will assume the risk of any operating inefficiencies.
The performance-based pricing would be based on SCE's current
forecast of NEW costs, excluding any previous construction costs.
Because the prices would be low, relatively little profit could
be made from increasing SONGS 1 output.
SCE's share of SONGS 1 is only 325 megawatts, compa=ed with over
2200 megawatts for Diablo Canyon. This means that the pricing
methodology has much less of an impact on corporate profits.

COMMENTS OF BRUCE DEBERRY
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
SUMMARY OF DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR PLANT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
December 2, 1991

A. EXCLUSIVE RATEMAKING AGREEMENT- It is the sole method
to recover Diablo Canyon costs.
B. TERM- The Agreement covers the period from December, 1988
through May, 2015 (Unit 1) and March, 2016 (Unit 2).
C. PRICE PAID FOR ENERGY- The price paid consists of a fixed
price and a variable price.
The variable price escala~es at
established rates through 1994 then increases by the a7erage of
the current Consumer Price Index plus 2.5 percent.
D. PRICES PAID VARY ACCORDING TO PEAK PERIODS- A higher
price is paid for the first 700 hours generated durin~ the hours
of 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. in the months of June through Se?tember.
This is offset by lower prices in the next 700 hours.
E. BALANCING ACCOUNT COLLECTIONS- PG&E may not cc~lect
balancing account accruals {approximately $2 billion) or any
litigation costs {approximately $150 million).
F.
DECOMMISSIONING COSTS- All decommissioning costs are
excluded from this settlement.
G. BASIC REVENUE REQUIREMENT- A basic revenue recuirement of
$1,056 million is established as plant, to be deprecia~ed
and collected in base rates.
H. FT~OR- An annual revenue floor can be triggered under
extreme ccnditions. Revenues which are received by PG&E as floor
payments must later be returned to ratepayers, with in~erest.
Operation at less than floor capacity for three consecutive
years requires an application for potential abandonmen~.
I. ABANDONMENT- In the event of a prolonged or pe~anent
outage PG&E may file an application to abandon one or both Diablo
units.
T~e amount to be recovered is capped by either future
floor payments or $2.7 billion (1991), which is reduced by $100
million per year in future years. This application can be
challenged by the CPUC or the California Attorney General.
J. PURCHASE REQUIREMENT- All Diablo output must be purchased
by PG&E, except during hydro-spill conditions, when excess water
is used to generate energy.

•.

K. COST SEGREGATION- All Diablo costs must be segregated
from other PG&E operations.
L. TREATMENT AFTER 30 YEARS- An application must be filed in
2015 (Unit 1) and 2016 (Unit 2) requesting future ratemaking
treatment.
M. EFFECT OF CHANGE IN AGREEMENT- Any change in the
Agreement renders it null and void.
N. SAFETY COMMITTEE- An independent safety committee is
established consisting of three members appointed by the
Governor, Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Energy
Commission. The CPUC participates in the nomination of potential
appointees. The Committee is funded through base rates
($500,000) and may hire consultants. It also has the right to
receive Diablo related reports, conduct site inspections, and
issue reports and recommendations.

COMMENTS OF ANNE MESTER, ESQ.
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
SUMMARY OF THE DIABLO CANYON SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AS IT PERTAINS TO
THE DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
December 2, 1991

A. Created through a settlement among the Attor~ey General of
California (AG), the CPUC's Division of Ratepayer Advoca~es (DRA), and
PG&E, adopted by CPUC in Decision 88-12-083 (1988).
B. Created to "review Diablo Canyon operations fer the purpose
of assessi~q the safety of operations and suggesting a~y
recommendations for safe operation." It has no responsi~ility or
authority f~r plant operations and cannot direct PG&E personnel.

c. E~titled to receive certain reports from PG&E; can contract
for services, including consultants and experts.
D. Has the right to conduct an annual site exami~ation; can
conduct additional site visits, as deemed necessary.
E. ~~st issue an annual report on safety-related ~spects of
plant opera~ions, which shall include recommendations t: ?G&E. PG&E
has 45 days to comment. PG&E's comments become part c: ~ie report,
which is t~e~ transmitted to four entities for review:
~he CPUC, the
CEC, the AG, and the Governor.
F. A:~er receiving Committee's annual report on safety of
operations cf the Diablo facility, any of the four revie~ing entities,
including C?UC, can request the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to
institute a proceeding to require PG&E to adopt any safe~y
recommendation made by the Committee.
G.

C?UC President serves, along with Dean of

u.c. Berke:ey and PG&E, on a nominating committee,
nominations to three appointing authorities: the
the AG, and the Governor. Appointments are for 3

Enqi~eering at
whic~ presents
Chai~.an of the CEC,
years ~nd are

s~aggered.

H. C:mmittee was intentionally created as an ince~endent safety
committee, ~ot beholden to either PG&E or the CPUC;· CPUC's oversight
role is specifically limited to inspecting and auditing ~he
Committee's books, records and accounts, including revie~ of
reasonable~ess of fees and expenses and review for conf:icts of
interest. C?UC sets compensation for Committee members, commensurate
with fees PG&E pays for similar services.

I. To date, the Committee has issued one annual report
(covering January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1990), which concludes the
facility is being operated safely. None of the reviewing entities has
requested any action by the NRC. The Committee approved the second
annual report, covering July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1991, at its public
meeting of October 10, 1991. After inclusion of PG&E's comments it
will be ~ransmitted to the reviewing agencies.
J. CPUC's Advisory and Compliance Division staff has attended
all of the Committee's public meetings. CPUC staff will undertake the
first audit of Committee books, records and accounts in first quarter
of 1992.
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COMMENTS OF CHERRIE CONNER
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
NUCLEAR DECOMMISSIONING TRUST FUNDS
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
December 2, 1991

A.

In Order Instituting Investigation 86 and Decision 83-04-013
the Commission determined that decommissioning fuhds should
be accumulated using an external sinking fund appr~ach. An
annual level payment amount is added to revenue requirements
for each nuclear unit, calculated such that, over the life of
the fund, the payments will accumulate to equal tte total
costs of decommissioning the unit. Decommissionihg cost
estimates and funding levels are reviewed in conj~~ction with
each utility's general rate case.

B.

The Tax Reform Act of 1984 accorded special tax status to
Nuclear Decommissioning Reserve Funds. Under section 468A of
the Internal Revenue Code, a utility may elect, u~der certain
conditions, to take a current year tax deduction =~r payments
to a decommissioning trust fund.
Earnings of the fund are
taxable.
Funds set up under section 468A are te~ed
"qualified" funds.
Qualified funds are limited tc post-1984
service life decommissioning costs. The prior se~rice share
of decommissioning cost funds are placed into a
"non-qualified" (taxable) fund.
Investments to qualified
funds are limited to (1) municipal bonds, (2) u.s. treasury
bills and (3) certificates of deposit in a bank o= insured
federal credit union.

c.

In 1987, the Commission established future estimates of
decommissioning cost for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2,
Humboldt Bay Unit 3, San Onofre Units 1, 2, and 3, and Palo
Verde Units 1, 2 and 3; established annual decommissioning
revenue requirements for Pacific Gas and Electric Co.,
Southern California Edison Co., and San Diego Gas & Electric
Co.; directed PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E to establish qualified and
non-~alified nuclear decommissioning trusts; adcfted the
trust agreements; and limited the investments· for nonqualified funds to those allowable under section 468A plus
guaranteed investment contracts, high quality corporate bonds
and equity securities, and other securities guaranteed or
secured by the U.S. government.

D.

Each utility has a five-member Trust Committee resoonsible
for oversight of their trusts. The Committee includes no
more than two employees of the company. The outside
Committee members nominated by the company are subject to

•.

confirmation by the Commission. The Trust Committees are
responsible for selecting the trustee and investment managers
for their funds (subject to Commission approval), setting
investment policies, evaluating the performance of the
tr:.1stee and investment managers annually, and submitting
annual and tri-annual reports to the Commission.
E.

The Commission Advisory and Compliance Division of the CPUC
monitors each utility's fund performance.
It's role is to
keep the Commission informed about the level of funds
accumulating in the trusts, the comparative performance of
each of the funds, and to alert the Commission to any
possible performance problems.

COMMENTS OF CHERRIE CONNER
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
SUMMARY OF HUMBOLDT DECOMMISSIONING
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
December 2, 1991
PG&E has conducted three nuclear decommissioninc cost
studies for Humboldt Bay which have been submitted to the
Commission. The Commission utilizes these studies in developing
the revenue requirements to be collected for the company's
Nuclear Decommissioning Trust Funds.
Pursuant to Decision 85-12-022 and Resolution E-3041, PG&E
was authorized to collect $26.894 million annually for four
years, beginning July 1, 1987, for decommissioning costs
estimated at $58 million in 1986 dollars and $438.5 million in
2015 dollars. PG&E submitted a 1987 decommissioning cost study
in its 1990 General Rate Case proceeding indicating the estimated
cost had dropped to $322.2 million. The Commission, however, did
not adjust the funding level because the change in the future
cost estimate is due purely to a drop in the expected inflation,
which will fluctuate over a thirty year period.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company collected decommissioning
funds for Humboldt and apportioned them between the Qualified and
Non-qualified Trusts as follows:
Qualified Trust
($1000)

Non-Qualified Trust
($1,000)

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

$ 5,025
10,049
10,049
10,049
5,025

$ 9,264
16,765
16,765
16,765
8,422

Total

$40,197

$67.981

Total
($1000)

$108,178

Total Humboldt Nuclear Decommissioning Trust Fund assets as
of September 30, 1991, and the returns earned since inception are
as follows:
(Note: assets are less than funding due to taxation
of the revenues collected for the Non-Qualified Trust Fund)
Assets
Qualified
Non-Qualified
Total

$ 46.7
47.2
$ 93.9

Return
Pre-Tax
After Tax
8.2%
9.5

7.1%
10.1

PETE WILSON, Oo,..mor

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
505 VAN NESS AYeNUE

SAN FRANCISCO, CA. 9410:Z-3296

December 16, 1991
The Honorable Herschel Rosenthal, Chairman
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilitles
State Capitol, Room 2035
Sacramento, California 95814
Subject a

DECEMBER 2, 1991 HEARING ON CALIFORNIA'S
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Dear Senator Rosenthal:
Thank you- for allowing us to appear be1fore the Committee.
We appreciate the opportunity to present the Division's views on
the status of nuclear power in the State of California. In
accordance with your wishes, we have enclosed our responses to four
questions regardinq our proposals for the San Onofre Nuclear Power
Generating Station Unit 1. We hope this will satisfy your concerns.
Should any further queations arise we will be more than happy to
respond to them.
Sincerely,

t d .~

;>~,;_'-.._ 7~£<-I;/L_

EDMUND J. TEXEIRA

Director
Division of Ratepayer Advocates
cca

Members, Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
Assemblyman Richard Mountjoy
AeserJblyman Trice Harvey
Michael Shapiro
Paul Fadelli

BESPONSES

OF DIVISION OP RATEPAYER APVQCATES

TO QUESTIONS 01" SENATOR RQSI!iN'Ji'HAL

QUESTION 11 What power options does ORA believe would be available
to SCE that could be less expensive than the continued operation of
SONGS Unit 1 after capital additions?
RESPOftSEt The analyses performed by SCE and ORA compared the costs
of SONGS Unit l with the costs of replacing its power using SCE's
entire system. These analyses did not evaluate SONGS Unit l
compared to one specific alternative, thus we are not recommending
that SONGS Unit 1 be replaced by any one option. A number of
different resources all serve to replace SONGS Unit 1, including
increased production from exiating power ~lants, increased
development of new geothermal and wind un1ts, increased Demand Side
Management programs, and increased purchases of power from other
utilities. The combination of these resources was found to be less
expensive than continuecl operation of SONGS Unit 1.

QUBSTION 2 1 Doea the ORA fall-back option to use •performance
based" ratemaking for SONGS Unit 1 mean that DRA ia fully satisfied
with the resul ta of the Diablo "performance based • settlement?

BESPONSE: As discussed below in response to Question 3, there are
many differences between the DRA proposal for SONGS Unit 1 and the
Diablo settlement. Because of these differences, ORA's
satisfaction with the Diablo settlement was not a factor in the
decision to propose performance-based priein9 for SONGS Unit 1.
However, ORA was satisfied with the settlement terms when it
entered into the agreement, and believes the settlement has
achieved the goals for which it was implemented• Operation risks
have been, shifted from ratepayers to PG&EJ costs are lower than
with traditional ratemaking; years of expensive litigation
regarding the reasonableness of construction costs have bean
avoided; and, PG&E has been given an incentive to operate the
facility reliably and safely.
OQESTION 3t Under ORA's proposal, what ratemakinq differences
would there be between the San onofre and Diablo Canyon plants?
RJSPONSRt There are a number of differences between the SONGS
Unit l proposal and the Diablo settlement. First, the Diablo
Canyon settlement addressed the costs of operation as well as the
costs of building Diablo Canyon. ORA's proposal for SONGS Unit 1
only includes the coats of future operation. This results in the
prices for SONGS Unit 1 being considerably less than the prices
specified in the Diablo Canyon settlement.
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In addition, the pricea for SONGS Unit 1 under ORA's proposal
are based on SCE's optimistic forecasts. SCE assumes high
reliability and low costs for SONGS Unit 1. This further reduces
the prices and limits any potential economic risks to ratepayer&
from the proposal. In addition, the SONGS UJtit 1 proposal does not
contain any floor provisions to limit the utilities' risks.
The SONGS Unit 1 proposal replacee the existing ratemakinq
treatment, which contains performance targets based on short-term
(two-year) deadlines. By replacing the existing ratemaking
process, the SONGS Unit 1 proposal reduces the need for litigation
and removes any incentives to delay maintenance or other work to
achieve higher short term performance. In contrast, no ratemaking
treatment was in place for Diablo Canyon when the settlement was
implemented.
QUESTION 4: Assuming performance based pricing is adopted for
SONGS Unit 1, should the PUC also create an independent safety
committee for the SONGS plant?

BESPQNSEa DRA does not believe that a safety committee is
necessary. SCE's share of SONGS Unit 1 is on.ly 300 MW, less
than 1/7 the size of Diablo Canyon. As discussed in response to
Question 3, above, the prices for SONGS Unit 1 are also relatively
low. SONGS Unit 1 will have much less im~act on SCE'a finances
than Diablo Canyon has with PG&E. In add1tion, by replacing the
current ratemaking treatment for SONGS Unit 1, which contains
short-term performance criteria, the performance based pricin9
proposal reduces potential incentives to operate unsafely. s~nce
the proposal will not result in any increase of incentives for
unsafe operation, ORA does not believe a safety committee is
warranted. However, the Commission could consider requirinq such a
committee if it favors ORA's ratemaking proposal.

ENERGY COMMISSION PRESENTATION AT THE
DECEMBER 2 1 1991 HEARING OF THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
ON "CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: THEIR
SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND ECONOMIC COSTS"

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
FOR THE ENERGY COMMISSION.

I AM WILLIAM CHAMBERLAIN APPEARING

SEATED NEXT TO ME IS MR. DANIEL NIX OF

THE ENERGY COMMISSION WHO CO-CHAIRS THE WESTERN INTERSTATE ENERGY
BOARD HIGH-LEVEL WASTE

COMMITTEE.

HE

IS

HERE

TO ANSWER ANY

QUESTIONS REGARDING THE FEDERAL PROGRAM FOR DISPOSING OF SPENT FUEL
FROM NUCLEAR REACTORS.

BASED ON THE REQUESTS IN YOUR INVITATION TO US,
THREE THINGS THIS MORNING:
COMMISSION'S
POWERPLANTS;

FIRST,

RESPONSIBILITIES
SECOND,

I

WILL

I WILL DO

I WILL SUMMARIZE THE ENERGY

REGARDING
PROVIDE

OUR

CALIFORNIA
VIEW

NUCLEAR

CONCERNING

THE

LIKELIHOOD OF NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS BEING SITED IN CALIFORNIA;
AND THIRD, I WILL ADDRESS ISSUES RELATING TO CALIFORNIA'S CURRENTLY
OPERATING NUCLEAR UNITS.

ADDRESSING FIRST THE ENERGY COMMISSION 1 S RESPONSIBILITIES, THE
COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION TO LICENSE ANY NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANT
THAT MIGHT BE PROPOSED FOR SITING IN CALIFORNIA (UNLESS SOMEONE
DEVELOPS ONE WITH CAPACITY UNDER 50 MW).

WE HAVE NO JURISDICTION

OVER ANY OF THE EXISTING NUCLEAR PLANTS THAT YOU ARE EXAMINING
TODAY.

THEY WERE ALL SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED FROM OUR LICENSING

AUTHORITY AND FROM THE CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR LAWS ENACTED IN 1976.

WE

DID EVALUATE THE FEASIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE RANCHO SECO
1

NUCLEAR FACILITY WHEN ITS RETIREMENT WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION, AND
WE

CONCLUDED THAT SMUD COULD REASONABLY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO

PURCHASE POWER FROM PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY AND FROM
SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA EDISON.

BUT WE

HAVE

NO

REGULAR ROLE

IN

INSPECTING OR MONITORING THE OPERATION OF ANY OF THE DIABLO CANYON
OR SAN ONOFRE UNITS.

TURNING TO OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF SITING NEW
NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS IN CALIFORNIA, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE PROBABILITY
OF SUCH AN EVENT IS VERY LOW FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT DECADE.
UTILITY

OFFICIALS

HAVE

INDICATED

NO

INTENT

TO

PURSUE

FIRST,
FURTHER

NUCLEAR POWERPLANT DEVELOPMENT, CITING HIGH COST OF CONSTRUCTION,
LONG REGULATORY AND CONSTRUCTION LEAD TIMES, AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION
TO NUCLEAR POWER.

CALIFORNIA UTILITIES ARE NOT ALONE IN THIS

ATTITUDE--NO NEW ORDERS OF NUCLEAR PLANTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1978.

SECOND, THERE ARE TODAY MANY SOURCES OF ELECTRICITY WHICH ARE
MUCH LESS EXPENSIVE THAN EXISTING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY,

INCLUDING

DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT, COGENERATION, REPOWERING OF UTILITY GASFIRED BOILERS, AND ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES SUCH AS WIND, GEOTHERMAL,
AND SOLAR-BASED TECHNOLOGIES.
TODAY,

NATURAL GAS PRICES ARE ALSO VERY LOW

AND OUR RECENTLY COMPLETED PRICE FORECASTS CONCLUDE THAT

THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE ATTRACTIVE THROUGHOUT THE 1990s.

LOW

PRICE PROJECTIONS FOR NATURAL GAS MAKE HIGHLY CAPITAL INTENSIVE
RESOURCES, LIKE NUCLEAR UNITS, APPEAR ECONOMICALLY UNATTRACTIVE.
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A THIRD AND FOURTH REASON FOR OUR VIEW THAT NEW NUCLEAR UNITS
ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE SITED IN CALIFORNIA RELATES TO EARTHQUAKE
SAFETY

AND

SCARCITY

OF

WATER

FOR

COOLING.

ALMOST

CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE WITH NUCLEAR UNITS HAS

ALL

OF

BEEN MARRED BY

UNEXPECTED PROBLEMS AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH UNDISCOVERED GEOLOGIC
FAULTS.

BECAUSE

OF

CALIFORNIA'S

GENERALLY

UNSTABLE

GEOLOGY,

CONSTRUCTION COSTS WILL BE HIGHER HERE THAN IN MOST OTHER AREAS OF
THE UNITED STATES, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF GEOLOGIC SURPRISES IS
INCREASED.

ADDITIONALLY,

BECAUSE NUCLEAR UNITS CONVERT HEAT TO

ELECTRICITY LESS EFFICIENTLY THAN OTHER GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES,
THEY REQUIRE MORE WATER FOR COOLING.

THE PAST SIX YEAR'S DROUGHT

EMPHASIZES THE PROBLEM THIS POSES WHEN OTHER SOURCES OF GENERATION
REQUIRE LESS WATER CONSUMPTION.

A FURTHER HURDLE FACED BY ANY NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANT PROPOSAL
OF

AN

INVESTOR-OWNED

UTILITY

WOULD

BE

THE

CALIFORNIA

PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION'S CURRENT REGULATORY PROCEDURES FOR RESOURCE
ACQUISITION.
RATEPAYERS

THOSE PROCEDURES, WHICH ARE INTENDED TO GAIN FOR
THE

BENEFITS

OF

COMPETITION,

REQUIRE

UTILITIES

TO

IDENTIFY A DEFERABLE RESOURCE AND PERMIT OTHERS TO BID FOR THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE THAT POWER INSTEAD.
MAKE

A UTILITY

COMMITMENT

TO

THIS PROCEDURE WOULD

NUCLEAR UNITS

DIFFICULT

IF

NOT

IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THE NUCLEAR UNIT WOULD FIRST HAVE
TO BE IDENTIFIED AS DEFERABLE AND OTHERS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO TRY
TO PROVIDE THAT POWER AT THE SAME OR LOWER COST.

THE ENERGY

COMMISSION'S ANALYSES OF LIKELY UTILITY RESOURCE ADDITIONS DO NOT
3

IDENTIFY NUCLEAR UNITS TO BE CANDIDATE RESOURCES FOR AT LEAST THE
NEXT 8-12 YEARS.

FINALLY, AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, CALIFORNIA LAW PROHIBITS
THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANY NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANT IN CALIFORNIA UNTIL
THE

ENERGY

COMMISSION

DEMONSTRATED AND

THERE

FINDS

THAT

EXISTS

THE

FEDERAL

A TECHNOLOGY

DISPOSAL OF SPENT FUEL FROM THESE FACILITIES.

GOVERNMENT

FOR THE

HAS

PERMANENT

BASED ON THE SLOW

PACE OF THE FEDERAL PROGRAM'S PROGRESS, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE
ENERGY COMMISSION COULD MAKE THAT FINDING TODAY.

THE COMMISSION IS

NOT LIKELY TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE UNTIL AND UNLESS SOMEONE PROPOSES
TO DEVELOP A NEW NUCLEAR UNIT.

FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS,

WE

CONCLUDE THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS WILL
BE PROPOSED THIS CENTURY FOR CONSTRUCTION IN CALIFORNIA.

THE ONE POTENTIAL BRIGHT SPOT FOR NUCLEAR POWER LIES IN ITS
LACK OF AIR EMISSIONS INCLUDING EMISSION OF GREENHOUSE GASES.

THE

HOPE OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IS THAT A NEW GENERATION OF LOWER COST
NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS CAN PROVE ATTRACTIVE IN A WORLD THAT PLACES A
HIGH VALUE ON TECHNOLOGY THAT AVOIDS AIR POLLUTION EMISSIONS.
WHILE IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THIS VISION COULD BECOME REALITY, EVEN
IN CALIFORNIA, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE OTHER, LESS
EXPENSIVE AND LESS ECONOMICALLY RISKY WAYS OF DEALING WITH AIR
EMISSION PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES.

IN

OTHER WORDS, IT IS LIKELY THAT IF A GOAL IS ESTABLISHED TO REDUCE
C02 EMISSIONS BY A PARTICULAR AMOUNT, WE WILL BE ABLE TO BUY FAR

MORE REDUCTION IN C02 PER DOLLAR THROUGH EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS
AND POSSIBLY THROUGH RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES THAN WE WILL BE ABLE
TO BUY BY CONSTRUCTING NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS.

TURNING NOW TO ISSUES REGARDING OUR EXISTING PLANTS, WE NOTE
THAT IN CONTRAST TO THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE RANCHO SECO PLANT,
BOTH DIABLO UNITS 1 AND 2 AND SAN ONOFRE UNITS 2 AND 3 HAVE ENJOYED
EXCELLENT AVAILABILITY FACTORS IN THEIR EARLY YEARS OF OPERATION.
SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 IS AN OLDER UNIT THAT WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER
UTILITY INVESTMENT TO REMAIN IN OPERATION.

I AM SURE THAT OTHER

SPEAKERS HERE TODAY WILL PROVIDE YOU DETAILS ON THE STATUS OF AND
PLANS FOR THAT UNIT.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
ASSESS

AS EACH OF THESE UNITS AGE, UTILITIES, THE

COMMISSION,

PERIODICALLY

THE

AND THE LEGISLATURE WILL NEED TO

LIKELIHOOD

OF

CONTINUED

SUCCESSFUL

OPERATION AND BALANCE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM THAT OPERATION
AGAINST THE LIKELY INVESTMENT REQUIRED BY THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE PLANT TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE
SAFELY.

IN 1989, THE SACRAMENTO VOTERS FINALLY DETERMINED THAT

THIS BALANCE FAVORED CLOSING THE RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR PLANT AFTER
MANY YEARS OF TROUBLED OPERATION.

THE FINAL POINT I WILL MAKE RELATES TO THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
ENERGY COMMISSION IN SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR
LAWS AGAINST A FEDERAL PREEMPTION CHALLENGE.

CALIFORNIA CITIZENS

OBVIOUSLY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AND
THIS GIVES RISE TO YOUR LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THAT ISSUE.
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BUT THE

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS NOW CLEARLY INDICATED THAT ACTIONS
OF THE STATES THAT ARE DESIGNED TO REGULATE RADIATION HAZARDS FROM
SUCH FACILITIES ARE PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
COURT

H~S

UNANIMOUSLY

UPHELD

STATE

ACTION

BY CONTRAST, THE
THAT

IS

BASED

ON

LEGITIMATE ECONOMIC QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE WISDOM AND COSTEFFECTIVENESS

OF

ALTERNATIVES.

THIS

TECHNOLOGY

WHEN

COMPARED

WITH

OTHER

THE STATE CAN ALSO LEGITIMATELY REGULATE OTHER

ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, SUCH AS ADVERSE BIOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF ONCETHROUGH COOLING ON COASTAL WATERS.

WE WOULD THEREFORE RECOMMEND

THAT ANY ACTION THE COMMITTEE MIGHT CONSIDER,

WITH RESPECT TO

EXISTING NUCLEAR UNITS AVOID DIRECT REGULATION OF RADIATION HAZARDS
AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON TWO AREAS:
ASSOCIATED

WITH

RADIATION

(1)

HAZARDS,

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS NOT
AND

( 2)

THE

ECONOMICS

OF

CONTINUED INVESTMENT IN AND OPERATION OF THOSE FACILITIES GIVEN
POSSIBLE FEDERAL NUCLEAR SAFETY REQUIREMENTS.

THAT COMPLETES MY PREPARED REMARKS.
AVAILABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.
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BOTH MR. NIX AND I ARE

STATEMENT OF.
ROBERT G. LACY
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC
TO
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DECEMBER 2, 1991

STATEMENT OF
ROBERT G. LACY
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC
TO
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECEMBER 2 1 1991

Chairman Rosenthal and members of the Committee, my name is
Robert G. Lacy.

& Electric.

I

I manage the Nuclear Department at San Diego Gas
appreciate the opportunity to discuss San Onofre

and, in particular, San Diego's involvement in the operation of
the plant.
plant.

As you heard from Mr. Rosenblum, we own 20% of the

We also obtain about 20% of our customers' electric

energy from it.

We take our role related to the safe operation

of the plant very seriously.
San Diego's focus at San Onofre is twofold--to look after
the interests of our shareholders and customers and to provide
support and assistance to Edison whenever it is appropriate.

We

monitor and work with Edison in a number of areas:
1.

We have a full time engineer at the site who provides

us with close to real time information on the status of the
plant.

This person has a nuclear background and is thoroughly

familiar with the plant and the people who operate and maintain
it.
2.

We participate with Edison in the estimating and

budgeting process.

We also monitor expenditures and commitments
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with a full time cost engineer, the equivalent of two full time
accountants and an auditor.
3.

We monitor nuclear licensing activities and issues

through the efforts of a full time licensing engineer who works
with his Edison counterparts.

In addition, our Senior Vice

President-Engineering and Operations and I attend selected
meetings with the NRC.
4.

San Diego is an active participant on the San Onofre

Board of Review.
endeavor.

This group oversees the plant as a business

They approve budgets, overhaul schedules, nuclear fuel

plans and, except for safety, other matters related to the
operation of the facility.

In addition to the monitoring efforts just discussed, San
Diego takes a very proactive role in insuring the continued safe
operation of San Onofre.
1.

We participate on the two Onsite Safety Review

committees.

These committees monitor Unit 1 and Units 2 & 3 to

verify they are operated in a manner consistent with policy,
rules, procedures and NRC license provisions as related to safety
and environmental matters.
2.

We also participate on the two Nuclear Control Boards.

These groups consist of senior management people from Edison, San
Diego and, in the case of Units 2 and 3, the Cities of Anaheim
and Riverside.

In addition, a consultant who is a recently

retired senior NRC manager serves on the Boards.

Among other
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things, the Boards review significant safety issues and verify
that safety and environmental occurrences which deviate from
operating instructions or acceptance standards are promptly
investigated and corrected.

The Boards are similar to the Diablo

Canyon Independent Safety Committee except that they have the
authority to direct changes for the purpose of enhancing or
ensuring plant safety.
not required by the NRC.

I should point out that these Boards are
However, it is my understanding they

are looked upon very favorably.
As Mr. Rosenblum has testified, the CPUC BRPU hearings have
recently completed.

Briefs were filed last week.

This

proceeding reviewed the resource plans for all the regulated
electric utilities in the State.

It specifically addressed the

continued operation of San Onofre Unit 1.

San Diego participated

with Edison in developing the assumptions used to prepare a
benefit/cost analysis.

These assumptions were unique to the Unit

and included such things as capacity factor, capital
requirements, operating and maintenance costs, and steam
generator performance.

San Diego then prepared its own

benefit/cost analysis taking into consideration additional
assumptions which are unique to us such as capacity requirements,
resource mix and resource opportunities, financial considerations
and nuclear fuel costs.

Our analysis demonstrated without a

doubt that continued operation of San Onofre Unit 1 is in the
best interests of our customers.

This conclusion held even after
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we did sensitivity runs which evaluated the impact of lower gas
prices, higher capital and O&M costs.
San Diego performed six sensitivity runs of the costeffectiveness of San Onofre Unit 1 at a capacity factor of 60%
and six sensitivity runs at an extremely low capacity factor of
44%.

Those runs showed that at a 60% capacity factor the Unit

remained cost-effective even under high capital and O&M cost
assumptions.

Even at a very low capacity factor, the Unit was

cost-effective for all but one sensitivity run which used the
most extreme adverse assumptions, and was cost-effective under
all sensitivities when realistic lead times were reflected.
While these runs were conducted using the CPUC mandated ER 90
fuel price forecast, it is our judgment that San Onofre Unit 1
would be cost effective at a 44% capacity factor and lower gas
prices.
While we do not believe it will be necessary, we even
concluded that replacement of the steam generators followed by
continued operation of the Unit with no life extension is still
in the best interests of our customers.
This concludes my remarks.
questions.

I will be happy to answer any
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MARINE REVIEW COMMITTEE

TESTIMONY BY WILLIAM MURDOCH, CHAIRMAN, MRC, TO THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES, DEC 2, 1991
Introduction
Between 1976 and 1989 the MRC carried out a study of the effects of the cooling system of
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) on the marine environment. The study
broke new ground, first, in being wholly independent of the power company, and second in
using a powerful statistical design that can distinguish the effects of the power plant from
natural variation in the environment.
Before summarizing the effects found by the MRC I need to stress that the study has
virtually nothing to say about the safety of nuclear power. It did not, and could not,
determine whether the various short- and long-term potential hazards of nuclear energy
(e.g. nuclear accidents, long-term storage of nuclear waste) can be avoided. It did show
that the plant did not release environmentally-significant amounts of radioactive materials
into the ocean when we investigated this question.
The Effects
The power plant affects marine organisms in two ways. First, it takes in enormous
quantities of ocean water to cool the reactor: an amount equivalent to a square mile 14 feet
deep every day. Second, it moves turbid water, i.e. water with a lot of particles, from near
the shore and from close to the ocean floor, offshore, up towards the surface and, about
60% of the time, over the nearby kelp bed. In doing so it reduces the amount of light
reaching the ocean floor in the kelp bed and it increases the flow of particles across the
cobbles and boulders in the bed.
The two major corresponding effects on the marine biota are as follows.
(1) First, the intakes kill about se billion fish eggs and larvae every year. Now, although
fish populations have some ability to "compensate" for such losses, It is most likely that the
adult stocks nevertheless decline as a consequence of these deaths. The main effects fall
on a few species of fish that are concentrated near shore, and the MRC calculated that the
standing stock of these species is reduced by 1% to 10% in the southern California Bight
(the region from Point Conception to northern Baja), an amount equivalent to around 600
tons.
These are not large percentage losses, and they occur mainly in non-sport and noncommercial species. But they occur on top of losses imposed by other human activities,
and they probably appear ultimately as reductions in the sport and commercial species that
feed on the affected group.
(2) Second, the changes in the physical environment caused by the turbid plume from the
power plant cause a roughly 50% reduction in the average size of the kelp bed near
SONGS, an average reduction in abundance of about 70% in fish living near the bottom,
and of about 45% in 9 species of invertebrates in the kelp bed. These effects are
substantial because kelp beds are ecologically important and biologically diverse habitats in
the ocean and are quite sparse in the San Onofre area.
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The MRC concluded that these effects do not constitute an ecological disaster, but they are
substantial adverse effects and require corrective or compensatory action.
MRC Recommendations and CCC Action
First, the :\1RC considered massive changes, namely the addition of cooling towers and
alterin~ the discharge system, that could prevent most of these effects. The majority of the
Committee concluded, however, that the costs would be disproportionate to the benefits
and that there would be additional significant environmental effects.
The MRC instead unanimously recommended a set of options from which the Commission
was invited to select its final list of conditions. The options included changes to the
operation of the plant, and various possibilities for mitigation. Mitigation options included
a replacement kelp bed and, for the Bight-wide fish losses, a fish reef or restoration of
coastal wetland. The MRC worked with Commission staff in exploring these options and
decided that changes to the plant would reduce its efficiency and would transfer a portion
of the environmental effects to other power plants. Thus the mitigation package fmally
imposed on Edison by the Commission centered on a replacement kelp bed and restoration
of coastal wetland, and this package is entirely consistent with the MRC recommendations.
Regional Water Quality Board Hearings
The MRC recently submitted testimony to the San Diego Regional Water Quality Board at
hearings on SONGS' NPDES permit. That majority testimony is that two standards in the
permit are not being met: (1) the plant reduces the light reaching the ocean floor in the
kelp bed and (2) the plant causes degradation of the biota by reducing the abundance of
kelp and other orgarusms in the kelp bed. The Board is presently weighing this and other
testimony.
You asked me to comment on what the Water Board should do. First, I am not competent
to evaluate the legal or regulatory issues. But, from an environmental point of view, since
the Coastal Commission has required full environmental compensation, I believe the
Board need not impose additional requirements. However, I would like to see the Board
reinforce the Coastal Commission's requirement for remedial action to be undertaken by
Edison.
Implications for Regulation
Finally, you asked me to comment on the broader implications for regulation. I have
concluded that current regulation under SONGS' NPDES permit is inadequate, for three
reasons.
(1) The present standards are ineffective. Edison is required by its NPDES permit to carry
out environmental studies to determine whether or not the effects of SONGS on the
marine environment violate regulatory standards. But the mandated studies do not have
the power to detect any but the most disastrous of effects.
(2) Self-assessment does not work. As is standard, Edison investigates itself. The
company, or its consultants, carry out the studies required by the permit. The company
analyzes and interprets the results. These analyses do not apply adequate techniques for
findmg effects.
(3) The Regional Water Quality Board has too small a scientific staff to investigate
properly the issues raised by this inadequate process.

3

In my view the regulatory activities carried out for SONGS' NPDES permit have been
almost entirely a waste of the millions of dollars that have been spent. The situation could
be improved by (a) carefully rewriting the regulatory standards and (b) requiring thirdparty monitoring by a wholly independent body reporting directly to the regulatory agency.

State1nent of Riuunon C. Fay, Ph.D. to the California State
Couuuittee on Energy and Public Utilities, 2 December 1991

Senate

San Onofre Nuclear G~nerating System (SONGS) entrains and kills
billions of organisms amounting to thousands of tons of biomass
per year.
In addition, the flow of cooling water through the
plant followed by discharge to the ocean results in
the
displacement of suspended sediments offshore.
These sediments
adversely impact the environment by reducing the penetration of
light accumulating on the bottom, of causing other disruptive
effects upon the organisms in the area impacted by
this
discharge.
These results are documented in the final report of
the
l1arint! Review Committee (MRC) and some 16
technical
appendices.
One of those technical reports, 0., "Water Quality
Compliance" details the fact that the discharge from the SONGS is
not
in compliance with the National
Pollution
Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued by the San Diego
Regioual Water Quality Control Board in that the penetration of
light through the water column is reduced, sediments accumulate
on the bottom, and a Balanced Population of Indigenous Organisms
is not being maintained. So long as the SONGS continues to
Opt!rate as it now does, this damage to the mar~ne environment
will continue.
The MRC found unanimously that over 90% of this continuing damage
to the murine environment cun be prevented by the retrofitting of
cooling towers to the uuits at the SONGS.
Instead of acting to eliminate the problem of water pollution
caused by the SONGS, the California Coastal Committee (CCC) acted
to compensate for the damage to llli..: ll4arine environment by
requiring Southern California Edison (SCE) to build an artificial
reef, restore some wetlands area, and fund a fish hatchery.
Review of the pollution problem by the Water Quality Control
Board, San Diego Region, is not complete and this agency has not
yet decided what is to be done in this matter.
Els...,~a.._
cooling towers are required for nuclear generating
stations where far lesser biomasses of aquatic resources are at
risk compar~d to the situation at the SONGS.

MRC studies of the effects of radiation released from the SONGS
were incomplete. In fact, the MRC submitted a special report to
the CCC criticizing the design of the radiation monitoring
program conducted at the SONGS. 1'wo problems remained to be
resolved with regard to the issue of release of radioactivity
fr01a the SONGS. One is the total amount and characteristics of
the release of radioactive substances leaving the station either
in the flow of cooling water or from the stacks. These releases
increase as the units age. Also, the radioactivity 1n the
components of the plant increases as the rate of neutron induced
corrosion increases. The other is the disposal of radioactive
wastes as it is now prorosed to externalize this problem into the
public sector,from the private sector.
''t

The MRC study produced the most reliable data of its type ever
reported for an environmental study. The estimates of annual
losses of marine organisms and damage to the marine community
affected are conservative. No evaluation of the chronic effects
resulting from the operation of the SONGS have been made. At the
same time, Nuclear Regulatory Commission practice will extend the
probable operating life of these units to a period of 40 to 50
years. Each and every day of operation will result in the death
and destruction of more fish and habitat than resulted from the
single spill of an herbicide into the Sacramento River and the
site will remain dangerously radioactive for more than 250,000
years.
The permit to construct the SONGS units 2 and 3 was issued under
the terms of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972
which forbade an irreversible, irretrievable comn1itment
of
coastal resources without full mitigation to prevent any net loss
of these resources at this in water quality exists in a State in
which has expended billions of dollars to abate problems in water
pollution.
It is inconsistent with the objectives of every law
adopted to protect, maintain, enhance, and restore coastal
resources without preventing this damage from occurring. It is
also alarming to expect that this pattern of damage will increase
in the future as the plant ages.
Attachment:
Table of
operations of the SONGS

estimated

annual

losses

caused

by

-Summary of Estimated Losses of tHota
Resulting from Operation of SONGS
Kelp plants

b9,000 plants
200 acres of kelp bed

Entrainment Losses
Phyt.op lank ton*

10,000 tons per year

Zooplankton **

1,350 tons per year

Ichthyoplankton***

4 billion larvae per year

Juvenile and adult fish

~1

l"1ys ids (ho 1op lank tonic)

to 56 tons per year
14

tons per year

Relative Abundance Losses
Kelp bed fish - bottom

70% reduction {2b tons)

Kelp bed invertebrates

30- 90% reduction (no est.)

Regional Fish Stocks

0 - 10% reduction'(600 tons)

Local Midwater Fish

30- 70% reduction (no est.)

*Estimated as approximately lOx amount of zooplankton
**Holoplankton and meroplankton excluaing fish, dry weight
***No estimate of weight

CALIFORNIA REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD
SAN DIEGO REGION
Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Public
Utilities
December 2, 1991
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
Background
The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) consists of
three nuclear-fueled electrical generating facilities, Units 1, 2
and 3. All three units are located in San Diego County, on a
site between the cities of San Clemente and Oceanside,
immediately adjacent to the Pacific Ocean, approximately two and
one half miles south of San Mateo Point, within the boundaries of
the United States Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton.
SONGS is
within the jurisdiction of the California Regional Water Quality
Control Board, San Diego Region.
Unit 1 began commercial operation in 1968 with a waste discharge
volume of up to approximately 500 million gallons per day, most
of which is condenser cooling water. Approximately 14 million
gallons per day of wastes resulting from plant operations, and
approximately 0.145 million gallons per day from two small sewage
treatment plants are also discharged. The cooling water intake
is located approximately 2980 feet offshore of the plant in
approximately 27 feet of water. The discharge structure is
located approximately 2460 feet offshore in approximately 25 feet
of water.
Units 2 and 3 were placed in operation in 1983, each with a
separate discharge and a waste discharge volume of up to
approximately 1400 million gallons per day, most of which is
condenser cooling water. Approximately 65 million gallons per
day of wastes resulting from plant operations are also introduced
into the discharge from each unit. Units 2 and 3 r1ave separate
cooling water intakes, each located approximately 3183 feet
offshore in 32 feet of water.
The Unit 2 discharge is through a
diffuser extending from approximately 5888 to 8350 feet offshore
ranging in depth from approximately 39 feet to 49 feet.
The Unit
3 discharge is through a diffuser extending from approximately
3558 feet to 6020 feet offshore ranging in depth from
approximately 32 feet to 38 feet.
Fish return systems serve the intake from each unit.
A common
discharge structure is used for the discharges from both fish
return systems.

The SONGS discharges of cooling water and other miscellaneous inplant waste streams and the discharge from the fish return system
have been regulated by NPDES permits adopted by the Regional
Board since the facility began operation.
Since NPDES permits
typically have durations of 5 years the permits for the SONGS
units have been renewed a number of times since the plant began
operation.
Unit 1 is currently regulated under Regional Board
Order No. 88-01. Unit 2 is currently regulated under Regional
Board O~der No. 85-11. Unit 3 is currently regulated by Regional
Board Order No. 85-13.
Information in Regional Board files indicates SONGS has been the
subject of three water quality related enforcement actions since
the facility began operation.
I will concentrate on the current
ongoing action, related to the report of the Marine Review
Committee, in the belief that it is of most interest to this
corr:mittee.
Marine Review Committee Report
In addition to the Regional Board's permits, Units 2 and 3 of
SONGS are also regulated under a California Coastal Commission
permit (Permit No. 183-73, adopted by the then California Coastal
Zone Commission in 1974). As a condition of this permit, because
of concerns about the effects of operation of Units 2 and 3 on
the marine environment, Edison was required to fund a three
member independent committee - the Marine Review Committee (MRC)
to:
" ... carry out a comprehensive and continuing study of the
marine environment offshore from San Onofre ... to predict and
later to measure, the effects of San Onofre Units 2 and 3 on the
marine environment with emphasis on a)
the effects of SONGS
Units 2 & 3 on zooplankton and larval organisms and b}
compliance with the regulatory requirements of State and Federal
water quality agencies ..... in a manner that will result in the
broadest possible consideration of the effects of SONGS Units 1,
2 and 3 on the entire marine environment in the vicinity of San
Onofre".
After a reported 17 years of study, and a cost of approximately
$48,000,000, the MRC issued its final report in August 1989.
Included in the report were findings that the discharges from
SONGS Units 2 and 3 were not in compliance with applicable NPDES
permit limi~ations for:
natural light in the ocean waters and
degradation of marine communities.
The Regional Board received copies of the final MRC report in
August 1989.
Staff members of the Regional Board and California
Coastal Commission (CCC) met a number of times, beginning before
the MRC report was finalized, to coordinate actions of the
respective agencies on the findings of the report.
During one of the early meetings it was agreed that ~he Regional
Board should not begin any hearings or other actions until after

the CCC concluded their hearing process.
I believe this approach
was appropriate for the following reasons:

*

The CCC commissioned the MRC and the subsequent report as a
part of their permitting process for the construction and
operation of SONGS Units 2 and 3. The findings of the
report had not yet been formally considered by the CCC in a
public hearing.
It was appropriate that the CCC hear and
act on the findings of the MRC before another State agency
acted.
·

*

Staff of the CCC and the Chairman of the MRC requested that
any Regional Board hearings to consider the alleged
violations cited in the MRC report not be held until after
the CCC hearings began.

*

Issues before the CCC included the necessity of altering the
CCC permit for Units 2 and 3 to require:
changes in the
cooling water systems, operational changes, mitigation
projects to compensate for any damages to marine life or
modifications to the cooling water system for Units 2 and 3.
The testimony before the CCC and any subsequent decisions on
these issues would be a major consideration in any Regional
Board deliberations.

*

Other possible actions taken by the CCC in response to the
MRC report (including acceptance, rejection or request for
additional work) would appropriately be considered by the
Regional Board in any deliberations they undertake.

In response to a request by representatives of Friends of the
Earth and the Surfrider Foundation for Regional Board enforcement
action, the findings of the MRC report were discussed during the
December 18, 1989 Regional Board meeting. A considerable amount
of testimony was presented by Regional Board staff, CCC staff,
representatives of Edison, representatives of the MRC and other
interested parties. Following the discussion the Board
tentatively decided to call an enforcement hearing.
Subsequent
to making that decision the Board concurred, for the reasons
cited above, that their enforcement hearings not begin before the
start of the CCC hearing process.
I

The CCC hearings were scheduled and postponed a number of times.
The matter was eventually heard by the CCC on July 16, 1991 in
Huntington Beach.

During their August 12, 1991 meeting the Regional Board scheduled
an enforcement hearing for October 31, 1991. The hearing was
opened on that date for the purpose of receiving testimony only.
The record for receipt of written testimony was held open until
November 15, 1991. A copy of the Regional Board staff report
presented at the hearing has previously been provided to the
Committee's staff.

The Regional Board will meet to consider a decision o~ the matter
after staff have completed their review of the considerable
amount of testimony that makes up the hearing record. We will be
discussing possible dates for this meeting with the Regional
Board, during their next regular meeting, on December 9, 1991.
At this time, based on the volume of written and oral information
that must be reviewed, I estimate the will not meet to consider a
decision prior to January 1992.
Discoloration of the Ocean Surface at Unit 1
Prior to beginning of coremercial operation of Units 2 and 3 the
Regional Board initiated an enforcement action because of Permit
violations at Unit 1. Shortly after Unit 1 was placed in
operation discoloration of the ocean surface in the vicinity of
the discharge was noted. This resulted from the intake
entraining turbid water from the inshore area, near the ocean
floor, with subsequent discharge of turbidity through the
discharge structure; entrainment of turbid water from near the
ocean floor, in the vicinity of the discharge structure, with
wa~er discharged through the discharge·structure; and, the
effects of the ocean currents on the discharge structure. The
discoloration was in violation of NPDES Permit conditions
requiring no aesthetically undesirable discoloration of the ocean
surface as a result of the discharge.
In response to the violations the Regional Board issued a time
schedule {Order No. 82-15) in 1982. Order No. 82-15 required
Southern California Edison, as operators of SONGS, to conduct
studies to determine the causes of the problem and potential
solutions.
In 1983 Edison presented the results of their studies
to the Regional Board, concluding tha~ the discoloration of the
ocean waters resulting from the Unit 1 discharge was not a
significant aesthetic problem because it was visible to only a
small number of people. Edison also reported that the cost to
correct the problem would be in excess of $400,000,000 and
requested that ~he Regional Board not require correction of the
problem.
On November 14, 1983 the Regional Board, concurring with the
Edison request, adopted Addendum 1 to Order No. 82-14 which
relieved the Company of the requirements that the discoloration
of the oce&n waters caused by the Unit 1 discharge be eliminated.
Effluen~

Violations at Unit 1

As previously ~entioned discharges from Unit 1 consist of
condenser cooling water and discharges from in-plant operations,
including discharges from two small sewage treatment plants. The
sewage treatment plants are used to treat domestic sewage from
SONGS workers and vis~tors.

During the period from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1990
the NPDES permit monitoring program indicated the effluent
limitations that apply to the Unit 1 discharges were exceeded a
total of 17 times.
The effluent limits for the combined
discharge were exceeded for chlorine residual.
The effluent
limits for one group of the small discharge streams, called "low
volume wastes", were exceeded for grease and oil.
The discharges
from the sewage treatment plants exceeded effluent limits for,
settleab:e solids and pH.
These violations were noted on reports the Regional Board
provides to the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Exercising its oversight role pursuant to Federal regulations,
the EPA informed the Regional Board that if a formal enforcement
ac~ion was not initiated by the State, EPA would initiate such an
action under Federal authority.
Since Regional Board enforcement
resources were limited, and the violations were not considered to
have significant water quality impacts, I advised EPA that if
enforcement action were considered necessary they should pursue
it. The Administrator of EPA subsequently issued an
administrative enforcement order on February 27, 1991.
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Utilities can't make tough decisions. They're on a nuclear power treadmill, driven by the
guarantee of a rate return and lack of competition. It is time to put on the brake.
Campaign California is one of the state's largest environmental and consumer
organizations with over 30,000 members. It led the two campaigns in Sacramento in 1988
and 1989 that led to the closure of Rancho Seco nuclear plant.
The chairman of Campaign California is Assemblyman Tom Hayden. Campaign California
has led other initiative campaigns, including Prop. 65 -- the 1986 Get Tough on Toxics
initiative, Prop. 99 -- the 1988 Tobacco Tax initiative, and Prop. 128, Big Green, in 1990.
We call for the closure of San Onofre nuclear generating station# 1 (SONGS 1). Much of
my testimony is reflected in the Division of Ratepayer Advocacy's (DRA) testimony and
its report on the cost-effectiveness of SONGS 1.
The DRA report documents a record of deception by Southern California Edison (SCE) in
its filing for authorization to pass costs of SONGS 1 onto ratepayers, including examples of
inflated capacity performance and reliability and numerous underestimations of costs-including the cost of capital additions, of line losses, of environmental impact on marine
life, of insurance, and of decommissioning. And they overestimate the cost of replacement
power.
SCE is cited by DRA for flawed and incomplete information -- as an example, SCE used
for comparison a group of 7 similar nuclear plants, but omits five other similar plants that
had poor performance.
Campaign California applauds the DRA recommendation, now under consideration by the
PUC-- that SONGS 1 be designated a deferrable resource and its capacity be put out to
bid. Let the free market determine the need for SONGS 1. The state's leading ratepayer
organization, TURN, joins us in this position.
Simply put, SONGS 1 is like an old car with too many miles -- it's dangerous, it's inefficient;
it operates to avoid embarrassment to the nuclear industry.
SONGS 1 is the nation's 3rd oldest nuclear reactor-- and the oldest of commercial size. It
began operating in 1967 and is 24 years old. Nuclear plants are not exempt from the laws
of nature. As nuclear plants age they require increasingly larger expenditures for
maintenance and repairs and produce ever less power.
One national study showed that, for the period of 1981-85, repair costs at older nuclear
plants (built in the '60's) was double than that for newer plants (built after 1970). An
earlier DOE report predicted this trend, suggesting that, after 15 years, capacity of older
plants will decline by 20Jo per year.
SONGS 1 has proven the rule. Reliable in its first decade, it averaged only 27% of its
capacity from 1980-1987. In '88, it rose to 36%, and fell to 31 OJo in 1989.
Yet, SCE projects a capacity factor of 60% to 80% in future years in order to justify
continued operation of the plant.
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To continue to operate at all, expensive repairs and improvements will continue to be
needed. SCE budgets for some long-delayed safety improvements triggered by the Three
Mile Island accident, but leaves little contingency for other likely costs.
A 1988 national study of costs found SONGS 1 to be the costliest in the nation. It
measured annual net capital additions from 1982-86, ranked by cost per KW.
While SCE would like to think that they've got everything fixed, they face probable large,
unbudgeted expenses. SCE's rosy forecasts would be destroyed if SONGS l's troubled
steam generator needed to be replaced, estimated by SCE at $200 million. Yet -- ALL
other 3-loop Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor plants have replaced steam
generators.
The optimists at SCE also project that the NRC will lighten up on requirements as the
plant ages, because modifications will not be cost effective. We agree that it appears that
the NRC at times places cost above safety; but not even the NRC will, as a matter of policy,
allow a plant to operate less safely because of age.
Factors outside of the controls SONGS 1's managers may force unbudgeted expenses onto
the plant. A problem at any of the 12 similarly designed plants may trigger improvements
at all plants. The current Earth Island Institute lawsuit could increase costs. Seismic
activity and continued research could lead to yet further earthquake safety requirements.
SONGS 1 is simply not needed. A 1987 study showed that even without nuclear power, the
nation had 280Jo surplus electrical generating power in 1986; in the western half of the
nation, the surplus without nuclear was 40%.
Even the perceived environmental benefit proves to be just so much smoke:
First of all, SONGS 1 reduces the need for fossil fuel only the extent it operates and is
reliable -- and for a decade it's only worked about a third of the time. Does anyone believe
that SONGS 1 will be a reliable energy source into the next century? Second, any air
benefit is offset by the damage to the marine environment. Significant marine
environmental benefit would result when SONGS 1 is closed. Third, continued operation
increases the large amount of on-site stored nuclear waste, and, finally, continued
operation exposes the nation's largest urban population needlessly to the inherent safety
risks of nuclear power.
SONGS 1 should be considered a deferrable resource. The DRA report notes that
SONGS 1 has not met ANY of the requirements for designation a resource as nondeferrable. If the PUC arbitrarily designates SONGS 1 as non-deferrable, it will shield it
from competition from other energy resources. This lost opportunity could cost ratepayers
hundreds of millions of dollars.
If the PUC ignored its own policies, legislation should be adopted defining what resources

can be shielded •• and requiring a competitive market.
I'm reminded of a fight that Campaign California joined in the late '70's to stop SDG&E's
involvement with Sun Desert nuclear plant. We were told then of rosy costs projections
and unbridled need. However, two years later a SDG&E's executive described the denial
of their plans as the best thing that ever happened to them.
Based on the DRA analysis and the experience of Rancho Seco, we expect a similar postSONGS 1 message by Southern California Edison.
###
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sacramento, california
A.

Introduction/Background

Chairman Rosenthal and Members of the Committee:
My name is Robert Wellington and I am the Legal Counsel for the
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee.

On behalf of the Safety

Committee, I would like to express our appreciation at being asked to
participate in today's oversight hearing.

Senator Rosenthal's recent

letter asked the Safety Committee to present a general status report
of its activities to date, plus a summary of activities planned in the
future.

Since the Committee has been in operation for less than two

years, and since this is our first opportunity to appear before you, I
thought I would give you a brief history on the formation of the Diablo
Canyon Independent Safety Committee ("DCISC") and then discuss its activities to date.
1.

Formation of the DCISC.

The establishment of the Diablo Canyon

Independent Safety Committee was provided for as one of the terms of an
extensive settlement agreement entered into by the Division of Ratepayer
Advocates ("DRA") of the California Public Utilities Commission ("PUC"),
the Attorney General ("AG") for the state of California and Pacific Gas
and Electric Company ( "PG&E") .

The settlement agreement, dated June 24,

1988, covers the operation and revenue requirements associated with the
two units of PG&E's Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant ("Diablo Canyon")
for the thirty-year period following the commercial operation date of
each unit.

The agreement arose out of rate proceedings that had been

pending before the PUC for four years, and which included numerous
hearings and pre-trial depositions.

Just prior to the commencement of

trial, the ORA, the AG and PG&E prepared and entered into the settlement
agreement and submitted it to the PUC for approval.

In addition to ex-

tensive provisions relating to the Diablo Canyon rates and pricing
structures, the agreement also provides in pertinent part that:
"An Independent Safety Committee shall be established consisting of three members, one each
appointed by the Governor of the State of California, the Attorney General and the Chairman
of the California Energy Commission ("CEC"),
respectively, serving staggered three-year terms.
The Committee shall review Diablo Canyon operations for the purpose of assessing the safety of
operations and suggesting any recommendations for
safe operations. Neither the Committee nor its
members shall have any responsibility or authority
for plant operations, and they shall have no authority to direct PG&E personnel."
The agreement further provides that the Safety Committee shall have
the right to receive certain operating reports and records of Diablo
canyon and that the Committee shall have the right to conduct an annual
examination of the Diablo Canyon site and such other supplementary visits as it may deem appropriate.

The Safety Committee is to prepare an

annual report and such interim reports as may be appropriate, which
shall include any recommendations of the Committee.
The settlement agreement was referred to the PUC for review and
approval, and following hearings before a PUC Administrative Law Judge
and the Commission itself, in December 1988 the PUC approved the settlement agreement, finding that it was reasonable and "in the public interest" and that the "Safety Committee will be a useful monitor of safe
operation at Diablo Canyon."
2.

Appointment of Committee Members.

_..,_

The settlement agreement

provides that the Safety Committee members are to be selected from a
list of candidates jointly nominated by the President of the PUC, the
Dean of Engineering of the University of California at Berkeley and
PG&E, and that they "shall propose as candidates only persons with
knowledge, background and experience in the field of nuclear power
facilities."

In July 1989 when then PUC President G. Mitchell Wilk

announced the initial list of nine candidates nominated for appointment
to the Committee, he noted that "an independent safety committee clearly
requires members who could demonstrate objectivity and independence.
For this reason, none of the nominees has testified for PG&E or any
other party before the PUC or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in any
proceeding regarding Diablo Canyon."
William E. Kastenberg.

In September 1989 Governor Deukmejian

appointed UCLA nuclear engineering professor William Kastenberg to a
one-year term on the Safety Committee.

Professor Kastenberg received

his BS and MS in Engineering from UCLA and his PhD in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley.

Upon graduation, he

joined the faculty at UCLA where he is currently Professor of Engineering and Applied Science.

Dr. Kastenberg has taught courses in nuclear

reactor theory, design and safety;

thermodynamics and heat transfer;

energy technology and environmental risk.

His research interests in-

clude nuclear reactor safety and risk-benefit studies.

A more detailed

statement of Dr. Kastenberg's educational and research background is set
forth in Exhibit "A," which is set forth in the packet of documents
provided to each of you.
In July 1990 Professor Kastenberg was re-appointed by the Governor to a new three-year term on the Safety Committee.
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Professor Kas-

tenberg was the first Chairman of the Diablo canyon Independent Safety
Committee, serving from May 1990 through June 1991.
warren H. owen.

In December of 1989, Warren Owen was appointed

to a three-year term as the second member of the Safety Committee by
the Chairman of the California Energy Commission.

Mr. owen was elected

Chairman of the Safety Committee in June 1991 for the current fiscal
year.

Mr. owen is Executive Vice President of Duke Power Company in

Charlotte, North Carolina, where he is responsible for power group operations.

In this capacity he directs all electric power production

activities (plant design, construction and operation) as well as related
technical and information services for the company.

Mr. Owen graduated

from Clemson University with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical
Engineering.

He joined Duke Power in 1948.

The additional details of

Mr. Owen's accomplishments are also found in Exhibit "A."

Herbert H. Woodson.

In March 1991 the California Attorney General

appointed Herbert Woodson to the Safety Committee for both the then unexpired term through the end of the fiscal year and for a three-year
term commencing July 1, 1991.

Dr. Woodson is the Dean of the College of

Engineering and the Director of the Bureau of Engineering Research at
the University of Texas at Austin.

He attended Massachusetts Institute

of Technology, where he received his Bachelor of Science and Master of
Science degrees in 1952, and a Doctor of Science degree in 1956, all in
Electrical Engineering.

He served as a faculty member at M.I.T. from

1956 to 1971, when he joined the staff and became Chairman of the
Electrical Engineering Department at the University of Texas.

Dr.

Woodson's resume is further set forth at Exhibit "A" in your packet of
documents.
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B.

Safety committee Activities

The variety and extent of the Safety Committee's activities during
the first nineteen (19) months of its operational existence can probably best be summarized for you here today by a brief review of six
topics:
oThe documents received and reviewed by the Committee.
oThe four public meetings held in San Luis Obispo County
by the Safety Committee.
oThe Committee's technical presentations and fact-finding
sessions.
oThe consultants and experts retained by the Committee
and their efforts to date.
oThe site visits, facility inspections, open houses and
related activities of the Committee members.
oThe reports prepared by the Safety Committee.
1.

Documents Provided to the Safety committee.

The settlement

agreement provides that the Committee shall have the right to receive
on a regular basis specified operating reports and records of Diablo
Canyon, as well as "such other reports pertinent to safety as may be
produced in the course of operations and may be requested by the Committee."

Thousands of documents have been provided by PG&E to the

Safety Committee, relating to both historical and current operations.
An example of the list of documents provided to the Committee members
on a quarterly basis, as well as upon specific request, are shown in
Exhibit "B."

I should note, however, that the list itself does not

begin to indicate the extent and bulk of these documents, which arrive
every three months at my office as a stack a to 10 inches high.
2.

committee Meetings.

A major portion of the Safety Committee's
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work has been conducted at the four public meetings which it has held in
San Luis Obispo County, in communities adjacent to the Diablo Canyon
plant.

The very first meeting of the Committee was held at the Grange

Hall in San Luis Obispo on May 22, 1990.

As you can see from the Notice

of Meeting and the meeting Agenda, which are set forth at Exhibit "C" of
your materials, the meeting was conducted in three sessions, starting at
9:30 in the morning and running throughout the afternoon and evening.
This has continued to be the general format of each of the Committee's
meetings:

an initial or morning session at which Committee business and

organizational matters are considered;

a second or afternoon session

devoted exclusively to technical presentations from PG&E representatives
on topics of plant operations, as requested by the Committee Members;
and a third session conducted in the evening for the primary purpose of
receiving comments and communications from the public.

Comments from

the public are also welcome at the morning and afternoon meeting sessions.
You can see from Exhibit "C" that at this first meeting the Safety
Committee adopted various Committee policies on such matters as internal
organization, accounting procedures, travel and expense reimbursement,
communications and procedures for conducting its meetings.

Committee

members reported on their inspections of the plant, and technical reports were given on PG&E's organization and operations at Diablo canyon,
on planned operational improvements and modifications, on training and
maintenance programs and on the current status of NRC issues and assessments.
Each of the initial meeting sessions was attended by 60 to 95 persons.

The evening session did not adjourn until nearly 11: oo P.M., with
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the two Committee members having spent over ten hours in that first public meeting.
Subsequent Safety Committee meetings have been held on November
9, 1990, on June 6, 1991, and on October 10, 1991.

a-

The meeting notice

and agenda for each of those three meetings are included at Exhibits
"D," "E" and "F," respectively.
were held.
Luis Obispo;

Again, day-long three-session meetings

All of the meetings except the third one were held in San
the June 6, 1991, meeting was held in Arroyo Grande, about

15 miles to the south.

Attendance at each of the sessions of the last

three meetings has averaged between 25 to 40 persons.
When some members of the public indicated that the Committee's
legal notices were not sufficient, the Committee commenced publishing
multiple display ads in the two largest local newspapers (see Exhibit
"G").

The meeting notices are also mailed out to some ninety persons

and organizations on a service list provided by the PUC and to over
thirty newspapers and radio and television stations.

Minutes (Exhibits

"H" and "I") and typed transcripts have been prepared for each of the
Safety Committee's meetings, and these documents have been filed for
review in the Public Document Room at the Cal Poly Library in San Luis
Obispo.
3.

Technical Presentations.

As you can see from a review of the

agendas provided to you, a considerable number and variety of technical
presentations have been given to the Committee at its meetings.

I have

already mentioned the PG&E reports given at the first meeting of the
Safety Committee.

At its second meeting in November 1990 the Committee

received presentations on outage management, operator training, fitnessfor-duty programs and fuel handling operations (see Exhibit "D").

The

technical reports given at the third meeting covered a number of topics,

including organizational improvements, significant events and error
reduction programs, performance of the steam dump valves, reliability
centered maintenance ("RCM"), employee performance assessments, the
installation of the sixth diesel generator at the plant and PG&E's
radiological effluent program (Exhibit "E").

At the recent Safety

Committee meeting this past October, the requested presentations on
plant operations included the status of the refueling outage, a summary
of the recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance ("SALP")
Report from the NRC, pipe cracking experience and resolution, and PG&E's
pipe erosion and corrosion control program (Exhibit "F").
I believe it is worthwhile to note that in its four meetings to
date, the Safety Committee has received over sixteen (16) hours of
technical presentations on safety-related issues concerning Diablo
Canyon.

These have been truly productive fact-finding sessions, held

in the local communities and open to the public.

These sessions have

permitted the Safety Committee - an independent panel of technically
qualified experts - to review and assess the safety of operations at
Diablo canyon, and have permitted the affected public to sit in on and
observe the process.
All of these technical presentations have been summarized by the
Safety Committee in its reports (see Exhibit

"J"

for example summary),

and also may be read in detail in the meeting transcripts.

My personal

observation has been that anyone who has attended one of these technical
presentations, or has read the transcript of such a session, could not
help but be impressed by the interest and knowledge exhibited, the
questions raised and the safety-related discussions generated by the
Safety Committee Members and consultants.

It is my opinion that these

fact-finding sessions are the real substance of the Safety Committee.
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4.

Safety committee consultants.

As authorized by the settlement

agreement, the Safety Committee has retained consultants and experts to
assist and advise it.

A review of the meeting agendas and minutes

(Exhibits "B"-"E" and "H" and "I") will show that the Committee has
contracted for the services of a geotechnical engineer to advise on
seismic issues, a board certified psychiatrist to review fitness-forduty and employee assistance programs, a metallurgical engineer, a
professor of radiology and a consulting engineer to advise on
probabilistic risk assessment ("PRA").

These experts have given oral

presentations at the public meetings of the Safety Committee (see
Exhibits "H" and "I") and their written reports have been appended to
the Committee's report on its activities (see Exhibit "L," pp. iii-iv).

s.

Plant Inspections and Other Visits.

Each of the Committee

Members has had one or more inspections of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant.

A review of Exhibit "K" at pages 8-9 will give you some

idea of the extent of the initial inspections by Members owen and
Woodson.

Chairman Owen also visited the plant site during the refueling

outage this last October.

Pages 6 and 7 of that exhibit further detail

three plant visits and two trips to PG&E headquarters by Professor
Kastenberg during fiscal year 1990-91.

He also conducted an open house

in San Luis Obispo to meet with the public and attended meetings with
the Mothers for Peace and the local Citizens for Adequate Energy.

As

noted at page 7 of Exhibit "K," a number of issues have been raised at
these meetings which have led to further investigation and follow-up by
the Committee and its consultants (e.g., the spent fuel pool, site
emergency plan, Long Term Seismic program, low-level radiation,
psychological testing, etc.).
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6.

Safety committee Reports.

As I previously mentioned, the

settlement agreement provides that "The committee shall prepare an
annual report, and such interim report as it deems appropriate, which
reports shall include any recommendations of the committee."

At its

third meeting, in June 1991, the Safety Committee adopted an initial
interim report, concerning the first six months of its operations, from
January through June 1990.

A copy of that first report, 56 pages in

length, has been provided to this Senate Committee.

The interim report,

which identified several areas of particular review and made
recommendations regarding specific improvements, concluded that the
Safety Committee "is satisfied that Diablo Canyon Power Plant is being
operated safely."
The Committee's second report, an annual report covering fiscal
year 1990-91, was approved at its meeting in October and forwarded to
PG&E for its response.

When the written response of PG&E is received

(in mid-December), pursuant to the settlement agreement it will become
part of the Committee's report which will then be filed with the
Governor, the Attorney General, the PUC and the Energy Commission.· We
will also provide a copy to your Committee at that time.
A preview of this second annual report, which will be over 200
pages in length, can be obtained by a look at the report's index, set
forth in Exhibit "L."

As you can see, the report contains reviews,

assessments, conclusions and recommendations on numerous Diablo Canyon
issues.

A further listing of Safety Committee recommendations to PG&E

can be seen in Exhibit "M," which is a draft of a chart prepared by a
consultant to track the various recommendations which have been made to
date.
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c.

Future Committee Activities

In response to the request that we give a summary of Committee
activities planned for the future, I can best direct you to the list
of agenda items tentatively scheduled for the Safety Committee's next
meeting in February 1992 (Exhibit "N").

The Long Term Seismic Program

will be discussed, as well as internal oversight practices, pipe
cracking and PRA.

In addition, as noted above, in determining its

future activities the Safety Committee will remain open to the
suggestions and concerns of the public regarding Diablo Canyon issues.
And finally, as noted in its two published reports, the Safety
Committee will continue to monitor and investigate any significant
items or trends adverse to the safe operation of the plant.
Conclusion.

This concludes my status report on the Diablo Canyon

Independent Safety Committee.
appear today.

Thank you again for inviting us to

I would be happy to answer any questions which you

might have.
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EXHIBIT DOCUMENTS
Referenced in Statement of
Robert R. Wellington
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee
to the
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities

December 2, 1991
Sacramento, California

INDEX OF EXHIBITS
A.

Background Resumes of the Independent Safety Committee
Members.

B.

Example List of Documents Received by the DCISC.

c.

Notice of Meeting and Agenda for DCISC Public Meeting
on May 22, 1990.

D.

Notice of Meeting and Agenda for DCISC Public Meeting
on November 8-9, 1990.

E.

Notice of Meeting and Agenda for DCISC Public Meeting
on June 6, 1991.

F.

Notice of Meeting and Agenda for DCISC Public Meeting
on October 10, 1991.

G.

Display ads for Public Meeting on June 6, 1991.

H.

Minutes of the Second Meeting of the DCISC on November
8-9, 1991.

I.

Minutes of the Third Meeting of the DCISC on June 6, 1991.

J.

Discussion of PG&E Technical Presentations at Second DCISC
meeting (section from draft of 1990-91 Annual Report.

K.

Committee Member Site Visits and Related Activities (section
from draft of 1990-91 Annual Report).

L.

Index from draft DCISC 1990-91 Annual Report on Safety of
Diablo Canyon Operations.

M.

Draft of DCISC staff report/graph on Committee Recommendations.

N.

Tentative Agenda for Fifth DCISC Public Meeting in San Luis
Obispo on February 5-6, 1992.

o.

Petition by San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace to Modify
Decision Nos. 88-12-083 and 89-03-062.

P.

Response and Protest of DCISC to Petition.

Q.

Opinion and Order of California Public Utilities Commission,
Denying Petition.

BACKGROUND RESUMES

OF
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
William E. Kastenberq. In September 1989 Governor George DeukmeJ1an appointed UCLA nuclear engineering professor William E. Kastenberg to a one-year term on the DCISC. William Kastenberg received his
BS and MS in Engineering from UCLA and his PhD in Nuclear Engineering
from the University of California, Berkeley.
Upon graduation, he
joined the faculty at UCLA where he is currently Professor of Engineering and Applied Science. Dr. Kastenberg has taught courses in
nuclear reactor theory, design and safety; applied mathematics; thermodynamics and heat transfer; energy transfer; energy technology and
environmental risk. His research interests include nuclear reactor
safety and risk-benefit studies. Professor Kastenberg has studied the
potential safety and environmental problems of other nuclear energy
systems including laser and magnetically confined fusion, fusion-fission hybrids and electronuclear breeders.
Professor Kastenberg spent a sabbatical year at the Nuclear Research Center in Karlsruhe, West Germany (1972-1973) and a sabbatical
year as a Senior Fellow with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, USNRC (1979-1980). He has published papers on severe accident mitigation systems for LWRs, on value-impact assessment for decay
heat removal systems in LWRs and on the allocation of safety goals for
LMRs. More recently he has been applying risk analysis techniques of
problems associated with toxic waste control with emphasis on metal
emissions from incinerators and ground water contamination. The latter involves volatile organic compounds and pesticides.
Professor Kastenberg has won distinguished teaching awards from
the Engineering Graduate Students Association at UCLA and the American Society for Engineering Education.
He was appointed Assistant
Dean for Graduate studies in the School of Engineering and Applied
Science (1981-1985) and Chairman of the Mechanical, Aerospace and Nuclear Engineering Department (1985-1988) at UCLA. Dr. Kastenberg has
served as Chairman of the Nuclear Reactor Safety Division of the ANS,
on two National Research Council Committees related to nuclear reactor
safety, and was Chairman of the NRC Peer Review Committee for the
first draft of NUREG-115 o, "The Reactor Risk Reference Document. "
Professor Kastenberg was a member of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear
Facility Safety to the DOE and a member of the Special Review Committee which reviewed the second draft of NUREG-1150.
In July of 1990 Professor Kastenberg was reappointed by the Governor to a new three-year term on the DCISC. Professor Kastenberg was
the first DCISC Chairman, serving until June 30, 1991.

Warren H. owen.
In December of 1989, Warren H. Owen was appointed to a three-year term as the second member of the DCISC by the
Chairman of the California Energy Commission. Mr. Owen was elected
Chairman of the DCISC in June 1991 for one year. Mr. owen is Executive Vice-President of Duke Power Company in Charlotte, North Carolina, where he is responsible for power group operations.
In this
capacity he directs all electric power production activities (plant
design, construction and operation) as well as related technical and
information services for the company.
Mr. Owen graduated from Clemson University with a Bachelor of
Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering. He joined Duke Power in
1948 as an engineer in the steam Production Department. He was named
Vice-President of the Design Engineering Department in 1971;
and
Senior Vice-President, Engineering and Construction in 1978. He was
also elected to the Board of Directors and Executive Committee in
1978. He was promoted to Executive Vice-President, Engineering and
Construction, in 1982, and Executive Vice-President, Engineering, Construction and Production, in 1984. He was named to his present position in 1988.
Under Mr. owen's leadership, Duke Power's fossil and nuclear generating plants have achieved one of the industry's highest levels of
operating performance and efficiency. Duke Power has had the number
one fossil generating system in the country for the past seventeen
years and finishes high in total generating efficiency, both nuclear
and fossil each year. Mr. owen's involvement in the design and construction of power plants led to placing in operation 14,295 megawatts
of productive capacity, half of which is comprised of seven nuclear
units. Mr. Owen is now directing the company's efforts toward completion of four pumped-storage hydroelectric units with a combined capacity of 1,000 megawatts.
Mr. owen is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and
a Fellow in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. He is also
a member of the American Nuclear Society, North Carolina Society of
Engineers, Professional Engineers of North carolina and the National
Society of Professional Engineers.
In 1981, Mr. owen received the Clyde A. Lilly, Jr. Award from the
Atomic Industrial Forum for managing recovery efforts following the
accident at Three-Mile Island;
in 1984, the Award for Outstanding
Engineering Achievement presented by the North Carolina Society of
Engineers; and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers' James
N. Landis Medal in 1987 for outstanding contributions to the electric
industry in the management of design, construction and operation of
one of the nation's best and most efficient nuclear power generating
systems. In December 1988, he received an Honorary Doctor of Law Degree from Clemson University.

Herbert H. Woodson. In March 1991 the California Attorney General appointed Herbert H. Woodson to the DCISC for both the then unexpired term through the end of the fiscal year and for a three-year
term commencing July 1, 1991. Dr. Woodson holds the titles of Dean,
College of Engineering, Ernest H. Cockrell Centennial Chair in Engineering, Dean's Chair for Excellence in Engineering, and Director,
Bureau of Engineering Research, The University of Texas at Austin.
Dr. Woodson graduated from high school in Lubbock, Texas, served
in the u.s. Navy during World War II, and then attended Massachusetts
Institute of Technology where he received his Bachelor of Science and
Master of Science degrees in 1952, and Doctor of Science degree in
1956, all in Electrical Engineering. He served as a faculty member
in Electrical Engineering at M.I.T. from 1956 to 1971, holding the
position of Philip Sporn Professor of Energy Processing from 1967 to
1971. He was the founder in 1968 and first Director of the Electric
Power systems Engineering Laboratory at M.I.T. from 1968 to 1971.
In 1971, he joined the faculty in Electrical Engineering at The
University of Texas at Austin. From 1971 to 1081 he served as Chairman of the department, from 1974 to 1988 he was Director of the Center
for Energy Studies, and from 1982 to 1988 he was Director ad interim
of the Center for Fusion Engineering. From 1980 to 1982 he was Texas
Atomic Energy Research Foundation Professor of Engineering, and since
1982 he has occupied the Ernest H. Cockrell Centennial Chair in Engineering. He served as Associate Dean for Development and Planning in
1986-1987, served as Acting Dean of Engineering from September 1, 1987
to July 5, 1988, and on that date he was appointed Dean of Engineering.
Dr. Woodson is the co-author of two textbooks, the holder of six
patents, and the author of numerous technical articles. He has been
a consultant for a number of companies and has served on several advisory panels for government and industry. He served as president of
the IEEE Power Engineering Society 1978-1980, from 1983 to 1986, as
Chairman of the Energy Engineering Board of the National Research
council, and 1987-1989 as Chairman of the Advisory council of the
Electric Power Research Institute. He is a member of the National
Academy of Engineering, a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, a Registered Professional Engineer in Texas and
Massachusetts, and a member of a number of professional and honorary
organizations.
In 1978 he received the Power Engineering Educator
Award from the Edison Electric Institute, in 1984 he received the
Nikola Tesla Award and a Centennial Medal, both from IEEE, in 1988 he
was named Engineer of the Year by the Texas Society of Professional
Engineers, and in 1990 he was named Engineer of the Year by the National Institute of Professional Engineers and Outstanding Power Engineering Educator by the IEEE Power Engineering Society.
Dr. Woodson served during 1979 and 1980 as a consultant to the
Texas Utilities Company as a member of the Comanche Peak Design Review Team which participated in a detailed review of the engineering
design of the Comanche Peak nuclear generating units following the

accident at Three-Mile Island.
The purpose of the review was to
examine the possibilities of a similar accident at Comanche Peak to
make recommendations for changes that would make such an accident much
less likely and to mitigate the effects if such an accident should
occur. Since 1980, he has served as a consultant to the Gulf States
Utilities Company as a member of the Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee
(NSAC) which has three to four regular meetings per year in which many
different technical aspects of the River Bend nuclear generating unit
are examined in detail and recommendations made to improve performance
and safety. During the design and construction phase of the project,
the NSAC met regularly with design engineers to review the details of
a variety of plant systems to assure that designs were technically
sound. When the River Bend unit began operating, the Committee was
augmented with operational experience, and it continued to examine
technical aspects of the plant operation. The Committee has examined
root cause analyses of scrams and other reportable events, and it has
examined maintenance problems, testing problems and engineering redesigns for improved performance and safety.
From 1984 to 1987, Dr. Woodson served as a consultant to the
Houston Lighting and Power Company as a member of the South Texas
Project Engineering Assurance Oversight Committee which participated
in a detailed review of the engineering design of the South Texas
Project nuclear generating units.

List of Documents
A.

Diablo Canyon Monthly Operating Report (May 15, 1991:
June 15, 1991; July 15, 1991)

B.

License Amendment Requests (LARs)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6•
7.
8.

c.

91-01 and 91-02, Additional Information,
3 , 1991
91-04, May 23, 1991
Approval of LAR 90-05, May 23, 1991
91-05, June 5 , 1991
91-06, June 5 , 1991
90-12, Additional Information, June 20, 1991
Approval of LAR 90-10, June 26, 1991
Approval of LAR 90-09, June 27, 1991

Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

D.

LAR
May
LAR
NRC
LAR
LAR
LAR
NRC
NRC

LER
LER
LER
LER
LER
LER
LER

LER
LER
LER
LER
LER

1-84-044-01, April 2 , 1991
2-90-009-01, April 3 1 1991
1-91-004-00, April 8, 1991
1-91-005-00, April 19, 1991
2-88-027-00, April 24, 1991
1-91-006-00, April 25, 1991
1-91-002-01, May 17, 1991
1-91-007-00, May 21, 1991
1-91-008-00, May 23, 1991
l-91-009-00, June 17, 1991
1-91-010, June 17, 1991
2-90-002-02, June 18, 1991

Inspection Reports/Notices of Violation (IRs/NOVs)
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

PG&E Letter DCL-91-072, Reply to Notice of
IR 90-30, April 1, 1991
IR 91-05, April 5, 1991
IR 91-03, April 11, 1991
IR 91-06, April 11, 1991
IR 91-08, April 15, 1991
IR 91-09 (Augmented Inspection), April 19,
PG&E Event Investigation Report 91-2
PG&E Letter OCL-91-113, Reply to NOV in IR
May 3, 1991
PG&E Letter DCL-91-127, Reply to NOV in IR
May 10, 1991
IR 91-10, May 31, 1991
IR 91-12, June 25, 1991
IR 91-17, June 28, 1991

Deviation in

1991; and
91-03,
91-04,

.....
1:"

Information Notices (INs)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5•
o.

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
F.

91-25,
91-26,
91-27,
91-28,
91-29,
91-31,
91-32,
91-33,
91-34,
91-35,
91-36,
91-37,
9l-38,
91-40,
91-41,
91-42,

April 1, 1991
April 2 , 1991
April 10, 1991
April 15, 1991
April 15, 1991
May 9, 1991
May 15, 1991
May 31, 1991
June 3 , 1991
June 7, 1991
June 10, 1991
June 10, 1991
June 13, 1991
June 19, 1991
June 27, 1991
June 271 1991

Inspection And Enforca~ent Bulletins (IE Bulletins) and
Generic Letters (GLs)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

G.

IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN

GL 91-04, April 2, 1991
GL 91-05, April 9, 1991
NRC Letter on PG&E Response to GL 90-03, April 24, 1991
GL 91-06, April 29, 1991
GL 91-07, May 2, 1991
GL 91-08, May 6, 1991

Miscellaneous
1.
2.
3.
4.

s.
6.
7.

a.
9.

10.

NRC Letter on Closeout of Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Analysis Issue for DCPP, April 3, 1991
NRC Letter on Performance Indicators for DCPP for
Fourth Quarter 1990, April 12, 1991; and for First
Quarter 1991, June 24, 1991
Special Report 91-03, April 17, 1991
PG&E Letters DCL-91-096 and OCL-91-164, Status of Court
Order, April 24 and June 28, 1991
PG&E Letter DCL-91-098, Annual Radiological
Environmental Operating Report, April 25, 1991
PG&E Letter DCL-91-106, Annual Non-Radiological
Environmental Operating Report, April 29, 1991
PG&E Letter DCL-91-112, IST Relief Request, May 3, 1991
NRC Letter on Summary of Fitness-For-duty Experience,
May 9, 1991
PG&E Letter DCL-91-132, IST Program Relief Request Pump Bearing, May 17, 1991
PG&E Letter DCL-91-138, Emergency Preparedness Field
Exercise Scenario Manual (without enclosure confidential}, May 22, 1991

G.

Miscellaneous (Continued)
11.
12.
13.
14.

NRC Letter on issuance of Supplemental DCPP Safety
Evaluation Report (without enclosure - furnished
separately), June 6, 1991
PG&E Letter DCL-91-153, Containment Integrated Leak
Rate Test, June 13, 1991
NRC Letter on Fitness-For-Duty Inspection for DCPP,
June 17, 1991
Recent News Articles on Diablo Canyon

NOTICE OF MEETING
OF THE
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on May 22, 1990, at the Grange
Hall, 2880 South Broad Street, San Luis Obispo, California, a
public meeting will be held by the Diablo Canyon Independent
Safety Committee. The Committee, with one member now appointed
by the Governor and one by the Chairman of the California Energy
Corrmission, was established by an agreement approved by the California Public Utilities Commission Decision 88-12-083 to review
the safety of operations at Pacific Gas & Electric Company's Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, and will conduct its initial
meeting in three separate sessions, at the times indicated, to
consider the following matters:
1. Morning Session - 9:30 A.M. to 12:00 Noon: Selection
of Chair and Vice-Chair; introductory comments; approve indemnification agreement and contracts with accounting firm and legal
counsel; adopt Committee policies and procedures for operation;
Committee member reports on plant inspection tours and documents
provided; and public comments. If time permits the afternoon
technical presentations may be started in this morning session.
2. Afternoon Session- 1:30 P.M. to 5:00P.M.: Consider
various technical presentations requested by the Committee from
PG&E on topics relating to plant operations.
(These may commence
in the morning session.)
3. Evening Session- 7:30P.M. to 10:00 P.M.: Public comments and communications to the committee. If time permits, the
Committee will conclude its initial meeting with a wrap-up discussion by the members concerning actions the Committee may wish
to take next, further information it may want to obtain or review,
consultants or experts it may retain, and the scheduling of future site visits, study sessions and meetings. If there is not
adequate time for these matters, NOTICE IS HEREBY FURTHER GIVEN
that the Committee may elect to continue these concluding discussions and reschedule them for a fourth session to be held the
following morning, on Wednesday, May 23, 1990, at the Grange
Hall, at a time to be announced by the Committee prior to the adjournment of the public meeting on the evening of the 22nd and
posted immediately thereafter.
The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and
materials regarding these items will be available for public review commencing Friday, May 18, 1990, at the Documents and Maps
Department of the Cal Poly library in San Luis Obispo. For further information prior to the public meeting, please contact
Robert Wellington, Committee Legal Counsel, 505 Abrego Street,
Monterey, California; telephone: (408) 373-8733. Written statements or communications to the Committee which are received at
the foregoing address by no later than May 15, 1990, will be
placed into the Committee's agenda packets prior to its meeting.
Dated:

May 9, 1990

NOTE: This notice was mailed to you because your name was
on a service list provided to the Committee by the P.U.C. relating to Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant rate proceedings. If
you wish to receive future notices of Committee meetings, pursuant to Government Code §11125, please so notify the Committee
Legal counsel in writing at the above address.

DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
Committee Members:

William Kastenberg
Warren Owen

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
A G E N D A
Tuesday, May 22, 1990
San Luis Obispo, California

The Grange Hall
2880 South Broad Stree

Morning Session - 9:30 A.M. to 12:00 Noon
I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.

CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL
NOMINATION & SELECTION OF CHAIR AND VICE-CHAIR
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
A.

History of Committee Formation - Legal Counsel

B.

Introduction, Background & Comments - Committee Members

CONSENT AGENDA

(Routine items which the Committee can approve
with a single motion and vote. A member may
request that any item be placed on the regular
agenda for separate consideration.)

A.

Contract with Accounting Firm - Ratify

B.

Contract with Legal Counsel - Ratify

c.

Member Indemnification Agreement - Ratify

D.

Committee Policies and Procedures re:
1)

Committee Organization;

2)

Accounting Procedures;

3)

Reimbursement for Travel and Other Expenses.

and

ACTION ITEMS
A.

Committee Policies and Procedures re:
1)

Rules and Procedures for Conduct of meetings;
and

2)

Communications to the Committee.

VI.

VII.
VIII.
IX.

X.

COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS
A.

Member Plant Inspection Tours

B.

Documents Provided to the Committee

STA~F-CONSULTANT

REPORTS

CORRESPONDENCE
PUBLIC COMMENTS

(Oral communications on Committee matters,
limited to 5 minutes per speaker. No action will be taken on matters raised, but
they may be referred to further study, response or action.)

ADJOURN MORNING SESSION

(If time permits the afternoon technical presentations may be started
in the morning session.)

Afternoon Session - 1:30 to 5:00 P.M.
XI.
XII.

RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION - ROLL CALL
INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
A.

XIII.

(May commence in the
morning.)

Technical Presentations requested by the Committee
of PG&E Representatives:
1)

Introductory Remarks.

2)

Overview of DCPP/NPGBU Organization and Operations.

3)

Planned-Operational Improvements and 1-iodifications.

4)

Training Programs.

5)

Maintenance Programs.

6)

NRC Issues and Assessments.

ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION

Evening Session - 7:30 to 10:00 P.M.
XIV.
XV.

RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION - ROLL CALL
PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

(Oral communications on
Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per
speaker. No action will
be taken on matters
raised, but they may be
referred for further
study, response or action.)

XVI.

XVII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
A.

Future Actions by the Committee.

B.

Further Information to Obtain/Review.

c.

Retaining of Experts or Consultants.

D.

Scheduling of Future Site Visits, Study Sessions
and Meetings.
(NOTE: If the Committee so elects,
---it may continue these concluding discussions to a
Fourth Session to be held
on the morning of May 23,
1990, at the Grange Hall,
at a time to be announced
prior to adjournment of the
Evening Session.)

ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING

NOTICE OF MEETING
OF THE
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on November 8 and 9, 1990, at the
San Luis Obispo City-County Library Community Room, 995 Palm
Street, San Luis Obispo, California, a public meeting will be held
by the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee. The Committee
was established by an agreement approved by the California Public
Utilities commission Decision 88-12-083 to review the safety of
operations at Pacific Gas & Electric Company • s Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant, and will conduct its second meeting in three
separate sessions, at the times indicated, to consider the
following matters:
1.
Afternoon Session (11/8) - 3:00 P.M.:
Introductory
comments; approve minutes of May 22, 1990, meeting; ratify
consulting agreements; approve revised rules and procedure for
conduct of meetings;
Committee members and staff-consultant
reports; P. G. & E. plant status report; and a study session to
permit the committee members to work on a draft of a Committee
report.

2. Evening Session (11/8) -7:30P.M.:
communications to the Committee.

Public comments and

3.
Mornina Session (11/9) - 9:00 A.M.:
Consider various
technical presentations requested by the committee from P. G. & E.
on topics relating to plant operations
(including outage
management, training programs, fuel handling operations, and
fitness for duty); public comments; and scheduling of future site
visits and meetings.
The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and
materials regarding these items will be available for public review
commencing Monday, November 5, 1990, at the NRC Public Document
Room of the Cal Poly Library in San Luis Obispo.
For further
information prior to the public meeting, please contact Robert
Wellington,
Committee Legal Counsel, 857 Cass Street, Suite D,
Monterey, California, 93940; telephone: 1-800-439-4688. Written
statements or communications to the Committee which are received
at the foregoing address by no later than November 1, 1990, will
be placed into the Committee's agenda packets prior to its meeting.
Dated:

October 26, 1990

DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
Committee Members:

William Kastenberg
Warren Owen

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
AG E N DA

Thursday, November 8th and
Friday, November 9th, 1990
San Luis Obispo, California

City-county Library
Community Room
995 Palm

Afternoon session (11/8) - 3:00 P.M.

I.
II.

CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL
CONSENT AGENDA (Routine items which the Committee can
approve with a single motion and vote. A member may
request that any item be placed on the regular agenda
for separate consideration.)
A.
B.
c.
D.

III.

VI.
VII.
VIII.

-Approve

Revisions to Committee Policy No. 4,
Rules and Procedures for Conduct of Meetings -Approve

COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION
A.
B.
c.

V.

-Approve
- Ratify
- Ratify

ACTION ITEMS
A.

IV.

Minutes of May 22, 1990 Meeting
Consulting Agreement with Engineer F. Wardell
Consulting Agreement with H. Cass, M.D.
Revision to Committee Policy No. 5,
Communications to the Committee

Site Visits and Other Related Activities
Issues Raised at Last Meeting
Documents Provided to the Committee

STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS
CORRESPONDENCE
PLANT STATUS REPORT (from P. G. & E.)
STUDY SESSION (At which time the Committee Members and
their consultants will discuss and work upon a draft of
a Committee report.)
(Continued . . • )

IX.

ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION

Evening session
X.
XI.
XII.

XIII.

(11/8) - 7:30 P.M.

RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS (by Committee Members)
PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications
on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker.
No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may
be referred for further study, response or action.)
ADJOURN EVENING SESSION

Morning session (11/9) - 9:00 A.M.
XIV.
XV.

RECONVENE FOR MORNING SESSION
INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
A.

XVI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
A.
B.

c.

XVII.

Technical Presentations requested by the
Committee of P. G. & E. Representatives:
1) outage Management; 2R3 outage Experience
2) Training Programs (Emphasis on Operator Training)
3) Fitness-for-Duty
4) Fuel Handling Operations

Future Actions by the Committee
Further Information to Obtain/Review
Scheduling of Future Site Visits,
Study Sessions and Meetings.

ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING.

NOTICE OF MEETING
OF THE
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on June 6, 1991, at the South
Coast Regional Center, 800 W. Branch, Arroyo Grande, California, a
public meeting will be held by the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety
committee. The Committee was established by an agreement approved
by the California Public Utilities Commission Decision 88-12-083 to
review the safety of operations at Pacific Gas & Electric Company's
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, and will conduct its third
meeting in three separate sessions, at the times indicated, to
consider the following matters:
1.
Morning Session
9:00 A.M.:
Opening comments;
introduction of new Committee member; approve minutes of November
8-9, 1990, meeting; ratify indemnification agreement and consulting
agreements; consider and adopt Committee Interim Report on Safety
of Operations; Committee member and staff-consultant reports; and
public comments.
If time permits, the afternoon technical
presentations may be started in this morning session.
2. Afternoon Session- 1:30 P.M.: Consider various technical
presentations requested by the Committee from PG&E on topics
relating to plant operations,
including NPG organizational
improvements, plant status and refueling schedule, reliability
centered maintenance, employee assistance program/psychological
screening/behavioral observation program, sixth diesel generator
installation, personnel errors and radiation releases.
3.
Evening Session
7:30 P.M.:
Public comments and
communications to the Committee; wrap-up discussion by Committee
members and scheduling of future site visits, study sessions and
meetings.
The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and
materials regarding these items will be available for public review
commencing Monday, June 3, 1991, at the NRC Public Document Room of
the Cal Poly Library in San Luis Obispo. For further information
prior to the public meeting, please contact Robert Wellington,
Committee Legal Counsel, 857 Cass Street, Suite D, Monterey,
California, 93940; telephone: 1-800-439-4688. Written statements
or communications to the Committee which are received at the
foregoing address by no later than May 28, 1991, will be placed in
the Committee's agenda packets prior to its meeting.
Dated:

May 7, 1991

DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
Committee Members:

William Kastenberg
Warren owen
Herbert Woodson

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
AGENDA
Thursday, June 6, 1991
Arroyo Grande, California

South Coast Regional Center
800 w. Branch

Morning session - 8:30 A.M.
I.
II.

CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL -

CONSENT AGENDA (Routine items which the Committee can
approve with a single motion and vote. A
member may request that any item be placed
on the regular agenda for separate
consideration.)
A.
B.
c.
D.

III.

-Approve
-Ratify
-Ratify
-Ratify

DCISC Interim Report on Safety of Diablo
Canyon Operations; January 1-June 30, 1990

-Approve

COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION
A.
B.

V.

Minutes of November 8-9 Meeting
Consulting Agreement with Geotechnical
Engineer Alfred Hendron
Consulting Agreement with Dr. Jacob
Fabrikant (Prof. of Radiology)
Consulting Agreement with Metallurgical
Engineer Michael Boldrick, PH.D.

ACTION ITEMS
A.

IV.

INTRODUCTIONS

Site Visits and Other Committee Activities
Documents Provided to the Committee

STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS
A.
B.

or. Hyla cass
Engineer Robert Lancet
(Continued • . • )

VI.

CORRESPONDENCE

VII.

PUBLIC COMMENTS

VIII.

INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
A.

Technical Presentations requested by the
Committee of P. G. & E. Representatives:
1)
2)
3)
4)

IX.

summary of Plant Performance
NPG Organization Improvements
Significant Events/Error Reduction Program
steam Dump Valve Performance

ADJOURN MORNING SESSION

Afternoon session - 1:30 P.M.
X.
XI.

RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION
INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Contd.)
5)
6)
7)
8)

XII.

Reliability Centered Maintenance
Employee Performance Assessment
Sixth Diesel Generator Installation
Radiological Effluent Program

ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION

Jveninq session - 7:30 P.M.
XIII.
XIV.

RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS (by Committee Members)

XV.

PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications
on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker.
No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may
be referred for further study, response or action.)

XVI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
A.
B.

c.

XVII.

Future Actions by the Committee
Further Information to Obtain/Review
Scheduling of Future Site Visits,
Study Sessions and Meetings.

ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING.

NOTICE OF MEETING
OF THE
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on October 10, 1991, at the San
Luis Obispo City-County Library Community Room, 995 Palm Street,
San Luis Obispo, California, a public meeting will be held by the
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee.
The Committee was
established by an agreement approved by the California Public
Utilities Commission Decision 88-12-083 to review the safety of
operations at Pacific Gas & Electric Company • s Diablo canyon
Nuclear Power Plant, and will conduct its fourth meeting in three
separate sessions, at the times indicated, to consider the
following matters:
1. Morning session-9:00A.M.: Opening comments; approve
minutes of June 6, 1991, meeting;
ratify consulting agreement;
consider and adopt Committee 1990-91 Annual Report on Safety of
Operations; discuss consultant guidelines and other administrative
matters;
Committee member and staff-consultant reports;
public
comments; and consider various technical presentations requested
by the Committee from PG&E on topics relating to plant operations,
including summary of plant performance and the plant refueling
outage status and schedule.
2. Afternoon session- 1:30 P.M.: Consider further technical
presentations from PG&E on topics relating to plant operations,
including summary of recent NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance (SALP) Report, pipe erosion/corrosion control program,
and pipe cracking experience and resolution.
3.
Evening session
7:30 P.M.:
Public comments and
communications to the committee; wrap-up discussion by Committee
members and scheduling of future site visits, study sessions and
meetings.
The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and
materials regarding these items will be available for public review
commencing Monday, october 7, 1991, at the NRC Public Document Room
of the Cal Poly Library in San Luis Obispo.
For further
information prior to the public meeting, please contact Robert
Wellington,
Committee Legal Counsel, 857 Cass Street, Suite D,
Monterey, California, 93940; telephone: 1-800-439-4688.
Dated:

September 23, 1991

DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
Committee Members:

William Kastenberg
Warren Owen
Herbert Woodson

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
AGENDA

Thursday, October 10, 1991
San Luis Obispo, California

City-county Library
Community Room
995 Palm

Morning Session - 9:00 A.M.
I.
II.

CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL
CONSENT AGENDA (Routine items which the Committee can approve with a sinqle motion and vote. A
member may request that any item be placed
on the reqular aqenda for separate considation.)

A.
B.

III.

DCISC Annual Report on Safety of
Diablo canyon Operations; July 1,
1990 - June 30, 1991

Approve

Site Visits and Other Committee Activities
Documents Provided to the Committee

STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS
A.
B.

c.
D.

Dr. J.
Robert
Ferman
Robert

Fabrikant (Radiology)
R. Lancet
Wardell
R. Wellington

VI.

CORRESPONDENCE

VII.

PUBLIC COMMENTS

VIII.

Ratify

COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION
A.
B.

V.

Approve

ACTION ITEMS
A.

IV.

Minutes of June 6, 1991 Meeting
Consulting Agreement with
Leonard J. Azzarello (re:
Probabilistic Risk Assessment)

INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
A.

Technical Presentations requested by the
committee of P.G.& E. Representatives:
l)
2)

Summary of Plant Performance
Refueling outage Status and Schedule
(Continued • • • )

IX.

ADJOURN MORNING SESSION

Afternoon session - 1:30 P.M.
X.
XI.

RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION
INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Contd.)
3)
4)
5)

XII.
XIII.

NRC Systematic Assessment of
Licensee Performance (SALP) Report
Pipe Erosion/Corrosion Control Program
Pipe Cracking Experience and Resolution

CLOSED SESSION (Pursuant to Govt. Code §11126)
ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION

Evening Session - 7:30 P.M.
XIV.
XV.

RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS (By Committee Members)

XVI.

PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications on
Committee matters, limited to 5 minutaa per speaker. No action will ba taken on matters raised, but they may be referred for further study, response or action).

XVII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
A.
B.

c.

XVIII.

Future Actions by the Committee
Further Information to Obtain/Review
Scheduling of Future Site Visits,
Study Sessions and Meetings

ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING

POBLIC MEE'tlNG
of the
DIULO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFE1
COMMI'n'EE
WheD: Tlaarsdcry, /rme 6, l99l
8:30 cr..m.

C4nunittee basiaess sessi.o1.
cmd technical preseJZtatioa:
by PCHrE oilidals 011 plcmt
operaao.as.

When:

1:30 p.m.

Thursday, June 6, 1991

1'vtJJer tec&niccz.l pnseala·
fioas by PO&£.
1:30 p.m.
Pvbli.e c:o••eats cmcl c:omJIIIUiic:rio.as to f.&e Coannitt
members.

8:30 a.m.
Committee business sessiorr.
and technicat presentations
by PG&e otflcia~s orr
p'ant operations.
1:30 p.m.
Funher technical
presentations by PG&E.
7~30

BDO W'. B.rcmc:b

p.m.

PubUc comments and
communications ta
the committee memtlers..

Where: Scuth County

Where: Soat& Cocm Begjo11czl Ce.ate

Regional Canter.
800 W. Branctr Stleet
Arroyo Grande

p1aa to atteDcl! !'or fm:ot1laJt ildoniiCI'I
Call l..aao-438-4888. A Cop! of tke ...,
.cllpDda packet may be 1"ftiwwecl Cit tke Cal 1=
~ PUlic Docam.ezat Boom.
pt._.

M I N U T E S
of the
SECOND MEETING
of the
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

Thursday, November 8, 1990
San Luis Obispo, California
I.

CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL

The second meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety
Committee was called to order by Chairman William Kastenberg at
3:00 P.M. on November 8, 1990, at the Community Room of the CityCounty Library in San Luis Obispo, California.
Roll call was
taken.
Present:
Absent:
Audience:
II.

Committee Member Warren Owen
Committee Member William Kastenberg
None.

[One Committee Member has
not yet been appointed.]

Approximately 30 to 35.

CONSENT AGENDA

Legal Counsel outlined and discussed briefly each of the
four items on the Consent Agenda, indicating that they were routine
matters which the Committee could approve with a single motion (or
remove to the regular agenda for separate consideration).
The
matters were:
a) approving the minutes of the May 22, 1990 first
meeting of the Committee;
b) ratifying the consulting agreement
for Engineer Ferman Wardell; c) ratifying the consulting agreement
with Hyla Cass, M.D.;
and d) adopting a revision to Committee
Policy No. 5, relating to Communications to the Committee.
Members of the audience, Rochelle Becker and Laurie
McDermott made some comments on and asked several questions about
the consent agenda items.
On motion by Mr. Owen, seconded by Dr. Kastenberg, the
Committee unanimously approved the Consent Agenda, Items A through

D.
III.

ACTION ITEMS

Revisions to Committee Policy No. 4. Mr. Wellington next
presented a revised version of Committee Policy No. 4, "Rules and

Procedures for conduct of Meetings," briefly discussing each of the
changes as suggested by Committee members or the public at the last
meeting and in subsequent correspondence. The changes made related
to
rules
of
decorum,
the
availability
of
reports
and
correspondence, closed sessions and the location of meetings.
Mr. owen and Mr. Kastenberg asked several questions about
the revised policy.
From the audience, Rochell.e Becker inquired
about the deleted reference to the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act
and the availability of DCISC records.
Mr. Wellington responded
that there is no determination that the DCISC is governed by the
Bagley-Keene Act. Laurie McDermott stated that when policy changes
are made it would be easier to review them if the changes were more
clearly
indicated.
Motion
was
then
made
and
seconded
(OwenfKastenberg) and unanimously approved to adopt the revisions
to Committee Policy No. 4.
IV.

COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS
A.

Site Visits and Related Activities.

Mr. Kastenberg reported on his July visit to PG&E's
headquarters in San Francisco and his review with Robert Lancet of
the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for Diablo Canyon.
He
discussed the purpose of the PRA and noted that it was state-ofthe-art.
Mr. Kastenberg also reviewed the Diablo Canyon quality
assurance program on that visit.
He then reported on the open
house he held at the San Luis Obispo library on August lOth, to
discuss matters of concern to the public. He also indicated that
he spent two days at the plant with Dr. Cass reviewing the matters
of training and substance abuse. Mr. Kastenberg reported that he
had written to CPUC President Wilk to request the appointment of a
third Committee member, and that the process for selection was
underway.
Mr. Kastenberg next noted that he and Mr. Lancet had
spent a day earlier in the week discussing spent fuel handling and
storage with PG&E staff. On September 9th he and Dr. Cass met with
a group from the Mothers for Peace and spent the following two days
at the plant.
Mr. Kastenberg indicated that he worked for five
hours on the plant simulator and spent one day observing an
operator requalification training class.
He then reported at
length on his observance on October 3rd of the community's
extensive emergency planning drill.
B.
Issues Raised at the Last Meeting.
Mr. Kastenberg
next discussed the several issues which were raised at the
Committee's last meeting which warranted further action or
discussion. Relative to the fitness-for-duty issue, the Committee
has acted to retain Dr. Cass to advise it on that matter.
On
emergency planning, the Committee will continue to observe the ongoing efforts of others specifically charged with that work. On

-2-

the seismic issues raised, the Committee will wait until the USGS
releases its report, and will then consider retaining an expert.to
assist it and schedule the matter for agenda discussion.
On the
question raised concerning a Committee presence in San Luis Obispo
County, Mr. Wellington reported that arrangements had been made to
file copies of all Committee documents at the NRC Public Document
Room at the Cal Poly library, and that the Committee had obtained
an 800 number so that toll-free calls could be made to the DCISC
from anywhere in California.
Mr. Wellington also indicated that
contact had been made with the Citizens Advisory Committee on
Emergency Services,
and the two committees will exchange
information and documents.
Comments were received from two members of the
audience that they had not been able to locate any Committee
documents at the Public Document Room. Jim Woessner, PG&E Director
of Nuclear Safety Assessment, indicated that he had also made
arrangements with the library and that PG&E had been sending to the
Public Document Room copies of all documents provided to the
Committee for the last four months.
Mr. Wellington and Mr.
Woessner stated that they would look into the matter to get it
straightened out.
V.

STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS

Robert Lancet outlined his activities in visiting PG&E
facilities, obtaining further documents and fact-finding on the
spent fuel pool issue. Dr. Hyla Cass then discussed her two days
at the plant interviewing personnel on the issues of fitness-forduty and the employment assistance program. She observed certain
psychological aspects of the accident management and drug screening
programs, and would be preparing a report for the Committee.
Consultant Ferman Wardell was then introduced by DCISC member Owen.
VI.

PLANT STATUS REPORT

PG&E President George Maneatis made some opening
comments on the report to update the Committee on Diablo Canyon
operations, noting that the NRC had given PG&E a high rating in its
SALP report. Jim Shiffer then continued with a broad overview of
the plant operations during 1990.
(The text of all PG&E technical
presentations, as well as that of the balance of the DCISC meeting,
is contained on a transcript of the proceedings.)
Considerable
information was presented and numerous questions were asked by the
Committee members and consultants.
VII.

STUDY SESSION

The Committee next conducted a study session to
consider and discuss the preparation of its first report, to cover
the period from January 1 through June 30, 1990.
The Committee
members and consultants each mentioned the section of the report

they were working on and the status of preparation.
When the
various sections are put together it will be submitted as a draft
for final review and adoption at the next DCISC meeting.
VIII.

ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION

The afternoon session of the Committee meeting was
adjourned at 5:45 P.M.
IX.

RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION

Chairman Kastenberg reconvened the DCISC meeting for
its evening session at 7:40 P.M. Approximately 45 people were in
attendance.
X.

PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Audience member Roger Freeburg spoke to the Committee,
indicating his concern for public safety and his support of drug
testing programs. Jacqueline Wheeler stated she had problems with
obtaining documents at Cal Poly, expressed some problems with the
DCISC's 800 number as presently set up, asked about a Committee
office in San Luis Obispo and had some questions of Dr. Cass'
resume. committee discussion on these matters followed. Rochelle
Becker indicated some problems with reviewing the meeting
transcript, inquired about emergency planning and urged the
Committee to contact the USGS on the long-term seismic issue.
Laurie McDermott questioned the access to documents at
the Public Document Room, requested that the 800 number be widely
advertised and asked the Committee to become involved with the
Hosgri Fault studies. Al Bohnan stated he had recently toured the
plant and was impressed with the professionalism of the staff.
Next speaking was Cordner Gibson, Dean of Agriculture, emeritus at
Cal Poly. As Chairman of the local Citizens for Adequate Energy,
he discussed a study about nuclear radiation. Walter Schroeder, a
member of the same group, stated that PG&E was a good neighbor.
The final speaker was Nancy Culver who noted that Committee
membership required the qualification of having spent a great deal
of time working in or for the nuclear power industry, and she
doubted if that made anyone independent.
She also outlined an
incident when she had called the DCISC 800 number to find out about
a containment water leal~, only to be told that the Committee would
not be in a position to provide information about daily problems at
the plant.
XI.

ADJOURN EVENING SESSION
The DCISC evening session was adjourned at 8:50 P.M.

XII.

RECONVENE FOR MORNING SESSION
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The morning session of the DCISC meeting was
reconvened on November 9 1 1990 1 at 9:00 A.M. 1 with approximately 30
people in attendance.
XIII.

INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

A. Technical Presentations requested by the Committee
of PG&E representations: Before the technical presentations began,
Jim Shiffer reported that PG&E has an active open-door policy for
employee concerns and advertises the 800 numbers of its own staff,
of the NRC and of the Committee.
Mr. Shiffer then introduced Bill McClain, who
presented an overview of the Diablo Canyon outage management
program, concentrating primarily on re-fueling outages. Questions
by the Committee members and consultants followed.
The next technical presentation was by Jim Welch,
and related to operator training issues. Following considerable
discussion and questions, the next topic was PG&E's fitness-forduty program, presented by John Townsend.
The final technical
presentation concerned the subject of fuel handling operations and
was presented by Dr. Pete Seraffian and John Gisglon.
XIV.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Chairman Kastenberg discussed the planned schedule for
DCISC meetings over the next year.
He noted that the Committee
would be working on its first report over the next few months, and
would be requesting further technical briefings from PG&E on plant
operations. Mr. Kastenberg indicated he would be discussing with
the NRC its telephone complaint lines and stated that the Committee
did not want to reproduce what the NRC is already charged with
doing. Mr. owen stated he would be working on the Committee report
and giving some preliminary consideration about review of the USGS
report when it is available.
Mr. Wellington indicated that concerns with the 800
number and the Public Document Room would be dealt with.
He
reiterated that the DCISC 800 number would not be able to provide
daily updates on plant operations, and that there were already
toll-free numbers for that information from the NRC and PG&E. He
also noted that there are certain federal requirements about what
information must be reported to the NRC, and indicated that the
Committee could not supplant the NRC in those matters. Mr. Lancet
indicated that PG&E had agreed to provide further information on
the procedures for the control of overtime by workers.
XV.

ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING

There being no further business, the second meeting of
the DCISC was adjourned at 11:45 P.M.
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MI N U T E S
of the
THIRD MEETING
of the
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
Thursday, June 6, 1991
Arroyo Grande, California
I.

CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL - INTRODUCTIONS

The third meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety
Committee was called to order by Chairman William Kastenberg at
8:30 A.M. on June 6,1991, at the South Coast Regional Center in
Arroyo Grande, California. Roll call was taken.
Present:

Committee Member Warren Owen
Committee Member William Kastenberg
Committee Member Herbert Woodson

Absent:

None.

Audience:

Approximately 30 to 35.

Mr. Kastenberg next introduced and welcomed Dr. Herbert H.
Woodson, the newest and third member of the DCISC, recently
appointed by the California Attorney General. He is the Dean of
the College of Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin.
Dr. Woodson responded and gave a brief outline of his educational
and professional background.
II.

CONSENT AGENDA

Legal Counsel outlined and discussed briefly each of the
four items on the consent Agenda, indicating that they were routine
matters which the Committee could approve with a single motion (or
remove to the regular agenda for separate consideration).
The
matters were:
a) approving the minutes of the November 8-9, 1990,
second meeting of the Committee;
b) ratifying the consulting
agreement for Geotechnical Engineer Alfred Hendron; c) ratifying
the consulting agreement with Dr. Jacob Fabrikant (Professor of
Radiology;
and
d) ratifying the consulting agreement with
Metallurgical Engineer Michael Boldrick, Ph.D.
Following a brief discussion, on motion by Mr. owen,
seconded by Dr. Woodson, the Committee unanimously approved the
Consent Agenda, Items A through D.

III.

ACTION ITEMS
Interim Report on Safety.

The draft of the Committee's

"Interim Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; January 1June 30, 1990 11 was discussed. Mr. Wellington noted that an annual
report is one of the charges of the Committee, but since the first
two DCISC Members were not appointed until late 1989 and could not
hold their initial meeting until May 1990, it was decided that the
first report would cover this interim period of January through
June.
Upon adoption, the settlement agreement provides that the
report shall be submitted to PG&E, which then has forty-five days
to respond in writing to the report, which will then be filed with
the Governor, the Attorney General, the CPUC and the Energy Commission. It was noted that a copy of the report had been previously
sent to the Public Document Room at the Cal Poly Library, where it
was available for public review.
There being no comments from the audience, motion was made
and seconded (Owen/Kastenberg) and unanimously adopted to approve
the draft report and forward same to PG&E for response.
IV.

COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS
A.

Site Visits and Related Committee Activities.

Dr. Kastenberg reported that since the last meeting in
November, he had on several occasions, with DCISC consultants, met
with PG&E representatives to discuss the reliability centered
maintenance program, the spent fuel pool, the sixth diesel proposal
and with Dr. cass, the employee assistance program. He indicated
that each of these topics would be discussed later in the meeting
by the DCISC consultant involved or a PG&E staff person. Chairman
Kastenberg also noted that he, Bob Lancet and Dr. Hyla Cass had
visited the Duke Power Nuclear Power Plant in April.
Mr. Owen then commented that although he was not
available for the previously scheduled meeting in February, he had
been following up on all consultant reports and information
available on plant operations.
Dr. Woodson next discussed his full-day tour of Diablo
canyon on May 14, 1991, including the training facilities for
maintenance and operations personnel.
B.

Documents Provided to the Committee.

Mr. Wellington discussed the foot-high stack of
documents received by the Committee during the last quarter, most
of which were technical reports from PG&E, which were supplied
pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.
He also
mentioned the correspondence received, including
1) a citizen
complaint and the NRC follow-up
and
2) a letter and attached
report on plant radiation issues. Dr. Kastenberg noted that one of
the documents received from PG&E was in response to an inquiry from
the public at the November meeting and related to a proprietary
computer program which for that reason had not been disclosed to
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the public.
V.

STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS

Dr. Hyla Cass gave reports on a February site visit to
Diablo Canyon and the tour of the Duke Power facilities in April,
with particular emphasis on employee assistance, fitness-for-duty
and management development programs. Robert Lancet next discussed
several fact-finding meetings conducted at PG&E facilities, looking
into such issues as reliability centered maintenance, spent fuel
pool safety issues, control of overtime and safety review
procedures.
Dr.
Kastenberg and consultant Ferman Wardell
participated in several of these meetings, and written reports are
being prepared on each of these topics and will be submitted for
inclusion in the 1990-91 annual report.
VI.

CORRESPONDENCE

Mr. Wellington again mentioned the correspondence received
by the DCISC, copies of which were in the agenda packet.
Dr.
Kastenberg noted that it would be best if correspondence was sent
to him care of the Legal Counsel's address, as letters sent to him
at UCLA could easily get mixed up with the great amounts of faculty
mail.
VII.

PUBLIC COMMENTS
There were no public comments from the public at this

time.
VIII.

INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

A. Technical Presentation requested by the Committee of
PG&E representatives:
PG&E President George Maneatis made some
introductory remarks and noted that 1990 was a very successful year
for Diablo Canyon.
Jim Shiffer then continued with a broad
overview of plant operations during 1990 and discussed six plant
performance indicators.
(Note:
The text of all PG&E technical
presentations, as well as that of the balance of the DCISC meeting,
is contained in a transcript of the proceedings.)
Warren Fujimoto, the newly appointed Vice President
for Nuclear Technical Services, discussed the NPG organization
improvements.
Plant Manager John Townsend next reported on two
recent significant events at the facility, a loss of off-site power
on March 7, 1991, and a reactor trip on May 17, 1991. He also discussed PG&E's error reduction program. Mr. Fujimoto then reported
on four failures of the steam dump valve system and actions taken
to resolve the problems. Considerable information was presented by
the several speakers and numerous questions were added by the DCISC
members and consultants.
IX.

ADJOURN MORNING SESSION
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The morning session of the Committee was adjourned at
11:45 A.M.
X.

RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman Kastenberg reconvened the DCISC meeting for
its afternoon session at 1:30 P.M. Approximately 30 people were in
attendance.
XI.

INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Contd.)
A.

Technical Presentations (Contd.)

Bryant Giffin. the Manager for Maintenance Services,
gave the first technical presentation of the afternoon session,
describing the history and details of the reliability centered
maintenance program.
The Diablo canyon employee assistance
counselor, Cindy Johnson, next discussed employee performance
issues with the Committee. Usama Farradj, the project manager for
the sixth diesel generator installation at Diablo Canyon, then
reported on the need for and the status of that project, and
William Goelzer outlined the project schedule. The Plant Manager
of Support Services, David Oatley, next made an extensive
presentation on Diablo Canyon's radiological effluent program.
Again, numerous questions were asked of each of the PG&E
representatives making a presentation, and considerable discussion
followed.
XII.

ADJOURN EVENING SESSION
The afternoon session of the DCISC was adjourned at 4:10

P.M.
XIII.

RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION

Chairman Kastenberg reconvened the evening session of the
DCISC at 7:30 P.M., with about 35 people in the attendance.
Introductions and opening comments were made by the Committee
Members.
XIV.

PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Audience member Cordner Gibson spoke as Chairman of the
310-member Citizens for Adequate Energy organization in the county.
He discussed the plant tours conducted by PG&E and indicated the
group members were impressed with the operating training and the
radiation protection programs.
The next speaker, Ralph Forhees,
noted that PG&E was a good neighbor and a valuable asset to the
community. A third speaker, Ted Waddell discussed a Time magazine
article on nuclear power and noted that the Diablo Canyon plant
provided power without polluting the environment. Chris Pillsbury
was the last speaker, and she stated that PG&E had assisted with
many local education efforts, that nuclear power was one of the
cleanest sources of power, and that in her opinion PG&E was
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committed to the well-being of the community.
XV.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Chairman Kastenberg discussed the schedule for DCISC
meetings during the next year, with meetings presently planned for
october 10, 1991, and February 6, June 4 and October 8, 1992. He
next noted that when he was elected Chairman in May 1990 it was
with the understanding that the chairmanship would rotate every
year among the members, and that the next item of business was to
elect a Chairman for the next fiscal year commencing July 1, 1991.
Dr. Woodson nominated Warren Owen, Dr. Kastenberg seconded the
nomination and a motion was then passed to close further
nominations, thus electing Mr. Owen. Noting that where he's from
that is called a "South Carolina election", Chairman-elect owen
then commented on the DCISC goals for the next year of
a)
completing the 1990-91 annual report by October, b) defining and
focusing the DCISC's use of consultants,
and
c) setting up a
process for establishing future actions and setting DCISC
priorities.
XVI.

ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING

There being no further business, Chairman
adjourned the third meeting of the DCISC at 9:40 P.M.

Kastenberg

1.5.2

PG&E Presentations

Introduction
PG&E President George Maneatis made a brief introduction
which focused on their commitment to and success in meeting
the PG&E corporate goal to "Operate the Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant at the highest level of safety,
reliability and performance."
Plant Performance
Jim Shiffer provided a brief overview of the plant
performance pointing out that "both units have run extremely
well in 1990." The two Unit 1 reactor trips, one manual and
10

one automatic were discussed in some detail. Unit 2 had not
experienced a trip in the current cycle. Repair of a minor
weld leak in the Unit 2 letdown line was mentioned as was
the short refueling times of 70 and 57 days for Units 1 and
2, respectively. The capacity factors since the beginning
of their last cycles were 92.6% and 91.9% for Units 1 and 2
respectively. Finally, Diablo Canyon (DC) retained its top
category rating following a 20-man, two-week INPO
evaluation.
These introductory presentations were followed by four
technical presentations requested by the Committee.
Outage Management Program
Bill McClane presented the DC Outage Management Program.
The first three refueling outages averaged around 120 days
which was about the industry average. However, this was
well in excess of their 84 day goal. PG&E decided a
substantial change was needed in their approach to
controlling refueling outages. A major study effort was
initiated. They talked to other u.s. utilities, especially
those that were doing well, the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO), Westinghouse, other contractors and
vendors, European utilities, and "anyone that had a good
idea on how to improve outage." As a result, changes were
made to improve scheduling, coordination, teamwork,
radiation exposure, and plant safety including:
1.

A dedicated full-time outage organization was
established.

2.

An Outage Control Center was established to manage
the entire outage. It was staffed 24 hours a day,
seven days a week.

3.

Critical path work was scheduled 24 hours a day,
seven days a week. Criticial path schedules were
reviewed twice a day.

4.

Better coordination through the use of 1) outage
coordinators for different parts of the plant, 2)
outage managers, and 3) team building exercises,
including sending some teams to the ROPES course.

5.

The formation of multidisciplined High Impact Teams
(HIT) which are formed six to nine months prior to
the outage. These teams have been so successful
that their number has been increased from three to
nineteen.

6.

Increased detailed scheduling down to the
availability of major cranes
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7.

More advanced planning to allow additional time for
reviews and re-reviewing

8.

Expanded management attention

The net result of this effort was a continued improvement in
the outage performance. The outage times went from about
120 days to 82 days, 70 and then 57 days. (Following this
meeting, Unit 1 was refueled in 62.3 days.)
In the future PG&E plans to focus on continued reductions in
radiation exposure, increases in plant reliability and
increases in personnel and plant safety.
Rather than try to speed up the individual operations, PG&E
appears to have appropriately taken a systems approach to
maximize the use of the available time. This approach
emphasized improved advanced planning, teamwork, focused
control, greater management involvement and continuous
effort on critical items. Whenever tight schedules are
involved, constant management attention is required to avoid
compromises in safety and reliability. The radiation
exposures may be evidence of this. Except for one point
prior to the last outage, there was a consistent increase in
radiation exposure with decreasing outage time. This trend
was dramatically changed in the last outage. The changes
made to correct this problem are described in Section 2.3.3.
The Committee will continue to closely monitor the outage
management program and its safety implications.
Operator Training Program
Jim Welsch presented the DC Operator Training Program.
The program, which employs 30 instructors, is approved by
the NRC and fully accredited by INPO. The trainees for
Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)
licenses have about a 95% record for passing their exams the
first time. This compares favorably with the industry
average of 89%. Shift Supervisor and Shift Technical
Advisor (STA) are four-year college degree positions.
Initial non-licensed operator training consists of 19 weeks
of classroom work plus five months training for each of five
watch stations. Initial SRO/RO training consists of 34
weeks of classroom work, six weeks of simulator training, 13
weeks on-the-job training and seven weeks of pre-license
preparation. All SROs are trained at the Shift Supervisor
level. Initial training for STAs is 34 weeks of classroom
work, two weeks of simulator training, and four weeks of
on-the-job training. All licensed personnel are given one
week of training every five weeks. Operators are taught to
think through the procedures as they proceed to recognize
when the plant behavior may require a deviation from the
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procedures. A formal mechanism is in place to make changes
"on the spot" which includes stopping and obtaining
appropriate approvals for procedure changes.
Annual simulator and in-plant oral exams are given as well
as biennial written exams to verify the effectiveness of the
training program. In addition, the training program is kept
current through a series of internal and external
evaluations. All design changes are routed through
training, and the program is updated accordingly.
Based on this presentation and a visit to observe training
at the plant simulator, the Committee feels that the PG&E
training program is very good. Periodic reviews will be
held to verify that the current high standards are being
maintained and that continued improvements are made.
Fitness for Duty
The PG&E Fitness for Duty Program was presented by John
Townsend. PG&E established an Employee Assistance Program
(EAP) about 20 years ago. Ten years ago, a full-time
employee assistance counselor was placed at DC. There is a
Twelve-Step Program for recovering individuals at DC which
is similar to an Alcoholics Anonymous support program. In
1982 the NRC mandated a behavioral observation program at
nuclear power plants. This was followed by a
Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) Policy in July 1986 and a rule in
January 1989 which was to be implemented by January 3, 1990.
The DCPP FFD Program complies with the NRC rule (10 CFR 26).
The key elements of this Program are:
1.

Pre-access testing for drugs and alcohol within 60
days of initial access to the protected or vital
areas of the plant or assignment to activities
associated with the emergency plan.

2.

Random unannounced testing for drugs and alcohol to
deter and detect substance abuse. The test rate is
equal to at least 100% of the work force per year.
Eligibility is continuous so that some employees will
be tested more than once per year, and some will not
be tested at all. (Note for example that at one
utility where about 2500 were subject to random
selection, 20% were tested twice, and one person was
tested seven times, while 29% were not tested at all
in that year.)

3.

For-cause testing can be invoked when individuals are
involved in accidents or when any credible information
is received that suggests that an individual is
abusing drugs or alcohol. Supervisors are trained to
recognize substance abuse problems.
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4.

A three-year Post-Rehabilitation Testing Program is
imposed on anyone who tests positive. This is a
requirement for continued employment.

~.

Sanctions include enrolling in the Post-Rehabilitation
Testing Program for the first confirmed positive test
and denial of access for a minimum of three years
following a second confirmed positive test.

5.

Positive tests are confirmed by a medical evaluation
performed by a physician.

7.

The EAP offers assessments, short-term counseling,
referral services, and monitoring of treatment.

8.

Specimen collection and analysis follow the guidelines
provided by the Department of Health and Human
Services.

Appropriate training and audits are provided in support of
the program. From January 3, 1990 to October 31, 1990
random and for cause tests resulted in nine (out of 1543
tested) and 11 (out of 1281 tested) positives for PG&E and
contractors respectively.
Committee comments on the FFD program are included in
Section 4.5, and the complete consultant's report is
provided in Exhibit B.S.
Fuel Handling Design Basis Accidents and Operations
The fuel handling operations were described by Dr. Pete
Seraffian, and the design basis accidents were covered by
John Gisclon. In preparation for fuel removal the reactor
head is removed and set down within the sealed containment.
The entire reactor cavity is filled with water up to the
operating deck. Then the upper internals are removed. Fuel
removal from the reactor vessel is only initiated after 100
hours following shutdown. This reduces the fuel assembly
decay heat load and fission product inventory in the event
of an accident. The entire core of 193 fuel assemblies is
removed one fuel assembly at a time and transferred to a
specific location in the fuel handling building. About two
thirds of these are inspected, the control rods are
shuffled, and the fuel assemblies are returned to the core
for the next cycle of operation. The remaining one third of
the fuel is inspected and placed in the spent fuel pool
(SFP). After about one year in the SFP, the decay heat has
been reduced to the point where the fuel could be cooled by
natural circulation of air alone. The remaining one third
of the core is replaced with fresh fuel. During fuel
loading, additional crew members monitor the neutron
detectors on each side of the reactor vessel to ensure a
large sub-critical margin is maintained.
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The DC fuel has operated very reliably with the number of
failures during operation varying from zero to three. ! Their
performance puts them in the upper 25% of the industry.
This performance is attributed to a good fuel supplier who
is monitored by PG&E, an emphasis on loose parts control and
housekeeping during refueling, and water chemistry control.
Inspections for debris in the vessel are limited to the
lower core plate before fuel is loaded, and the top of the
fuel prior to installation of the upper internals.
The first postulated accident discussed was the loss of
cooling to the spent fuel pool. Based on a series of very
conservative assumptions, boiling could be reached in about
two and one half hours if all cooling were lost. This
should be adequate time to provide the 90 gpm of water
required to make up for the boil off. If not, there would
be 48 hours to take action before the top of the fuel would
be exposed. Because of the several redundant sources of
makeup water, PG&E believes fuel uncovery is precluded. No
probabilistic analysis was made using best estimates of
system performance.
There are no penetrations of the pool at a significant level
below the water. Lines that bring cool water into the
bottom of the pool have vacuum breakers so that the water
cannot be siphoned out. Therefore, PG&E believes that there
is no credible loss of coolant accident.
Dropping a heavy load on the fuel in the SFP is precluded by
administrative controls which limit the weight of loads over
the SFP, restricting the cask operations and movement, and
seismically qualifying the bridge cranes and parking them
away from the SFP. Nevertheless, it was postulated that an
accident occurred such that all of the rods in one fuel
assembly were breached. In this case, it was found for both
the containment building and the fuel handling building that
the calculated doses were well within NRC 10 CFR 100
guidelines.
A brief discussion was presented of industry experience with
events which lead to water loss in the reactor cavity or the
SFP. PG&E feels that they preclude similar accidents at DC
due to design differences and strict control of leakage
paths.
The Committee concurs that the risk from fuel handling
design basis accidents appears to be acceptably small.
However, following up a concern raised by members of the
public at a previous meeting, the Committee investigated the
risk from seismic events including beyond design basis
seismic events. The results are s1mmarized in Section 4.1
with the complete consultant's report provided in Exhibit
H.l.
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1.4
1.4.1

Committee Member Site Insoection Tours
Inspections by W. E. Kastenberg

Committee Chair W. E. Kastenberg made several visits to the
site and to PG&E Headquarters in San Francisco during the
period July 1, 1990 - June 30, 1991 as follow:
July 27, 1990- To PG&E Headquarters with Mr. R. T. Lancet
(Consultant) to discuss the 6th diesel generator addition.
September 10-11, 1990 - To the plant with Dr. Hyla Cass
(Consultant) to discuss operator training, the Employee
Assistance Program and the Fitness for Duty Program. Dr.
Kastenberg spent a full day at the simulator and a second
day attending an operator regualification class.
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October 3, 1990 - To San Luis Obispo and the plant to
observe the Emergency Plan Exercise.
December 5, 1990 - To PG&E Headquarters with R. T. Lancet
to discuss the spent fuel pool.
February 12, 1991 - To the plant with R. T. Lancet and H.
Cass to discuss reliability-centered maintenance and
management training.
These meetings and visits were conducted for the purpose of
fact-finding and led to presentations by PG&E at the full
Committee public meetings. These presentations by PG&E are
summarized in Sections 1.5 and 1.6 of this report, as
appropriate.
In addition, Chairman Kastenberg met with the public as
follows:
August 10, 1990 - Open house held at the San Luis Obispo
Public Library
September 9, 1990 - Met with the Mothers for Peace in San
Luis Obispo at a member's home
November 13, 1990 - Luncheon speaker at a meeting of the
Citizens for Adequate Energy
During these meetings a number of issues were raised which
led to further investigations by the Committee and its
consultants. These issues included the following:
. The spent fuel pool with emphasis on seismic effects
. The Long-term Seismic Program
. The site emergency plan with emphasis on evacuation
. Drug and substance abuse by plant personnel
. Low-level radiation and releases
. Psychological testing of operators
. Maintenance and reliability
. Operator training
The Committee investigations regarding these issues are
discussed elsewhere in this report.
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1.4.2

Inspection by w. H. Owen

(Note: Although this inspection occurred in the previous
DCISC reporting period, it did not appear in the Interim
Report and is included here for completeness.)
DCISC Member Warren H. Owen visited the Diablo Canyon Power
Plant on May 4, 1990 to become familiar with the plant type
and layout, procedures and policies and personnel. A plant
tour consisted of the following:
. Training Building and Maintenance Training Facilities
. Inside Protected Area, including Turbine Deck, Control
Room, Cable Spreading Room, Electrical Rooms, Main
Feedwater Pumps, and Unit 2 Diesel Generators
. Administration Building, including Computer Center and a
PIMS Demonstration
. Outside Protected Area consisting of Warehouse, Cold
Machine Shop, Technical Support Center, and I&C
Maintenance Building
. Auxiliary Building, including Access Control, RHR Pumps,
Containment Spray Pumps, Charging Pumps, Component
Cooling Water Pumps, Safety Injection Pumps, Auxiliary
Feedwater Pumps, & Spent Fuel Pool
Discussions and presentation during the visit consisted of
the following:
. ?G&E and DCPP Organization
. DCPP History
. Plant Operating Experience, including Achievements &
Significant Events
. Goals
. Strengths
. Performance Improvement Initiatives
The major areas PG&E was targeting for improved performance
were reactor trips, industrial safety, outage duration,
engineering/plant interface, communications, and radiation
exposure. Performance improvement initiatives had begun in
the areas of personnel errors, valve/equipment alignment,
configuration management, professionalism and maintenance.
Facility improvements planned were increased space for
training, warehouse, machine shop, telecommunications and
medical functions. Major plant equipment enhancements
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consisted of improvements/additions of a digital feedwater
system, plant process computer, sixth diesel generator,
radiation monitor system, and digital engineered safety
systems ~nstrumentation.
1.4.3

:nspection by Herbert Woodson

DCISC member Herbert H. Woodson visited the Diablo Canyon
Power Plant on May 14, 1991 to become more familiar with the
plant, the organization and people responsible for its
operation and maintenance, its operating history, and the
PG&E goals and expectations for the plant. Presentations
dur~ng ~hat visit included:
. ?G&E and DCPP organization
. DCPP history and plant description
. Regulatory and generation performance and performance
indicators for important parameters
. Public and industrial safety
. Cost competitiveness
. Human resources
. Management enhancements
. Significant operational events such as loss of offsite
power, stuck-open pressurizer spray valve, piping weld
cracks, steam dump valve failures and auxiliary
saltwater system degradation
During the formal presentations there was extended
discussion of how the plant staff was organized, who gets
formal ~raining and how much, and how responsibility was
determined and exercised. There was also extended
discussion of where emphasis will be placed to achieve
improved performance as described in PG&E's goals for the
future.
The plant tour included visits to:
. The protected area (but not Radiologically
Controlled Areas)
. The warehouse
. The operator training facilities
. The maintenance training facilities, especially the
facilities for hands-on training

9

OPEN HOUSE
for
PUBLIC INPUT
to
DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT
SAFETY COMMiftEE
. WHO: Meet with Prof. William Kastenberg fram UCLA,
member and farmer Chairman of the OCISC.

.

WHERE• Conference Room at the San Luis Obispo
• City-County Ubrory, 995 Palm Street

WHEN: Tuesday, July 16th 2:00 to 5:00 p.m. and 7:00
to 9:00p.m.

WHAT• To receive your thoughts and conc:ems about
• saiety-retated issues at the Diablo Canyon
Nudear Power Plant.

l
I

p;

.....................................)
I

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety C0111lti.ttee
Annual Repor~ on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations
July 1, 1990 - June 30, 1991
Volume I - Main Report
1.0

Introduction

1

1.1

Formation of Independent Safety Committee

1

1.2

Appointmen~

1.3

Documents Provided to the DCISC

6

1.4

Committee Member Site Inspection Tours

6

1.4.1

Inspections by William Kastenberg

6

1.4.2

Inspection by warren OWen

8

1.4.3

Inspection by Herbert Woodson

9

1.5

1.6

2.0

of Committee Members

2

November 8-9, 1990 Public Meeting

10

1.5.1

Committee Business

10

1.5.2

PG&E Presentations

10

1.5.3

Public Comments

16

June 6, 1991 Public Meeting

17

1.6.1

Committee Business

~

1.6.2

PG&E Presentations

17

1.6.3

Public Comments

27

...

..:.. I

Summary of Diablo Canyon Operations

28

2.1

PG&E/DCPP Organization

28

2.2

Summary of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operations

28

i

Page
2.]

3.0

29

2. 3 .1

Capacity Factor

29

2.3.2

Refueling Outage Duration

30

2. 3. 3

Collective Radiation Exposure

30

2.3.4

Industrial Safety Lost Time Accident Rate

31

2.3.3

Unplanned Reactor Trips

32

2.3.6

Unplanned Safety System Actuations

34

2.3.7

Secondary Chemistry Index

35

2.3.8

Fuel Reliability

35

NRC Assessments and Issues

37

3.1

Summary of Licensee Event Reports

37

3.1.1

Discussion

37

3.1.2

DCISC Evaluation & Recommendations

38

3.2

3.3

3.4

4.0

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Performance Indicators

Inspection Reports

39

3.2.1

Discussion

39

3.2.2

DCISC Evaluation & Recommendations

42

Enforcement Actions

42

3.3.1

Discussion

42

3.3.2

DCISC Evaluation & Recommendations

43

Industry and Generic Issues

43

3.4.1

Discussion

43

3.4.2

DCISC Evaluation and Recommendations

43

DCISC Review and Assessments

45

4.1

Review of DCPP Spent Fuel Pool Safety
Issues

45

4.2

Review of PG&E Control of Overtime

46

4.3

Review of DCPP Reliability Centered
Maintenance

47

ii

4.4

Review of PG&E Safety Committee Review
Process

49

4.5

Review of PG&E Employee Assistance Program
and Fitness for Duty Program

51

4.6

Review of Management Development Program

53

4.7

Review of 6th Diesel Installation

53

4.8

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

54

4.9

Review of Emergency Drill

56

4.10 Visit to Duke Power

58

5.0

Public Input

59

6.0

Conclusions and Recommendations

60

7.0

PG&E Response

63
Volume II - Exhibits

A.

Example List of Documents Received by the DCISC

A-1

B.

DCISC Notice for the November 7-8, 1990 Public Meeting

B-1

c.

Agenda for the November 7-8, 1990 Public Meeting

C-1

D.

DCISC Notice for the June 6, 1991 Public Meeting

D-1

E.

Agenda for the June 6, 1991 Public Meeting

E-1

F.

PG&E Corporate Organization Chart {Nuclear) and Nuclear
Technical Services

F-1

G.

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Organization Chart

G-1

H.

Committee Member/Consultant Reports
H.l

Review of DCPP Spent Fuel Safety Issues

H.l-1

H.2

Review of PG&E Control of Overtime

H.2-l

H.3

Review of the DCPP Reliability Centered
Maintenance Program

H.3-l

H.4

Review of PG&E Safety Committee and Experience
Evaluation Activities

H.4-l

iii

!.

H.S

Review of PG&E Employee Assistance Program and
Fitness for Duty Program

H.S-1

H.6

Review of PG&E Management Training Program

H.6-1

H.7

Review of 6th Diesel Installation

H.7-1

H.8

Review of Diablo Canyon Probabilistic Risk
Assessment

H.8-1

H.9

Review of 1990 Emergency Plan Exercise

H.9-l

H.lO Trip Report on Visit to Duke Power (Lancet)

H.l0-1

H.ll Site Visit to Duke Power Company (Cass)

H.ll-1

Glossary of Terms and Definitions

iv

I-1

1991

October ;
~

---~·-·····--·····-····--------

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
I tea

I

Reco-ndation

Reference

1

Substantially increase emphasis on timely resolution
of problems.

1990 AR (2.4.1.2, 4.0)

2

Provide needed attention to quality of health
physics and work practices during outages.

1990 AR (2.4.2.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

3

Provide tiaely and effective actions needed to
correct root causes of problems.

1990 AR (2.4.2.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

4

Improve understanding of design bases by aaintenance
and operating staffs.

1990 AR (2.4.3.2, 4.0)

5

Provide management emphasis and oversight to reduce
overtime during outages

1990 AR (2.4.3.2, 4.0)

6

Improve escalation of problems to appropriate levels
of management or priority level to assure timely
corrective action.

1990 AR (2.4.4.1.3),
NRC/DCJ:SC Rec.

7

Improve level of engineering support in the 'l'SC and
EOP.

1990 AR (2.4.4.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

8

Increase aanagement attention to finalize hardware
corrective actions ori a timely bases.

1990 AR (2.4.5.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

9

Correct weaknesses in integrated security system
lbarriers, perimeter alarm, and CCTV cameras)

1990 AR (2.4.5.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

10

Remove inadequacies of portions of vital area
barriers at Units 1 and 2 pipe galleries.

1990 AR (2.4.5.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

11

strengthen interface between SF-based NECS and site.

1990 AR (2.4.6.1~3,
4.0) 1 NRC/DCJ:SC Rec.

12

Apply System Engineering approach to problea
solving.

1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

13

NECS should perform self critical assessments.

1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

14

Improve understanding of all the implications of
changes on actual plant operations.

1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

15

Improve tiaely assessment of plant material
condition

1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

16

Improve formal training for design system engineers

1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

17

Assure proper control and aonitoring of QA audits of
equipment suppliers of safety grade equipment

1990 AR (2.4.7.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.

18
_,

strengthen QA implementation of corrective action
requirements.
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1990 AR (2.4.7.1.3),
NRC/DCISC Rec.
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19

Xmprove plant housekeeping.

1990 AR (2.4.7.1.3),
NRC/DCXSC Rec.

20

Closely monitor personnel error trends and determine
their specific causes.

1990 AR (2.5.1.2)

21

Present, at a Public Meeting, an analysis of
personnel error trends and plans for resolution

1990 AR (2.5.1.2)

22

Analyze inadvertent actuations or mode shifts of
safetv-related ventilation systems.

1990 AR (2.5.1.2)

23

Apply good refueling practice& to other operations.

1991 AR (Eeec. swa.,
6.0)

24

Apply aignificant attention to the problems of, too
111anv trips unplanned safety syste111 actuations.

1991 AR (Exec. swa.,
6.0)

25

Develop procedures to facilitate the hookup of a
diesel from one unit to the other.

1991 AR (Exec. sua.,
4.7)

26

Accelerate RCM progra.

1991 AR (Exec. swa.,
4.3)

27

Continue development and expand use of risk analysis
111odels. Consider other ob1ective functions.

1991 AR (Exec. sua.,
4.8)

28

:Increase emphasis on completing actions

1991 AR (Exec. sua.,
4.4)

29

Look at broader issues associated with human error.

1991 AR (1.6.2)

30

Consider requiring acknowledgement of safety
considerations qiven durinq tailboard briefinqs.

1991 AR (1.6.2)

31

Consider using steam dwap valve presentation as a
111odel for future presentations.

1991 AR (1.6.2)

32

Develop documentation for verifyinq that supervisors
and fore~~~en have tracked overtillle hours.

1991 AR (4.2)

33

Revise overtime procedures to eliminate invalid
assurances and provide ability to verify department
head compliance.

1991 AR (4.2)

34

Provide additional quidance for overtillle
authorization

1991 AR (4.2)

35

Xlllplement a positive »ethod for trackinq GONPRAC
outstandinq action ite111s

1991 AR (4.4)

36

Add an outside (of PG'E) 111elllber to PG'E

1991 AR (4.4)

37

Docu111ent reasons for not recoqnizinq all
implications of Voqtle event and the correspondinq
corrective actions taken.

1991 AR (4.4)
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Reference

38

Increase the Health Education and Stress Reduction
Programs in number and utilization.

1991 AR (4.5)

39

Continue development, expansion and implementation
of management training programs.

1991 AR (4.6)

40

Continue to seek cost--effective desiqn and
operational chanqes usinq risk aanaqement tools for
principle plant vulnerabilities

1991 AR (4.8)

41

Complete Level 2 and Level 3 PR.Il on a timely bases.

1991 AR (4.81

42

Improve effectiveness of corrective action proqram
for all aspects of operation.

1991 AR (4.8)
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Reference

=-

•

Date

Tentative Agenda Items
for
DCISC Public Meeting. February 5-6. 1992
1.

Annual plant tour by Committee Members.

2.

Results of PG&E review of internal oversight practices.

3.

Report on the Long Term Seismic Program by PG&E.

4.

Report of Long Term Seismic Program by DCISC consultant
Hendron.

5.

PG&E tracking/handling of generic safety issues.

6.

PG&E Probabilistic Risk Assessment to date.

7.

Report on pipe cracking issue by DCISC consultant
Boldrick.
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1 .I Law Offices of
· ROBERT R. WELLINGTON
2 ,! 857 Cass Street, Suite D
, Monterey, California 93940
3
Telephone: (408) 373-8733
<I

Attorneys for DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

4
I

- 'l

o;

I

71.

8

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

91

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

10\
111 Application of Pacific Gas and
' Electric Company, for Authoriza12 tion to Establish a Rate Adjustment Procedure for Its Diablo
13 canyon Nuclear Power Plant; to
Increase Its Electric Rates to
Reflect
the Costs of owning,
14
Operating, Maintaining and
15 Eventually Decommissioning Unit
1 of the Plant;
and to Reduce
Electric
Rates
Under
Its Enerqy
16
cost Adjustment Clause and Annual
17 Enerqy Rate to Reflect Decreased
Fuel Expenses.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

18

)

19
20
21
22

23

Application
No. 84-06-014

CU 39 El )
)

_______________________________)
And Related Matter.

)

Application
No. 85-08-025

RESPONSE AND PROTEST OF DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMI'rl'EE
TO PETITION BY
SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE ET AL.
TO MQDIFY DECISION NQS. 88-12-083 AND 89-03-062

24

25

26

hereby makes a special appearance in this matter for the

27

purpose of submitting its Response to the above-mentioned

28

Petition to Modify herein, and to provide information to the

LAW OI'PtCIIa OP
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11 California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") which is

2!1

pertinent to a determination of said Petition, as follows:
The Petition.

4

The Petitioners allege that the

performance-based pricing, which was provided for in the 1988

5j settlement agreement between the Division of Ratepayers

61
71

Advocates of the CPUC, the Attorney General and Pacific Gas &

81

and that the DCISC is non-functional, so that the cited

9

Electric Company ("PG&E"), has created a hazardous situation,

decisions approving same should be modified to suspend the

10

performance-based rates and disband the DCISC.

11

seven numbered allegations or paragraphs of the Petition

12

relate to the DCISC, as well as portions of allegations 10 and

13

11, and will be responded to in turn herein:

1.

14
15
16

The first

The DCISC, which has been in existence
for just one and one-half years, bas
adopted its first report on the safety
of Diablo Canyon operations and will
consider adoption of its second report
in October.

17

18

-

-

The Petitioners' first allegation is that "Although the

19

Settlement Agreement was adopted in December 1988 the

20

Committee's report is yet to be seen, even in draft form."

21

This statement is misleading and incorrect.

22

in that there was in fact no committee in existence until the

23

Governor appointed Dr. William Kastenberg of

24

DCISC in September 1989 and the Energy Commission Chairman

25

appointed Warren owen of Duke Power Company in mid-December

26

1989.

27

but a committee that had never existed before and which had no

28

rules, procedures, staff, operational history or anything else

•urra o

o

CAL.II'OIINIA . . . . .

u.c.L.A. to the

Thus, as 1990 began, there was finally a "committee,"
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I

I

I

1· - except two members.

Professor Kastenberg met with the CPUC

2

staff in early February 1990 and at their suggestion an

3

accounting firm and legal counsel were retained, following a

4

two-month search and interview process.
The DCISC then held its first meeting in May 1990 and its

5
6

second meeting the following November (copies of the meeting

7

notice and the agenda from each of those sessions are attached

8

hereto as Exhibits A, B, C and D, respectively).

g

!

allegation is also incorrect in that the DCISC has in fact

10
11
12

In addition to the foregoing, the Petition's first

I
I

adopted its first "Interim Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon
Operations."

This first report was adopted at the June 6,

I

131 1991, meeting of the DCISC in Arroyo Grande, prior to the date

14

that the certificate of service for the within Petition was

15

signed by Petitioner Becker.

16

Mothers for Peace were well aware that this report was to be

17

adopted on June 6th because they were recipients of the

18

meeting notice mailed out in May which described the proposed

19

action (see Exhibit E), and they were also present when the

20

DCISC members and consultants discussed and worked on draft

21

portions of the first report at the November 1990 meeting.

22

The draft of the report was completed in early 1991, pursuant

23

to the intent clearly stated at the November meeting that it

24

would be adopted at the meeting scheduled in February 1991.

25

That meeting had to be canceled due to the illness of one of

26

the then two DCISC members (so that a quorum could not have

27

been obtained), and only for that reason was approval delayed

28

until June.

Petitioners Becker and the

As indicated by the June meeting notice, a draft

LAW OP'101Cil8 OP'
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1

copy of the report was filed in the Public Document Room at

2

the Cal Poly Library on June 3, 1991.

3

At no time since the

draft was first discussed at the November DCISC meeting did
i

41

anyone ever inquire about the status of the draft report prior

5

to its final approval at the meeting in June.

6

In light of the foregoing, the misleading and incorrect

7

allegation quoted above is surprising.

8

forthright statement is also particularly distressing to the

9

DCISC members, who have worked energetically and in good faith

10

This less than

to commence the work of this new committee, to fully

11' investigate the safety of operations at Diablo Canyon, and to
12

meet with and respond to the concerns of the local community,

13

including the Mothers for Peace (as will be discussed

14

hereinbelow).

15

Because of the delay in the appointment of members to the

16

DCISC, its first interim report covers only the period of

17

plant operations from January 1 through June 30, 1990.

18

second report, which will deal with fiscal year 1990-1991,

19

ending June 30, 1991, is presently being drafted by the

20

members and its consultants and will be presented for

21

consideration and final approval of the DCISC at its next

22

scheduled meeting on October 3, 1991.

2:3

24
25

2.

A

In less than one and one-half years
since its formation the DCISC has
conducted three public meetings and
has participated in several other
meetings with the san Luis Obispo
county community.

26
27
28

The second allegation of the Petition on file herein is
also misleading and based upon limited facts in that it a)

SS7 c:AJIS STUKT
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1

refers to the time frame from the settlement agreement and not

2

from the appointment of committee members

3

only two meetings on the very eve of a third meeting.

4

also is left unstated is the length and substance of each of

5

the DCISC public meetings and the additional meetings with the

6

Mothers for Peace and others in the community that have been

7

attended.

8
9

three sessions - committee business matters, technical
presentations by representatives of PG&E on topics requested

11

by DCISC members, and public comments and communications.

12

May 22, 1990 meeting went from 9:30A.M. to 10:40 P.M., and

13

took up a full ten (10) hours of one day.

14

meetings have each lasted approximately six and one-half

15

hours.

16

dealt with the principal charge of the DCISC - to review and

17

assess the safety of operations at the plant.

18

( 14) hours of technical presentations on safety-related issues

19

have been elicited at the first three DCISC public meetings,

201

on such important topics as outage management, operator

21

training, fuel handling operations, fitness-for-duty, steam

22

dump valve performance, reliability centered maintenance,

23

radiological effluent program, etc. (see Exhibits B and D and

24

the agenda from the June meeting, Exhibit F).

The

The two subsequent

The greater portion of each of these meetings has

over fourteen

Notices of each of these meetings have been published in

26

the local newspapers and also mailed to some ninety {90)

27

persons and organizations on a service list provided by the

28

CPUC and to over thirty (30) newspapers and radio and

WllLLINCiiTON
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1iI television stations.

When the Mothers for Peace complained

2! that legal notices in the newspaper were insufficient, the

3i DCISC placed multiple display ads in the two largest local
I
I

4j papers for its next two meetings (see example ad in Exhibit
I

5i

G) •

6

In addition to the above formal meetings, the first

7

Chairman of the DCISC, William Kastenberg, has been present in

8

the local community on several occasions on behalf of the

9

DCISC.

on August 10, 1990, Professor Kastenberg conducted an

10

advertised open house at the City-county Library in downtown

11

San Luis Obispo, from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.

He met and

121 discussed concerns about Diablo Canyon with numerous members
13

I

of the public, specifically including several representatives

14

from the Mothers for Peace.

15

1990, Dr. Kastenberg and Hyla cass, M.D., who was retained by

On the evening of September 9,

16j the DCISC to consult with it on drug and substance abuse,
17

employee psychological screening, stress reduction and

18

related issues, met for approximately three hours with a group

I
19! from the Mothers for Peace.

on October Jrd, Professor

20

Kastenberg attended the all-day emergency planning exercise

21

related to the Diablo canyon plant, and on November 13th he

22

addressed a luncheon meeting of the local Citizens for

23

Adequate Energy, attended by over two hundred and fifty (250)

24

people.

25

another open house in San Luis Obispo to hear the concerns of

26

and receive input from the community regarding operations at

27

the plant (see notice attached as Exhibit H).

28

persons came in to talk to Dr. Kastenberg, and he was also

Last week, on July 16th, Dr. Kastenberg held yet

LAW 01'1'1Cit8 OP
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Over a dozen

,,I
1/ interviewed by local radio and newspaper reporters.
'

2i

Contrary to the inaccurate and misleading statement of

3! the Petitioners, the DCISC has had an active presence in the
!

41 community and has been quite open and available to the public.
3.

51
i

61

I
I

71

Apart from some delay in obtaining the tapes of its first meeting, DCISC meeting transcripts
have been openly and routinely
prepared in a timely fashion.

l

8

I

9

of the Petition (relating to the meeting transcripts), it

10

should be first noted that this whole point is simply a

11

"straw man argument" -setting up a standard that does not

12

exist and then attacking it.

13

law, in the settlement agreement or elsewhere that the DCISC

14

must prepare a transcript of its meetings.

15

sole discretion, has determined that such transcripts will be

16

prepared (along with official meeting minutes) .

171

having been made, there are no resultant requirements as to

18

when the transcript will be prepared and if and where it will

19

be filed.

20

I working

There is no requirement in the

The DCISC, in its

That decision

The principal purpose of the transcript is as a

document for the use of the DCISC members and

21

consultants, and to that end the primary concern has been the

22

accurate transcription of the technical presentations to the

23

DCISC, to create a record for future reference in connection

241

with safety-related issues.

25

DCISC that its public documents be made available locally,

26

the DCISC has made arrangements to file same with the Public

27

Documents Room ("PDR") at the Cal Poly Library in San Luis

28

Obispo.

LAW OPI'ICIIS 01'
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I

1

1

2

each meeting at the PDR

a) when prepared

and

b) prior to

the next following meeting.

31

For almost five months after its first meeting in May

'

4

1990 the DCISC was unable to obtain the tapes of the meeting

5 · from the party who prepared them.

Petitioner Becker inquired

6

about the transcript and specifically was made aware of the

7

difficulty in obtaining the tapes.

8

finally prepared and placed in the PDR prior to the November

9

1990 meeting.

The 95-page transcript was

A new firm was hired to tape the subsequent

10

meetings and the transcript of the November meeting was filed

11

in the PDR on June 3, 1991, along with all agenda materials

12

for the June 6th meeting.

13

inquiries to the DCISC about or requests to view or receive a

14

copy of the transcript.

1 51

From November to June there were no

Relative to the "issue" of PG&E being asked to correct

16

their portion of the transcript, there are no covert actions

17

involved, only standard operating procedures.

18

with hearing transcript review practices followed by the CPUC

In accordance

and other regulatory agencies, the DCISC has requested that

19
1

20

PG&E proofread those portions of the transcript that contain

21

the presentations made by its representatives (comprising well

22

over 90% of the transcript), and to advise us of any

23

typographical errors, misspellings or other non-substantive

24

errors in transcription.

25

that provided in the Code of Civil Procedure for the reading,

26

correcting and signing of the transcribed deposition of a

27

witness.

28

especially with regard to the technical safety-related

The procedure involved is not unlike

An accurate transcript is important to the OCISC,

LAW OPf'ICitS Of'
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1

presentations, questions and answers, which will become a

2

valuable reference tool and part of the permanent (and public)

3

records of the DCISC.
4.

4

5

correspondence and other communications to the DCISC from the public
do not go unanswered.

The allegation in paragraph 4 of the Petition that

0

71 letters to the DCISC go unanswered is made without benefit of
;I

Bl evidence or examples;
9

In checking with each of the DCISC members, none can

10

recall anything that would give any basis to this claim.

11

communications to DCISC members are by telephone.

12

letters received do not require any response or have been

13

responded to by telephone.

14

Dr. Kastenberg discussed the issue of correspondence received

15

at his office and his comments, which are pertinent to this

16

allegation, are attached (Exhibit I).

17

allegation 4, a few examples of responses which have been made

18

by the DCISC are attached as Exhibit J (along with a follow-up

19

response to one letter by the NRC) .

20

23

~W

none.

the undersigned presumes there are

s.

Some

At the recent meeting on June 6th

To further refute

There is correspondence from the
the DCISC in the PDR, althouqh
compliance with procedures for
providinq same possibly could be
improved.

As shown in Exhibit J, some correspondence from the DCISC

24

has been attached to meeting agenda packets, which in turn

25

have been filed in the PDR.

26j

there is some correspondence from DCISC members that has not

27

been filed with Legal Counsel, as provided for in Committee

28

Policy No. 5 (see Exhibit K).

However, it is possible that

With DCISC members spread from
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I

11'I, California to Texas to North carolina, compliance with this
2

il

policy is not easy to monitor but certainly has been

·I

3 1 encouraged.

4!

It should be emphasized, however, as has been

pointed out at the DCISC meetings, that many if not all of the

5; requests and inquiries by the DCISC members have been made by

61 telephone calls, not correspondence.
I

6.
I

si
I

!

The DCISC has determined that an
office in san Luis Obispo is not
necessary at this time for the
accomplishment ot its objectives.

91
10
11

The Petition's sixth allegation is correct, the DCISC has
not been persuaded that an office in San Luis Obispo would be

12i valuable.

131
141

There has not been anything like a community-wide

demand or request for a local DCISC office.

Several members

of the Mothers for Peace addressed the issue at the first

151 meeting and three raised it last November, but the issue was

16

not mentioned at all at the June meeting.

The DCISC certainly

17

has given consideration to the idea, but has determined that

18

such an office is not reasonably necessary at this time to the

191 fulfillment of its objectives and obligations to review and

..

20

assess the safety of operations at the nuclear power plant.

21

As noted above, the DCISC has had substantial physical

22

presence in the community, its members and consultants have

23

conducted numerous inspections at the plant and related

24

facilities, it has provided for the filing of all public

25

documents and papers in San Luis Obispo (over 95% of which are

26

received from PG&E and are presently lodged at the POR), and

2?

has established a 24-hour "800" toll-free telephone number to

28

receive questions and concerns.

Calls and correspondence to
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1

the DCISC have been very limited, and have not indicated any

2

need for the expense of an office and the personnel necessary

3

to staff it.

The DCISC has indicated its preference at this

time to spend available funds on the experts and consultants
...,

necessary to assist and advise the DCISC on safety and

6

operations issues, rather than on an office which would be of

7

limited use.

8

this issue is certainly not closed, and they will continue to

9

consider the matter.

v

However, the DCISC members have indicated that
1

10

I

7.

11

12

All safety-related problems concerning Diablo canyon that have
been brought to the attention of
the DCISC have been reviewed by
it and have bean or will be commented upon.

13
Again, allegation 7 is made without example or

2.4

15

elaboration so it cannot be specifically refuted.

From the

16

information available to the DCISC, the allegation is

17

misleading, unsubstantiated and untrue.

2.8

related issues and problems at Diablo Canyon have been

Numerous safety-

19: reviewed and examined at length by the DCISC members and its
'
I

20'I consultants.
21

I

Some of these matters have been commented upon

in the first Interim Report, and yet others will be discussed

22

and recommendations made concerning same in the upcoming

23

annual report.

24

regulatory agency;

It must be recalled that the DCISC is not a
it does not supplant the NRC.

Its charge,

25
26

It should also be noted that, as with the transcript issue
discussed above, there is no requirement for a local office
and it is a matter to be determined in the discretion of the
DCISC.

2?
28
I..AW OI'I'ICitS 01'
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1

as set forth in the settlement agreement, is to review,

2

assess, comment and recommend.

3

to review and consider all important safety-related issues

4

and problems that have come to its attention.

5

L.AW

-

The DCISC has taken action -

For example, the DCISC members and consultants reviewed

6

the NRC Augmented Inspection Report concerning a loss of off-

7

site power event which occurred on March 7, 1991.

8

June 1991 meeting the DCISC requested and received a further

9

report on this incident from PG&E.

At its

Also at its June meeting

10

the DCISC heard a report which it specifically had requested

11

regarding recent problems with the steam dump valves (see

12

Exhibit F, item VIII-A (4)).

13

acted to retain a metallurgical engineer, Michael Boldrick,

14

for the purpose of reviewing and advising the DCISC concerning

15

cracks which have developed in the Unit 2 Chemical and Volume

16

Control System (CVCS) let-down lines

17

Boldrick and Kastenberg spent a full day last week at Diablo

18

canyon inspecting the eves lines and reviewing the pipe

19

thinning monitoring program.

20

requests and concerns of its own, the DCISC also acted at its

21

June meeting to retain the services of a geotechnical engineer

22

to advise it on plant-related seismic issues, and Dr.

23

Kastenberg and the DCISC's consultant will be present at the

24

August 7, 1991 meeting in Washington D.C. at which time the

25

U.S.G.S. report concerning the Diablo canyon Long-Term Seismic

26

Program will be presented to the NRC Advisory Committee on

27

Reactor Safeguards.

28

II

At this same meeting the DCISC
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Li

Contrary to the unsubstantiated
alleqations ot the Petition herein, the DCISC has proved to be a
viable and functional committee,
accomplishinq the purposes contemplated by the parties to the
settlement agreement.

8.

I

.I

2 II
3

4

The principal purpose of the DCISC is to provide an

5

61 independent panel of technically qualified experts to review
71 and assess the safety of operations at Diablo canyon.

The

settlement agreement provides that only persons "with

81
I

91 knowledge, background and experience in the field of nuclear
10

power facilities" may be nominated.

Any unbiased person who

11

attended or read the transcripts of the technical

12

presentations could not help but be impressed by the interest

13

and knowledge exhibited, the questions raised and the

, 4 1 discussions generated by the DCISC members and consultants.
- II
1~ i1 These are truly productive fact-finding sessions on safetyv ,,
::.. 6 I1 related issues.

These sessions are the substance of what the

17

DCISC is about, not offices and phantom correspondence.

18

the possibility, and the probability, of the many benefits

19

~~

It is

that must necessarily result from these expositions and open

20 II discussions of operations and safety issues at Diablo Canyon,
I

21

I

held in the affected communities and available to public view,

22

that will provide the "additional assurance of safety"

23

contemplated by the parties to the settlement agreement.

24

Unfortunately only two or three of the Petitioners have

25

attended less than one-third of these fact-finding sessions by

26

the DCISC.

27

understand or appreciate what the DCISC has accomplished.

28

//

It is not surprising, therefore, that they cannot
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11

In a relatively short period of time, starting at ground

2! zero, the DCISC has accomplished much.

As of April 1991 the

3! DCISC is now at full strength, and as its meetings,
I

41 investigations, reviews and reports proceed, and as its
I

I

51 operations and procedures are fully developed, the DCISC will
6

continue to accomplish the objectives of the settlement

7

agreement.

8

allegations of the Petition herein, the DCISC has certainly

9

proved itself to be a viable and functional committee.

Contrary to the vague and unsubstantiated

Conclusion.

10

Based upon the foregoing, and upon the lack

11

of any substantial or credible evidence in the Petition, it is

12

submitted and respectfully urged that those portions of the

13

Petition relating to the DCISC be denied.
Dated:

14

July ___ , 1991
Respectfully submitted,

15
16

Robert R. Wellington
Legal Counsel for the
Diablo Canyon Independent
Safety Committee

17

18
19

20

I

211
22

23

24
25

26
27
28

II
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ALJ /RAB/ f. s
Mailed
Decision 91-10-020

OCT 1 5 1991

October 11, 1991

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Application of Pacific Gas and
Electric :ompany, for Authorization
to Establish a Rate Adjustment
Procedure for its Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant; to Increase its
Electric Rates to Reflect the Costs
of Owning, Operating, Maintaining
and Eventually Decommissioning
Units 1 and 2 of the Plant; and to
Reduce Blectric Rates Under its
Energy Cost Adjustment Clause and
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The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Life on Planet
Earth, and Rochelle Becker (petitioners) seek to modify Decision
(D.) 89-03-062 & D.88-12-083 to rectify what they allege to be an
intolerable situation created by the CPUC's adoption of an
innovative performance-based settlement for Diablo Canyon.
Petitioners request that we suspend performance-based pricing for
Diablo Canyon power and disband the Independent Safety Commit~ee.
Petitioners allege:
1. The Independent Safety Committee's single
mandate is an annual report. Although the
Settlement Agreement was adopted in
December 1988, the Committee's report is
yet to be seen, even in draft form.
2.

In the 2-1/2 years since the adoption of
Diablo Canyon Settlement Agreement, the
Safety Committee, an inseparable part of
the agreement, has met publicly only twice.
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3.

The transcript from the first meeting of
the Committee took over six months to
appear in the public document room.
This
transcript was first sent to PG&E for
correction to their portion of the meeting.
The transcript from the second meeting, the
first week of November 1990, is still not
in the public document room.

4.

Letters to the Committee from the public go
unanswered.

5.

There is nQ correspondence from the
committee to anyone, including the utility,
in the public document room.
Only
responses from PG&E are in the public
document room. These responses do not
allow the public to know what the committee
has asked and if the answers are responsive
to their questions.

6.

The community most closely impacted by the
safety implications of the unique
settlement agreement has requested, but has
been unable to persuade the committee, that
an office in San Luis Obispo would be
valuable.

7.

Several safety-related problems during
routine operation and refueling have arisen
since the adoption of the Settlement
Agreement and yet no action or comment by
the Committee has resulted.

8.

The performance-based Settlement Agreement
adopted by the CPUC in 1988 has resulted in
millions of dollars in profit for PG&E from
the operation of their Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant.

9.

Ratepayers are currently forced to pay
9.5 cents a kwh for power produced at
Diablo Canyon, while the price per kwh of
renewables (sic) is 7 cents, fossil fuel is
3.5 cents and hydro is 1-3 cents a kWh.
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10.

Above and beyond the exorbitant price of
electrical power ratepayers must pay, the
CPUC added an excess of $500,000 per year
for an "Independent Safety" committee which
is nothing less than a cruel hoax.

11.

The settlement adopted by the California
Public Utilities commission clearly has
safety and financial implications for
California ratepayers. The CPUC decided
that NRC was not sufficient to deal with
these safety implications and promised an
"additional assurance of safety" by
requiring that a Safety Committee be an
inseparable part of the Settlement
Agreement. The current committee members
have done nothing to provide ratepayers
·with any "additional assurance of safety."

Petitioners argue that safety problems and violations
have been due in part to the absence of a viable safety committee.
The Settlement Agreement created an imminent danger to the
residents of San Luis Obispo. They believe that safety violations
may be related to performance-based ratemaking. They assert that
over $500,000 of ratepayer dollars are being wasted each year on a
committee that serves no purpose and provides no "additional
assurance of safety." Petitioners pray that the Commission
immediately suspend performance-based payments for Diablo Canyon
and disband the Safety Committee.
The Diablo canyon Independent Safety Committee (the
Committee) and PG&E responded, denying the allegations and
requesting that the petition be dismissed.
The Committee's Response
The Committee's response states that the Committee was
not :armed until late December 1989. Its first committee member,
or. William Kastenberg, was appointed by the governor in September
1989 and the second member, Warren Owen, was appointed by the
chairman of the Energy Commission in late December, 1989. The
Committee had to organize itself, prepare rules and procedures,
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retain a staff, and do those other housekeeping functions needed
before it could be effective. The Committee held its first meeting
in May 1990 and its second meeting the following November. It
adopted its first report on the safety of Diablo Canyon operations
in June, 1991. The report would have been adopted much earlier but
for the illness of one of its two members which prevented a quorum
for a meeting. A draft of the report was filed in the public
document room at the California Polytechnic State University at San
Luis Obispo library on June 3, 1991. The first report covered the
period of plant operations from January 1 through June 30, 1990. A
second report, which will deal with fiscal year 1990-1991, through
June 30, 1991, is presently being drafted by the Committee and will
be presented for consideration and final approval at its next
scheduled meeting on october 3, 1991.
The public meetings of the Committee are lengthy and
include reports on committee business matters, technical
presentations by representatives of PG&E on topics requested by the
Committee, and public comments and communications. Meetings last
from six to 10 hours a day.
Notice of the meetings is given
through a mailing to interested parties, publication of ads in
local newspapers, and notices over radio and television stations.
In addition to official meetings, the chairman of the Committee has
met with numerous members of the public, including representatives
of petitioners, on a number of occasions.
The Committee prepares a transcript of its meetings,
although a transcript is not required to be made, and permits those
who have made presentations, especially technical presentations, to
review the transcript for errors and omissions. The Committee
maintains that this review is comparable to the review of
depositions and is not an unusual practice. The Committee responds
to written and telephone communications. The Committee points out
that petitioners have not alleged any specific communications which
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failed to elicit a response; the Committee in its filing has
provided examples of responses it has made.
The Committee has considered opening an office in San
Luis Obispo but has determined that such an office is not necessary
at this time to the fulfillment of its objectives and obligations
to review and assess the safety of operations at the nuclear power
plant. The committee notes that it has established a 24-hour 800
toll free telephone number to receive questions and concerns. The
Committee believes that at this time it is preferable to spend
available funds on the experts and consultants necessary to assist
and advise the Committee on safety and operations issues rather
than on an office which will be of limited use.
In regard to Allegation 7 of the petition that several
safety related problems have arisen at Diablo Canyon without any
action on the part of the Committee, the Committee asserts that
this allegation is misleading, unsubstantiated, and untrue. No
specific instances are cited by petitioners. The Committee states
that numerous safety-related issues and problems at Diablo Canyon
have been reviewed and examined at length by the Committee's
members and its consultants. Some of these matters have been
commented upon in the Committee's first interim report and others
will be discussed in the forthcoming second annual report. The
Committee has taken action.
The Committee explains, for example, that its members and
consultants reviewed the NRC Augmented Inspection Report concerning
a loss of off-site power·event which occurred on March 7, 1991. At
its June 1991 meeting, the Committee requested and received a
further report on this incident from PG&E.
Also at its June
meeting, the Committee heard a report from PG&E which it
specifically had requested regarding recent problems with steam
dump valves. At this same meeting, the Committee acted to retain a
metallurgical engineer for the purpose of reviewing and advising
the committee concerning cracks which have developed in the Unit 2

-
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Chemical and Volume Control Systems (CVCS) let-down lines.
Committee members spent a full day in August at Diablo Canyon
inspecting the eves lines and reviewing the pipe thinning
monitor:.ng program.
In further response to public requests and
concerns of its own, the Committee also acted at its June meeting
to retain the services of a geotechnical engineer to advise it on
plant-related seismic issues, and a Committee member and a
consultant were present at a recent meeting in Washington, D.C. at
which time the U.S.G.S. report concerning the Diablo Canyon LongTerm Seismic Program was presented to the NRC Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards.
PG&E
PG&E supports the statements made by the Committee.
It
states that the Committee has adopted an annual report on Diablo
operations, has met publicly since beginning operations in
January 1990, has prepared transcripts of its meetings and made
them available to the public in an open manner, and has been
responsive to the public in San Luis Obispo County.
PG&E asserts
that it is operating Diablo canyon safely and that it is committed
to operating Diablo canyon safely for the entire term of the
settlement and the life of the plant.
Discussion
This is the second petition by petitioners regarding the
settlement of the Diablo Canyon prudence review.
In April 1989,
petitioners filed a petition seeking to modify D.89-03-062 and
D.88-12-083 (the decisions that approved the settlement of the
Diablo Canyon prudence review) by suspending the performance-based
payments for Diablo canyon. At that time, the petitioners alleged
that the Independent Safety Committee was not appointed or
functioning.
In 0.90-04-008, we denied the petition.
Petitioners are again before us, this time asserting that
the Committee is ineffective. We have set out in detail
petitioners' allegations and the response of the committee, and in
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summarJ form, the response of PG&E. Petitioners have presented no
facts which would cause us to suspend performance-based pricing for
Diablo Canyon power and disband the Independent Safety Committee.
We conclude that the petition should be denied.
0 R 0 E R

~others

IT IS ORDERED that the petition of the San Luis Obispo
for Peace, Life on Planet Earth, and Rochelle Becker is

denied.
This order is effective today.
Dated October 11, 1991, at San Francisco, California.

JOHN B. OHANIAN
DANIEL Wm. FESSLER
NORMAN D. SHUMWAY
Commissioners
Commissioner Patricia M. Eckert,
being necessarily absent, did not
participate.
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United States Department of the Interior
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

345 Middlefield Road MS 977
Menlo Park, California 94025
4 December, 1991

TAKE
PRIDE IN
AMERICA

Senator Herschel Rosenthal
Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
Room 2035, State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Senator Rosenthal:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the oversight hearing at the State Capitol on 2
December. I enclose a copy of the comments I prepared for the hearing. As you suggested, in my
verbal testimony I summarized the prepared copy and incorporated some responses to the list of
questions that were addressed to the U.S. Geological Survey. Your staff may fmd the original
version helpful in transcribing the testimony.
I also enclose written responses to the list of questions given to me.
You also asked whether I agreed with the statement made by Mr. Martin that "NRC and USGS
agreed to disagree". As I responded at the time, I believe that is an inaccurate description of the
NRC response to our review. It also confuses the roles, for USGS acted as an advisor, not a
partner in the decision process. In fact, the headquarters staff of NRC did respond, in varying
degree, to USGS concerns about the dip of the Hosgri fault, the adverse effect of a vertical
component of slip, and other important issues. For example, the final NRC position on ground
motion required an increase in the assumed vertical component of slip, raising parts of the spectral
ground-motion estimates by as much as 20% over the design values.

Sincerely yours:

Robert D. Brown

enc.2
cc. J. Devine, USGS
R.Wesson, USGS
R. Rothman, NRC

!1212

•

-- -

415/329-5620 FAX 415/329-5163

Thank you again for your interest in the USGS review of the Diablo Canyon LTSP.

-
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Testimony by Robert D. Brown, U.S. Geological Survey
at
Hearing by California Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
regarding
CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: THEIR SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS AND ECONOMIC COSTS
Sacramento, California
2 December, 1991

R. Brown, U.S. Geological Survey

December 2, 1991

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
Thank you for the inviting me to contribute to this hearing. In summarizing the U.S.
Geological Survey's (USGS) role and findings regarding the Diablo Canyon power plant I would
like to begin by explaining the USGS role and the scope of its acitivies. I would also like to
remind you that the complete USGS report is available to the public as Appendix C in the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG 0675, Supplement No. 34,
dated June, 1991.
Our report examined only the geological, geophysical and seismological issues. It did not
examine such other topics as plant engineering, soil-structure interaction, or probabilistic risk
assessment, although all of these were considered by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
in their Long Term Seismic Program (LTSP) and by NRC and some of its other reviewers.
Under a long-standing interagency agreement, the USGS advises NRC on earth-science
issues and research related to reactor siting. For the Diablo Canyon Long Term Seismic Program,
I was the principal USGS consultant from January, 1985, until completion of the NRC review
process in September, 1991. That time period began with the original design and scoping of the
LTSP in 1985 and continued through the acquisition, analysis, and interpretation of the data.
The review process included a series of informational meetings between NRC and its
consultants, and the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and its consultants. I and other
USGS scientists attended chiefly those meetings devoted to geology, seismology, and tectonics,
although on one or two occasions I also attended those on ground motion.
PG&E's fmal report on the Diablo Canyon Long Term Seismic Program was issued in
July, 1988. Chapters 2 and 3 of that report triggered many questions about PG&E's conclusions
regarding the geometry and the direction and amount of slip on faults near the plant Those
conclusions are important because they constrain ground-motion estimates, which in turn define
the severity of shaking for structures and components at the site. PG&E responded to these
questions in a series of supplemental reports issued between January, 1989, and July,l990.
Together, all of these reports constituted PG&E's assessment of the geology, seismology, and
tectonics as these topics relate to earthquake hazard near the plant site .
The USGS review was based on the PG&E reports and supporting proprietary data
furnished by PG&E, information from other published or pre-publication sources, and on our own
investigations and file data. As noted in our report to the NRC, our review confirmed many of the
findings of the LTSP. But we also questioned several conclusions by PG&E, most significantly
those regarding the Hosgri fault geometry at depth and the direction and amount of slip on the
Hosgri fault.
The north-northwest-trending surface trace of this fault is offshore, 2.8 miles from the
Diablo Canyon power plant The fault is judged to be capable of generating a 7.2 magnitude
earthquake. PG&E interprets the Hosgri fault as a vertical or near-vertical plane, along which the
displacements that cause earthquakes are essentially horizontal. In geologist's jargon, this is a
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right-lateral strike-slip fault, geometrically similar to most parts of the San Andreas fault The
USGS review considers the Hosgri fault to be a more complex structure, with parallel seaward
branches, and with a main fault plane that--although nearly vertical within 2 miles of the sea floor-flattens to dips of 50° to 70° NE, at depths of 2.5 to 7 miles. USGS also finds that the sense of
motion on the Hosgri fault is most likely oblique. That is, earthquakes on this fault will result
from approximately equal amounts of horizontal and vertical slip and will resemble the Lorna Prieta
earthquake of October, 1989.
These differences become important in estimating ground motion, which as a rule
diminishes with distance from the slipped surface of the fault The seismic waves that produce
strong ground motion will come chiefly from those regions of the Hosgri fault that are 3 to 8 miles
deep. The USGS interpretation differs from PG&E's by placing this deep, seismogenic area of the
Hosgri fault closer to the plant site and, in part, vertically beneath it Moreover, the ground-motion
estimates for the LTSP indicate that oblique-slip earthquakes produce more severe shaking than do
comparable strike-slip earthquakes. Thus, both the geometry of the fault and the oblique-slip
orientation may contribute to increased levels of ground motion.
Slip rates on faults, together with other information, help us predict the magnitude and
frequency of earthquakes; higher slip rates translate into larger earthquakes, more frequent
earthquakes, or both. From trench exposures and displaced stream channels, PG&E estimated a
long-term, strike-slip rate of about 0.1 in./yr for the San Simeon fault, 36 miles northwest of
Diablo Canyon. This estimate characterizes the surface deformation on the trenched fault strand,
but it does not incorporate nearby geologic and seismologic evidence for an additional vertical
component of slip which may equal the horizontal component. Net oblique slip (the vector sum of
horizontal and vertical components) on the San Simeon fault may therefore exceed the estimated
long-term rate of strike slip, contributing again to higher ground-motion estimates.
Ground-motion levels that exceed the design parameters for the plant and its components
can lead to failure and loss of function. The upper limits of ground motion are difficult to establish
for several reasons. Let me mention just 3 that apply here:
1.--The horizontal component of displacement for the Hosgri fault is imported from the
San Simeon fault, 36 miles distant; these 2 faults are probably related, but the nature of
that relationship is ambiguous. Direct observations of horizontal slip on the offshore
Hosgri fault have not been obtained.
2.--A vertical component of slip on the Hosgri fault is evident, but its magnitude is
unknown and is likely to remain so without offshore drilling to provide reliable age
control.
3.--Even with all other questions resolved, ground motion estimates currently depend on
a data base that is nearly devoid of ~7 earthquakes within 3 miles of strong-motion
recording instruments.
Such gaps in our knowledge makes the assessment of earthquake hazard uncertain. The
use of probabilistic methods gives a basis for decisions, but cannot substitute for real data. At this
time the analysis for Diablo Canyon depends heavily on geologic judgement, extrapolated data, and
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tenuous assumptions regarding the Hosgri fault. New evidence from offshore geology and
geophysics and from earthquake seismology will probably resolve some of this uncertainty in the
next decade or two. That evidence could confmn present views of plant safety, but it could also
drastically alter those views.
The Diablo Canyon LTSP and the controversy regarding some of the earth-science issues
underscores 5 important conclusions or lessons:
• The problem of the Hosgri fault and its earthquake hazard potential is not satisfactorily
resolved.
• For such critical facilities as dams and reactors, geologic hazards should be fully and
carefully evaluated ~ resources are committed to construct and operate the facility.
• In regions as geologically complex and incompletely known as coastal California,
exploration costs required to define earthquake hazards adequately may approach or

exceed the construction costs for some facilities.
• New discoveries and unexpected events occur frequently in earthquake research.
Timely reassessment of earthquake vulnerability at existing facilities is a critical
element in long-term risk management.
• Where seismic hazard is recognized, adequately defined, and quantified, engineering
strategies can usually reduce the risk to acceptable levels. An engineering solution to
an undefmed or poorly constrained problem offers substantially less protection.

3

Response to questions for U.S. Geological Survey from California Senate Committee on Energy
and Public Utilities, hearing of 2 December, 1991

Q 1:

Please comment on reports that Ken Campbell, a former USGS employee who was also
involved in reviewing the Diablo Canyon seismic study, estimated the increase in ground
motion at 47%.

A 1:

The 47% increase is probably from an estimate made early in the course of the Long Term
Seismic Program (LTSP). Ground-motion estimates were based on several methods of
analysis and were re-examined several times; estimates by different investigators clustered
more closely toward the end of the investigation. Dr. Campbell's most recent comments on
the empirical ground-motion estimates are contained in his Review of the Long-Term
Seismic Program: Empirical Ground-Motion Studies, dated March 18, 1991, and Revised
Ground-Motion Estimates, May 22, 1991.

Q 2:

Why wasn't ground-motion information included in the final USGS report? What is the
USGS position on ground motion caused by the Hosgri fault?

A 2:

Dr. Campbell, as a member of the USGS staff, reviewed ground-motion estimates for NRC
from 1985 unti11990. Campbell's resignation from the USGS in January, 1990,
terminated USGS participation in the ground-motion review, but NRC continued to retain
Campbell as a consultant until the review process ended USGS has taken no position on
ground motion because it did not participate in the review after January, 1990.

Q 3:

Has any serious doubt been expressed within USGS about the ability of the Diablo plant to
safely withstand a maximum Hosgri fault earthquake?

A 3:

The ability of the plant to "safely withstand a(n) .....earthquake" depends on the detailed
engineering analysis of the plant and its components when these are subjected to the strong
shaking from a large earthquake. The USGS review of geology, geophysics and
seismology did not extend into matters of plant safety and engineering. To my knowledge,
the survivability of the Diablo plant under earthquake loads has not been seriously examined
within USGS. See also the answer to question 4 below.

Q 4:

The recent NRC decision which endorses PG&E's position on the seismic safety of the
plant requires PG&E to submit further calculations to NRC to back up its position. Will
USGS be called on to review this new information?

A 4:

These calculations are probably those noted in section 3.8.1.1 of the NRC Safety Evaluation
Report, Supplement 34 (SSER 34), p. 3-19, concerning the adequacy of seismic margins to
accommodate the higher ground motions required in the NRC staff report. The calculations
are for specific structures or systems within the plant and they would be reviewed by
engineers and risk analysts, not by the USGS. See also the answer to question 3 above.

Q 5:

Has there been any consideration of a further independent USGS investigation--not just a
review of PG&E studies?
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A 5:

USGS has not seriously considered a site-oriented investigation, similar to the LTSP. It
continues to support a broad research program on active California faults. That program
includes earthquake monitoring of the Hosgri and other coastal faults, seismic-reflection and
field geologic investigations of the structure and stratigraphy near coastal faults, collection
of strong-motion data on large earthquakes, and development of improved methods of
estimating strong ground motion.

Q6:

What lessons about the Hosgri fault were learned from the 1989 Lorna Prieta earthquake?

A 6:

Strictly speaking, the Lorna Prieta earthquake was located on a different structure than the
Hosgri fault and so provided little direct evidence about the nature of the Hosgri fault.
However, the Lorna Prieta earthquake emphasized several lessons of importance in the
LTSP review. Some examples are: 1) oblique-slip and reverse-slip earthquakes of
magnitudes greater than 7 are common in the San Andreas fault system; 2) surface evidence
of faulting may not always foretell the mechanism for the next large earthquake; 3) where
fault ruptures that produce earthquakes do not consistently reach the ground surface, the
hazard from damaging earthquakes can be seriously underestimated; and 4) the character of
faulting at depth can change within 10-20 miles along a single fault, making suspect those
estimates that are based on extrapolated data.

Q 7:

Will USGS ongoing onshore and offshore studies provide relevant information that may
have a bearing on the seismic safety of the Diablo Canyon plant? Will that information be
shared with the NRC?

A 7:

The answer, as suggested in the response to question 5 above, is yes to both questions.
Moreover, USGS research results are made available to the public, as well as to other
federal and state agencies. The ongoing research ties between USGS and NRC make it
likely that any significant new information on the Hosgri fault would be exchanged
promptly.
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San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
1037 RHchi e Rd.
Grover City~ CA 93433
(605) 469-7 420

SAFETY COMMITTEE

The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace actively participated in the
California Public Utilities Commission's hearings on the Settlement
Agreement for PG&E ·s Diablo Canyon. \.Yhile we were disappointed that the
Pub 1i c Staff Di vision, 1ater renamed the Di vision of Ratepayer Advocates,
,jid not pursue their original recommendation of a $4.4 billion dollar•
,jJsallowance in the anginal Diablo rate case, we were devastated when the
CPUC announced the pay-for-performance rate scheme that PG&E .. the
Attorney General, and the CPUC staff had come up with behind closed doors.
Almost four years and hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxpayer money
had been spent developing the reasonableness portton of the rate case and it
is now buried in the archives somewhere.
The prime objections of the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace to the
Settlement Agreement have always been based on safety. 'we felt that if
PG&E Yvas only to be paid for power produced then the incentive for not
shutting down when repairs needed to be made and /or rushing through
refueling outages was great. We \'Vere told by the Commission that it was in
PG$,_E's best interest to keep Diablo Canyon operating safely because if their
nuclear plant did not operate PG&E would not be paid. \4/e argued that if
safety problems arose that did not effect operation, PG&E would be likely to
put off fixing those problems until refueling.
To eliminate ..,..,.hat the Commission felt was a chance~ that safety might be
compromised for profit the "Independent Safety" Committee was created.
From the very beginning the requirements for this committe were set up in
such o woy thot virtually no person wlth any history of safety concerns
regarding the nuclear industry would be eligible to sit on the committee.
Only those wlth "experience, background, and knowledge of the nuclear
industry would be eligible. This is not even a requirement at the NRC who
have the power to enforce, cite, fine, and supposedly shut down nuclear
p1ants for safety vi o1au ons.

For over a year the public ·waited for the "Independent Safety" Committee to
r·1old its first rneeting. A third rnember was not even appointed until spring
of this ~ear. If the Commission believed that safety could be compromised
for profit, why did the commission a11ow PG&E to co11ect rates under this
unique rate scheme for over a year before the committee was in place? V·lhy
did they disallow any applicant who had testified on behalf of the public
regarding safety issues at Diablo Can1don? 'w'hy did the commission fall to
senously consider, much less adopt, even one of the recommendations
:3ubmitted by public intevenors regarding safety implications of the
settlernent aqreernent? If the commission did not believe that safety could
be compromised for profit under this unique rate scheme, vvhy is the pub1ic
paying over $500,000 a year for this "Independent Safety" committee?
In the three yeors thot hove possed since the odoption of the
Settlement Agreement do the Son Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
feel that the ·Independent Sofety· Committee has provided the
·odditional assurance of safety promised by the commission?
Absolutely noH The public attended the first committee meeting to let
the committee ~~now v·ihat they needed to do in order for the community of
San Luis Obispo to have any confidence in them. Basically three issues were
repeated through out the afternoon and evening. First, that there be an an
office and staff (a presence) in San Luis Obispo. The office should provide4
a place where the public could go to ask questions and review documents
requested by and subm1tted to the committee; a place where Diablo Canyon
emplo1dees could go in confidentiality to report safety concerns.
Second, members of the public repeatedly requested that the committee
retain a consultant to do an independent analysis of PG&E's l TSP and the
NRC review of that program. After repeating that request at several
meetings and though several letters, that were never answered, this
summer it is our understanding that the committee finally hired such a
consultant. Unfortunately, the consultant was from the east coast and
unable to attend the Atomic Committee on Reactor Safeguard's subcommitte
t1earing in San Luis Obispo last September. In addition to the extreme delay
in hiring this consultant the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace wonder why
the committee felt that a California geologist or se1smollg1st would not be
as qualified, if not more qualified to review a seismic program specific to
the California coastline?

Finally, we asked that all correspondence submitted to the committee be
placed in the record and avallable for the publlc to review. This has not
happened. In fact, the public document room which houses the documents
from the committee is sorely lacking in its completeness. In the collection

of ijocuments the public ·vvill find little if any publlc correspondence. We
t·,ave no idea of ·what the committee has been asked to look into. Answers to
questions submitted b!-1 the committee to PG&E flll the shelves, but not the
questions themselves. Therefore, the public who read the committee's files
have no idea if the ans-.,.vers are responsive to the committee's questions or
lf tJtere was any fallow up.
This macessabllity of the committee and the committee's documents even
extends to the press. On November 20 . 1991 . the Five Cities Times Press
Recorder ran a column entitled, "How Safe is Diablo? Vou·n have to Pay to
Kno··i·i. It seems our 1oca 1 paper had requested a copy of the safety
committee's onnuol report and was told the newspaper would be charged
$.30 a page for the 160 page report. This paper understands that the issues
surrounding all aspects of Diablo Canyon have been and remain
controversial. draws alot of public interest, and affect the public's health
and welfare. By providing a copy to the press the community would hove
been mode aware of what the committee has been doing with the money we
are forced to pay and just where that money has been spent. Doesn't the
committee want the public to know what they are doing with our money?
They seem to me to have enough of our money to provide the press and I
bell eve the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace with a copy of their reports.
How man'd members of the the publlc still attend the "Independent Safety"
comm1ttee's meetings? The answer is very few. V.Je believe the safety
committee is a tooth 1ess 1ap dog, not a watch dog.
From the beginning we had little confldence the committee would be able or
even willing to provide the promised "addltional assurance of safety."
Despite that fact, vve took time out of out busy schedules to attend the first
two meetings and offer suggestions on how this committee might work
successfully with the San Luis Obispo community to built that assurance of
safety. It soon became apparent that our suggestions were not welcomed.
Vie vv'ere virtually ignored.
During the years since the settlement agreement w·as signed our fears that
PG&E might compromise sofety for profit hove not disappeared. PG&E
repeatedly touts their ability to refuel more quickly than any other utility.
However during refuelings PG&E has been cited f£~2~c~ss1ve ~r
overtime, they have had a serious crane accident, and~at their last refueling
two contract workers were exposed to radidation. Also just before their
last refuellng the Diablo nuclear plant had been leaking for three weeks, but
PG&E 'Nas determined to set a world record for continuous operation.

Somehow that record did little to increase the public's perception of PG&E
as a utlllty that places safety before profit.

Son Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
1037 Ritchie Rd.
Grover City .. Co 93433
(805) 489-7420

SEISMIC

In 1973, after Diablo Canyon w·as about 50% constructed, the public first
of the existence of the Hosgri Fault. The Hosgri Fault is an
active fault \Nhich lies offshore & vvithin 2.8 miles of the Diablo Canyon
nuc 1ear plent. ! t was in the fall of 197 4 that the San Luis Obispo Mothers
for Peace tiled a motion wlth the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to stop
wort< on the plant untll se1sm1c studies could be completed. Our motion was
denied. construction continued, and the economic investment by PG&E
b1i r11jed the regula tors to safety concerns.

bec~me aw~re

We are here today, over 17 years later, to detan the history of PG&E's and
the NRC's unwillingness to seriously look into the possibility that this fault
could produce an earthquake that could trigger a radioactive release.
The San Luis Ob1spo Mothers for Peace believe a historical perspective is
vital to understanding how the seismic issue evolved to where it is today.
To that end, we recently retained Dr. James Crouch, formerly with the
United States Geological Survey {USGS), and a consultant to the CPUC on
:::eismic issues during their reasonableness review to review PG&Es Long
Term Seismic Program and the NRC's staffs review. Dr Crouch prepared
testimony for a recent NRC subcommittee hearing. The Mothers for Peace
have been actively involved in bringing to the NRC's and the publics·
attention safety issues at Diablo canyon, as their representative I will also
be quoting sections of~ testimony.

(Dr.er"uch',.)
After reading the USGS fln~l review of PG&E's LTSP, the Mothers for Peace
understood that the USGS~concluded that PG&E's Hosgri related conclusions
were unreasonable & biased toward a vertical slip strike fault. The USGS
also concluded that as a result of this bias the related ground motion
determined at Diablo Canyon may be underestimated. In fact, a member of
the USGS review team pointed out that they could rightly be accused of
being "too gentlemanly" regarding their report on PG&E's LTSP.

To quote the last sentence in the first paragraph of the USGS executive
:;ummary ..... some issues remain unresolved or controversial .. chiefly because
of the lack of definitive evidence." They go on to state that "Revievv·ers, ...
,jisagree with PG.5c.E's interpretation of the Hosgri fault as a strike-s1ip
fault with little or no vert1cal component of sllp ... Strike-slip rate of 1-3
mm/yr, derived by PG&E from surface geologic evidence, probably represent
only part of the potentlai seismogenic slip on the Hosgri fault ... PG&E
considers the Hosgri fault to be nearly vertical, but data for both the
seafloor fault zone and the broader fault system suggests northeast dips of
50-70 degrees at earthquake depths of 4-10 km ... A logic tree for the Hosgri
fault designed by PG&E to characterize seismic sources probab11istica1ly,
contains several branches in which parameters derived from a strike-slip
model are substituted for data. Model-based values, biased to favor strikeslip faulting, yield logic tree probability distribution functions for the
Hosgri fault that are similarly biased .. .Some questionable procedural steps
m the logic tree also bias t1'"1e number of outcomes in the same sense,
producing more strike-slip outcomes ... And the final paragraph of the USGS
summary, "These review comments may be especially important to
estimates of ground motion. The most significant differences vvith PG&E
interpretations concern the dip and seismogenic-sllp mechanism for the
Hosgri fault at depths of 4-10 km, where earthquakes nucleate and where
most seismic energy originates. If ground motions depend on fault
characteristics other than earthquake magnitude, the ground motion values
for a vertical strike-slip fault may underestimate those for oblique slip,
reverse. or thrust faults."
Senators, none of these concerns were raised in the NRC staff's report SSER
34. According to the testimony of Dr. Crouch at the September meeting in
San Luis Obispo, "the NRC staff virtually adopted and reiterated almost
verbatim all of PG&E's unconservative conclusions regarding the Hosgri
fault and the related ground motion: Furthermore, the USGS criticisms lead
the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace to be1ieve that PG&E's multi-million
dollar investment in their LTSP has not resulted in assuring the public that
Diablo Canyon is any more seismically safe than it was when their study
began.
The independent conclusions of the USGS differ regarding the character and
dip of the Hosgri fault. We feel it is vital to discover how this difference in
interpretation might impact ground motion at the Diablo Canyon site. Given
the weight of scientific evidence, the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace do
not believe that PG&E's conclusions regarding the character and dip of the
Hosgri fault and the associated ground motion at the sHe are appropriate in
terms of applying reasonable conservatism.

ln Dr Crouch's testimony of September 16, 1991, he restates the opinions of
other scientists \'·tho had revie·wed PG&E's LTSP. Dr. Ralph Archuleta, stated
that "After a revie 1N of all of the elements of the numerical simulations, I
conclude that the PG~"-E numerical analyses has systematically
underestimate,j the ground motion for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
Plant for the expectant r·1 7.2 earthquake.
Dr. Ken Camp be 11 vvho vvorked on ground motion used the f o11 owt ng
descriptive v·tords in his review: biased_. unconservative, unreliable,
inappropriate, too subjective.
f1r. David McCulloch, \Nho was involved in the review of the offshre data
related to the Hosgri fault but has since retired, was so disturbed by the
r··iRC staff's conclusions in ~SER 34 that he is formulatting a letter of
protest that v·ti 11 soon be forwarded to the NRC.
It appears that in arriving at their conclusions in Safety evaluation Report
34 regarding the character and dip of the Hosgri fault and related ground
motion the NRC staff essentially agreed wtth PG&E's interpretation of the
Hosgri fault and in doing so ignored the noted concerns of the USGS
reviewers. Reasonable conservatism has not been applied in the review
process. Furthermore, there is something fundamentally wrong wtth a
review process which allows NRC staff to ignore the advise of their
consultants. Vo/e flrmly believe that an Independent Study of the Hosgri fault
could produce a conservative and more scientifically sound outcome.
Dr. Crouch, a Santa Barbara scientist immenently Qualified to speak on
siesmic issues especially in Callfornia told the NRC's subcommHee that he
is "not opposed to nuclear power in general, nor Diablo Canyon specifically.
I am, however, opposed to the misuse of science and to what I perceive to be
a flawed regulatory review process, a process which relies on investigative
material assembled and presented by an applicant who has a mu1ti-b1111on
,jollars investment and income base to protect, a process in which the
overvvhelming review and approbval decisions are in the hands of a few
individuals, the NRC staff, who hove little or no local expertise in the
complex gee-seismic issues surrounding Diablo Canyon, but have power to
set aside the advice of their own independent consultants who possess this
expertise."
Another independent scientist, Dr Jay Namson, testH1ed at the recent NRC
~:;ubcornmittee meeting held in San Luis Obispo that there are a series of
large folds within the coast ranges and going out into the offshore where

the Diablo nuclear plant is located. He used a series of overheads . which
'vvere not included in the transcript, to explain that these folds could have a
significant impact on PG&E's nuclear plant. Dr. Namson and his partner Dr.
Davis had studied the offshore geology and submitted their wor~c According
to Dr. Namson·~: testimony of September 16, 1991, PG&E \.Yas asked to
address the Namson and Davis model. Dr. Namson said PG&E's summary and
critique of the Davis & Namson model "is filled with half-truths,
1rrelevancies, absolutely wrong 1nformat1on or conclusions, and, ~ think
most importantly .. it shows that they (PG&E) have great misconcetions about
t·,ow you use this tectmique and approach. They clearly don't understand how
to do this ... one of the things that they (PG&E) go through and do in their
critique is that they point out that none of the folds, the Point San Luis
anticline, the San Luis range anticlinorium, or the La Panza anticlinorium,
basically they go on to conclude that these folds don't even exist; that they
are a figment of our approach and we developed them because of our
approact1 ... for them (PG&E) to 1gnore this long regional trend of t1iocene
rocks and be telling you that the folds don't exist is absolutely
1udicrous .. .THe other thing was that right along one of those important folds
concerning Diablo Canyon, this fold that I call the Point San Luis anticline,
which runs right underneath or right along the northern edge of the Santa
Maria Valley and then underneath Diablo Canyon. That fold was first mapped
by Reed & Hollister in the 1930's. I didn't invent that fold ... the (PG&E's)
cone 1us10ns are the f o1ds don't exist; therefore, the thrusts underneath don't
exist."
Dr. Narnson goes on to explain that PG&E was "asked to come up with their
o·.,vn ideas as to ·whether there might be ·what we call blind thrust
faults ... undemeath the nuclear power plant...Well, in these two studies,
there's a couple of interesting things about them. One is that the Point San
Luis anticline, which they argued didn't exist, is now shown ... and they
(PG&E) now show a series of thrust faults underneath the power plant... they
(PG&E) never actually say there is a fold there but they've certainly drawn
it."
Dr. Namson goes on to state that he was criticized by PG&E for not
understanding "crustal rheology· (please don't ask me what that is). As he
was about to explain why his studies reflect the correct method of
understanding the way rocks behave and why that is important to the
subject at hand for the NRC subcommittee, he was interrupted by the
chairman and told he was out of time. This is one of many examples of the
NRC's unwillingness to look at independent scientific data that exists, when
it might impact the operation of one of their nuclear plants. Fortunately,
ttme was given to Dr. Namson from another member of the public and Dr.

Namson v·fas allo··Ned to continue. He explained he was an expert in the field
of rnodeling folds. He teaches course on the subject. PG&E does not have
.~nyone . . .·rho has a background on this technique. He finished his testimony by
:;tating that "I h(:lve to conclude that not only are they (PG&E) incompetent,
but the'd are clearly advocates of the nuclear pov·ler industry, clearly
advocates of Diablo Canyon, and clearly advocates to minimize the seismic
risk."

The public vvho had attended the NRC subcommitte meeting were amazed at
Dr. Narnson·s testimony and at the courage 1t took this scientist to come to
San Luis Obispo on his own to fight for what he believed was right. As a
non-scientist, I osked Dr. Steve Lewis of the USGS if Dr. Namson·s
allegations had amd basis in fact; his answer was a resounding VES!
The reports and test.1mon'd from the above independent scientists cry out for
an maepenaent study mto the seismicity and geology of the Diablo Canyon
onshore and offshore area. The publlc deserves to know that 1f they live by
a nuclear plant that sits less than 3 mtles from a major active earthquake
fault they everything in our governments po·wer to assure that the public
·...vill be safe should be done. This means an indepth seismic study done by
independent scientists \f'tith continual updates when new seismic
information becomes available.
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December 2, 1991
Senator Herschel Rosenthal
Chairman
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
State Capitol, Room 2035
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Senator Rosenthal,
Thank you for inviting TURN to participate in your
committee's hearing on "California's Nuclear Power Plants: Their
Safety, Environmental Impacts and Economic Costs." I regret that
another commitment prevents me from attending the hearing and
ask that this letter be included in the formal record.
TURN shares many of the concerns that will be raised by the
Division of Ratepayer Advocates, Mothers for Peace, Campaign
California and others who will testify at the hearing regarding
the safety and environmental problems of nuclear power plants.
My comments will focus specifically on the economic impact of
what is undoubtedly the most controversial of California's
nuclear power plants-- Pacific Gas & Electric Co.'s Diablo
Canyon plant near San Luis Obispo.
As you may know, PG&E profits handsomely from the power it
generates at Diablo canyon as a result of a controversial
settlement that the utility entered into in 1988 with the
California Public Utilities Commission's Division of Ratepayer
Advocates and the California Attorney General. The settlement
does away with traditional ratemaking and lets PG&E base its
revenues for Diablo Canyon primarily on the amount of electricity
generated at the plant.
In addition to providing PG&E with a strong incentive to put
production concerns before safety, the settlement enabled the
utility to avoid the embarrassment of having to explain why it
took 17 years, three attempts and $5.6 billion to construct the
plant. such an explanation would have been necessary under
traditional ratemaking because the rules require that utilities
demonstrate that the costs incurred in building a new power plant
are reasonable and prudent.
Instead, PG&E's rates are among the highest in the nation.
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
survey of winter 1990-91 power rates ranked PG&E among the 25

TURN is a nonprofit, tax exempt consumer organization; contributions are tax deductible.
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most expensive utility companies. Furthermore, the price that
PG&E gets for Diablo power is more expensive than any other power
on PG&E's system, including power from the qualifying facilities
that are criticized by utilities as too expensive.
PG&E notes in its annual report that as a result of the
settlement, the price of power generated at Diablo Canyon was set
at 9.6 cents per kilowatt-hour in 1991. In 1992, the price of
Diablo Canyon electricity will rise to 10.34 cents per kilowatthour, and by 1994 it will be at 11.89 cents per kilowatt-hour as
a result of the settlement.
In comparison, the price for power that PG&E generates at
fossil fuel plants like Moss Landing is approximately 5-6 cents
per kilowatt-hour, and power from hydroelectric sources is priced
at 1-3 cents per kilowatt-hour. It is significant to note that
the Diablo power is even more expensive than independently
produced power from qualifying facilities, which averages 7.3
cents per kilowatt-hour and is frequently criticized by utilities
as too expensive.
Given the recordbreaking rate at which Diablo is generating
power, it isn't surprising that PG&E's earnings are up. Indeed,
the company's most recent annual report cites increased earnings
from Diablo as a major reason that earnings per common share were
higher in 1990 than in the previous year. And net income for the
year came close to reaching the $1 billion mark.
Meanwhile, PG&E's electric customers have been faced with
huge rate hikes. Between 1988 and 1991, PG&E's residential
electric rates went up 49 percent, and customers who stayed
within the baseline allowance saw even steeper increases. When
PG&E raised its electric rates more than 10 percent last January,
nearly one-third of the increase was a result of the Diablo
settlement.
TURN opposed the Diablo canyon settlement at the time it was
announced, and we continue to believe that the terms of the
settlement unfairly benefit PG&E's stockholders at the expense of
captive ratepayers. The facts revealed in PG&E's latest annual
report substantiate our concerns.
Although TURN appealed to the California Supreme court to
review the CPUC's decision authorizing the Diablo settlement, we
were not surprised when the Court declined to hear the matter.
Unfortunately, TURN believes the CPUC also lacks the will to
correct the inequities that have resulted from the settlement.
Consequently, it may be time for the Legislature to consider

legislation that would require the CPUC to revisit the Diablo
settlement in order to provide for more equitable rates and to
eliminate the incentive to favor production over safety.
Again, I want to thank you for
in the Dec. 2 hearing. Please feel
have questions about my comments or
information about the impact of the
PG&E's electric rates.

inviting TURN to participate
free to contact me if you
would like additional
Diablo canyon settlement on
Sincerely,

~-~

Audrie Krause
~
Executive Director

co:

Committee members

December 2, 1991

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF THE REDWOOD ALLIANCE
REGARDING THE HOMBQLDT BAY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
AND THE INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE
PRESENTED BY JAMES S. ADAMS
The Redwood Alliance (Alliance) appreciates the opportunity to
address this committee on the Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power Plant and
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.

Since its formation in

1978, the Alliance has worked on a variety of issues concerning
nuclear power plants in California.

The Alliance would like to

comment on three of those issues this morning.
The first concerns the Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit #3,
a

small

(63

megawatt)

nuclear

generation

facility

that

operated from 1963 to 1976 until the reactor was shut down for
periodic fuel replacement and never reopened.

The owner,

Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E), made a decision in the
early 1980's to retire Unit 3 in part because of concerns
about seismic safety and the cost of structural repairs.
Alliance

supported

Environme~tal

this

decision

and

reviewed

The
the

Impact Report for SAFSTOR and decommissioning

, activ:i.tif1s, 9.'i-1d .the relevant license modifications in 1986 and
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The Alliance entered into an agreement (see Attachment A) with
PG&E, political representatives for the Humboldt area and local
citizens, regarding the storage and disposal of radioactive waste
at the Humboldt plant.
1.

The agreement had three main components:

PG&E agreed to ship the spent fuel assemblies to a

u.s.

Department of Energy approved repository as soon as one
is available;
2.

PG&E

agreed

dismantling

to
of

carry

the

out

Humboldt

Bay

process

Unit

3

of

final

following

the

removal of the spent fuel assemblies and any other high
or intermediate level waste from the Unit 3 site;
3.

PG&E agreed to reexamine the possibility of utilizing
"dry cask storage"

as a

method of storing the

fuel

assemblies until they could be moved to a repository.
At

the

Regulatory

time

of

the

Commission

agreement

(NRC)

had

(June

not

1987),

approved

the

the

technology as viable means of storing fuel assemblies.

Nuclear

dry

cask

However,

the NRC recently sanctioned the use of dry cask storage and the
Alliance believes that PG&E should now reexamine the preferred
option of utilizing the new method at Humboldt Unit #3.
The spent fuel pool at Humboldt Bay Unit 3 is housed in a
building which is not designed to withstand a maximum credible
earthquake

from

adjacent faults.

the

underlying Little

Salmon

fault

and

other

A 262 foot tall discharge stack and a 200 ton

emergency condenser are located directly over the storage pool.
- 2 -

Even though chances are slight that an accident could cause the
spent fuel to reach criticality, the Alliance believes there are
identifiable risks of environmental contamination.

Removing the

fuel from the building and placing it in dry cask storage outside
of the building would preclude any chance of a collapsing building
or discharge stack from harmfully impacting the irradiated fuel.
In addition,

it

is our understanding that

Municipal Utility District

(SMUD)

the

Sacramento

has undertaken a

project to

develop a dual purpose dry cask that can be used onsite at a
nuclear

plant,

transported

by

indefinitely at a repository.

truck

or

train,

and

stored

Funds for the project are being

provided by SMUD, the Department of Energy, and the Electric Power
Research Institute.
fully

in

this

The Alliance encourages PG&E to participate

endeavor

in

parallel

with

its

own

study

of

implementation of Dry Cask Storage, in hopes that the technology
will soon be available to nuclear power plants like Humboldt Bay
Unit 3.
Second, we hereby request that PG&E drill groundwater test
wells between the plant's radioactive waste handling areas and
Humboldt Bay.

It is our opinion that the test wells that are

currently on site are inadequate in that they are not "downstream"
from the plant in the direction that the water table flows
Attachments B & C).

(see

Therefore, it is possible that leaks at the

facility remain undetected.
The third issue the Alliance would like to comment on involves
public access to reports issued by the Institute of Nuclear, Power
-

3 -

Operations (INPO), a nuclear utility self-regulating group funded
by ratepayers' electric bills.

INPO conducts periodic inspections

of all nuclear power plants and assembles candid reports about each
facility's operation, safety procedures, and related matters.

The

NRC has refused to release these reports to the public despite
several rulings by the U.S. Court of Appeals that the documents
should be made available.
The Alliance has requested copies of the reports for Diablo
Canyon and Humboldt Bay nuclear power plants.

The request was

denied by INPO on the grounds that public exposure would damage the
"detailed and candid exchange of information that is so vital to
the INPO evaluation program" (see Attachment D).

The NRC has not

yet responded to our request; however, a denial is expected based
on the experience of others attempting to obtain INPO reports.

A

denial would be in direct contradiction to previous rulings of the
Appellate Court, and undermines the regulatory role of the NRC
regarding the public dissemination of reports and analyses about
the safety and operation of nuclear power plants.
The Alliance urges this Committee to contact the NRC and
require

that

all

INPO

reports

for

nuclear

California be provided to this Committee.

power

plants

in

If this request is

denied, the Alliance encourages the Committee to notify Congress of
that fact.
We are prepared to assist the Committee and staff in whatever
manner is appropriate.

Thank you for the opportunity to address

the Committee.
-
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A'l''IACHMENT A

1

2
3

In consideration

~or

the Joint Intervenors, GAYE M. BARR,

4

LEAG:.:E OF

5

BARRY KEENE, DOUGLAS H.

6

ALLIANCE, PJ\LPH KRACS and UONA

7

agreeing to withdraw

8

Company's (hereinafter Licensee) request for modification of

9

their possession-only license in NRC Docket case. No. 50-133 OLA,

\·i0~1EN

10

Licensee agrees to

11

and conditions

12

1.

c:

COU!1TY, DANIEL E. HAUSER,

n~:-sc.:..:DT

VOTERS 0?

BCSCO, \\'ESLEY CHESBRO, THE REDv100D

t~eir

co~ply

KRAU~

(hereinafter the Intervenor.!)

o9position to Pacific Gas and Electric

in good faith with the following terms

settler:.e;.t:

Licensee agrees

~o

shi? the spent fuel assemblies

13

p~esently

14

Department of Energy

15

repository or some other facilicy in

16

receiving the spent fuel

17

existing contract enterec into between the Licensee and DOE on

18

June 30, 1983, or such ocher successor

19

entered into between Licensee and DOE or its successors or

20

assigns, and the DOE indicates

21

fuel

22

stored at

t~e

Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit 3 to the

(hereinaf~er

DOE) as soon as the DOE has a

asse~blies

i~s

o~eration

capable of

under the terrns of the

agree~ent

as reay be

readiness to accept the spent

asserr~lies.

Licensee further agrees to reasonably pursue the highest

23

DOE priority for the renoval of the Hunboldt Bay Power Plant Unit

24

3 spent fuel
2.

asse~blies.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company agrees to carry out

the process of final decorr:.rnissioning of f.umboldt Bay Unit 3
following the

re~c~al

of the spent fael assemblies and any other

1

ment

2

receipt of a9propriate approvals from the Nuclear Regulatory

3

Corrur.ission ("NRC"), and the availability of decommissioning

4

funds based U?On California Public

5

action.

6

exceeds funds then authorized by the CPUC for decommissioning of

7

Humboldt Bay Unit 3, then the Intervenors agree not to oppose

8

the Licensee's request before the CPUC for additional funds to

9

pay fer the cost of

~f

actual

activities will be subject to

Gtilit~·

Com.rnission ("CPUC")

If the cost of decommissioning at this earlier time

3.

10

de~ornr:-,issio:Ling

deco~~issioning.

Finally, Licensee and the Intervenors acknowledge that

11

at the

12

the spent fuel assemblies presently stored at the Humboldt Bay

13

Power Plant Unit 3, and that no such DOE facility may exist for

14

a number of years.

15

this agreement that the NRC has authorized Dry cask Storage as

16

a means o: interim

17

but such an option is not yet authorized by the NRC for sites

18

such as

19

presen~

time, no DOE repository exists that can accept

Hu~boldt

It is further understood by the parties to

sto~age

in the absence of a DOE repository,

Bay Power Plant Unit 3.

The Licensee agrees to reexamine the possibility of

20

utilizing Dry Cask Storage, if and when

21

becomes available for sites such as Hunboldt Bay Power Plant

22

Unit 3.

23

24

4.

Licensee further agrees to publicly commit to the

foregoing terms of settlement.

25

This agreement was entered into on the
\

26

such a storage option

____
\ _·_:_7'0___,-.·'..._ _ _ ,

1987, at

..,

\ . ,. ' ' . "'
____I..,_·~-~·~\--~_!_.~·---------'

day of
California.

1

Signed on behalf of Licensee
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

2
3

4

BY:

5

~ BY:~~~~~-+-__._......::C,__:_c_/!_~
Gas and Electric Company

8
9

10
11

Signed on behalf of the
JOINT INTERVENORS
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ATTACHMENT

INPO

D

Institute of
Nuclear Power
Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339-3064
Telephone 404 953-3600
Telelax 404 953-7549

November 12, 1991

Mr. Michael Welch
Office Coordinator
Redwood Alliance
P. 0. Box293
Arcata, CA 95521
Dear Mr. Welch:
This is in reply to your recent letter to Dr. Zack Pate, president of the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations (INPO), requesting evaluation reports for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
The U.S. nuclear utility industry established the Institute as an independent, nonprofit
organization whose mission is to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability - to promote
excellence - in the operation of nuclear electric generating plants. Periodic evaluations of operating
nuclear stations arc one of the basic means of accomplishing the Institute's mission.
INPO evaluation results arc provided to the operating organization of the respective nuclear
plant for the purpose of assisting that utility in achieving high levels of safety and reliability in its
nuclear power plant operations. The evaluations identify exceptions to performance objectives and
criteria based on standards of excellence rather than regulatory requirements.
INPO has a long-standing policy of not externally releasing evaluation reports, and not
commenting on the conduct of specific evaluations. This policy on external release is based on our
concern that such release would seriously impact the detailed and candid exchange of information
that is so vital to the INPO evaluation program. Further, we believe that ample information
regarding compliance of licensees with Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements is available to
the public and should satisfy your interest in the safety of nuclear power plants.

Angelina S. Howard
Vice President
Industry Relations and
Information Services

ASH:cna
cc: Mr. Zack T. Pate (INPO)

~SMUD
P. 0. Box 15830, Sacramento CA 95852-1830, (916) 452-3211

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT

AN ELFCTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA

December 2, 1991
GM 92-933

The Honorable Herschel Rosenthal
California State Legislature
State Capitol, Room 2035
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Senator Rosenthal:

SUBJECT:

RANCHO SECO DECOMMISSIONING AND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE PLAN

The purpose of this letter is to certify that the Sacramento Municipal Utility District
(the District) is conducting activities associated with decommissioning Rancho Seco
Nuclear Generating Station in accordance with the requirements of the California
Nuclear Facilities Decommissioning Act (the Act). The District has developed a sound
strategy for decommissioning Rancho Seco, and has made a significant effort to develop
a realistic, credible, and accurate decommissioning cost estimate.
The District staff submitted its proposed Decommissioning Plan and Financial Assurance
Plan to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in May 1991.
The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has recently approved the Financial Assurance Plan, and is continuing to
review the Decommissioning Plan. We anticipate approval of the Decommissioning Plan
in late 1992.
As discussed in the Decommissioning Plan and the Financial Assurance Plan and in
accordance with the requirements of the Act, the District will make annual adjustments
to the cost estimate to account for inflation. In addition, the District will review
and modify its annual funding level at least every five years to reflect inflation,
technology changes, and other factors that may impact decommissioning costs.
District staff held public workshops and then presented the proposed Decommissioning
Plan to the District's Board of Directors. The Board conducted public hearings and
ratified the Decommissioning Plan by resolution at a public Board meeting held on
October3, 1991.
Members of your staff with questions requiring additional information or clarification
may call Ken Miller at (916) 452-3211, extension 4513.
Sincerely,
~-"
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S. DAVID FREEMAN
GENERAL MANAGER
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RANCHO SECO .

)

11

Nuclear Generati.ng Station
DECEMBER 2, 1991 CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMITIEE
ON ENERGY AND. PUBLIC: UTILITIES
-

De~ommissioning

• Spent Fuel Disposition

SMUD
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT

10776
R-16

RANCHO SECO CLOSURE
LLO:SUKt<.;

~

PLAN

...- lJI<.:L:OMMISSIONINtl

PLAN

CURRENT LICENSE/
I•IANT HEFUELEI>

-

0
* Maintain current license
requirements for defuelcd
condition in accordance
with Tech. Spec. evaluation

* Centralized Training
• Current E-Pian

* Current Security Plan

INTERIM RELIEF/
UEFUELEil AMENUMENT

c

~

* Streamlined E-Pian
at 10 mile EPZ
• Centralized Training with
OJT only, except for
Operations

* Reduced Security Posts

- Submitted 12(29/89
-Implemented 7/1/90
CURRENT STAFFING
217 Total
( l 1/04/91)
• lm(,lemented/Received

c

t•ERMANENTLY DEFUELEU

-Permanently Dcfueled Tech
Specs
*Permanently Dcfueled
Emergency Plan ( Aprvd 2(22/91)
• Permanently Dcfueled
Training Program (Aprvd 8/5/91)
* Permanently Defucled
Security Plan
- POL License

-Submitted 4/30/90
- Expected Implementation 1/1/92

I•ROJECTEU STAFFING
-175 Total

DECOMMISSIONING

- Implement Custodial and
Hardened SAFSTOR

* Environmental Report

- Submitled 5(20/91
- Expected Implementation l/l/93

t•RO.JECTED STAFFING
-150 Total

rr-
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----- -----------

~

91-0041A

RANCHO SECO LONG RANGE PLAN (Proposed)
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DECOMMISSIONING STRATEGY

•

•

EVALUATED THREE NRC ALTERNATIVES
-

DECON

-

ENTOMB

-

SAFSTOR

SELECTED SAFSTOR WffH DEFERRED-DECON

·---·---

-

--- -

WASTE DISPOSAL ASSUMPTIONS

•

LOW LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL
-

SOUTHWEST COMPACT, NEEDLES, CA
SCHEDULED OPERATION IN 1993

•

HIGH LEVEL WASTE I SPENT FUEL DISPOSAL

-

MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE (1998) OR

-

FEDERAL GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY (2010)

DECOMMISSIONING COST ESTIMATE

•

SAFSTOR ESTIMATE
- $281M
(INCLUDES SPENT FUEL STORAGE
EXCLUDES SITE RESTORATION)

•

CUSTODIAL-SAFSTOR

- $10.6 M I YR

HARDENED-SAFSTOR

- $ 2.6 M I YR

DEFERRED-DECON

- $177M

SITE RESTORATION

$38- $47 M

PRUDENCY REVIEW OF COST STUDY

•

BA'ITELLE NORTHWEST LABS

•

PROVIDED INPUT FOR NRC COST ESTIMATES

ASEA-BROWN BOVERI

-

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

DECOMMISSIONING FUNDING
•

ACCUMULATED FUNDS - $90 M (JULY 1991)

•

ANNUAL D-FUND CONTRIBUTION:

•

-

CURRENTLY $8 M

-

- $12 M AFTER D-PLAN APPROVAL, UNTIL 2008

ANNUAL D-FUND WITHDRAWALS:
- $10.6 M I YR UNTIL 1997
- $ 2.6 M I YR UNTIL 2006

-

WITHDRAWAL FOR SPENT FUEL STORAGE
(- $16-20 M 1993 - 1996)

·-·----

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
•

CEQA ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT I STUDY

-

•

NEGATIVE DECLARATION
DISTRICT IS LEAD AGENCY
ADDRESSES BOTH DECOMMISSIONING
AND SPENT FUEL

NEPA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT

-

"NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT," UNLESS SITE-SPECIFIC
FOCUS ON COST AND RADIOLOGICAL AREAS
NRC IS LEAD AGENCY
SEPARATE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS FOR
DECOMMISSIONING & SPENT FUEL

SUMMARY

DECOMMISSIONING STRATEGY:

-

ENSURES PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFE'IY

-

CONFORMS TO AVAILABLE REGULATORY GUIDANCE

..

PROVIDES PRUDENT COST ESTIMATE & FINANCIAL PLAN

-

PROPOSES D-FUNDING TO END OF LICENSE, 2008

-

·-

·-

---------~

It I

SPENT FUEL DISPOSITION STRATEGY
Wll'll DOE COMMITMENT
I'J'JO

I >I eM( INSTI{ ATION
J>I.ANNIN<illJ<:ENSING
'JHANSI'I:I{

TO
DOl'.

L
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STOki'/M(INIT(Ht
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48 ASSEMULIES

I
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WET STOkAliE

WLTSTOkAGt:

491 ASSEMIJUES

421 ASSEMUUES
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EXPECTED SAVINGS
Wet versus Dry Spent Fuel Storage

CUSTODIAL SAFSTOR (Wet) $10.6 Million/Year
HARDENED SAFSTOR (Dry) $ 2.6 Million/Year
Annual Cost Difference
$ 8.0 Million/Year

TOTAL SAVINGS*
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
Net Potential Savings
*

$ 80 - 176 MILLION
20 MILLION (Estimated)
$ 60 - 156 MILLION

$

Assumes no MRS until 1998 with final acceptance of fuel by 2008 or
no Repository until 2010 with final acceptance of SMUD fuel 2020

PROJECTED DOE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM COSTS

DOE

$ 8 MILLION

DUAL PURPOSE CASK (1)
CASK-TO-CASK TRANSFER SYSTEM
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

SMUD

$ 3-5 MILLION

DUAL PURPOSE CASK (1)
IN-KIND (Ucenslng, ISFSI,
Fuel Handlers)

EPRI
(Electric Power Research lnstHute)
CASK-TO-CASK TRANSFER SYSTEM DESIGN

$ 0.5 - 1 MILLION

SUMMARY

•

TECHNOLOGY PROTECTS PUBUC HEALTH & SAFETY, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT

•

SCHEDULE SUPPORTS HARDENED SAFSTOR

•

DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM HAS NATIONAL BENEFITS, &
MAY ALLOW SMUD TO ABANDON THE SPENT FUEL POOL

•

LONG-TERM SAVINGS JUSTIFY CAPITAL INVESTMENT

